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Chapter 1
The Modern Multilateral Bureaucracy: What  




What is the role of ‘international administrative law’—the law of employment 
 relations—at international organizations? This chapter begins by contrasting the in-
ternational legal status of States on the one hand, and international organizations on 
the other, before noting that the bureaucracies of the latter are heir to the traditions 
and identity of the former. It is then argued that transposing modern bureaucracy—
ideally, meritocratic and impersonal national civil services—to multilateral adminis-
tration, replaces the ‘patrimonial’ pressures on modern States with the related risks of 
‘State sociability’ and co-option of international organizations. We then review the 
several legal bases of international administrative tribunals to discern whether inter-
national administrative law takes into account this strain. This chapter draws the con-
clusion that international administrative law is inherent to the assumption by multi-
lateral administration of the ideals of modern bureaucracy— impartial, efficient and 
energetic—and so synonymous with the independent existence of international 
organizations.
1 Introduction
The functionalist paradigm that underpins the law of international 
 organizations1—namely, that intergovernmental institutions are attributed 
1 See, for example, ilc, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations’ 
2011, art 2(a), “‘international organization’ means an organization established by a treaty or 
other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own international legal 
* Peter Quayle, Chief Counsel, Corporate at Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and 
Visiting Professor of International Organizations Law at Peking University Law School, pe-
terquayle@gmail.com. The contents of this chapter reflect the personal opinion of the indi-
vidual author and are not the views of AIIB. The author is grateful to Yifeng Chen and 
 Christian Parreno for their comments on an earlier draft.
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functions by their member States together with all necessary powers to fulfil 
such  functions—lends itself to a dynamism (or malleability, if you prefer) con-
cerning the competences and controls of these powerful and pervasive inter-
national actors.2 Tellingly, the limits of the powers of an international organi-
zation were most emphatically encountered by the International Court of 
Justice (icj) when ruling what an intergovernmental institution was not: it was 
not a State, “still less […] a ‘super-State’, whatever that expression may mean”.3
Whilst in Reparation for Injuries (1949), the icj determined that an interna-
tional organization is possessed of an international legal personality, governed 
by international law, “That is not the same thing as saying that it is a State, 
which it certainly is not, or that its legal personality and rights and duties are 
the same as those of a State”.4 The limitation this imposes is underlined by the 
icj in a later advisory opinion, Legality of Nuclear Weapons (1996):
The Court need hardly point out that international organizations are 
subjects of international law which do not, unlike States, possess a gen-
eral competence. International organizations are governed by the ‘princi-
ple of speciality’, that is to say, they are invested by the States which cre-
ate them with powers, the limits of which are a function of the common 
interests whose promotion those States entrust to them.5
Yet, although international law distinguishes between the competences of 
States and the international organizations they create, they share an institu-
tional identity. The official bureaucracies of States—their national civil 
 service—are the antecedents of the multilateral secretariats of intergovern-
mental institutions—the international civil service. Therefore, following this 
introduction, in attempting to answer the question, ‘What is the role of inter-
national administrative law at international organizations?’, this chapter will 
begin by considering the ideals of modern bureaucracy—of a national civil 
service (Section 2); before contemplating how transposition of these ideals to 
 personality”; this chapter uses the terms ‘international organization’ and ‘intergovernmental 
institution’ interchangeably.
2 See, generally, Klabbers 2015, 9 (“Few people would dispute the relevance of international 
organizations as part of our [normative universe], and yet our understanding of these crea-
tures is very limited”).
3 icj, Reparations for Injuries, 9.
4 Ibid.
5 icj, Legality of Nuclear Weapons, para 25.
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multilateral administration is accompanied by the sustained strain of State in-
terference upon the neutrality of the international civil service (Section 3). It is 
then argued that the several legal bases of international administrative tribu-
nals (iats) reveals the role of international administrative law, and that this 
correlates to maintaining multilateral administration against co-option by 
States (Section 4); and by way of conclusion, that as international administra-
tive law ensures the impartiality of international civil servants it secures the 
independence of international organizations (Section 5).
2 Modern Bureaucracy
As Francis Fukuyama discerns, “Human beings […] are social animals by 
nature”.6 This, “natural sociability takes the specific form of altruism toward 
family (genetic relatives) and friends (individuals with whom one has ex-
changed favours)”.7 This is the default pattern of interrelationships—“universal 
to all cultures and historical period”8—to which humanity reverts if strategies 
to incentivize impersonal behaviors fail. A State based upon inherent human 
sociability is described by Max Weber as ‘patrimonial’; in other words, “the pol-
ity is considered a type of personal property of the ruler, and State administra-
tion is essentially an extension of the ruler’s household”.9 Weber contrasts this 
with a modern State, which is impersonal:
[A] citizen’s relationship to the ruler does not depend on personal ties 
but simply on one’s status as citizen. State administration does not con-
sist of the ruler’s family and friends; rather, recruitment to administrative 
positions is based on impersonal criteria such as merit, education or 
technical knowledge.10
This impersonal administration—modern bureaucracy—whilst attained in 
ancient China, was not there merged with an accountable, rule of law based, 







modern State.11 Instead, contemporary modern bureaucracy was achieved in 
nineteenth century Britain as a consequence of the Northcote-Trevelyan Re-
port of 1854—a parliamentary report calling for an end to patronage appoint-
ments and for examination to be the exclusive basis for entrance into the Brit-
ish civil service. A Civil Service Commission was established in 1855 to oversee 
this process of competitive recruitment.12 A similar effect was achieved in the 
United States (US) later in the century with the passing of the Pendleton Act in 
1883.13 In both the United Kingdom and the US, a steadily professionalizing 
civil service “and the selection of bureaucrats based on merit and technical 
competence rather than patronage”14 was synonymous with the potency of the 
modern State.
Weber’s criteria for a modern bureaucracy is instructive, including: that bu-
reaucrats “are organized into a clearly defined hierarchy of offices”; “candidates 
are selected on the basis of technical qualifications”; “the office is treated as the 
sole occupation of the incumbent”; “the office constitutes a career”; and “offi-
cials are subject to strict discipline and control”.15 Of course, in practice, the 
ideal national civil service is far from ubiquitous. Nevertheless, it is these ideals 
of modern bureaucracy that are transposed to multilateral administration. In 
the process, the tendency to revert to a patrimonial polity is matched by the 
risks of State co-option of an international organization. This is not to say that 
the member States of international organizations do not possess a legitimate 
role in the governance of intergovernmental institutions. But that this role is to 
be confined to the constitutional exercise of influence through formal 
 decision-making organs.
3 Multilateral Administration
Dag Hammarskjöld was the lauded, second Secretary-General of the United 
Nations.16 As Guy Fiti Sinclair notes, “For many in the UN and outside it, Ham-





15 Ibid, 562, endnote 4, lower-case added.
16 Sinclair 2015, 748 (“While serving in that capacity during the crucial years of 1953–1961, at 
the height of the Cold War and decolonization and perhaps the most formative period of 
UN history, Hammarskjöld was intimately involved in the formulation of several legal in-
novations that have since become staples of UN activity, including preventive diplomacy 
and peacekeeping”).
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servant”.17 In publicly defending the embattled international civil service, 
Hammarskjöld draws attention to the traditions of the great national civil 
services:
In the United Kingdom, as in certain other European countries, a system 
of patronage, political or personal, had been gradually replaced in the 
course of the nineteenth century by the principle of a permanent civil 
service based on efficiency and competence and owing allegiance only to 
the State which it served.18
It was not a foregone conclusion that these attributes would be conveyed from 
the national to the international civil service. In the same way that an imper-
sonal national civil service was once a novelty, Stephen Schwebel notes, “The 
concept of a secretariat which, as the [UN] Charter prescribes, shall be of ‘ex-
clusively international character’ is relatively new”.19 Indeed, this defining 
characteristic is unmentioned in the Covenant of the League of Nations. A per-
manent Secretariat is established with its seat in Geneva20 and, “The secretar-
ies and staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary-General 
with the approval of the Council”.21 But, the profile of the League’s Secretari-
at  is otherwise only governed by Article 7 of the Covenant which— 
commendably—requires appointments “open equally to men and women”. As 
Hammarskjöld recounts:
In the earliest proposals for the Secretariat of the League, it was appar-
ently taken for granted that there could not be a truly international secre-
tariat but that there would have to be nine national secretaries, each as-
sisted by a national staff and performing, in turn, the duties of Secretary 
to the Council, under the supervision of the Secretary-General. This plan 
[…] was in keeping with the precedents set by the various international 
bureau established before the war which were staffed by officials second-
ed by [m]ember countries on a temporary basis.22
This recognizes that the most natural organizational tendency on the level of 
international cooperation resembles the same persistent pattern at the 
17 Ibid, 755; importantly, Sinclair essays a critique of this reputation.
18 Hammarskjöld 1961, 331.
19 Schwebel 1953, 71, citing art 100(2) of the UN Charter.
20 League of Nations Covenant, arts 2 and 6.
21 Ibid, art 6.
22 Hammarskjöld 1961, 330; and League of Nations Covenant, art 4; the Leagues’ Council was 
to comprise nine member States.
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national level—namely, patronage-based, not impersonal, bureaucracy; albeit, 
that the preferment of family and friends is replaced with State co-option of 
international organizations and the sponsorship of same-State-national staff 
accordingly. Henceforth, this chapter terms this irrepressible tendency, ‘State 
sociability’. At best, “The Secretariat would be nothing more and nothing less 
than a permanent conference of representatives of the members of the 
League”, as the League’s first Secretary-General, former British civil servant, 
Sir Eric Drummond feared. At worst, the League and subsequent international 
organizations would resemble the four-way zonal administration of post-war 
Berlin. In this scenario, intergovernmental institutions would be indistinguish-
able from their member States.
But, summoning the example of disinterested modern bureaucracy, Drum-
mond was instead a proponent “of a truly international civil service—officials 
who would be solely the servants of the League and in no way representative 
of or responsible to the [g]overnments of the countries of which they were 
nationals”.23 The League’s Council endorsed this approach in 1920 by adopting 
the British delegation’s ‘Balfour Report’.24 This states, “the members of the Sec-
retariat once appointed are no longer the servants of the country of which they 
are citizens, but become for the time being the servants only of the League of 
Nations […] The members of the staff carry out […] not national but interna-
tional duties”.25 This assumed the force of international administrative law 
with the League’s adoption of Staff Regulations, founding “two of the essential 
principles of an international civil service: (i) its international composition 
and (ii) its international responsibilities”.26 With the demise of the League, this 
became the basis for Article 100 of the UN Charter, which states:
1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the 
staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or 
from any other authority external to the [UN]. They shall refrain 
from any action which might reflect on their position as interna-
tional officials responsible only to the [UN].
2. Each [member State] of the United Nations undertakes to respect 
the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the 
Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in 
the discharge of their responsibilities.
23 Ibid, 229.
24 Drummond 1931, 228 (indeed, “the principles underlying the organization of the Secre-
tariat of the League are largely those on which the British Civil Service has been 
developed”).
25 Schwebel 1953, 72, citing the Balfour Report (with original elisions).
26 Hammarskjöld 1961, 76.
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In this way, Article 100 secures the undivided duty of loyalty of the interna-
tional civil service.27 So much so that it preempts the inevitable tension be-
tween national and multilateral allegiances—“in such an eventuality, the in-
ternational obligations of the staff member would prevail”.28 Article 101(3) of 
the UN Charter likewise endeavours to establish the international civil service 
on the basis of impersonal appointment criteria:
The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the 
determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of secur-
ing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due 
regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a 
geographical basis as possible.
The ‘necessity of securing’ these highest standards highlights how efficiency, 
competence and integrity must be institutionalized, in counterbalance to 
State sociability. In light of this ‘paramount condition’, the ‘due regard’ paid to 
the multinational composition of the bureaucracy may be understood to weigh 
against the co-option of international organizations through the over- 
representation of any one State’s nationals.
Lastly, three other clauses of the UN Charter combine to constitute the ide-
als of modern bureaucracy: Firstly, the Secretary-General “shall be the chief 
administrative officer of the [UN]”; second, “[t]he staff shall be appointed by 
the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assem-
bly”; and third “…officials of the [United Nations] shall […] enjoy such privi-
leges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their 
functions in connection with the [UN]”.29 This results, Schwebel notes, in the 
“exclusively international responsibilities of the Secretariat” being “rooted in 
the exclusively international process of appointment of its members”.30 They 
are also the foundation of the organizational hierarchy and “strict discipline 
and control” that Weber’s modern bureaucracy contemplates.
It may be thought that co-option of an international organization by a State 
through its same-nationality staff is fanciful. Yet, Hammarskjöld catalogues, 
“the interest of […] governments in placing certain nationals and in barring 
the employment of others” at the UN.31 Moreover, “various authorities of the 
United States Government, host to the United Nation’s Headquarters”, in the 
27 See Quayle, Legal Advisors 2017, 259–261.
28 Schwebel 1953, 99.
29 UN Charter, arts 97, 101 and 105(2), respectively.
30 Schwebel 1953, 79.
31 Hammarskjöld 1961, 339.
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early 1950s, “conducted a series of highly publicized investigations of the loy-
alty of its nationals in the Secretariat”.32 There is also, “[a] risk of national 
 pressure on the international official […] introduced, in a somewhat more sub-
tle way, by the terms and duration of [their] appointment”.33 The Secretary-
General has in mind the practice of secondment to international organizations 
from national civil services, in which the now international official struggles to 
disregard their State allegiance and assume an impartial identity; and short-
term employment contracts which impinge upon the independence of inter-
national civil servants as they bow to political influences for fear of imminent 
non-renewal of their appointment.34 (So offending Weber’s principle, that the 
office constitutes a career.)
These State pressures are neither new, nor confined, to the UN, and all inter-
national organizations attempt to absorb them. In this way, at the outset of the 
League of Nations it was found politic to establish sufficient Deputy- and 
 Under-Secretary-General roles, so that together with the Secretary-General ap-
pointment itself, the nationals of all five Allied Great Powers were ensured rep-
resentation.35 Although, “[t]he Under-Secretaries-General created with some 
the impression of national representatives rather than international officials”,36 
this compromise safeguarded the underlying impartiality of the rank-and-file 
international civil service. In other words, as Schwebel urges, the “official poli-
cy and dominant practice conformed to the concept of the Secretariat as being 
exclusively international in its responsibilities”.37 Set against this principle, “ex-
ceptions which derogated from the rule”38 are isolated and pragmatic conces-
sions to State sociability.
Deflecting the intrusions of State sociability through the appointment of 
quasi-representative officials in this way is intrinsic to all international or-
ganizations. As Jacob Katz Cogan demonstrates, “informal agreements al-
locating positions of authority and decision making pervade international 
32 Ibid, 340; this is a passing reference to McCarthyite allegations of subversive activities by 
US national staff of the UN, leading to their dismissal by the Secretary-General and 
fraught examination of the extent of obligations owed a headquarters State, see generally, 
Schwebel 1953, 83–115 and 115, (“The question arises whether the members of a  totalitarian 
party, subject to party discipline, can be reasonably deemed to lack the requisite integrity 
for honouring the injunction of Article 100 ‘not to seek or receive instructions […] from 
any other authority external to the Organization’”).
33 Ibid, 341.
34 Ibid.
35 Drummond 1931, 229; namely France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and United States.
36 Schwebel 1953, 73.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
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organizations”.39 But, notably, as with the five senior members of the League’s 
Secretariat,
These informal agreements largely take account of, and reallocate au-
thority to match, the differences in power and interests that pervade the 
international system when those differences cannot be acknowledged 
formally.40
The most widely-known examples of such informal agreement are that the 
World Bank is always led by a US national and the International Monetary 
Fund by a European.41 Taken together, this also exemplifies how “the designa-
tion of top posts cannot be seen in isolation—they are often part of a package 
deal”.42 Whilst, a functional justification is sometimes offered—“appointing 
governmentally approved staff will be likely to promote the international con-
fidence which the Secretariat must enjoy”—this seems self-defeating, if “the 
greater the confidence shown by a [g]overnment in its nationals appointed to 
the Secretariat, the more will the objectivity of such nationals be distrusted by 
other [m]ember States”.43
A more effective constraint is afforded by, on the one hand, these ‘quasi-
representational’ positions being appointed, seldom on the basis of the distor-
tion of impersonal criteria, but as an uninhibited governance decision—if 
necessary, by formal voting—by a membership organ of an international or-
ganization.44 On the other hand, these appointees are then—somewhat 
 surprisingly—subsumed into the international civil service. For example, the 
Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization (iloat) de-
termined that the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (opwc), appointed by the Conference of the States Parties 
39 Cogan 2009, 211.
40 Ibid.
41 Cogan 2009, 247; ibrd Country Voting Table (The United States subscribes for 16.76% of 
the World Bank’s capitalization); and imf Executive Directors and Voting Power (The vot-
ing power of the United States is 16.51%, however, the total voting power of Directors with 
European States in their constituencies is 32.22%).
42 Cogan 2009, 228.
43 Schwebel 1953, 102, summarizing the equivalent considerations of State vetting of inter-
national organization staff.
44 For example, UN Charter, art 97, second sentence, “The Secretary-General shall be ap-
pointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council”.
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of the opcw, is “the foremost ‘official’ of the Organization”,45 and thereby pos-
sesses “the status of an international civil servant”.46
The transposition of the ideals of modern bureaucracy to multilateral 
 administration is clearly subject to the sustained strain of potential State 
 co-option. State sociability is partially absorbed by the extensive appointment 
of quasi-representational national officials. Considering the governance basis 
of these appointments and sublimation to the standards of the international 
civil service, this is presented as a tolerable derogation from the ideals of mod-
ern bureaucracy that ought to otherwise rule multilateral administration. In 
studying the several legal bases of iats, which function to adjudicate the em-
ployment-related disputes of international civil servants, may we discern a role 
for international administrative law in managing the stresses of State sociabil-
ity upon international organizations?
4 International Administrative Tribunals
Since the advent of the League of Nations, iats have been inherent to an inter-
national civil service governed by international administrative law.47 As Santi-
ago Villapando observes, “The law of the international civil service is therefore 
an essential feature of the contemporary phenomenon of international 
organizations”.48 Consequently, a study of the legal bases of iats should afford 
an assessment of the role of international administrative law—and allow us to 
discern the extent to which this role involves managing the tendencies of State 
sociability to which the international civil service is inevitably subject. iats 
have four prominent legal bases. Firstly, and most immediately, the basis af-
forded by the statement of jurisdiction in the statues of iats; second, is the 
basis of limited review of discretionary decisions established by the case law of 
iats; third, the influential contingency identified by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) in considering the extent to which iats should satisfy 
the right to a hearing afforded by the European Convention on Human Rights 
(echr); and fourth, the basis articulated by the icj, when called upon to sus-
tain the competence of international organizations to establish iats at all. We 
45 iloat, Judgment No 2232, para 7.
46 Ibid, para 8.
47 See generally, Villapando, International Administrative Tribunals 2016, 1085 (“These tribu-
nals are part of the internal systems of administration of justice that international organi-
zations have put into place to settle employment disputes, which would otherwise fall 
under no jurisdiction”).
48 Villapando, International Civil Service Law 2016, 1070.
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shall consider each of these legal bases in turn, in light of what they may con-
vey about the role of international administrative law, in the context of mod-
ern multilateral administration.
4.1 Statutes of International Administrative Tribunals
The statutes of iats—adopted by the governance organs of international or-
ganizations49—establish their legal basis by reference to a jurisdiction entirely 
bounded by the terms of appointment (also referred to as the contract of em-
ployment) to the staff of an intergovernmental institution. In this way, the ju-
risdiction of the iloat is innocuous:
The Tribunal shall be competent to hear complaints alleging nonobser-
vance, in substance or in form, of the terms of appointment of officials of 
the International Labour Office, and of such provisions of the Staff Regu-
lations as are applicable to the case.50
The jurisdiction of the World Bank Administrative Tribunal (wbat) is similar:
The Tribunal shall hear and pass judgment upon any application by 
which a member of the staff of the Bank Group alleges non-observance 
of the contract of employment or terms of appointment of such staff 
member. The words ‘contract of employment’ and ‘terms of appoint-
ment’ include all pertinent regulations and rules in force at the time of 
alleged non-observance including the provisions of the Staff Retirement 
Plan.51
The comparable provision of the statute of the UN Dispute Tribunal (undt) 
establishes that the undt is competent to,
[H]ear and pass judgment on an […] appeal [of] an administrative deci-
sion that is alleged to be in non-compliance with the terms of appoint-
ment or the contract of employment. The terms ‘contract’ and ‘terms of 
appointment’ include all pertinent regulations and rules and all relevant 
administrative issuances in force at the time of alleged non-compliance.52
49 See, Preambles, iloat, wbat and undt Statutes: the iloat is established by the Interna-
tional Labour Conference of the International Labour Organization; the wbat by the 
Board of Governors of the World Bank; the undt by the UN General Assembly.
50 iloat Statute, art ii (1).
51 wbat Statute, art ii (1).
52 undt Statute, arts 1 and 2(1).
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Noticeably, none of the statutes of the three major iats attribute a legal 
basis to international administrative law, other than the contracts of employ-
ment or terms of appointment of international organizations. Nor is the law 
governing this relationship identified by these statutes. The functional ration-
ale of iats is not obvious. Nothing suggests that the approach by iats to hear-
ing complaints and passing judgment should be anything other than wholly 
self-contained, without reference to any exterior legal principles. In this way, 
the role of international administrative law is left unstated and uncertain.
4.2 Deference to Discretionary Decision-Making
Instead, the application of international administrative law by iats is domi-
nated by a doctrine that is unarticulated by the statutes of iats. Namely, the 
limited review of discretionary power. The extent to which the “relevant admin-
istrative issuances” of international organizations are compendious—regulat-
ing almost every imaginable aspect of employment—engages a broad range 
of alternative outcomes. From the decision to appoint an international official 
through to the decision to terminate their employment, the exercise of discre-
tion by the employing international organization causes iats to limit the scope 
of their judicial review. iats reiterate this approach ad infinitum—for example:
The [iloat’s] case law has it that a staff appointment by an international 
organization is a decision that lies within the discretion of its executive 
head. Such a decision is subject to only limited review and may be set 
aside only if it was taken without authority or in breach of a rule of form 
or of procedure, or if it was based on a mistake of fact or of law, or if some 
material fact was overlooked, or if there was abuse of authority, or if a 
clearly wrong conclusion was drawn from the evidence.53
This approach is emulated by every other iat.54 In other words, in order not to 
be set aside, a discretionary decision must be undertaken by: (i) a competent 
53 iloat, Judgment No 3652, para 7.
54 For example, wbat, Jassal, para 37, “[T]he Tribunal is charged with determining whether 
the Bank’s decision was the product of bias, prejudice, arbitrariness, manifest unreasona-
bleness, or unfair or improper procedure. Thus, if the Bank’s conclusion regarding the 
[a]pplicant’s qualifications for selection […] altogether lacks support in factual evidence 
or reasonable inference, that conclusion must be found to be an abuse of discretion”; and 
unat, Abassi, para 24, “The Secretary-General has a broad discretion in making decisions 
regarding promotions and appointments. In reviewing such decisions, it is not the role of 
the undt or the Appeals Tribunal to substitute its own decision for that of the Secretary-
General regarding the outcome of the selection process”.
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authority; (ii) in accordance with the accompanying procedure established by 
the international organization; and (iii) demonstrate sufficient rigour and rea-
sonableness so as not to be susceptible to mistaken understandings, oversights, 
prejudices and erroneous conclusions. However, in the sense of the resultant 
role of international administrative law at international organizations, this 
 results in three discernable institutional features.
Firstly, international administrative law acts to constrain a decision-maker, 
rather than to adjudicate a contractual bargain. Albeit, as the wbat states, 
“Discretionary power is not absolute power”,55 it is apparent that international 
administrative law is predicated upon a power imbalance and the “strict disci-
pline and control” and “clearly defined hierarchy” contemplated by Weber. 
This is a legacy of the Commission of Jurists appointed by the Council of the 
League of Nations to address the first appeal by an official of the Secretariat 
against termination of their employment. The Commission concluded that 
“[r]elations connected with public employment are always governed by the 
exigencies of the public interest, to which the private and personal interests of 
the officials must necessarily give way”.56 This approach privileges the discre-
tionary power of public administration and consequently international organ-
izations. (Although the domestic analogy is imperfect “since municipal sys-
tems have different conceptions of how their own national civil service 
relationship is to be construed”.)57 This is not then a law intended to maximize 
human resources or ensure managerial excellence—it is the law of restraint of 
egregious intergovernmental arbitrariness.
Second, inherent in even this standard of limited review is longstanding un-
certainties. Neither the test of reasonableness, the implications of non- 
adherence to procedure, nor the consequences of a decision being set aside 
have been pronounced upon with the same uniformity as the limited scope of 
 review itself. Instead, the combination of specific facts and contextualizing re-
view lends itself to persistent unforeseeability: every issue being triable and 
the continual retrying of issues.58
55 wbat, de Merode, para 45.
56 Schwebel 1953, 74, citing the Commission’s report.
57 Villapando, International Civil Service Law 2016, 1073.
58 The one-line summaries from the iloat’s Case-law Database afford a flavour. The follow-
ing are the most recent five, from the 129th Session, 2020, with the respondent interna-
tional organizations in parenthesis: “The complainant impugns the decision whereby the 
Director-General of the iter Organization dismissed [them]” (iter Organization); “After 
the delivery of Judgment 4006, the complainant re-submitted to the new Registrar of the 
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Third, the preponderance of iats and the density of most judgments, re-
sults in international administrative law being unrevealed to the average inter-
national official. With good reason, international administrative law is said to 
be, “among the least-known dimensions of the phenomenon of international 
organizations”.59 Taken together, these features are at best unsatisfactory, and 
at worst, troubling if—as a UN Justice System Redesign Report lately finds— 
“A large part of the current management culture in the [UN] exists because it 
is not underpinned by accountability. Accountability can be guaranteed only 
by an independent, professional and efficient internal justice system”.60
4.3 The Right to a Hearing by a Tribunal
Since the League of Nations and the advent of multilateral administration, 
iats were considered to be mostly pragmatic requirements of international 
organizations. On the one hand, “The League Administration was not unaware 
that a mechanism which was either arbitrary or harsh in its personnel policies 
could not expect to attract the devotion and energies of qualified officials”.61 
On the other hand, “International organizations are generally granted immu-
nity from municipal jurisdiction, which implies that their employees are, in 
principle, barred from having recourse to national tribunals (both those of the 
host country and their own state of nationality)”.62 It was not until the judg-
ment of the ECtHR in Waite and Kennedy v Germany (1999) that an iat was 
considered to be a contingency of the jurisdictional immunity of international 
organizations.
icc a harassment grievance on the part of the former Registrar. [They] filed [their] com-
plaint directly with the Tribunal, considering that [they] did not receive a final decision 
on [their] grievance within the prescribed time limit” (International Criminal Court); 
“The complainants, former officials of the World Food Programme whose employment 
was terminated as a result of the abolition of their posts, allege that they performed func-
tions of a higher level than those of the posts they occupied, and claim compensation as 
well as reinstatement”. (Food and Agriculture Organization); “The complainant, a former 
epo employee subjected to a ‘house ban’, seeks to impugn the decision to reject [their] 
requests for review” (European Patent Office); and “The complainant, who was suspend-
ed and revoked for having behaved inappropriately, challenges the delay in the appeal 
proceedings” (interpol).
59 Villapando, International Civil Service Law 2016, 1083.
60 UN Justice System Redesign Report 2016, para 13.
61 Schwebel 1953, 75.
62 Villapando, International Administrative Tribunals 2016, 1085.
15The Modern Multilateral Bureaucracy
<UN>
The applicants, former contractors—who allege that they were de facto em-
ployees—of the European Space Agency (esa), contend that the preclusion of 
jurisdiction of the German labour courts where they worked, over their claims 
for unfair dismissal, flout their rights under Article 6(1) of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (echr) to a fair hearing before a tribunal. Impor-
tantly, the ECtHR is untroubled by jurisdictional immunity itself: “[T]he Court 
points out that the attribution of privileges and immunities to international 
organizations is an essential means of ensuring the proper functioning of such 
organizations free from unilateral interference by individual governments”.63 
Thus, under the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, jurisdictional immunity pursues, 
what is known as, a ‘legitimate objective’—so, the restriction on the Conven-
tion is permissible, but it must however be proportionate.64
Is barring employees of international organizations from the labour courts 
of States that are both members of an intergovernmental institution (the esa, 
for example), and adherents to the echr, proportionate? The Court is clear 
that despite the long-established practice of jurisdictional immunity, “States 
were [not] thereby absolved from their responsibility under the Convention”.65 
However, in testing the proportionality of this jurisdictional immunity, the 
ECtHR is interested in what arrangements the international organization has 
in place of national jurisdiction:
For the Court, a material factor in determining whether granting esa im-
munity from German jurisdiction is permissible under the Convention is 
whether the applicants had available to them reasonable alternative 
means to protect effectively their rights under the Convention.66
From this judgment arose an apprehension that the jurisdictional immunity of 
international organizations was contingent upon the availability of alternative 
judicial forums—in the realm of employment-related disputes this demands 
an iat of sufficiently judicial character to act as a reasonable alternative to a 
national labour court.67 As August Reinisch identifies, this aligns with expand-
ed expectations of a right of access to justice:
63 ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy, para 63.
64 Ibid, para 59.
65 Ibid, para 67.
66 Ibid, para 68.
67 See, generally, Reinisch 2008.
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[A]lthough it did not make the availability of an alternative forum a strict 
prerequisite for immunity but only regarded it a ‘material factor’, this 
‘conditionality’ for granting immunity to an international organization 
has fallen on fertile ground in the subsequent case law of various national 
courts in Europe.68
But, afforded the opportunity to confirm this contingent legal basis of iats—
in Mothers of Srebrenica v The Netherlands (2012)—the ECtHR refuses to en-
dorse this conclusion: “It does not follow, however, that in the absence of an 
alternative remedy the recognition of immunity is ipso facto constitutive of a 
violation of the right of access to a court”.69 In other words, the contingent 
 legal basis of iats and the related role of international administrative law sug-
gested by Waite and Kennedy, “cannot be interpreted in such absolute terms”.70
4.4 Treaty Basis of International Administrative Tribunals
If the legal bases attributable to iats by their statutes, the convention of defer-
ence to the discretionary decision-making by international organizations and 
the right to a hearing before a tribunal, result in an inconclusive role for inter-
national administrative law, then the approach of the icj in Effect of Awards of 
Compensation (1954) is all the more compelling. The contentious role of the 
UN’s administrative tribunal in reviewing, and intermittently revoking, the al-
leged subversive activity related dismissals in the early 1950s, led to a challenge 
to “[t]he legal power of the [UN] General Assembly to establish a tribunal com-
petent to render judgments binding on the United Nations”.71 The icj begins by 
identifying the familiar pragmatic predicate of iats; namely, that “[i]t was in-
evitable that there would be disputes between the [UN] and staff members as 
to their rights and duties” and “Article 105 [of the UN Charter] secures for the 
United Nations jurisdictional immunities in national courts”.72
The next sentence of the icj’s Advisory Opinion could be mistaken for the 
gravamen of the judgment. Although no provision of the UN Charter expressly 
establishes an iat,
It would, in the opinion of the Court, hardly be consistent with the ex-
pressed aim of the Charter to promote freedom and justice for individu-
68 Ibid, 292.
69 ECtHR, Mothers of Srebrenica, para 164.
70 Ibid.
71 icj, Effect of Awards, 13.
72 Ibid, 14.
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als and with the constant preoccupation of the United Nations […] to 
promote this aim that it should afford no judicial or arbitral remedy to its 
own staff for the settlement of any disputes which may arise between it 
and them.73
But instead, this is in fact an aid to the Court’s finding—it identifies the best 
methodology to settle the UN’s employment-related disputes, namely, judicial 
or arbitral remedy. Rather, the icj holds that the legitimate legal basis for iats 
is derived from the exceptional status of the international civil service:
In these circumstances, the Court finds that the power to establish a tri-
bunal, to do justice as between the [UN] and the staff members, was es-
sential to ensure the efficient working of the Secretariat, and to give ef-
fect to the paramount consideration of securing the highest standards of 
efficiency, competence and integrity. Capacity to do this arises by neces-
sary intendment out of the Charter.74
In other words, the legal basis of iats is that they are necessary to multilateral 
administration ensuring the embodiment of the ideals of modern bureaucra-
cy. As Hammarskjöld warns, “The conception of an independent international 
civil service, although reasonably clear in the Charter provisions, was almost 
continuously subjected to stress in the history of the [UN]”.75 The attendant 
role of international administrative law, necessarily intended by the UN Char-
ter itself, is thereby to secure the efficiency, competence and integrity of an 
international civil service continually strained by sustained and inevitable 
State pressures upon its impartiality.
5 Conclusion
The “default mode of human sociability” is the preference for family and 
friends, not strangers and foreigners.76 At the State level, this tendency lends 
itself to patrimonial polities and a State that is the extension of the personal 
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Hammarskjöld 1961, 338; see also Sinclair 2015, 761 (strikingly, “An aspect of Ham-
marskjöld’s expertise that has received almost no systematic scholarly treatment, for ex-
ample, is his approach to public administration”).
76 Fukuyama 2014, 208.
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property of the ruler. The modern bureaucracy—impersonal, technically qual-
ified, competitively recruited, national civil services—is inherent to a potent, 
rule of law based and accountable, modern State, resistant to these profound 
pressures. The ideals of modern bureaucracy are the institutional inspiration 
of multilateral administration. In the course of this transposition, patrimonial 
pressures are replaced by the strain of State sociability and co-option. In other 
words, the exertion of inevitable influence by States on the staff of interna-
tional organizations. Intergovernmental institutions attempt to absorb this 
strain by acceding to quasi-representative high-level appointments, as a dero-
gation from the rule of impersonality of the rank-and-file international civil 
service. International administrative law is intrinsic to securing the exception-
al status of international officials, namely their independence. Notably, the icj 
judges this impartiality of the international civil service so fundamental as to 
be correlated with the independence of an international organization itself.
The full caption of Reparation for Injuries reminds us that the icj’s determi-
nation that international organizations possess international legal personality 
is in the aftermath of injuries (including fatalities), suffered by international 
civil servants in the service of the UN.77 In 1948, the assassination in Jerusalem 
of Count Folke Bernadotte and other members of the UN Mission to Palestine, 
raised, “with greater urgency than ever, the question of the arrangements to be 
made by the United Nations with a view to ensuring to its agents the fullest 
measure of protection in the future and ensuring that reparation be made for 
the injuries suffered”.78 The convention of relying upon the same-nationality-
State to represent and protect persons on the international legal plane against 
the actions of other States is incompatible with the independence of interna-
tional officials. Consequently, the icj concludes that, to enable the independ-
ent action of an international organization, the independence of international 
officials must be ensured—and vice versa.79
Fukuyama terms backsliding by modern States, ‘repatrimonialisation’, and 
identifies it as a mechanism of political decay—the rotten, re- personalized 
State becomes incapable of governing effectively.80 This “leads either to 
slowly increasing levels of corruption, with correspondingly lower levels of 
government effectiveness, or to violent populist reactions to perceived elite 
manipulation”.81 Given the strength of the related strains of State sociability, 
77 See Quayle, Treaties of a Particular Type 2016, 871–873.
78 icj, Reparation for Injuries, 9, citing the UN General Assembly resolution referring the 
request for an Advisory Opinion to the icj.
79 Ibid, 13.
80 Fukuyam 2014, 35.
81 Ibid, 28.
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there is no reason to  discount the risk of ‘repatrimonialisation’ of international 
organizations. Whilst, “a spirit of international loyalty among public servants 
can be maintained in practice”, Drummond’s experience of leading the League 
of Nations Secretariat was “also that maintenance of such a spirit is an essential 
factor in the activity of an international service, since this alone can ensure to it 
that confidence without which it cannot function as it ought”.82 If the political 
decay of an international organization resembled that of a modern State, the 
compromised international civil service would lead to dwindling governance 
effectiveness and the de-legitimizing of the intergovernmental institution. In 
other words, international organizations are only international organizations 
because of the independence of the international civil service. The resulting 
role of international administrative law is surely to maintain this exclusively 
international loyalty, indispensable to modern multilateral administration.
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Chapter 2
The Tension between the Jurisdictional Immunity 




The major controversy about immunity from legal process possessed by many interna-
tional organizations is that without access to court or adequate alternative recourse 
there may be a denial of justice. Even where a recourse to an alternative dispute resolu-
tion mechanism is available, there is still the issue whether that mechanism meets the 
requisite standards of impartiality and independence for the determination of a legal 
claim. This chapter addresses the nature, sources and purpose of the immunity from 
legal process of international organizations, and then discusses how national courts 
and international courts and tribunals, especially the European Court of Human 
Rights, have dealt with the interplay between these competing or conflicting princi-
ples of jurisdictional immunity and access to court. Most importantly, it addresses 
whether the jurisdictional immunity of international organizations is conditional on 
the availability of an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. It also discusses the 
adequacy of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms; in particular, whether the 
proceedings of international administrative tribunals meet the standards of such in-
struments as Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. It concludes 
with an exploration of whether the international law principle of jurisdictional im-
munity of international organizations could be reconciled with the human rights prin-
ciple of access to court or tribunal.
* Edward Chukwuemeke Okeke, Senior Counsel, Work Bank Group, and author of Jurisdic-
tional Immunities of States and International Organizations (OUP 2018), meke.okeke@ yahoo.
com. The contents of this chapter reflect the opinion of the individual author and do not 




There is no denying that there is tension between the international law princi-
ple of jurisdictional immunity1 of international organizations and the human 
rights principle of access to court. The tension arises because of the inherent 
conflict between both principles. The major controversy about jurisdictional 
immunity is that without access to court or adequate alternative recourse 
there may be a denial of justice or accountability gap where an international 
organization does not provide remedy to aggrieved persons. This is so because 
any time jurisdictional immunity is asserted and granted, the inevitable result 
is that an aggrieved party will be left without legal recourse or remedy. Even 
where a recourse to an alternative dispute resolution mechanism is available, 
there is still the issue whether that mechanism is adequate in the sense that it 
meets the requisite standards of fairness for the determination of a legal claim.
Following this introduction, this chapter will start with a discussion of the 
nature of international organizations and the sources and purpose of their ju-
risdictional immunity (Section 2). This is followed by the identification of the 
right of access to court or tribunal in international human rights instruments, 
as well as some national laws together with an examination of how courts have 
addressed the tension between jurisdictional immunity and access to court—
especially the fecund and profound jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights (Section 3). In particular, it will examine how courts have con-
sidered the availability and adequacy of alternative dispute resolution mecha-
nisms in addressing the tension. In this regard, it will address whether the ju-
risdictional immunity of international organizations is conditional on the 
availability or adequacy of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, such as 
international administrative tribunals (Section 4). The chapter concludes with 
an exploration of whether jurisdictional immunity and access to court could 
be reconciled (Section 5).
2 Sources and Purpose of Jurisdictional Immunity of International 
Organizations
States opt for international cooperation through the establishment of and 
participation in international organizations to achieve their common objec-
tives. International organizations, which are different from nongovernmental 
organizations or multinational corporations, are established by international 
1 Jurisdictional immunity is often referred to as immunity from legal process or immunity 
from judicial process.
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agreements by their member States and governed by international law. They 
are not rogue entities. As the International Court of Justice has determined, 
international organizations have their own international personality and are 
 therefore subjects of international law.2 However, international organizations 
are not sovereign States or ‘super-States’.
International organizations derive their jurisdictional immunity primarily 
from their constituent instruments.3 International organizations may also de-
rive jurisdictional immunity from other multilateral treaties on privileges and 
immunities;4 bilateral treaties, such as host nation agreements; or national leg-
islation, such as the United States International Organizations Immunities 
Act5 and the United Kingdom International Organisation Act.6
To enable international organizations to fulfill their functions, their mem-
ber States accord them certain privileges and immunities, including immunity 
from legal process. These privileges and immunities protect international or-
ganizations from the jurisdiction and enforcement measures of their member 
States. Jurisdictional immunity bars a national court from subjecting these in-
ternational organizations to judicial process or adjudicating their legal rela-
tions.7 Staff of these international organizations also enjoy jurisdictional im-
munity for acts performed in the discharge of their official duties. Under 
international law, international organizations generally are immune from legal 
process unless the organization expressly waives the immunity.
2 icj, Reparation for Injuries 1949, 174.
3 See, for example, imf Articles of Agreement, art ix, s 3 (“The Fund, its property and its assets, 
wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of judicial 
process except to the extent that it expressly waives its immunity for the purpose of any 
proceedings or by the terms of any contract”).
4 See, for examples, Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (Gen-
eral Convention), art ii, s 2 (“The United Nations, its property and assets wherever located 
and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except inso-
far as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity”); Convention on the Privi-
leges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies (Specialized Agencies Convention), art iii, 
s 4 (“The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located and by whomso-
ever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except in so far as in any 
particular case they have expressly waived their immunity”).
5 International Organizations Immunities Act (USA), s 2(b) (“International organizations, 
their property and their assets, wherever located, and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy the 
same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign govern-
ments, except to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive their immunity for 
the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract”).
6 International Organizations Act 1968 (UK), sch 1, pt i (‘Immunity from suit and legal 
process’).
7 Okeke 2018, 4.
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Jurisdictional immunity prevents interference by member States, through 
their national courts, in the administration, management and operation of in-
ternational organizations. It ultimately serves to protect international organi-
zations from becoming subject to national laws and regulations. Jurisdictional 
immunity protects both the international organizations and their member 
States by preventing their various national courts from unilaterally determin-
ing the legal validity of the acts of the international organizations in the 
 exercise of their functions. Immunity allows international organizations to ful-
fil their functions effectively, efficiently and economically. These functions or 
activities of international organizations are determined and defined by the 
member States.
The main justification for the jurisdictional immunity of international or-
ganizations has been summed up as follows:
Intergovernmental organizations, which carry out their functions not 
only in their headquarters State but in the territories of all their mem-
bers, must, in order to deal equitably with all their members, be able to 
operate on the basis of uniform, i.e., international, law, rather than on the 
basis of the diverse laws of particular member States. If any State could, 
through its courts, bend the operations of an organization to the laws of 
that State, all other States could do likewise with respect to their laws, 
thus possibly paralyzing or fragmenting the organization.8
3 Right of Access to Court and Availability of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Mechanism
International human rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (udhr),9 the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (iccpr),10 the European Convention on Human Rights (echr),11 Amer-
8 UN Juridical Yearbook 1980, 228. See also Court of Appeals for the dc Circuit, Broadbent v 
Organization of American States.
9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art 10 (“In the determination of his civil rights 
and obligations […] everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”).
10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 14 (“In the determination of his 
[…] rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by law”).
11 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
art 6(1) (“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by 
an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”).
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ican Convention on Human Rights,12 and African Charter on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights,13 all recognize the right to a fair proceeding before an  independent 
and impartial court or tribunal.14 These human rights instruments impose the 
obligation of access to court on their respective State parties.15 Where these 
State parties are also members of international organizations and have grant-
ed them jurisdictional immunity under applicable treaties, there is an appar-
ent conflict between their treaty obligations: the right of access to court to 
persons under their jurisdiction and the jurisdictional immunity of interna-
tional organizations which is an impediment to that right. Reconciliation of 
the conflict is made more difficult in that neither the right of access to court 
nor the jurisdictional immunity of international organizations has achieved 
customary international law status as to be applicable erga omnes. Conse-
quently, courts have to and have developed legal standards to reconcile these 
competing principles.
At issue is whether an international organization’s jurisdictional immunity 
must be conditioned on the availability of an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism. Some legal instruments on privileges and immunities oblige 
 international organizations to provide an alternative or appropriate mode of 
resolution of disputes of contracts or other disputes of a private nature. For 
example, Article viii, Section 29 of the Convention on the Privileges and 
 Immunities of the United Nations (General Convention) provides:
The United Nations shall make provisions for appropriate modes of set-
tlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a 
private law character to which the United Nations is a party; (b) disputes 
involving any official of the United Nations who by reason of his official 
position enjoys immunity, if immunity has not been waived by the 
Secretary-General.
12 American Convention on Human Rights, art 8(1) (“Every person has the right to a hearing, 
with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and 
impartial tribunal, previously established by law”).
13 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art 7 (“Every individual shall have the 
right to have his cause heard”).
14 In addition to international human rights treaties, some national constitutions do pro-
vide for access to court: Constitution of Italy, art 24(1) (“All may bring a case before a court 
of law in order to protect their rights under civil and administrative law”); Constitution of 
South Africa, s 34 (“Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the 
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, 
another independent and impartial tribunal or forum”); Constitution of Japan, art 32 
(“No person shall be denied the right of access to the courts”).
15 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding 
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith”).
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Similarly, Article ix, Section 31(a) of the Convention on the Privileges and 
 Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations (Specialized 
Agencies Convention) provides:
Each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of 
settlement of: (a) Disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of 
private character to which the specialized agency is a party; (b) Disputes 
involving any official of a specialized agency who by reason of his official 
position enjoys immunity, if immunity has not been waived in accord-
ance with the provisions of Section 22.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) had reported on the proce-
dures in place for the implementation of Article viii, Section 29 of the General 
Convention, in response to the request from the General Assembly.16 With re-
spect to disputes arising out of commercial agreements (contracts and lease 
agreements), the report stated that,
[I]t has been the practice of the United Nations to make provision in its 
commercial agreements (contracts and lease agreements) for recourse to 
arbitration in the event of disputes that cannot be settled by direct nego-
tiations. This practice has also been followed by subsidiary bodies of the 
United Nations, such as the United Nations Development Programme 
(undp) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (unicef).17
It reported that the UN incorporates a standard clause on privileges and im-
munities in all of its commercial agreements: “Nothing in or relating to this 
Contract shall be deemed a waiver of any of the privileges and immunities of 
the UN, including, but not limited to, immunity from any form of legal 
process”.18 The preservation of privileges and immunities clause,
…which normally follows the arbitration clause, makes clear to the con-
tractor/lessor that the United Nations, by entering into contractual rela-
tions with private firms or individuals and by accepting arbitration as the 
method of dispute settlement, has not agreed to waive its immunity from 
legal process, which the Organization enjoys in accordance with Section 
2 of the General Convention.19
16 See unga Fifth Committee, ‘Review of the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial 
Functioning of the United Nations’ 1995.
17 Ibid., para 3.
18 Ibid., para 6.
19 Ibid.
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It continued:
It is clear, however, that the ‘privileges and immunities clause’ does not 
adversely affect the commitment to arbitration since the Organization 
has agreed to be bound by the arbitration award as the final adjudication 
of the dispute, controversy or claim; the privileges and immunities clause 
provides protection to the Organization against possible court proceed-
ings initiated prior to or after the award unless a waiver of immunity is 
expressly granted.20
According to the Report, other disputes of a private law character encountered 
by the UN include “(a) third-party claims for personal injuries (arising outside 
the peace-keeping context), (b) claims related to United Nations peace- 
keeping operations, and (c) claims related to operational activities for 
development”.21 For tort claims arising from acts within the Headquarters dis-
trict in New York, the organization has a special Regulation,
…to place reasonable limits on the amount of compensation or damages 
payable by the United Nations in respect of claims by third parties for 
death, personal injury or illness or for damaged, destroyed or lost prop-
erty arising from acts or omissions occurring within the Headquarters 
district in New York.22
For claims for personal injury or property damage arising from acts occurring 
on UN premises in duty stations other than New York, recourse is had to ami-
cable settlement through negotiation, failing which, the matter would be 
 referred to arbitration.23 Claims arising from accidents involving vehicles oper-
ated by United Nations personnel for official purposes are dealt with through 
the commercial insurance policy with worldwide coverage that the UN 
maintains.24
Regarding third-party claims for compensation for personal injury or death 
and property loss or damage resulting from acts of members of a United 
 Nations peace-keeping operation, the UN enters a status-of-forces agreement 
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., para 9.
22 Ibid., para 11.
23 Ibid., para 13.
24 Ibid., para 14.
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(sofa) with host countries which envisage the establishment of a ‘standing 
claims commission’ for the purpose of settling most claims.25
The Report states that the United Nations’ policy is not to enter into litiga-
tion or arbitration with individuals who are aggrieved that they were not se-
lected for positions in the UN, but that the internal dispute resolution mecha-
nism is available to those other individuals who are recruited as staff members 
and present complaints relating to their terms of employment.26
The International Court of Justice (icj), in the Cumaraswamy case, raised 
the issue of the obligation of the UN under Section 29 of the General Conven-
tion to provide alternative modes of settlement of disputes, but it did not ad-
dress whether the organization’s entitlement to immunity is conditioned on 
the availability of an alternative remedy.27 The icj noted:
However, as is clear from Article viii, Section 29, of the General Conven-
tion, any such claims against the United Nations shall not be dealt with 
by national courts but shall be settled in accordance with the appropriate 
modes of settlement that “[t]he United Nations shall make provisions 
for” pursuant to Section 29.28
In Georges v United Nations, the question presented before the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was whether the fulfillment by the 
United Nations of its obligation under Section 29 of the General Convention is 
a condition precedent to its immunity under Section 2 of the General Conven-
tion such that the UN’s failure to make provisions for appropriate modes of 
settlement of certain disputes compels the conclusion that its immunity does 
not exist.29 The Court held that the UN’s fulfillment of its Section 29 obligation 
is not a condition precedent for its jurisdictional immunity under Section 2 of 
the General Convention. Plaintiffs, citizens of the United States or Haiti, had 
sued the United Nations, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (minustah), 
the Secretary-General, and the former Head of minustah. They claimed that 
they “have been or will be sickened, or have family members who have died or 
will die, as a direct result of the cholera” that was introduced by the Nepalese 
contingent of minustah and the epidemic that had ravaged Haiti.30
25 Ibid., para 16.
26 Ibid., para 24.
27 icj, Cumaraswamy Case 1999.
28 Ibid., para 66.
29 US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Georges v United Nations 2016.
30 Ibid., para 90.
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To answer the question whether Section 29 is a condition precedent for Sec-
tion 2, the Court noted that the interpretation of a treaty begins with the text, 
and where the language is plain, a court must construe it and refrain from 
amending it. It also noted that a treaty is a contract between nations and must 
be interpreted upon the same principles that govern the interpretation of con-
tracts between individuals.31 It applied the interpretation canon of expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius, in other words, the express mention of something 
means the exclusion of another. Since Section 2 expressly mentions express 
waiver as the only circumstance when the United Nations shall not enjoy im-
munity, by negative implication all other circumstances, including failure to 
fulfill its Section 29 obligation, are excluded. The Court concluded that Section 
29 is not a condition precedent for Section 2. It reasoned that conditions prec-
edent to contractual obligations are generally disfavored and must be ex-
pressed in plain and unambiguous language—which is lacking regarding Sec-
tions 2 and 29 of the General Convention.32
Other courts have considered the availability of alternative dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms in their decision on the jurisdictional immunity of interna-
tional organizations. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been 
in the vanguard and has developed its own standard to deal with the tension 
between right of access to court granted by Article 6(1) of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (echr) and the jurisdictional immunity of interna-
tional organizations. In the Waite and Kennedy v Germany, and Beer and Regan 
v Germany cases both decided on 18 February 1999, the ECtHR unanimously 
held that in giving effect to the jurisdictional immunity of the European Space 
Agency (esa), the German courts did not violate Article 6(1) of the echr.33
The applicants in Waite and Kennedy, British nationals residents in Germa-
ny, were employed by a company to provide services for esa.34 When the com-
pany informed the applicants that their employment would be terminated at 
the expiration of their contract, they instituted proceedings against esa before 
the Darmstadt Labour Court, claiming that under the German labor law, they 
had acquired the status of employees of esa. esa invoked its immunity under 
its constituent instrument and the Darmstadt Labour Court declared the ap-
plicants’ action inadmissible. The Frankfurt/Main Labour Appeals Court, 
31 Ibid., paras 92–93.
32 Ibid., paras 93–94.
33 ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy v Germany 1999 and Beer and Regan v Germany 1999. The 
ECtHR was set up by the Council of Europe member States in 1959 to deal with allegations 
of violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.
34 The European Space Agency is an international organization established under the Con-
vention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency.
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as well as the German Federal Labour Court, dismissed the applicants’ appeal. 
The applicants then applied to the European Commission of Human Rights, 
complaining that they had been denied access to a court for the determination 
of their dispute with esa regarding an issue under German labour law in viola-
tion of Article 6(1) of the echr. The Commission declared their application 
inadmissible and referred the case to the ECtHR.
The ECtHR declared that the right to institute proceedings before courts in 
civil matters is but one aspect of the ‘right to a court’ as embodied in Article 
6.35 The ECtHR, however, noted that “the right of access to the courts secured 
by Article 6 [subsection] 1 of the Convention is not absolute, but may be sub-
ject to limitations; these are permitted by implication since the right of access 
by its very nature calls for regulation by the State”.36 It recognized that States 
enjoy a certain margin of appreciation, but it remains the province of the 
ECtHR to decide whether the requirements of the echr are met.
The ECtHR determined that to ensure that the right of access is not 
impaired,
…a limitation will not be compatible with Article 6 [subsection] 1 if it 
does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is not a reasonable relation-
ship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought 
to be achieved.37
The ECtHR then concluded that the jurisdictional immunity of international 
organizations had a legitimate objective because the attribution of privileges 
and immunities is essential to the proper functioning of international organi-
zations, and to freedom from unilateral interference by individual govern-
ments.38 The ECtHR noted “that the Convention is intended to guarantee not 
theoretical or illusory rights, but rights that are practical and effective”.39 Un-
der the circumstances of the case, a material factor for the Court in determin-
ing whether granting esa jurisdictional immunity in Germany is permissible 
was whether the applicants had available to them reasonable alternative 
means to protect effectively their rights under the Convention. The assess-
ment  of proportionality “cannot be applied in such a way as to compel an 
 international organization to submit itself to national litigation in relation to 
35 ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy v Germany 1999, para. 50.
36 Ibid., para. 59.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., para 63.
39 Ibid., para 67.
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employment conditions prescribed under national labour law”.40 It therefore 
held:
Taking into account in particular the alternative means of legal process 
available to the applicants, it cannot be said that the limitation on their 
access to the German courts with regard to esa impaired the essence of 
their ‘right to a court’ or was disproportionate for the purposes of Article 
6 [subsection] 1 of the Convention.41
Following Waite and Kennedy, Belgian and French courts decided not to recog-
nize the jurisdictional immunity of international organizations in cases where 
they found the dispute resolution mechanism in those organizations to be in-
compatible with the echr. The Belgian Court of Cassation delivered its judg-
ment on 21 December 2009, in three cases in connection with employment 
disputes between international organizations and their employees that have 
been making their way through the Belgian court system.42
In Lutchmaya v General Secretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States (acp), an employee of acp had successfully challenged the 
non-renewal of their term appointment before the Belgian Labour Tribunal, 
which awarded them compensatory damages. When acp failed to pay the 
award, the employee sought an order attaching the organization’s bank ac-
counts. acp contested the attachment and invoked its immunity under its con-
stituent instrument, and the Tribunal upheld the organization’s immunity and 
vacated the attachment. The employee then appealed to the Brussels Labour 
Court, which ruled that, if it is to be effective, the right to a hearing consistent 
with Article 6(1) of the echr must include the enforcement of a final decision. 
The Labour Court applied the principle developed by the ECtHR in Waite and 
Kennedy, and ruled that giving effect to immunity from enforcement would 
violate Article 6 because acp did not provide an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism for the employee to challenge acp’s refusal to abide by a decision 
rendered against the organization. It ordered attachment of acp’s account.43 
Subsequently, acp filed an appeal of the decision with the Court of Appeals 
and in turn with the Court of Cassation, which confirmed the decision of the 
40 Ibid., para 72.
41 Ibid., para 73.
42 Belgian Court of Cassation, weu v Siedler 2009; acp v Lutchmaya 2009; acp v B. D. 2009.
43 Brussels Labour Court, Lutchmaya v acp 2003.
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Court of Appeals denying the immunity of execution against acp’s Belgian 
bank account.44
In a companion case to Lutchmaya, acp had decided not to comply with an 
order to pay damages to the plaintiff and had opposed the enforcement meas-
ures before the Tribunal of First Instance and Court of Appeal of Brussels 
based on immunity from execution. The Court of Appeal decided that the im-
munity from execution would be incompatible with Article 6 of the echr.45 
acp filed an appeal with the Court of Cassation, which rejected the appeal and 
immunity on the ground that the plaintiff ’s right of access to court had been 
unduly limited by the absence of any dispute resolution mechanism with 
acp.46
In Siedler v Western European Union, an employee of the now defunct West-
ern European Union (weu) had challenged their termination in 2000 before 
the organization’s internal appeals mechanism, and had been awarded damag-
es.47 Not happy with the disposition of their appeal, the former employee took 
their case to the Belgian Labor Tribunal. The claimant argued that their em-
ployment contract was subject to national labour law rather than the internal 
law of weu. The Labour Tribunal ruled in favor of the claimaint, and weu ap-
pealed the decision to the Belgian Labour Court, invoking its jurisdictional im-
munity. weu had also argued that Belgian law was inapplicable to the employ-
ment relationship between the organization and its staff. At issue was whether 
the jurisdictional immunity of weu could be reconciled with the right to a fair 
trial as guaranteed in Article 6(1) of the echr. The Belgian Labour Court con-
cluded that, absent an independent dispute resolution mechanism within an 
international organization, Article 6(1) mandates that the organization be sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of national courts. It concluded that weu’s internal 
mechanism did not provide the necessary safeguards for an independent tri-
bunal as required under the Convention because the hearings were closed, the 
decisions were not published, the adjudicators were nominated by the organi-
zation for a two-year term, and there was no provision for adjudicators to 
recuse themselves, calling into question their independence. In other words, 
the existence of an internal mechanism is not enough—the quality of that 
mechanism must also be scrutinized to determine whether that mechanism is 
independent. Consequently, the Labour Court ruled that granting immunity to 
44 Belgian Court of Cassation, acp v Lutchmaya 2009.
45 Brussels Labour Court of Appeals, b.d. v acp 2007.
46 Belgian Court of Cassation, acp v b.d. 2009.
47 Brussels Labour Court of Appeals, Siedler v weu 2003.
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the weu in this regard would violate Article 6(1) of the echr.48 The weu ap-
pealed the decision to the Court of Cassation, which agreed with the Labour 
Court that the guarantees of a fair trial have not been met by the weu internal 
procedure. The Court of Cassation rejected the weu jurisdictional immunity 
claim but ruled that the weu’s internal rules, as opposed to the Belgian labour 
law, would apply to the proceedings before the Belgian courts.49
In Degboe v African Development Bank, an employee of the African Develop-
ment Bank (AfDB) who had been terminated appealed the decision to the 
AfDB’s appeals committee, which made a recommendation in their favor.50 
When the AfDB’s president rejected the recommendation, the former employ-
ee brought an action before the French Labour Tribunal, which ruled in their 
favor and ordered the payment of compensatory damages. The AfDB, which 
did not appear before the Labour Tribunal, appealed the decision of the Tribu-
nal before the Paris Court of Appeals, and invoked jurisdictional immunity. 
The former employee argued that the AfDB’s jurisdictional immunity contra-
vened Article 6(1) of the echr. The Paris Court of Appeals applied the princi-
ple of Waite and Kennedy, and noted that the (then) dispute resolution mecha-
nism within the AfDB did not provide for a binding decision (The case arose 
before the establishment of the AfDB’s Administrative Tribunal).51 The French 
Court consequently concluded that respecting the AfDB’s immunity would 
deny its employees an adequate recourse to challenge its decisions and there-
by negate their right under Article 6 of the Convention. It declined to dismiss 
the case on jurisdictional grounds and ordered further proceedings before the 
national court.
The ECtHR clarified the principle that it had developed in Waite and Ken-
nedy in the case of Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v The Nether-
lands.52 The case arose out of the horrors of the 1992–1995 war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The applicants were a foundation created under Dutch law to 
bring proceedings on behalf of relatives of the victims of the Srebrenica Mas-
sacre, and 10 nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina who were the surviving rela-
tives of people killed in the massacre. The United Nations Security Council 
(unsc) had set up the United Nations Protection Force (unprofor) for the 
48 Ibid.
49 Belgian Court of Cassation, weu v Siedler 2009.
50 Paris Court of Appeal, Degboe v AfDB 2003.
51 The Tribunal was established by Resolution No B/BD/97/11 of 16 July 1997 of the Board of 
Directors of the African Development Bank as an independent judicial body for the final 
resolution of disputes between the Bank and its staff. The decisions of the Tribunal are 
final and binding, unlike the Appeals Committee which was established in 1989.
52 ECtHR, Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v The Netherlands 2012.
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Yugoslav crisis, and the Netherlands was one of the troop-contributing na-
tions. By Resolution 819 (1993), the unsc had declared Srebrenica in eastern 
Bosnia a ‘safe area’. In 1995, the Bosnian Serb Army overran the ‘safe area’ and, 
despite the presence of a battalion of unprofor, made up of lightly-armed 
Dutch soldiers (Dutchbat), massacred about 8,000 Bosniac men and boys.
The applicants had first brought proceedings against The Netherlands and 
the United Nations before the Regional Court of The Hague and argued that 
the jurisdictional immunity of the UN had been overridden by Article 6 of the 
echr and the jus cogens prohibition of genocide. The Regional Court declined 
jurisdiction against the UN and noted that
…the creation of the United Nations predated the entry into force of the 
Convention. Moreover, the United Nations was an organization whose 
membership was well-nigh universal; this distinguished it from organiza-
tions such as the European Space Agency, the organization in issue in 
Waite and Kennedy and Beer and Regan, which had been created only in 
1980 and whose membership was limited to European States.53
The applicants appealed to the Court of Appeals of The Hague, which upheld 
the judgment of the Regional Court. The applicants then filed an appeal with 
the Supreme Court, which decided that, pursuant to the Charter of the United 
Nations and the General Convention, the UN could not be summoned before 
the national courts of its member States.
Following the exhaustion of proceedings in the Dutch courts, the applicants 
took their case to the ECtHR, and complained that the recognition of the juris-
dictional immunity of the United Nations by the Dutch courts violated their 
right of access to courts under Article 6 of the Convention. The ECtHR noted:
[T]he attribution of responsibility for the Srebrenica massacre or its con-
sequences, whether to the United Nations, to the Netherlands State or to 
any other legal or natural person, is not a matter falling within the scope 
of the present application. Nor can the Court consider whether the Sec-
retary-General of the United Nations was under any moral or legal obliga-
tion to waive the United Nations’ immunity. It has only to decide whether 
the Netherlands violated the applicants’ right of “access to a court”, as 
guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, by granting the United  Nations 
immunity from domestic jurisdiction.54
53 Ibid., para 70.
54 Ibid., para 137.
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Before the ECtHR applied the principles from its case law55 to the jurisdic-
tional immunity enjoyed by the UN, it noted that previous cases before it con-
cerned the jurisdictional immunity of international organizations in disputes 
between the organization and members of its staff,56 or the request to impute 
the acts of international organizations to State Parties to the echr who are 
member States of those international organizations.57 It differentiated those 
cases from this one because the dispute in this one involved a dispute between 
the applicants and the United Nations arising out of the action of the unsc 
under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The Court consequently held that because 
of the fundamental mission of the United Nations to secure international 
peace and security, Article 6 of the Convention cannot be interpreted to deny 
the UN jurisdictional immunity for the acts and omissions of the Security 
Council:
To bring such operations within the scope of domestic jurisdiction would 
be to allow individual States, through their courts, to interfere with the 
fulfillment of the key mission of the United Nations in this field, includ-
ing with effective conduct of its operations.58
The ECtHR noted that in Waite and Kennedy as in Beer and Regan, it had con-
sidered the availability of reasonable alternative means to protect effectively 
the rights under the Convention a ‘material factor’ in its determination wheth-
er the grant of jurisdictional immunity was permissible under the Convention. 
It conceded that there was no such alternative means in this case, but 
contended:
It does not follow, however, that in the absence of an alternative remedy 
the recognition of immunity is ipso facto constitutive of a violation of the 
right of access to a court. In respect of the sovereign immunity of foreign 
States, the icj has explicitly denied the existence of such a rule. As re-
gards international organizations, this Court’s judgments in Waite and 
Kennedy and Beer and Regan cannot be interpreted in such absolute 
terms either.59
55 Ibid., para 139 (citations omitted).
56 See ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy v Germany 1999 and Beer and Regan v Germany 1999.
57 ECtHR, Behrami v France 2007 and Saramati v France 2007.
58 ECtHR, Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica v The Netherlands 2012, para. 154 (citations 
omitted).
59 Ibid., para 164, citation omitted to the icj’s Judgment Jurisdictional Immunities of the State 
(Germany v Italy: Greece intervening) 2012, para. 101.
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The ECtHR further noted:
There remains the fact that the United Nations has not, until now, made 
provision for “modes of settlement” appropriate to the dispute here in 
issue. Regardless of whether Article viii, Section 29 of the Convention on 
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations can be construed so 
as to require a dispute settlement body to be set up in the present case, 
this state of affairs is not imputable to the Netherlands. Nor does Article 
6 of the Convention require the Netherlands to step in: as pointed out 
above, the present case is fundamentally different from earlier cases in 
which the Court has had to consider the immunity from domestic juris-
diction enjoyed by international organizations, and the nature of the ap-
plicants’ claims did not compel the Netherlands to provide a remedy 
against the United Nations in its own courts.60
The ECtHR concluded that the grant of immunity to the United Nations in this 
case served a legitimate purpose and was not disproportionate.61
Lastly, the position of the Canadian Supreme Court may sum up the pre-
dominant view on the availability of alternative dispute resolution mecha-
nism: “The absence of a dispute resolution mechanism or of an internal review 
process is not, in and of itself, determinative of whether [an international or-
ganization] is entitled to immunity”.62 It had ruled that the “fact that the appel-
lant has no forum in which to air his grievances and seek remedy is unfortu-
nate. However, it is the nature of an immunity to shield certain matters from 
the jurisdiction of the host State’s courts”.63 It noted that “it is an ‘inevitable 
result’ of a grant of immunity that certain parties will be left without legal re-
course, and this is a ‘policy choice implicit’ in the legislation”.64
4 Adequacy of Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism
Even when alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are available, there may 
still arise an issue about the adequacy of such mechanism. Employment rela-
tions within international organizations are usually regulated by their internal 
rules and policy. For the resolution of employment-related disputes, most in-
60 Ibid., para 165.
61 Ibid., para 169.
62 Supreme Court of Canada, Amaratunga v Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization 2013, 
para 60.
63 Ibid., para 63.
64 Ibid.
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ternational organizations have set up an internal dispute resolution mecha-
nism in the form of administrative tribunals. Judges of administrative tribu-
nals are independent from the organs in the international organization that 
appoint them. The adequacy of an alternative dispute resolution mechanism 
revolves around its independence and impartiality. Some courts have denied 
immunity to an international organization where they considered an internal 
mechanism not to be independent and impartial. Generally, courts have recog-
nized the jurisdictional immunity of international organizations with respect 
to employment disputes with their staff.
The Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Or-
ganization (iloat), which was adopted by the International Labour Confer-
ence on 9 October 1946, provides in Article ii:
1. The Tribunal shall be competent to hear complaints alleging non-
observance, in substance or in form, of the terms of appointment of 
officials of the International Labour Office, and of such provisions 
of the Staff Regulations as are applicable to the case.
2. The Tribunal shall be competent to settle any dispute concerning the 
compensation provided for in cases of invalidity, injury or disease 
incurred by an official in the course of her or his employment and to 
fix finally the amount of compensation, if any, which is to be paid.65
International organizations, such as the World Health Organization (who), 
United Nations Education, Science and Cultural Organization (unesco), Food 
and Agricultural Organization (fao), and a good many others that have their 
headquarters in Europe, have accepted the jurisdiction of the iloat for the 
resolution of employment disputes between them and their staff.66
The World Bank Administrative Tribunal (wbat) was established in 1980 
and its Statute provides in Article ii (1):
The Tribunal shall hear and pass judgment upon any application by 
which a member of the staff of the Bank Group alleges non-observance 
of the contract of employment or terms of appointment of such staff 
member. The words “contract of employment” and “terms of appoint-
ment” include all pertinent regulations and rules in force at the time of 
alleged non-observance including the provisions of the Staff Retirement 
Plan.67
65 iloat Statute.




The United Nations Administrative Tribunal was established in 1950 pursu-
ant to the General Assembly Resolution 351 A (iv) of 24 November 1949.68 Un-
der Article 2 of its Statute, the Tribunal had jurisdiction over employment dis-
putes between the United Nations and its staff. Article 9 of the Statute provides 
that “the oral proceedings of the Tribunal shall be held in public unless the 
Tribunal decides that exceptional circumstances require that they be held in 
private”.69 The United Nations reformed its internal justice system and intro-
duced a two-tier system in 2009, with a first instance, United Nations Dispute 
Tribunal (undt) and the appellate and final, United Nations Appeals Tribunal 
(unat).70 Other international organizations, like the International Maritime 
Organization (imo) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (icao), 
have accepted the jurisdiction of the undt and unat for the resolution of 
employment disputes between them and their staff.
Administrative tribunals of international organizations are judicial bodies. 
In its advisory opinion in the Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the 
United Nations Administrative Tribunal (Effect of Awards) case, the icj deter-
mined that the United Nations Administrative Tribunal was “an independent 
and truly judicial body pronouncing final judgments without appeal within 
the limited field of its functions”.71 The Court inferred an obligation from the 
Charter of the UN to establish a dispute resolution mechanism for its staff 
members:
When the Secretariat was organized, a situation arose in which the rela-
tions between the staff members and the [UN] were governed by a com-
plex code of law. This code consisted of the Staff Regulations established 
by the General Assembly, defining the fundamental rights and obliga-
tions of the staff, and the Staff Rules, made by the Secretary-General in 
order to implement the Staff Regulations. It was inevitable that there 
would be disputes between the [UN] and staff members as to their rights 
and duties. The Charter contains no provision which authorizes any of 
the principal organs of the United Nations to adjudicate upon these dis-
putes, and Article 105 secures for the United Nations jurisdictional im-
munities in national courts. It would, in the opinion of the Court, hardly 
be consistent with the expressed aim of the Charter to promote freedom 
and justice for individuals and with the constant preoccupation of the 
68 unga Res 351 A (iv), 24 November 1949.
69 UN Administrative Tribunal Statute, art 9.
70 unga Res 63/253, 24 December 2008.
71 icj, Effect of Awards 1954, 53.
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United Nations Organization to promote this aim that it should afford no 
judicial or arbitral remedy to its own staff for the settlement of any dis-
putes which may arise between it and them.72
The establishment of international administrative tribunals by international 
organizations is founded on a human rights principle of access to court or the 
obligation to provide an alternative dispute resolution mechanism under mul-
tilateral or bilateral treaties on their jurisdictional immunities. In this regard, 
when the Administrative Tribunal of the World Bank was established in 1980, 
the memorandum of the President of the World Bank to the Board of Execu-
tive Directors stated that one of the reasons for the establishment of the tribu-
nal is that,
Wherever administrative power is exercised, there should be the possibil-
ity, in case of disputes, of a fair hearing and due process. This principle is 
enshrined not only in numerous national constitutions, it is also reaf-
firmed in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.73
The ECtHR has decided whether the Article 6 of the echr applies to the ad-
ministrative tribunals of international organizations in a number of cases. In 
Boivin v 34 Member States of the Council of Europe, the applicant, a dual Belgian 
and French national, had challenged the termination of their employment 
with the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol) 
before the iloat.74 The Tribunal upheld the impugned decision. The applicant 
subsequently filed an application with the ECtHR and complained, inter alia, 
that the reasoning in the iloat judgment had been insufficient under Article 
6 of the echr. The Court noted that the complaint in the application is actu-
ally against the judgment of the iloat concerning their employment dispute 
with Eurocontrol. In other words, the applicant’s complaints were not directed 
against any acts of the respondent States but against the decision of the Tribu-
nal. It pointed out that the iloat was outside the jurisdiction of the respond-
ent States, that those States did not intervene directly or indirectly in the em-
ployment dispute, and that no action or omission of those States can be 
considered to engage their responsibility under the echr. It distinguished this 
72 Ibid., 57.
73 World Bank, ‘Memorandum of the President’, 14 January 1980.
74 ECtHR, Boivin v 34 Member States of the Council of Europe 2008. The application was de-
clared inadmissible with respect to 32 of the member States for failure to comply with the 
six-month time-limit, and was only examined with respect to France and Belgium.
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case with those cases where the State or States concerned had been involved 
directly or indirectly such that the responsibility of the respondent States had 
been at issue. The Court determined that the alleged violation of the echr 
cannot be attributed to France and Belgium. It also pointed out that since Eu-
rocontrol is not a party to the echr, its responsibility cannot be engaged un-
der the Convention. Consequently, the Court declared the applicant’s com-
plaints incompatible ratione personae—in other words, by reason of the 
person concerned—with the provisions of the Convention, and the applica-
tion inadmissible.
In Connolly v 15 Member States of the European Union, the applicant was a 
British national resident in London, whose employment with the European 
Commission was terminated, following disciplinary proceedings, for publish-
ing a book without prior authorization.75 The former employee unsuccessfully 
challenged their termination before the European Community Court of First 
Instance (abbreviated as tpice in French) before appealing to the European 
Community Court of Justice (abbreviated as cjce in French) which also re-
jected their appeal. Before the ECtHR, the claimant alleged violation of Article 
6(1) of the echr, amongst other things. The Court noted that this application 
originated from a decision of the European Commission to terminate the ap-
plicant’s employment, as well as the decisions of the tpice and cjce. The 
Court also noted that the applicant, however, thought that the 15 member 
States of the European Union at the time of the impugned decisions should be 
held responsible for the violation of the Convention. The ECtHR confirmed its 
jurisprudence as established in the Boivin case and decided that the alleged 
violation of the Convention should not be imputed to the respondent States 
and that the responsibility of the European Union, an international organiza-
tion that is not a party to the Convention, cannot be engaged.
In Gasparini v Italy and Belgium, the applicant, an Italian national, was an 
employee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato) and had been 
working at the organization’s headquarters in Brussels.76 The applicant brought 
proceedings before the nato Appeals Board to challenge the increase in their 
pension contributions. At the ECtHR, they complained that the proceedings 
at the nato Appeals Board had not met the requirements of a fair hearing as 
enshrined in Article 6 of the echr. The ECtHR noted that this complaint was 
different from that in the Boivin and Connolly cases. Specifically, the complaint 
was about the absence of public hearings at the nato Appeals Board. The 
Court concluded that, under the circumstances of the procedure under 
75 ECtHR, Connolly v 15 Member States of the European Union 2008.
76 ECtHR, Gasparini v Italy and Belgium 2009.
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the  nato Civilian Personnel Regulations, the requirements of fairness were 
still met without the holding of public hearing. It recalled that the Appeals 
Board had justified the absence of a public hearings by the need “to preserve its 
serenity in the specific context of an organization such as nato”.77 Regarding 
the complaint about the alleged bias or partiality of the nato Appeals Board, 
the Court noted that the Appeals Board is composed of three members who 
were appointed by the North Atlantic Council for three years from outside the 
organization and with recognized competence. It also noted that the applicant 
had the right to ask for a change of the composition of the Appeals Board for 
presumed partiality but failed to do so.
Beygo v 46 Member States of the Council of Europe was an application by a 
French and a former employee of the Council of Europe, alleging, inter alia, a 
violation of Article 6(1) of the echr.78 The applicant claimed that as a result of 
the composition of and appointment of the members of the Administrative 
Tribunal of the Council of Europe by the Council of Europe, the tribunal had 
not provided the guarantees of independence and impartiality required under 
the Convention. The Court noted that the applicant did not dispute that the 
alleged violations of the Convention originated from the impugned decision 
by the Secretary General and the decision of the Tribunal, but claimed that the 
46 member States of the Council of Europe should be jointly held responsible 
for the alleged violation arising from the impugned decision. After recalling 
the principles enunciated in its case law, the ECtHR held that the alleged viola-
tion of the echr cannot be imputed to the member States in this case, and 
consequently concluded that the applicant’s complaint is inadmissible ratione 
personae within the provisions of the Convention.
In Klausecker v Germany, the applicant who was physically disabled had ap-
plied for the post of patent examiner at the European Patent Office (epo) in 
Munich, Germany, but was not appointed because the organization deter-
mined that they did not meet the physical requirements of the post as required 
by the Service Regulations of epo.79 The applicant challenged the decision not 
to recruit them, claiming that the decision constituted unlawful discrimina-
tion against the disabled. Their request for review was dismissed by the Presi-
dent of epo and their internal appeal was rejected as inadmissible, but they 
77 Ibid., 2.
78 ECtHR, Beygo v 46 Member States of the Council of Europe 2009.
79 ECtHR, Klausecker v Germany 2015.
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were advised that they could appeal the decision to the iloat which has juris-
diction over employment disputes between epo and its staff members.80
The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint directly with the German 
Federal Constitutional Court, arguing that the epo enjoyed jurisdictional im-
munity in German courts, and complaining that their right of access to court 
under Article 19(4) of the Basic Law had been violated because they had no 
remedy within epo, or before the German courts or the iloat. The Federal 
Constitutional Court found the constitutional complaint inadmissible.
The applicant then filed an application with the iloat against the decision 
by the epo not to recruit them, and the tribunal dismissed this complaint as 
irreceivable.81 The iloat considered that it was a court of limited jurisdiction 
and had no jurisdiction over claims by applicants who had no contract of em-
ployment with the international organization. It ruled that it had no authority 
to order the epo to waive its immunity. It noted, however, that its judgment 
created a legal vacuum and considered it highly desirable that the epo should 
seek a solution affording the applicant access to a court, either by waiving its 
immunity or by submitting the dispute to arbitration.82
The applicant then filed an application with the ECtHR, which considered 
the applicant’s complaints about lack of access to German courts and to the 
epo internal justice system to fall under Article 6(1) of the echr. The Court 
noted:
The internal system of judicial review within the epo also guaranteed a 
protection of fundamental rights comparable to that secured by the Con-
vention. Moreover, despite the restriction of access to that system of in-
ternal judicial review for job applicants, the applicant did have, in the 
circumstances of the present case, alternative means effectively to pro-
tect [their] Convention rights. The epo had offered the applicant to con-
duct an arbitration procedure which would have afforded [them] effec-
tive protection.83
The Court recapitulated the relevant principles from its case law and applied 
them to the case. It considered that the arbitration that was offered to the ap-
plicant, but which was declined, made available to them,
80 iloat, in Fabio Liaci v epo 2000, had previously rejected as irreceivable a complaint 
against epo by an applicant whose application for a job at the organization had equally 
been rejected for failure to meet the physical requirements of the post.
81 iloat, R. K. v epo 2007.
82 See ECtHR, Klausecker v Germany 2015, paras 19 and 20.
83 Ibid., para 55.
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…reasonable alternative means to protect effectively [their] rights under 
the Convention. Therefore, the limitations placed on the applicant’s ac-
cess to the German courts had been proportionate to the legitimate aims 
pursued by the grant of immunity from jurisdiction to the epo and the 
very essence of the applicant’s right of access to court under Article 6 
[subsection] 1 was not impaired.84
It concluded that the denial of access to the internal justice system of an inter-
national organization to an applicant who was not recruited does not disclose 
a “manifestly deficient protection of fundamental rights” within the organiza-
tion, especially where the applicant was offered arbitration of the impugned 
decision.85 The Court dismissed the application as manifestly ill-founded.
In Perez v Germany, the applicant, a Spanish national who had served the 
United Nations and resided in Germany, had challenged their termination of 
employment by the UN before the unat before filing their application with 
the ECtHR.86 In their application, the former staff member complained that 
the proceedings before the UN internal justice system,
…had been characterised by manifest procedural, substantive and practi-
cal shortcomings and had not met the requirements of a fair trial within 
the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. Germany was to be held re-
sponsible for these deficient procedures as it had failed to ensure that 
there was a UN internal dispute settlement procedure protecting [...] fun-
damental rights in a manner equivalent to the Convention standards.87
The applicant argued that Germany, by granting jurisdictional immunity to the 
UN, “had failed to guarantee [their] access to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of [their] civil rights 
before the German courts, in breach of Article 6 of the Convention”.88 The 
Court recalled its case law:
[W]here the impugned decision emanated from an internal body of an 
international organization or an international tribunal outside the juris-
diction of the respondent States, in the context of a labour dispute that 
84 Ibid., para 76.
85 Ibid., para 106.
86 ECtHR, Perez v Germany 2015.
87 Ibid., para 47.
88 Ibid., para 48.
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lay entirely within the internal legal order of an international organiza-
tion that had a legal personality separate from that of its Member States. 
It was decisive for the respondent States to be held responsible under the 
Convention in those cases whether the States concerned had intervened 
directly or indirectly in the dispute, and whether an act or omission of 
those States or their authorities could be considered to engage their re-
sponsibility under the Convention. If that was not the case, the Court 
considered the applicants not to have been “within the jurisdiction” of 
the respondent States concerned for the purposes of Article 1 of the Con-
vention and therefore declared the applications to be incompatible ra-
tione personae with the provisions of the Convention in this respect.89
The Court also recalled its case law as established in Bosphorus Hava Yolları 
Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland,90 and its progeny on the  responsibility 
89 Ibid., para 61 (citations omitted).
90 ECtHR, Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland 2005. The appli-
cant in the Bosphorus case was an airline charter company incorporated in Turkey which 
had leased aircraft from the national airline of the former Yugoslavia which was then 
impounded by Ireland following United Nations Security Council (unsc) Resolution 757 
(1992) which was implemented in the European Community by Regulation (eec) No 
1432/92, and unsc Resolution 820 (1993) which was implemented by Regulation (eec) No 
990/93. The Court determined that the impoundment was in compliance by Ireland with 
its legal obligation under Article 8 of Regulation (eec) No 990/93 flowing from its mem-
bership of the European Community. To establish the extent to which a State’s action was 
in compliance with obligations that flow from its membership of an international organi-
zation to which it has transferred part of its sovereignty, the Court noted that absolving 
the member States completely from their Convention responsibility in the areas covered 
by such transfer would run counter to the purpose and object of the Convention. The 
Court considered the State to retain liability under the Convention for treaty commit-
ments subsequent to the entry into force of the Convention. The Court took the view: 
“State action taken in compliance with such legal obligations is justified as long as the 
relevant organisation is considered to protect fundamental rights, as regards both the 
substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance, in a 
manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention 
provides: By ‘equivalent’ the Court means ‘comparable’; any requirement that the organi-
sation’s protection be ‘identical’ could run counter to the interest of international coop-
eration pursued […]. However, any such finding of equivalence could not be final and 
would be susceptible to review in the light of any relevant change in fundamental rights 
protection” (para 155). The Court created the so-called Bosphorus Presumption: “If such 
equivalent protection is considered to be provided by the organisation, the presumption 
will be that a State has not departed from the requirements of the Convention when it 
does no more than implement legal obligations flowing from its membership of the or-
ganisation. However, any such presumption can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a 
particular case, it is considered that the protection of Convention rights was manifestly 
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of States in complaints about acts of international organizations and their in-
ternational administrative tribunals:
In Gasparini, the Court deducted from the principles developed in the 
Bosphorus case that, when transferring part of their sovereign powers to 
an international organization of which they are a member, Contracting 
Parties to the Convention were under an obligation to monitor that the 
rights guaranteed by the Convention received within that organization 
an “equivalent protection” to that secured by the Convention system. In 
fact, a Contracting Party’s responsibility under the Convention could be 
engaged if it subsequently turned out that the protection of fundamental 
rights offered by the international organization concerned was “mani-
festly deficient” […]. Conversely, an alleged violation of the Convention 
was not attributable to a Contracting Party because of a decision or 
measure emanating from an organ of an international organization of 
which it is a member where it has not been established nor even been 
alleged that the protection of fundamental rights generally offered by the 
said international organization was not “equivalent” to that secured by 
the Convention and where the State concerned neither directly nor indi-
rectly intervened in the commission of the impugned act.91
The Court then applied its case law to the Perez case and held that the mere 
fact that the impugned decision that was reviewed under the United Nations 
internal justice system took place in Germany where the applicant worked and 
resided does not bring the impugned act within the ECtHR’s jurisdiction for 
the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. Regarding the alleged violation of 
Article 6 (1) of the Convention for denial of access to German courts, the Court 
reiterated:
[I]t would be incompatible with the purpose and object of the Conven-
tion if the Contracting States, by attributing immunities to international 
organizations, were absolved from their responsibility under the Conven-
tion in relation to the field of activity covered by such attribution. This 
applies, in particular, to the right of access to the courts in view of the 
prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial 
deficient. In such cases, the interest of international cooperation would be outweighed by 
the Convention’s role as a ‘constitutional instrument of European public order’ in the 
field of human rights” (para 156).
91 Ibid., para 62 (citations omitted).
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[…]. It follows that the applicant was not estopped from holding Germa-
ny responsible for its alleged failure to grant her access to the domestic 
courts in order to have [their] employment dispute with the UN deter-
mined. Therefore, [their] application is compatible ratione personae with 
the provisions of the Convention in this respect.92
The ECtHR concluded that a complaint before the German Constitutional 
Court would have been an effective remedy but the applicant had failed to ex-
ercise that remedy regarding their complaint about the alleged deficiency of 
the United Nations internal justice system.
The conclusion that could be drawn from the case law of the ECtHR is that 
if an international organization is not a signatory to the Convention, then it 
cannot be held accountable by the Court for alleged violation of the echr. 
Applications against international organizations are, therefore, inadmissible 
ratione personae. An application that challenges the internal justice system of 
an international organization as incompatible with the echr is not attributa-
ble to its member States unless they have intervened in the dispute or the sys-
tem is not equivalent to the standards of the echr. The Court recognizes the 
need for the independence of international organizations and therefore re-
spects their jurisdictional immunity where they provide an alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism. Under some circumstances, the ECtHR will respect 
the jurisdictional immunity of an international organization even in the ab-
sence of an alternative recourse or remedy for an aggrieved party. This is 
 usually the case with international organizations whose member States in-
clude States that are not parties to the echr. When applicants want to chal-
lenge the acts or decisions of international organizations before the ECtHR, 
they usually do so by invoking the responsibility of the host State of the inter-
national organization, or the responsibility of the member States of the 
 international organization for the deficiency in the internal dispute resolution 
mechanism.
5 Conclusion
The case law of international and national courts demonstrates that the right 
of access to court is not absolute and may be legitimately limited by jurisdic-
tional immunity. It is widely recognized that jurisdictional immunity of inter-
national organizations serves a legitimate purpose. Some courts consider the 
92 Ibid., para 93.
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availability of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in their  determination 
of whether to uphold jurisdictional immunity. However, the absence of such a 
mechanism does not always equate to a violation of the right of access to court. 
Courts are still struggling with striking the right balance between the need to 
maintain the independence of international organizations through jurisdic-
tional immunity and the need to offer redress to those aggrieved by the inter-
national organization. Because of their jurisdictional immunity, proceedings 
against international organizations can only be brought before administrative 
tribunals which have very limited jurisdiction. Currently, administrative tribu-
nals are only available for the resolution of employment related disputes be-
tween international organizations and their employees.
Recourse is usually had to arbitration for the resolution of commercial 
and other contractual disputes. Although arbitral panels are not considered 
courts established by law, they are acceptable as an alternative to dispute 
resolution by such courts. An alternative dispute resolution mechanism for 
disputes of a tortious nature involving third parties is still lacking. Absence 
of redress for victims of tort by international organizations may constitute 
an accountability gap or denial of justice, but proceedings in national courts 
are not the ideal way to address them. It is also worth considering whether 
to expand the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals to also hear such cases. 
Availability of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms serves as a counter-
balance to jurisdictional immunity and a reasonable compromise to access 
to court.
Reference List
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into 
force 21 October 1986) 1520 unts 217.
Amaratunga v Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, 2013 scc 66, [2013] 3 scr 866 
(Can.).
American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into 
force 18 July 1978) 1144 unts 143.
b.d. v General Secretariat of African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, Court of Ap-
peals of Brussels, 27 February 2007.
Beer and Regan v Germany App No 28934/95 (ECtHR, 18 February 1999).
Behrami v France App No 71412/01 (ECtHR, 2 May 2007).
Beygo v 46 Member States of the Council of Europe App No 36099/06 (ECtHR,16 June 
2009).




Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland App No 45036/98 
(ECtHR, 30 June 2005).
‘Brief for the United Nations as Amicus Curiae’ (1980) United Nations Juridical Year-
book 227.
Broadbent v Organization of American States, 628 F.2d 27 (US).
Connolly v 15 Member States of the European Union App No 73274/01 (ECtHR, 9 
 December 2008).
Constitution of Japan 1947.
Constitution of the Republic of Italy 1947.
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996.
Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency (signed 30 May 1975, 
entered into force 30 October 1980) 1297 unts 161.
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies (adopted 21 
November 1947, entered into force 2 December 1948), 33 unts 261 (Specialized 
Agencies Convention).
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (adopted 13 Febru-
ary 1946, entered into force 17 September 1946) 1 unts 15 (General Convention).
Degboe v African Development Bank, Court of Appeal of Paris, 7 October 2003.
Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Com-
mission on Human Rights (Advisory Opinion) [1999] icj Rep 62 (Cumaraswamy 
Case).
Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal 
(Advisory Opinion) [1954] icj Rep 47.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 unts 221.
Fabio Liaci v European Patent Organisation, iloat Judgment No 1964 (2000).
Gasparini v Italy and Belgium App No 10750/03 (ECtHR, 12 May 2009).
General Secretariat of African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States v b.d., Belgian 
Court of Cassation, 21 December 2009, No C.07.0407.F.
General Secretariat of African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States v Lutchmaya, Bel-
gian Court of Cassation, 21 December 2009, No C.03.0328.F.
Georges v United Nations, 834 F 3d 88 (2d Cir. 2016).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, en-
tered into force 23 March 1976) 99 unts 171.
International Labour Organization, ‘Membership (ilo Administrative Tribunal)’ (ilo) 
<https://www.ilo.org/tribunal/membership/lang--en/index.htm> accessed 20 Feb-
ruary 2020.
International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement (adopted 22 July 1944, signed and 
entered into force 27 December 1945) 2 unts 39.
International Organizations Act 1968 (UK).
53Jurisdictional Immunity versus the Right of Access to Court
<UN>
International Organizations Immunities Act 22 usc § 288 (USA).
Klausecker v Germany App No 415/07 (ECtHR, 29 January 2015).
Lutchmaya v General Secretariat of African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, Brus-
sels Labor Court, March 4, 2003, Journal des Tribunaux, 2003, 684–687.
Okeke E, Jurisdictional Immunities of States and International Organizations (oup 
2018).
Perez v Germany App No 15521/08 (ECtHR, 29 January 2015).
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) 
[1949] icj Rep 174.
r.k. v European Patent Organisation, iloat Judgment No. 2657 (2007).
Saramati v France App No 78166/01 (ECtHR, 2 May 2007).
Siedler v Western European Union, Belgian Labor Court of Appeals, Brussels, 17 Septem-
ber 2003, Journal des Tribunaux 2004, 617.
Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization (il-
oat) <https://www.ilo.org/tribunal/about-us/WCMS_249194/lang--en/index.htm> 
accessed 27 February 2020.
Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations (UN Administrative Tri-
bunal) <https://untreaty.un.org/UNAT/Statute.htm> accessed 27 February 2020.
Statute of the World Bank Administrative Tribunal (wbat) <https://tribunal.world-
bank.org/statute> accessed 27 February 2020.
Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v the Netherlands App No 65542/12 (ECtHR, 
8 October 2012).
United Nations General Assembly Fifth Committee, ‘Review of the Efficiency of the 
Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations’ (24 April 1995) UN 
Doc A/C.5/49/65.
United Nations General Assembly Res 63/253 (24 December 2008) UN Doc 
A/RES/63/253.
United Nations General Assembly Res 351 A (iv) (24 November 1949) UN Doc 
A/RES/351(iv)A.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (unga Res 217A (iii), 10 December 1948) UN 
Doc A/810.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) 1155 unts 331.
Waite and Kennedy v Germany App No 26083/94 (ECtHR, 18 February 1999).
Western European Union (weu) v Siedler, Belgian Court of Cassation, 21 December 
2009, No S.04.0129.F.
World Bank, ‘Memorandum of the President’ (14 January 1980), Board Document 
R80-8.
© Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), ���1 | doi:10.1163/9789004441033_004
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the cc-by-nc 4.0 License.
<UN>
Chapter 3
Breaking the Silence: Why International 
Organizations Should Acknowledge Customary 
International Law Obligations to Provide Effective 
Remedies
Kristina Daugirdas and Sachi Schuricht*
Abstract
To date, international organizations have remained largely silent about their obliga-
tions under customary international law. This chapter urges international organiza-
tions to change course, and to expressly acknowledge customary international law 
obligations to provide effective remedies. Notably, international organizations’ obli-
gations to afford effective remedies need not precisely mirror States’ obligations to 
do so. Instead, international organizations may be governed by particular customary 
international law rules. By publicly acknowledging obligations to afford effective rem-
edies, international organizations can influence the development of such particular 
rules. In addition, by acknowledging obligations to afford effective remedies—and by 
actually providing effective remedies—international organizations can rebut argu-
ments that they are above the law, and can help to retain support for their jurisdic-
tional immunities.
1 Introduction
Individuals and other private actors who have been harmed by international 
organizations usually will not get very far if they seek recourse in national 
courts. Immunity typically shields international organizations from such legal 
* Kristina Daugirdas, Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School, kdaugir@
umich.edu; Sachi Schuricht, Associate at Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, sschur@umich.
edu. The views presented in this chapter are those of the authors alone and do not necessar-
ily represent the views of the firm or its clients. The authors would like to thank Monica 
Hakimi, Steve Ratner, and Peter Quayle for their helpful comments.
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process.1 In some cases, these private actors have recourse to other forums or 
mechanisms for resolving disputes and challenging the conduct of interna-
tional organizations. Employees of individual organizations can turn to ad-
ministrative tribunals.2 Parties who have entered into contracts with interna-
tional organizations may be able to invoke the arbitration or other dispute 
resolution mechanisms written into their contracts.3 Individuals harmed by 
the acts or omissions of multilateral development banks may be able to turn to 
specialized accountability mechanisms like the World Bank Inspection Panel 
(wbip).4 Individuals subject to the United Nations (UN) Security Council’s 
isil and Al-Qaida targeted sanctions regime may enlist the Office of the Om-
budsperson to challenge their designation.5 But many individuals harmed out-
side of the employment and commercial contexts do not have any avenue to 
seek recourse from international organizations.
There are many policy reasons for international organizations to develop 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to fill this remedial gap. Back in 
1954, the International Court of Justice (icj) observed that establishing an ad-
ministrative tribunal,
to do justice between the [United Nations] and its staff members was es-
sential to ensure the efficient working of the Secretariat, and to give ef-
fect to the paramount consideration of securing the highest standards of 
efficiency, competence, and integrity.6
Several decades later, Ibrahim Shihata, the former General Counsel of the 
World Bank, argued that the wbip would improve “the efficiency of the Bank 
and of development finance in general”.7 Finally, as international  organizations’ 
1 Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance 2014, 96 (“igos enjoy absolute immunity from na-
tional courts, granted to them either in headquarters agreements with host States or in the 
constituent treaties that bind all State parties”).
2 Kingsbury and others 2005, 20; Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance 2014, 168–171.
3 Schmitt 2017, 179–183.
4 Suzuki and Nanwani 2005, 206–219.
5 See United Nations Security Council (unsc), ‘Ombudsperson to the isil’.
6 icj, Effect of Awards 1954, 57.
7 Shihata 1994, 114–115 (“[T]he mere presence of the Panel is likely to make the Bank staff more 
diligent in the observance of Bank policies. […] Since these policies and procedures are 
meant to ensure quality in the Bank-financed projects and to serve broader institutional ob-
jectives approved by Bank members (through the Executive Directors), the greater attention 
paid to them can only serve the Bank, its members as a whole, and in particular the borrow-
ers concerned. Inspection can also raise issues not otherwise known or appreciated and may 
cause the Bank to adopt more effective or clearer standards in the pursuit of its objectives. In 
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lawyers have themselves recognized, international organizations’ immunity is 
vulnerable when injured individuals lack access to alternative dispute settle-
ment mechanisms.8
In addition, international organizations may have legal obligations to de-
velop such mechanisms. One possible source of such obligations is customary 
international law. Section 2 explains that there is a strong argument that cus-
tomary international law binds international organizations. That said, scholars 
of international law continue to debate whether all or only some customary 
rules bind international organizations. Moreover, international organizations 
have been, on the whole, conspicuously reluctant to acknowledge these obli-
gations in public statements. In any event, applying customary international 
law norms to international organizations is not entirely straightforward. In 
some cases, rules that were developed mainly by and for States must be adapt-
ed to account for differences between international organizations and States 
and for differences among international organizations.
Section 3 addresses States’ obligations to afford effective remedies to indi-
viduals who have been harmed by violations of human rights law. This section 
considers the extent to which these obligations have hardened into customary 
international law and, if so, what exactly they require of States. As evidenced 
by States’ treaty obligations, effective remedies have both procedural and sub-
stantive elements. The precise contours of the obligations, however, are not 
well defined and States retain significant discretion in crafting such remedies. 
Moreover, effective remedies are not ‘one size fits all’; the necessary compo-
nents will depend to some degree on which right is violated and the gravity of 
the violation.
Section 4 considers how an obligation to provide effective remedies might 
apply to—and be adapted for—international organizations. International or-
ganizations’ customary law obligations need not precisely mirror States’ obli-
gations. Instead, international organizations may be governed by particular 
customary international law rules. Most significantly, this section argues that 
the process, it can enhance the awareness of the borrowers of deficiencies in their own pro-
cesses and attitudes that need to be corrected […]. The end result should increase the effi-
ciency of the Bank and of development finance in general”). See also Benvenisti, The Applica-
bility of the Law of Occupation 2019 (focusing on UN-led instances of territorial administration 
and arguing that “accountability is not a burden on functionality. Rather, accountability en-
hances functionality, and in fact, it is necessary for ensuring functionality”).
8 See, for example, Amerasinghe 1982; Kwakwa 2010, 600; Martha 2012, 93–94; ibid, 125 (“[M]ost 
of the calls for eliminating or restricting the immunities of international organizations in-
voke the absence of alternative dispute-settlement mechanisms for noncontractual disputes 




the scope of international organizations’ obligations to provide effective rem-
edies may well be broader than those of States for two reasons. Such particular 
customary rules may build on treaty obligations that require international 
 organizations to develop alternative dispute settlement mechanisms in cases 
that do not necessarily involve a violation of international law. In addition, 
such norms may develop from the practice of international organizations—
like the wbip and similar institutions at other multilateral development 
banks—that likewise provide remedies to individuals who have been harmed 
in instances that may not involve a violation of international law.
Section 5 urges international organizations to not only afford effective 
 remedies—but to expressly acknowledge a customary international law obli-
gation to do so. The International Law Commission (ilc) recently affirmed 
that international organizations can contribute to the development of custom-
ary international law.9 By speaking out about their obligations to afford effec-
tive remedies, international organizations can actively shape the development 
of customary international law in this area. Moreover, such engagement can 
help to ensure the sustainability of international organizations’ immunities. 
The perception that international organizations are above the law erodes their 
legitimacy—and in particular, support for their immunity.10 By publicly ac-
knowledging legal obligations to afford effective remedies—and ensuring that 
they do indeed provide effective remedies—international organizations can 
better defend against such charges.
2 International Organizations’ Obligations Under Customary 
International Law
In some cases, international organizations have express treaty obligations to 
develop alternative mechanisms for resolving disputes that cannot be resolved 
by national courts on account of their jurisdictional immunity.11 Often, 
9 ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law’ 2018, conclu-
sion 4(2) (“In certain cases, the practice of international organizations also contributes to 
the formation, or expression, of rules of customary international law”).
10 Boon 2016, 375 (“[A]s a matter of public legitimacy, the UN must not be seen to be above 
the law”); Daugirdas, ‘Reputation and Responsibility’ 2014, 1007–1009. For examples in the 
popular press, see Yeoman, 27 September 2018; Rosen, 26 February 2013 (“The organiza-
tion is functionally above the law—and victims of Haiti’s cholera outbreak aren’t the only 
ones paying the price”).
11 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (General Conven-
tion), art viii, s 29; Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agen-
cies (Specialized Agencies Convention), art ix, s 31; see also Berenson 2012, 139 (describing 
multilateral and bilateral agreements that the Organization of American States has 
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 however, such treaty obligations are limited or nonexistent. As a result, any 
cross-cutting obligation to afford effective remedies must come from another 
source of law. The most promising candidate is customary international law.12 
But to what extent does customary international law bind international or-
ganizations? It turns out that the answer to this question remains somewhat 
contested.
Arguments that customary international law binds international organiza-
tions often reference a 1980 advisory opinion of the icj concerning the legality 
of efforts to relocate the regional office of the World Health Organization 
(who) in Alexandria, Egypt.13 Egypt had protested that the proposed reloca-
tion would violate a 1951 bilateral treaty between itself and the who. In the 
course of a paragraph that makes the obviously correct and rather trivial point 
that international organizations lack an absolute right to select the location of 
their offices, the Court wrote:
International organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, 
are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules 
of international law, under their constitutions or under international 
agreements to which they are parties.14
Paraphrasing this sentence, many scholars have affirmed that customary 
 international law binds international organizations.15 Others have expressed 
doubts, citing the lack of practice to support this conclusion, or taking the po-
sition that the icj was referring to only a subset of customary international law 
rules.16 After all, the statement that international organizations are bound by 
concluded); Reinisch, ‘Immunity’ 2008, 288 (describing the International Atomic Energy 
Agency’s headquarters agreement with Austria).
12 The charters of individual organizations may also be sources of such obligations; so too 
may be other international agreements to which organizations are parties, such as the 
specialized agencies’ relationship agreements with the United Nations. See, for example, 
Verdirame 2011; Skogly 2001. The literature on global administrative law suggests some 
possibilities outside the traditional sources of international law. See Benvenisti, The Law 
of Global Governance 2014, 91–137 (suggesting that such principles are binding based on 
‘rule of law’ principles, international human rights law, or trusteeship); Kingsbury and 
others 2005, 29 (proposing a ‘revived version of ius gentium’).
13 icj, Interpretation of the Agreement Between the who and Egypt 1980.
14 Ibid, para 37.
15 See Reinisch, ‘Accountability’ 2001, 136; Brunnée 2005, 40; Benvenisti, The Law of Global 
Governance 2014, 99; Shelton 2015, 46.
16 Alvarez 2007, 677; Klabbers 2017, 987; see also Wellens 2002, 1 (“As subjects of interna-
tional law, international organizations […] are subject to rules and norms of customary 
international law to the extent required by their functional powers […]”).
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“any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international 
law” leaves open the question of which obligations so qualify.17
For their part, most international organizations have said little or nothing 
about whether and to what extent customary international law binds them.18 
They have neither expressly rejected nor acknowledged the applicability of 
customary international law other than jus cogens norms.19
Some international organizations weighed in on this question several dec-
ades ago during the deliberations over the set of draft articles adopted by the 
ilc that were eventually codified as the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between Interna-
tional Organizations.20 A number of organizations sought to ensure that any 
rules resulting from this process could not bind them without their consent.21 
Some advocated against negotiating a treaty at all. Instead, they proposed that 
the General Assembly adopt the Commission’s draft articles “as a standard of 
reference for action destined to harden into customary international law”.22 
This proposal indicates that these organizations understood such customary 
rules would bind them; otherwise, their proposal does not make sense.
More recently, the ilc’s development of draft articles regarding the respon-
sibility of international organizations provided another opportunity for inter-
national organizations to address their obligations under customary interna-
tional law. The final set of articles, adopted in 2011, includes a provision that 
describes the elements of an internationally wrongful act of an international 
organization, indicating that there is such an act when “conduct consisting of 
an action or omission: (a) is attributable to that organization under interna-
tional law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that 
17 icj, Interpretation of the Agreement Between the who and Egypt 1980, para 37 (emphasis 
added).
18 Daugirdas, ‘How and Why’ 2016, 372–380; see also Benvenisti, The Applicability of the Law 
of Occupation 2019, 3–4 (describing the United Nations’ silence with respect to the legal 
framework that applies to UN-led administration of territories); Wellens 2002 (noting a 
long-established “reluctance by international organizations to acknowledge in explicit 
terms a legal obligation to comply with human rights”).
19 As defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (vclt), art 53, a jus cogens or 
peremptory norm is “a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same char-
acter”. See also Frowein, 2013.
20 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organiza-
tions or Between International Organizations, art 34.




organization”.23 The commentary elaborated on this second element, noting 
that the breached obligation may “result from either a treaty binding the inter-
national organization or from any other source of international law applicable 
to the organization”.24 The commentary then quotes the same indeterminate 
sentence from the who-Egypt advisory opinion, and notes that a “breach is 
possible with regard to any of these international obligations”25—that is, the 
obligations “incumbent upon [international organizations] under general 
rules of international law, under their constitutions or under international 
agreements to which they are parties”.26 Thus, the ilc did not stake out a posi-
tion on the question of which customary international law rules bind interna-
tional organizations.
In their comments to the ilc, participating international organizations gen-
erally agreed that jus cogens norms bind them. A handful said so explicitly, and 
none contested this conclusion.27 When it came to other customary interna-
tional law norms, however, the organizations that submitted comments did 
not embrace their application. No organizations directly rejected the view that 
customary international law binds them—but none directly acknowledged 
such obligations either.28 Some organizations did suggest that customary in-
ternational law had virtually no relevance for international organizations be-
cause their charters reflect lex specialis—or specific rules that displace the 
more generally applicable rules regarding the responsibility of international 
organizations.29 Take, for example, these comments by the International 
 Monetary Fund:
23 ilc, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations’ 2011, art 4.
24 Ibid, art 4, comm (2).
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Daugirdas, ‘How and Why’ 2016, 378–379 and n 301 (quoting comments from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the World Bank).
28 For a more detailed discussion of international organizations’ comments, see Daugirdas, 
‘How and Why’ 2016, 377–380.
29 The lex specialis principle provides that when both a general and a more specific rule 
govern the same subject matter, the specific rule should take precedence over the more 
general rule. Koskenniemi 2006, para 60 (“A special rule is more to the point […] than a 
general one and it regulates the matter more effectively […] than general rules. This could 
also be expressed by saying that special rules are better able to take account of particular 
circumstances. The need to comply with them is felt more acutely than is the case with 
general rules. They have greater clarity and definiteness and are thus often felt ‘harder’ or 
more ‘binding’ than general rules which may stay in the background and be applied only 
rarely. Moreover, lex specialis may also seem useful as it may provide better access to what 
the parties may have willed”). See also Daugirdas, ‘How and Why’ 2016, 347–348. Note that 
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[W]hen an organization acts in accordance with the terms of its constitu-
ent charter, such acts can only be wrongful in relation to another norm of 
international law if the other norm in question is either a “peremptory 
norm” ( jus cogens) or arises from a specific obligation that has been in-
curred by the organization in the course of its activities ([for example], 
by entering into a separate treaty with another subject of international 
law). However, vis-à-vis all other norms of international law, both the 
charter and the internal rules of the organization would be lex specialis as 
far as the organization’s responsibility is concerned and, accordingly, 
cannot be overridden by lex generalis, which would include the provi-
sions of the draft articles.30
It would be a mistake to interpret these comments as implying a categorical 
rejection of the view that customary international law binds international or-
ganizations.31 First, the lex specialis argument is limited to relations between 
international organizations and their member States: it does not affect the 
point that customary international law governs relations between internation-
al organizations and non-member States. Second, it is important to keep in 
mind that when States create lex specialis, they are not necessarily rejecting 
general international law. Sometimes lex specialis is an elaboration or specifi-
cation of an already-applicable, general international law rule. And even when 
States do create lex specialis to diverge from otherwise-applicable general in-
ternational law, general international law norms persist in the background. 
Those norms fill gaps and influence the interpretation of treaties—including 
constituent instruments that establish international organizations. Finally, 
treaties that create lex specialis are presumed to align with customary interna-
tional law unless States have made clear their desire to diverge from it.32 As a 
result, these rules are already implicit in international organizations’ charters 
except to the extent that their charters provide to the contrary.
In this context, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (aiib) is a 
 refreshing—and admirable—counterexample. The aiib website includes the 
following statement:
there are some limitations on States’ capacity to derogate from customary international 
law by creating lex specialis. Ibid, 346–347.
30 ilc, ‘Responsibility of International Organizations’, 1 May 2007, 5 (emphases added). For 
other examples of similar statements, see Daugirdas, ‘How and Why’ 2016, 378–379.




aiib is an international organization established by the aiib Articles of 
Agreement (entered into force on December 25, 2015), a multilateral trea-
ty, the Parties to which comprise the Membership of the Bank. Accord-
ingly, aiib is both constituted and governed by public international law, 
the sources of which include applicable international conventions, cus-
tomary international law, general principles of law and subsidiary means 
for the determination of rules of law.33
Just as the icj’s who-Egypt opinion raised questions about which rules are 
‘incumbent upon’ international organizations, the aiib’s statement on inter-
national law leaves unaddressed the question of which customary internation-
al law rules are ‘applicable’ to the aiib. But the acknowledgement of at least 
some customary international law obligations is notable nonetheless.
In prior work, one of the present authors sought to supply a firmer founda-
tion for the conclusion that the entire corpus of customary international law 
does indeed bind international organizations, at least as a default matter.34 
The argument goes, in short, that this conclusion holds regardless of whether 
one conceives of international organizations as peers of States on the interna-
tional plane (that is, as entities that exercise independent authority as both a 
formal legal matter and as a practical matter)35 or as vehicles through which 
States act.36 The reasons for the conclusion differ, however. On the peer view, 
customary international law automatically binds international organizations, 
just as it binds new States, by virtue of their status as members of the interna-
tional community.37 From the vehicle perspective, the underlying concern is 
that States will try to evade their international obligations by acting through 
international organizations. Here, treaty law supplies the relevant baseline: 
what States can do directly by treaty, they can do indirectly through an interna-
tional organization. And what States cannot do directly by treaty, they cannot 
do indirectly through an international organization.38 Thus, States cannot cre-
ate international organizations that are unbound by customary international 
law vis-à-vis non-member States because the pacta tertiis rule precludes States 
from using treaties to modify their international obligations to non-parties.39 
States can use treaties to create lex specialis and modify their customary 
33 aiib, ‘The Role of Law’.
34 Daugirdas, ‘How and Why’ 2016, 325.
35 See ibid, 359–365.
36 Ibid, 345.
37 See ibid, 357–359 and 365–368.
38 Ibid, 345.
39 The pacta tertiis rule is codified in the vclt, art 34 (“A treaty does not create either obliga-
tions or rights for a third State without its consent”). See also Chinkin 1993, 71 (“Treaties 
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 international law obligations to other parties—but, as noted above, treaties 
are generally interpreted to align with customary international law unless 
States have made clear their desire to diverge from it.40 Thus, when it comes to 
an international organization’s interactions with its member States, customary 
international law binds the organization except to the extent that the member 
States have clearly expressed their desire for the organization to diverge from 
it.41 In sum, customary international law binds international organizations to 
the same degree that it binds States: international organizations are not more 
extensively or more readily bound, nor are they less extensively or less readily 
bound.
3 States’ Obligations to Afford Effective Remedies
Numerous international human rights treaties expressly require States to af-
ford effective remedies to victims of human rights violations. There is a plausi-
ble, albeit not uncontested, argument that over the past several decades this 
obligation has—in at least some contexts—ripened into a norm of customary 
international law.
As a starting point, article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(udhr) provides that “[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by com-
petent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him 
by the constitution or by law”.42 Although the status of the udhr as a binding 
source of international law is unsettled,43 it is foundational to many other hu-
man rights instruments. Among those is the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (iccpr), which similarly obligates each State party to 
 provide effective remedies for violations of rights protected by that instru-
ment. Article 2(3) reads:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recog-
nized are violated shall have an effective remedy notwithstanding 
bind consenting parties only, and strangers to any treaty are legally unaffected by it. This 
is the classic rule of treaties and third parties […]”).
40 Daugirdas, ‘How and Why’ 2016, 347–348.
41 Ibid.
42 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (udhr), art 8.
43 Hannum 1996, 317–335 (summarizing varying customary treatment of the udhr, where-
by some States treat all of the articulated rights as customary international law while 
others consider only some of them binding).
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that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an offi-
cial capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have the 
right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or 
legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provid-
ed for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibili-
ties of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such reme-
dies when granted.44
Similar guarantees are found in other human rights treaties.45
Surveys of State practice have reached inconsistent results as to whether 
States consistently provide effective remedies for violations of human rights, 
and whether they do so with a sense of legal obligation. One survey of State 
practice in 1995 indicated that the right to an effective remedy was “not gener-
ally included in lists of customary human rights and [was] not the subject of 
significant domestic jurisprudence”.46 Likewise, in 2001, another scholar took 
the view that,
44 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr), art 2(3).
45 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (echr), art 13 (guaranteeing to “[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth 
in this Convention are violated […] an effective remedy before a national authority”); 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art 6 (obligating 
state parties to assure “effective protection and remedies, through the competent nation-
al tribunals and other State institutions […] as well as the right to seek from such tribunals 
just and adequate reparation or satisfaction”); American Convention on Human Rights, 
art 25 (“Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective re-
course, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his funda-
mental rights”; obliging state parties “(a) To ensure that any person claiming such remedy 
shall have his rights determined by the competent authority provided for by the legal 
system of the state; (b) To develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and (c) To ensure 
that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted”); Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art 47 (“Everyone whose rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy be-
fore a tribunal […]”). For a comprehensive discussion of relevant human rights instru-
ments, see Shelton 2015, 63–73.
46 Hannum 1996, 345; see ibid, 329–335 (noting that governments of the US, Denmark, Swit-
zerland, Australia and New Zealand had not specified whether article 8 of the udhr 
counts among the rights therein that qualify as customary international law, while offi-
cials from Singapore, China and Germany (and a court from South Africa) had made 
statements according less-than-binding status to the entire udhr).
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treaty practice as such does not yet provide a sufficiently broad basis for 
the conclusion that today access to effective judicial or administrative 
proceedings is an entitlement enshrined in general, [which is to say], cus-
tomary international law.47
However, other scholars have surveyed State practice over largely the same pe-
riod and concluded that States do recognize “the duty to provide a remedy to 
victims’ of human rights violations”.48 Notably, the most recent and compre-
hensive review of human rights remedies, completed by Dinah Shelton in 2015, 
recognizes that “national tribunals [are] hear[ing] and decid[ing] more cases 
alleging violations of international human rights norms”,49 “as states have in-
creasingly limited their governmental immunities and developed innovative 
responses to human rights violations”.50 Extensive work in this area led Shel-
ton to conclude that “[t]he right to a remedy is well established, even a norm 
of customary international law”.51 Other scholars, and some international 
courts, have reached the similar conclusion that treaty-based rights to reme-
dies reflect customary international law rules.52
If it is a customary international law norm, what does the obligation to pro-
vide an effective remedy require of States? International human rights instru-
ments that articulate a right to an effective remedy tend to employ vague terms 
47 Handl 2001, 52.
48 Bassiouni 2006, 218–221(surveying contemporary state practice as reflected in constitu-
tions, legislative proposals, and legal systems). The inconsistencies among these surveys 
may be due to changes over time and to the authors’ consideration of different source 
materials. For instance, Bassiouni’s survey included proposed legislation that had not yet 
been adopted by several States (Ibid, 218, n 67).
49 Shelton 2015, 91.
50 Ibid, 141.
51 Ibid, 238.
52 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), Aloeboetoe v Suriname (Repara-
tions) 1993, para 43 (describing Article 63(1) of the American Convention on Human 
Rights, which requires remedies for violations of human rights, as a codified rule of cus-
tomary law); cf Permanent Court of International Justice (pcij), Case Concerning the Fac-
tory at Chorzów 1927, 21 (describing the obligation to make adequate reparations as “a 
principle of international law” which applies regardless of its express articulation in a 
treaty). See also Reinisch, ‘Immunity’ 2008, 287 (suggesting that the obligation to provide 
a legal remedy is “implicitly contained in the customary international law prohibition of 
a denial of justice”); Bradlow, ‘Shield as a Sword’ 2017, 60–61; International Commission of 
Jurists 2018, 19 (noting that the “obligation is enshrined in so many international human 
rights treaties, and confirmed by international jurisprudence, that it can be considered to 
be an obligation of customary international law”).
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and do not enunciate specific modalities for providing recourse.53 While States 
have considerable discretion to design remedial mechanisms, it is clear that an 
effective remedy encompasses both procedural and substantive elements.54 
Many human rights instruments refer specifically to both procedural mecha-
nisms and substantive reparations.55 Some, most notably the iccpr, do not 
explicitly require substantive reparations, but UN treaty bodies have under-
stood even a general reference to an “effective remedy” as encompassing both 
procedural and substantive relief.56 As scholars have observed, these two ele-
ments are complementary: “a right of reparation is […] an empty victory if 
there is no corresponding mechanism to provide […] a forum to press a claim 
or obtain an award”.57
Importantly, what qualifies as an effective remedy will depend on the right 
that is violated, as well as on the gravity of the violation.58 With respect to 
 procedural relief, some instruments refer specifically to the development of 
judicial remedies.59 However, most refer more broadly to the provision of 
53 See Lasco 2003, 3 (observing that “many international human rights instruments […] pro-
vide rights in vague terms that allow each state to interpret ‘remedy’ as it sees fit”).
54 Shelton 2015, 58 (“Most texts guarantee both the procedural right of effective access to a 
fair hearing and the substantive right to a remedy”). The former element is often referred 
to as ‘the right of access to justice’ and the latter as ‘substantive redress’. Ibid, 17. How-
ever, some scholars understand these terms—and their relationships to one  another—
differently. See Schmitt 2017, 92–95 (discussing various conceptions of the right of ac-
cess to justice, and positing that “the right of access to justice […] concentrates on the 
procedural aspect while the [right to a remedy] focuses on the substantive result of the 
proceedings”).
55 echr, art 6.
56 Human Rights Committee (hrc), ‘General Comment No 31’ 2004, para 16 (as explained by 
the hrc in its interpretation of iccpr, art 2(3), “[w]ithout reparation to individuals 
whose Covenant rights have been violated, the obligation to provide an effective remedy 
[…] is not discharged”); pcij, Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów 1927, 21 (the pcij 
employed similar logic nearly a century ago, when it explained that the obligation to pro-
vide substantive reparations need not be spelled out in a treaty, for it is “the indispensable 
complement of a failure to apply” protections that are expressly articulated in a binding 
text).
57 Bassiouni 2006, 232; see also ibid (“One of the cornerstones of a victim’s right to repara-
tions is that States have an obligation to have some form of mechanism in place to redress 
violations of their international and domestic legal obligations”).
58 See International Law Association (ila) 2004, 37 (noting that “the procedural aspects of 
remedial action will vary amongst the different categories of potential claimants”); Inter-
national Commission of Jurists 2018, 77 (citing cases where the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) held that the right to a remedy, in echr, art 13, does not require a judicial 
remedy in all instances; rather, “the scope of the remedy varies with the right” at stake).
59 See iccpr, art 2(3)(b); unga, ‘Basic Principles’ 2005, princ 12 (recognizing “access to an 
effective judicial remedy” as part of the right to remedies); see also Shelton 2015, 96 
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‘ competent’ tribunals,60 which may include judicial, administrative or legisla-
tive authorities—or a combination thereof.61 Whatever the nature of the tri-
bunal, in order to provide effective procedural relief, the tribunal should be 
independent and impartial,62 widely accessible63 and capable of processing 
( “Access to justice means ensuring the possibility for an injured individual or group to 
bring a claim before an appropriate tribunal and have it adjudicated, increasingly this 
means by judicial proceedings”).
60 See udhr, art 8; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art 
6 (referring to “competent national tribunals and other State institutions”); Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, art 2(c) (referring to 
“competent national tribunals and other public institutions”).
61 hrc, ‘General Comment No 31’ 2004, para 15 (various UN treaty bodies have espoused a 
combination approach. For instance, in its interpretation of iccpr, art 2(3), the hrc 
stressed the importance of establishing both judicial and administrative mechanisms, the 
latter of which “are particularly required to give effect to the general obligation to investi-
gate allegations of violations promptly, thoroughly and effectively through independent 
and impartial bodies”); Committee on the Rights of the Child (crc), ‘General Comment 
No 16’ 2013, para 71 (as another example, in General Comment No 16 on State Obligations 
Regarding the Impact of the Business Sector on Children’s Rights, the crc stated that “[n]
on-judicial mechanisms, such as mediation, conciliation and arbitration, can be useful 
alternatives” to judicial process, but should be provided “without prejudice to the right to 
judicial remedy”).
62 See Bradlow, ‘Amicus Brief ’, 17 August 2016, 20–21 (reviewing the ECtHR’s decisions about 
“reasonable alternative means of remedy” and concluding that qualifying forums are con-
sistently ‘independent’ and ‘impartial’); International Commission of Jurists 2018, 16 and 
52; see also Shelton 2015, 96 (“[Access to justice] means the right to seek a remedy before 
a tribunal which is constituted by law and which is independent and impartial in the ap-
plication of the law”); ibid, 100–102 (discussing the meaning of independence and impar-
tiality in the context of international human rights law); Schmitt 2017, 108 (proposing 
“core institutional requirements” of the right of access to justice, including “the right to an 
independent and impartial ‘tribunal’ established by law”).
63 To ensure accessibility, information about the accountability mechanism should be dis-
tributed widely and resources should be allocated so that barriers (often a lack of finan-
cial resources or expertise) do not prevent those harmed from accessing procedural rem-
edies. See, for example, hrc, ‘General Comment No 32’ 2017 (interpreting iccpr, art 14 to 
require equality of access and equality of arms); unga, ‘Basic Principles’ 2005, princ 
12(a)-(d), 24 (encouraging states to publicly and privately disseminate information about 
available remedies and to provide assistance to victims to ensure that they can exercise 
their rights to remedies); see also International Commission of Jurists 2018, 71 (noting “a 
tendency towards recognition […] that an effective remedy implies a positive obligation 
… to assist those persons who do not have the means to access justice”); Bassiouni 2006, 
260–263 (discussing the duty on states to make known the availability of remedies for 
human rights violations and to ensure that victims can exercise their rights to such rem-
edies); Shelton 2015, 98 (observing that “most human rights tribunals have held that if the 
failure to provide legal aid interferes with the right to pursue legal remedies […] it is itself 
a human rights violation”).
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claims promptly.64 Finally, the tribunal should be empowered to render more 
than merely advisory opinions or recommendations.65
Much like the procedural component of the remedy, the nature of effective 
substantive relief depends on the circumstances of a given case.66 To a signifi-
cant degree, the substantive component of an effective remedy tracks the ele-
ments of reparations required for violations of international law.67 An effective 
remedy may involve restitution, or relief that restores the claimant to the same 
position occupied prior to the wrong; this is generally considered the most ef-
fective substantive remedy.68 When that is not possible, compensation can 
cover the cost imposed by the wrong.69 If those remedies are not effective, or if 
the wrong is particularly blameworthy, rehabilitation or satisfaction—such as 
a public apology, acknowledgment of misconduct, or expression of regret—
may be appropriate.70 For example, in the case of repeat or widespread wrongs, 
effective substantive remedies might include a guarantee of non-repetition or 
64 See, for example, unga, ‘Basic Principles’ 2005, princ 11(b); International Commission of 
Jurists 2018, 66 (reviewing ECtHR jurisprudence on the importance of promptness); Shel-
ton 2015, 102 (“The speed with which a remedy can be obtained may be relevant in assess-
ing its effectiveness”). Similarly, regional human rights conventions require the determi-
nation of rights and obligations “within a reasonable time”. See, for example, echr, art 
6(1); American Convention on Human Rights, art 8(1).
65 See, for example, unga, ‘Basic Principles’, 2005, princ 17 (encouraging states to provide 
“effective mechanisms for the enforcement of reparation judgments”); International 
Commission of Jurists 2018, 81 (“If the judicial power lacks the means to carry out its judg-
ments, the remedy cannot be considered to be effective”); Shelton 2015, 94 (discussing 
jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which requires 
remedies that are “sufficient, i.e. capable of redressing the violation” and not “discretion-
ary”); Schmitt 2017, 112 (emphasizing the importance of a tribunal with “the power to is-
sue binding decisions which may not be altered by non-judicial authorities”).
66 See, for example, icj, Avena Case 2004, para 119 (“reparation in an adequate form’ varies 
‘depending on the concrete circumstances surrounding each case and the precise nature 
and scope of the injury”); ila 2004, 35 (“With regard to the potential [substantive] out-
come of remedies, there seems to be a connection between the identity of the party seek-
ing redress, the kind of accountability involved, and the forum before which the remedial 
action has been brought”).
67 See Shelton 2015, 32 (“The law of state responsibility […] contains useful precedents for 
evaluating the nature and scope of remedies afforded in state practice”); see also ilc, 
‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ 2001, arts 
34–39 (addressing forms of reparation for injury, including restitution, compensation, 
and satisfaction).
68 Shelton 2015, 19, 33–34, 298, 307 (noting that restitution is the “preferred remedy” among 
regional human rights courts) and 384.
69 Ibid, 19 and 315 (describing compensation as “a substitute remedy”).
70 Ibid, 42–43, 394–397; see, for example, unga, ‘Basic Principles’ 2005, princ 18 and 21 (in-
cluding rehabilitation as a potential form of redress); hrc, ‘General Comment No 31’, para 
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public exposure of the truth.71 For grave breaches of human rights, the obliga-
tion to afford an effective remedy includes a duty of the State concerned to 
prosecute and punish the person responsible.72
Because the requirements of an effective remedy vary by context, and be-
cause States have significant discretion in shaping such remedies, it is difficult 
to discern consistent patterns in the type, amount, or frequency of reparations 
awarded.73 However, in her detailed survey of human rights remedies, Dinah 
Shelton has recognized “a growing consensus on minimum standards”74 of 
redress awarded by subsets of decision-making bodies. For instance, among 
international arbitral tribunals, compensation is “the most usual form of 
reparation”,75 although such tribunals regularly award various forms of sat-
isfaction as well.76 In the case of UN treaty bodies, such as the Human Rights 
Committee, recommendations for compensation are often accompanied by 
measures aimed at providing restitution and preventing reoccurrences.77 Last-
ly, while regional human rights courts differ widely in the specificity of their 
reparation decisions, they regularly consider compensation appropriate and 
are increasingly ordering or recommending restitution and satisfaction, when 
appropriate.78
16 (explaining that the reparations required under iccpr art 2(3) can involve “rehabilita-
tion and measures of satisfaction”).
71 See Shelton 2015, 22–24 (discussing restorative justice principles) and 112–120 (discussing 
the right to truth); Bassiouni 2006, 275–276 (discussing the right to truth).
72 Francioni 2007, 36–37.
73 Shelton 2015, 106 (noting latitude afforded to states in awarding reparations under inter-
national human rights instruments), 143 (noting discretion afforded to international arbi-
trators in awarding reparations, but also arguing that scholarly criticisms that such prac-
tice is “inconsistent, even incoherent” are “overstated”), 383 (acknowledging another 
scholar’s argument that “jurisprudence demonstrates the principle of the complete free-
dom of the judge or arbitrator, that there are no rules for reparations”), 376 (noting the 
“highly variable” and “unpredictable” awards by human rights tribunals).
74 Ibid, 19; see also ibid, 298 and 314 (noting consensus among international human rights 
bodies that restitution is the preferred remedy, but compensation, rehabilitation and sat-
isfaction may be afforded as a substitute).
75 Ibid, 146.
76 Ibid, 159 (noting that international arbitrators often award “[p]ecuniary satisfaction” and 
have begun to view declaratory judgments as another form of satisfaction).
77 Ibid, 196–200, 306 (noting various types of restitution recommended by the hrc) and 321 
(noting that UN treaty bodies “often call for compensation […] but never quantify the 
amount due”).
78 Ibid, 205–232 (discussing the ECtHR, which “continues to insist that it is for the states to 
choose the method of remedying the violation” but has “moved toward more of an em-
phasis on non-repetition of the violation and on restitution”, as well as the IACtHR, which 
frequently orders compensation and is increasingly insisting that states publicly acknowl-
edge violations), 307 (noting that both the European and Inter-American courts “now 
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In sum, effective remedies are not ‘one size fits all’. This point is especially 
important in evaluating how obligations to afford such remedies apply to in-
ternational organizations.
4 International Organizations’ Obligations to Provide Effective 
Remedies
The authors of this chapter are not the first to suggest that the customary inter-
national law obligation to provide effective remedies extends beyond States to 
international organizations.79 This chapter emphasizes three points, however, 
that have not garnered adequate attention. First, international organization 
are not simply passive recipients of customary international law rules; they 
have an active role to play in developing the rules that bind them. Second, in 
some cases, international organizations’ obligations with respect to effective 
remedies might diverge from States’ obligations. Just as distinct rules govern 
treaties to which international organizations are parties and the international 
responsibility of international organizations, so too there may be—or there 
may yet emerge—rules concerning effective remedies that are particular to 
international organizations. Third, the applicable rules may in some cases be 
further adapted for the circumstances of individual organizations through the 
development of lex specialis.
With the express support of a number of States and some international or-
ganizations, the ilc recently affirmed that international organizations can di-
rectly contribute to the development of customary international law.80 As the 
ilc put it, in certain cases, the practice and opinio juris of international 
 indicate that restitution is the preferred remedy where this is possible”), 385–388 (dis-
cussing evolution of the ECtHR’s reparations awards) and 396–399 (discussing the wide 
range of the IACtHR’s orders requiring satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition).
79 See, for example, Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance 2014, 110–111 (proposing that 
international organizations are “subject to at least basic human rights norms that require 
them to comply with procedural and due process obligations toward affected individu-
als”); Bradlow, ‘Shield as a Sword’ 2017, 60–61; ila 2004, 33 (noting that “[a]s a general 
principle of law and as a basic international human rights standard, the right to a remedy 
also applies to ios in their dealings with states and non-state parties’ and ‘may be seen as 
a norm of customary international law”); Schmitt 2017, 118 (“[A] customary law to estab-
lish administrative dispute settlement mechanisms is progressively emerging for interna-
tional organizations”).
80 Daugirdas, ‘Creation of Customary International Law’ forthcoming, 32.
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 organizations “as such” may give rise or attest to customary international law 
rules.81
There are several key areas of practice by international organizations, as 
such, that are directly relevant to establishing and assessing possible custom-
ary international law rules concerning effective remedies for violations of indi-
viduals’ rights under international human rights law. Most, if not all, interna-
tional organizations have established access to administrative tribunals to 
resolve employment disputes. These tribunals were established at least in part 
to vindicate individual rights under international law.82 The Security Council 
established the Ombudsperson for the Al-Qaida and isil sanctions regime fol-
lowing successful legal challenges and widespread criticism that the sanctions 
regime violated the human rights of designated individuals.83 And the Kosovo 
Human Rights Advisory Panel was specifically established to examine alleged 
violations of human rights by the UN Mission in Kosovo.84
This practice by international organizations could contribute to the devel-
opment of customary international law rules regarding effective remedies that 
apply to States and international organizations alike—but it may also, or alter-
natively, contribute to the development of rules that apply only to interna-
tional organizations, or only to subsets of them. There is room for the emer-
gence of such particularized rules with respect to international organizations’ 
obligations to provide effective remedies.
In its recent work on identifying rules of customary international law, the 
ilc affirmed the category of “particular customary international law” rules 
81 ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law’ 2018, concl 4; 
see also Daugirdas, ‘Creation of Customary International Law’ forthcoming, 1 (arguing 
this view is correct and supplying a fuller rationale for this conclusion).
82 See, for example, ilc, ‘Comments and Observations’ 2004, 31 (“The area in which the oas 
has had to respond to claims alleging violation of international law is labour relations. 
Indeed, the Organization’s decisions to establish an Administrative Tribunal in 1971 was, 
in part, based on the need to provide a forum for adjudicating those claims consistent 
with international standards of due process and additional standards established by the 
International Labor Organization”); Amerasinghe 1982 (“A second reason for the estab-
lishment of the [administrative] tribunal is […] a principle accepted in many national 
legal systems and reaffirmed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This principle 
requires that where administrative power is exercised there should be available machin-
ery, in the event of disputes, to accord a fair hearing and due process to the aggrieved 
party”); Kwakwa 2010 (addressing the “human rights obligations of international organi-
zations vis-à-vis their staff members” and responding to criticisms that existing mecha-
nisms for resolving disputes with staff members fail to satisfy those obligations).
83 See unsc, ‘Ombudsperson to the isil’.
84 Human Rights Advisory Panel, ‘Kosovo’ 2016, 3.
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that bind only a limited number of States, excluding those States that do not 
participate in the practice or assent to be bound by it.85 The Commission has 
limited its discussion to particular customary law that has emerged, or might 
emerge, among groups of States linked by geography or by common cause, in-
terest, or activity.86 This concept can likewise apply to international organiza-
tions as a category, or even to subcategories of international organizations.87 
Particular customary international law rules can thus account for differences 
between States and international organizations, as well as differences among 
international organizations. This kind of tailoring is especially appropriate in 
the context of obligations to provide effective remedies.
One important way that international organizations’ obligations may differ 
from those of States concerns the scope of international organizations’ obliga-
tions to provide effective remedies. Specifically, international organizations’ 
obligations may be broader than States’ obligations in that they apply not only 
to violations of human rights, but also to other instances where international 
organizations cause harm to private individuals.88
Two main bodies of practice support this claim. First, as noted above, some 
international organizations have express treaty obligations to develop alterna-
tive dispute settlement mechanisms when legal process is blocked in national 
courts on account of the organizations’ jurisdictional immunities.89 For exam-
ple, the ‘Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations’ 
(General Convention) and the ‘Convention on the Privileges and Immunities 
of the Specialized Agencies’ (Specialized Agencies Convention) contain near-
identical language in this regard. Article viii, Section 29 of the former 
provides:
85 ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law’ 2018, concl 16 
and related comm.
86 Ibid.
87 Daugirdas, ‘Creation of Customary International Law’ forthcoming, 10–11 (suggesting that 
particular customary international law rules might emerge that apply specifically to inter-
national financial organizations).
88 In some cases, States have treaty obligations to provide compensation for lawful activities 
that cause harm. See, for example, Ronzitti 2007, 115; Guttinger 2010.
89 General Convention, art viii, s 29; Specialized Agencies Convention, art ix, s 31; see also 
Berenson 2012, 139 (describing multilateral and bilateral agreements that the Organiza-
tion of American States has concluded); Reinisch, ‘Immunity’ 2008, 288 (describing the 
International Atomic Energy Agency’s headquarters agreement with Austria).
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The United Nations shall make provisions for appropriate modes of set-
tlement of:
(a) Disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private law 
character to which the United Nations is a party;
(b) Disputes involving any official of the United Nations who by reason 
of his official position enjoys immunity, if immunity has not been 
waived by the Secretary-General.90
Implementing these obligations, the United Nations has established proce-
dures for handling, among other things, disputes arising out of commercial 
agreements, including contracts and lease agreements; tort claims arising from 
acts within the Headquarters district in New York; and claims arising from ac-
cidents involving vehicles operated by UN personnel for official purposes.91
The second body of relevant practice includes the World Bank Inspection 
Panel (wbip) and similar institutions at other multilateral development 
banks.92 At the World Bank, this inspection mechanism is open to individuals 
who have been harmed by the Bank’s violations of certain of its own policies 
and procedures.93 These ‘safeguard policies’ address a range of environmental 
and social issues—but there is no explicit safeguard policy addressing human 
rights.94 Violations of these policies might constitute violations of internation-
al law—but there is no requirement that they do so. Notably, there are no trea-
ty provisions that expressly demand the establishment of the wbip or other 
similar mechanisms; instead, they have been established and refined based on 
90 General Convention, art viii, s 29; Specialized Agencies Convention, art ix, s 31.
91 UN, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’ 1995; see also Difference Relating to Immunity from 
Legal Process Verbatim Record (1998), paras 5–14 (explanation by the UN Legal Counsel of 
the remedial regime established by art viii, s 29 of the Convention).
92 For a description and comparison of these mechanisms, see Bradlow, ‘Comparative Study’ 
2005.
93 World Bank Inspection Panel Res No ibrd 93–10 & Res No ida 93–6, 22 September 1993, 
para 12 (“The affected party must demonstrate that its rights or interests have been or are 
likely to be directly affected by an action or omission of the Bank as a result of a failure of 
the Bank to follow its operational policies and procedures with respect to the design, ap-
praisal and/or implementation of a project financed by the Bank […] provided in all cases 
that such failure has had, or threatens to have, a material adverse effect”).
94 World Bank Operational Manual, op 4.10. There is a reference to human rights in Opera-
tional Policy 4.10 regarding Indigenous Peoples, which notes at the outset that the policy 
“contributes to the Bank’s mission of poverty reduction and sustainable development by 
ensuring that the development process fully respects the dignity, human rights, econo-
mies, and cultures of Indigenous Peoples”.
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‘ practice and necessity’.95 And although they are not identical, the resulting 
inspection mechanisms converge across institutions to a significant degree.96
While particular customary international law can tailor rules to internation-
al organizations as a group, or to certain groups of international organizations, 
it bears emphasis that there is some further room for tailoring obligations to 
individual organizations. As noted above, customary international law rules 
bind international organizations as a default matter; as a result, member States 
have some capacity to alter the applicable customary international law rules 
by creating lex specialis.97 Because States are not permitted to alter customary 
international law rules on human rights to the detriment of beneficiaries, this 
route is not available to eliminate altogether the obligation to afford effective 
remedies.98 This route is available, however, to further specify the details of 
individual organizations’ obligations to afford effective remedies.
Whether international organizations’ practice with respect to providing al-
ternative remedies adds up to a rule of particular customary international law 
ultimately depends not only on the consistency of this practice across interna-
tional organizations (or some subset of international organizations), but also 
on the motivations for that practice—specifically, whether it is undertaken 
with a sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris. For this reason, it matters not 
only what international organizations do, but what they say about why they do 
it. The next section urges international organizations to say more.
5 Breaking the Silence
International organizations ought to not only ensure that they have in place 
dispute settlement mechanisms that satisfy the procedural and substantive re-
quirements of effective remedies—but also acknowledge customary interna-
tional law obligations to do so. By publicly engaging in discourse about their 
95 Boisson de Chazournes 2012, 174.
96 Ibid.
97 See Daugirdas, ‘How and Why’ 2016, 347–348, and accompanying text for n 40–41.
98 Koskenniemi 2006, paras 108–109; Bradley and Gulati 2010, 211–212; ibrd Articles of 
Agreement, art iv, s 10. This point is especially important when considering the impact on 
customary obligations, if any, of language prohibiting political activity in the constituent 
instruments of numerous multilateral development banks. For the World Bank, the rele-
vant language is that, “The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs 
of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character 
of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant 
to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to 
achieve the purposes stated in Article i”.
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international obligations to afford effective remedies, international organiza-
tions can actively shape the development of customary international law in 
this area, counter the narrative that their immunities place them above the 
law, and bolster their reputations and their legitimacy.
International organizations’ effectiveness depends, in part, on their reputa-
tions and perceptions of their legitimacy.99 One important aspect of interna-
tional organizations’ reputations—and by extension their legitimacy—is their 
reputation for legality.100 In a narrower sense, a reputation for legality depends 
on compliance with legal obligations. Perhaps one motivation for internation-
al organizations’ silence with respect to their obligations to afford effective 
remedies (and their obligations under customary international law more gen-
erally) is the desire to preserve their reputations for legality. Just as, for exam-
ple, States might avoid putting their reputations for compliance on the line by 
becoming parties to certain treaties, so too might international organizations 
try to avoid risking their reputations for compliance by not acknowledging ob-
ligations under customary international law.
Such an approach is misguided and ultimately self-defeating. To start, inter-
national organizations do not insulate themselves from charges that they are 
non-compliant by not acknowledging the existence of binding obligations in 
the first place. Thus, for example, in the course of recent litigation challenging 
the immunity of the International Finance Corporation (ifc), which ultimate-
ly reached the United States Supreme Court in the case Jam v ifc, Daniel Bra-
dlow argued that the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman—the ifc’s variation 
of the wbip—does not qualify as an effective remedy.101 Moreover, in a broad-
er sense, a reputation for legality depends on adherence to rule-of-law values 
99 See Boon 2016, 375 (“[A]s a matter of public legitimacy, the UN must not be seen to be 
above the law”); Daugirdas, ‘Reputation and Responsibility’ 2014, 1007–1009. For examples 
in the popular press, see Yeoman, 27 September 2018; Rosen, 26 February 2013 (“The or-
ganization is functionally above the law—and victims of Haiti’s cholera outbreak aren’t 
the only ones paying the price”); see also Daugirdas, ‘Reputation as a Disciplinarian’ 2019, 
225–235.
100 Daugirdas, ‘Reputation and Responsibility’ 2014, 1012–1016; Daugirdas, ‘Reputation as a 
Disciplinarian’ 2019, 228.
101 Bradlow, ‘Amicus Brief ’, 7 August 2016, 17–18 and 22–23 (arguing that the Compliance Ad-
visor Ombudsman meets some but not all of the criteria for effective remedies: “It is ac-
cessible to all qualifying stakeholders and it is reasonably fair, although the complainant 
is not necessarily given an opportunity to respond to the evidence and arguments pre-
sented by the ifc’s management. It is not clearly impartial because the ifc’s Board and 
senior management retain final decision making powers. Moreover, it is not independent 
because the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman is appointed by and reports to the senior 
management of the ifc. In addition, it does not necessarily provide the complainants 
with a meaningful remedy because its findings and recommendations are non-binding”).
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and norms.102 When international organizations fail to provide effective rem-
edies, they are vulnerable to the charge that they are above the law, or that they 
are abusing their immunities—and as a result, their reputations for legality in 
the broader sense remain at risk.103
Separately, although the trend is not universal, courts that are asked to up-
hold the immunity of international organizations are increasingly concerned 
not just with the existence—but also with the adequacy—of alternative dis-
pute settlement mechanisms.104 Sometimes the motivation for evaluating the 
adequacy of those mechanisms is ensuring compliance with the State’s own 
human rights obligations. Thus, for example, in Waite and Kennedy v Germany, 
the European Court of Human Rights held that,
[A] material factor in determining whether granting [the European Space 
Agency] immunity from German jurisdiction is permissible under the 
[European Convention on Human Rights] is whether the applicants had 
available to them reasonable alternative means to protect effectively 
their rights under the Convention.105
In other cases, the adequacy of alternative mechanisms may affect the policy 
decisions of national governments. When Jam v ifc reached the US Supreme 
Court, only one justice—Justice Breyer—was willing to uphold the absolute 
immunity of the ifc.106 Justice Breyer likewise emphasized the importance of 
adequate dispute settlement mechanisms. He observed that, if the alternative 
102 Hurd 2005 (describing the serious threat that Libya posed to the UN Security Council in 
part by portraying it as acting inconsistently with the rule of law in imposing sanctions in 
the wake of the bombing of Pan Am 103).
103 Berenson 2012, 145 (noting that abuse of immunities occurs “when international organi-
zations and their officials do not provide alternative independent means for recourse for 
claims against them”); see also Boon 2016, 375 (“[A]s a matter of public legitimacy, the UN 
must not be seen to be above the law”); Daugirdas, ‘Reputation and Responsibility’ 2014, 
1007–1009. For examples in the popular press, see Yeoman, 27 September 2018; Rosen, 26 
February 2013 (‘The organization is functionally above the law—and victims of Haiti’s 
cholera outbreak aren’t the only ones paying the price’).
104 See Reinisch, ‘Immunity’ 2008, 285 (observing that, when adjudicating cases involving the 
immunity of international organizations, “more and more national courts are […] looking 
at the availability and adequacy of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms”); Martha 
2012, 119–120 (describing such cases in Argentine courts).
105 ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy v Germany 1999, para 68. See also Singer 1995, 90–95; Treichl 
2019, 417–429 (describing relevant case law subsequent to Waite and Kennedy).
106 US Supreme Court, Jam v ifc 2019, dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer.
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mechanisms proved inadequate, the relevant statute allowed the US executive 
branch to set aside the organization’s immunity.107
International organizations that can credibly characterize their alternative 
mechanisms as satisfying customary international law standards with respect 
to the provision of effective remedies will be better able to defend those mech-
anisms as ‘adequate’—and thereby discourage national governments and na-
tional courts from evaluating adequacy on the basis of idiosyncratic or ‘chau-
vinistic’ criteria.108 Particular customary international law regarding effective 
remedies can supply standards that are not only international, but also tai-
lored to the specific context of international organizations.
As an example of constructive participation in the discourse about effective 
remedies, consider former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s commentary 
regarding the essential features of mechanisms for challenging the continued 
imposition of targeted sanctions by the Security Council. The routes available 
for challenging such sanctions have evolved over time. Initially, targeted indi-
viduals and entities were able to seek delisting only through their national gov-
ernments.109 Starting in 2006, they were able to make such demands directly 
through a ‘focal point’.110 For what is today the targeted sanctions regime for 
isil and Al-Qaida, targeted individuals and entities may present petitions for 
delisting to an Ombudsperson appointed by the UN Secretary-General.111 The 
Ombudsperson then gathers information from various sources and engages 
with the petitioner to explain the process and collect additional information if 
needed; ultimately the Ombudsperson makes a recommendation to the Secu-
rity Council to maintain or terminate the listing.112 If the Ombudsperson rec-
ommends delisting, the individual or entity will be removed from the sanc-
tions list unless, within 60 days, a committee of the Security Council members 
decides, by consensus, to retain the listing—or if the Security Council makes a 
decision to maintain the listing. To date, none of the Ombudsperson’s recom-
mendations have been overturned.113
Kimberly Prost, who served as the first Ombudsperson, has argued that the 
appropriate standard for evaluating the Ombudsperson process was articulat-
ed by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. In 2006, Annan set out what 
107 Ibid.
108 Prost 2017, 224.
109 Kingsbury and others 2005, 32 and 34.
110 Forcese and Roach 2010, 225 (recounting the evolution of the focal point and ombudsper-
son mechanisms).
111 unsc Res 1904, 17 December 2009, paras 20–21; unsc, ‘Ombudsperson to the isil’.
112 Ibid.
113 unsc, ‘Ombudsperson to the isil’.
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were, in his view, the minimum standards for ensuring that the procedures for 
listing and delisting individuals were “fair and transparent”.114 On the proce-
dural side, Annan explained, listed persons have a “right to be heard, via sub-
missions in writing, within a reasonable time by the relevant decision-making 
body […] as well as the right to be assisted or represented by counsel”.115 In 
addition, listed persons have a “right to review by an effective review mecha-
nism”, where effectiveness “will depend on its impartiality, degree of independ-
ence and ability to provide an effective remedy, including the lifting of the 
measure and/or, under specific conditions to be determined, compensation”.116
Prost praised Annan’s enunciation of these requirements as “carefully craft-
ed, taking into account realities of the practice of the Security Council and 
what might be achievable in that very particular context”.117 As for how the 
Ombudsperson mechanism measures up, Prost argued that the Ombudsper-
son mechanism “as designed and operating in practice to date fulfills the fun-
damental requirements of an effective review mechanism; one which provides 
an equivalent protection to judicial review by an independent tribunal”.118 The 
UN Secretary-General’s intervention didn’t preclude further debate about or 
criticism of the adequacy of the Ombudsperson mechanism.119 But, as Prost 
points out, Annan helpfully defined standards that were specifically tailored 
for an international organization, and that could—and ought to—anchor 
evaluations of the Ombudsperson mechanism.
When it comes to defining what constitutes an effective remedy in the spe-
cific context of international organizations, another valuable resource is the 
literature on global administrative law. This field focuses on “the mechanisms, 
principles, practices, and supporting social understandings that promote or 
114 unsc, ‘5474th Meeting’ 22 June 2006, 5.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 Prost 2017, 232.
118 Ibid, 233.
119 ecj, European Commission et al. v Yassin Abdullah Kadi 2013, paras 133–134. Most notably, 
in reviewing measures to implement Security Council sanctions, the Court of Justice for 
the European Union declined to accord any significance to the existence of the Ombud-
sperson mechanism because that mechanism did not guarantee effective judicial protec-
tion as it had been defined by the European Court of Human Rights, which asks whether 
the person concerned can “obtain a declaration from a court, by means of a judgment 
ordering annulment whereby the contested measure is retroactively erased from the legal 
order and is deemed never to have existed, that the listing of his name, or the continued 
listing of his name, on the list was vitiated by illegality, the recognition of which may re-
establish the reputation for that person or constitute for him a form of reparation for the 
non-material harm he has suffered”.
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otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies”.120 These 
principles and mechanisms include ex post review by judicial or other similar 
bodies121—as well as other complementary principles and mechanisms, such 
as transparency, reason-giving, and participation in decision-making.122 Schol-
arship in this area has devoted considerable attention to review mechanisms 
like the wbip, the UN Security Counsel Ombudsperson, and the ifc Compli-
ance Advisor Ombudsman.123 For example, Benjamin Saper argues that the 
ifc Compliance Advisor Ombudsman has advanced the interests of individu-
als affected by projects funded by the ifc by increasing the ifc’s responsive-
ness to these individuals—even though the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman 
lacks the authority to halt projects or to award compensation to injured 
individuals.124
Notably, while global administrative law can inform evaluations of the 
scope and content of customary obligations to provide effective remedies, the 
recognition of such obligations can also advance the aims of global adminis-
trative law. While scholars in the field have developed a normative case for the 
adoption of certain principles and mechanisms, they have devoted less atten-
tion to arguing that international organizations have legal obligations to do 
so.125 That said, they have recognized that locating such obligations in tradi-
tional sources of international law “may be the best way to maintain legal pre-
dictability and to sustain rule of law values in international relations”.126 Cus-
tomary international law obligations to provide effective remedies supply just 
that: a way to cement certain global administrative law principles in a tradi-
tional source of binding law that applies to international organizations.
To be sure, by engaging in discourse about their obligations to afford effec-
tive remedies, international organizations would face certain risks and costs. 
120 Kingsbury and others 2005, 17.
121 Ibid, 39–40; Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance 2014, 240–285.
122 Kingsbury and others 2005, 37–39; Stewart 2014 (distinguishing ex post accountability 
mechanisms from other related and complementary mechanisms).
123 See Kingsbury and others 2005, 39–40; Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance 2014, 
240–285; Saper 2012.
124 Saper 2012.
125 To the extent scholars have tried to ground global administrative law principles in bind-
ing sources of law, they have not focused on traditional sources and have not coalesced 
around any unified theory. Compare Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance 2014, 91–
137 (suggesting that such principles are binding based on ‘rule of law’ principles, interna-
tional human rights law, or trusteeship) with Kingsbury and others 2005, 29 (proposing a 
“revived version of ius gentium”).
126 Kingsbury 2005, 148.
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First, organizations will be constrained by their own legal arguments.127 Most 
importantly, having acknowledged legal obligations to afford effective reme-
dies, international organizations will need to confront the possibility that their 
existing accountability mechanisms fall short of any plausible interpretation 
of those obligations—and that those mechanisms need to be reformed ac-
cordingly. In addition, acknowledging customary international law obligations 
to provide effective remedies may increase pressure on international organiza-
tions to recognize other customary obligations, particularly obligations based 
on international human rights law. International organizations may also con-
front increased demands by individuals for compensation. At the end of the 
day, however, international organizations’ current approach is sure to be even 
more costly by eroding their legitimacy and support for their immunities.
Human rights advocates might raise a different objection—that by exhort-
ing international organizations to shape the customary international law rules 
that bind them, we are inviting international organizations to minimize their 
obligations. In our view, this risk is not significant. One feature of legal argu-
ments is that they are not infinitely elastic: implausible arguments about, for 
example, what constitutes an effective remedy will encounter vociferous ob-
jections from scholars, activists and UN special rapporteurs, among others.128 
Separately, there are countervailing advantages to international organizations’ 
express participation in discourse about their international obligations. By ac-
knowledging international obligations with respect to effective remedies, in-
ternational organizations would limit their discretion to ‘backslide’ by paring 
back or eliminating such mechanisms. This consequence is important in light 
of some member States’ limited enthusiasm for them.129 Finally, participation 
in the development of norms can bolster compliance with those norms. 
Anthea Roberts and Sandesh Sivakumaran made this point when addressing 
parallel concerns regarding their proposal that armed opposition groups be 
127 See generally Johnstone 2011. For example, Johnstone points out that a government’s (or, 
by extension, an international organization’s) rhetorical acceptance of a norm creates a 
“discursive opening” for critics to challenge its compliance with that norm, eventually 
inducing governments (or, by extension, international organizations) “to match deeds 
with words”. Ibid, 27.
128 Daugirdas, ‘Reputation and Responsibility’ 2014, 998 (noting the range of actors who par-
ticipate in transnational discourse in various forums about international organizations’ 
legal obligations and compliance with those obligations, and noting that that these actors 
can “initiate and perpetuate discussion, they can contribute new legal arguments or rel-
evant facts, and they can evaluate legal arguments”).
129 Bradlow, ‘Multilateral Development Banks’ 2019, 29–30 (noting the persistence of ten-
sions that independent accountability mechanisms created between borrower and credi-
tor member states of multilateral development banks).
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allowed to participate in the creation of international humanitarian law.130 
Giving ordinarily excluded groups a role in lawmaking affords them a sense of 
ownership in the law, which makes it psychologically easier for them to accept 
and respect those laws.131 Such participation can also help to assure that the 
rules that are established are rules with which regulated entities can realisti-
cally comply.132
6 Conclusion
As international organizations affect individuals in ever-expanding ways,133 it 
is increasingly apparent that alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are 
needed to protect and redress those harmed by these international actors. This 
chapter urges international organizations not only to establish such mecha-
nisms, but also to acknowledge customary international law obligations to pro-
vide effective remedies.
There are several benefits to recognizing a customary international law ob-
ligation on international organizations to provide effective remedies. From the 
perspective of international organizations, it offers a way to protect their exist-
ing immunities and to develop customary norms that are tailored specifically 
to them. From the perspective of international human rights law, it offers a way 
to apply human rights law to powerful, non-State actors—and increases the 
likelihood that those obligations will be implemented. And from the perspec-
tive of global administrative law, a customary obligation offers a way to cement 
accountability-promoting principles in a traditional source of binding law.
Recognizing this customary obligation is, of course, not costless. It may ex-
pose international organizations to increased pressures and demands for com-
pensation, and it might allow international organizations to water down the 
content of their obligations. The authors of this chapter are not blind to these 
costs. But we believe that the risks and costs of the status quo are even 
greater.
130 Roberts and Sivakumaran 2012, 126–127 and 151.
131 Ibid, 127; Blokker 2017, 10 (“Why should [international organizations] fully comply with 
rules of customary international law without being able to fully participate in its 
development?”).
132 Roberts and Sivakumaran 2012, 139; see also Prost 2017, 232 (noting this advantage with 
respect to the minimum standards articulated by former Secretary-General Annan in the 
context of Security Council targeted sanctions).
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Chapter 4
What is ‘International Administrative Law’? The 




This chapter examines the adequacy of using the term ‘international administrative 
law’ in international administrative tribunal decisions, and finds it wanting. Whilst it is 
accepted that there is a set of legal rules applied by administrative tribunals estab-
lished by international organizations to resolve employment-related disputes, it is mis-
leading to term this ‘international administrative law’. This chapter argues, both that 
‘international administrative law’ has a literal legal meaning more aptly applied to the 
unique treaty-based legal regimes of international organizations, and that ‘interna-
tional administrative law’ obscures uncertainty about the sources of law governing the 
employment relationships of inter-governmental institutions. This leads to confusion 
between substantive law and procedural law applied by international administrative 
tribunals together with a tendency to refer to ‘international administrative law’ when-
ever the tribunal could not clearly say what law they were applying.
1 Introduction
The notion of ‘international administrative law’ is frequently referred to 
by judges of international administrative tribunals (iats), as well as appli-
cants and respondents in the proceedings of those tribunals. Many seminars 
organized by iats use the term ‘international administrative law’.1 The notion, 
however, is far from self-explanatory. It surely depicts an important aspect of 
1 For example, a symposium organized by the imf Administrative Tribunal in April 2014 on the 
occasion of its 20th anniversary was entitled ‘The Future of International Administrative 
* Shinichi Ago, Professor at Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan, ago-law@fc.ritsumei.ac.jp. 
This chapter is written in my academic capacity, and not as a judge serving on the Asian De-
velopment Bank Administrative Tribunal. This chapter does not necessarily reflect the views 
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the legal relationship between international organizations and their employ-
ees, but the use of the term by iats has not been entirely clear.
Rather than being a lex specialis of the employment relations of interna-
tional organizations, the literal legal meaning of ‘international administrative 
law’ suggests instead a set of rules in international law that pertains mostly to 
the activities of international organizations in the execution of their man-
dates. This is a whole system of international procedural law, ‘administrating’ 
or ‘executing’ the substantive law of international organizations, which sup-
port international public interests. When the United Nations (UN) General As-
sembly establishes a subsidiary organ, such as the UN Development Pro-
gramme (undp) or a peace-keeping operation, it executes one of its mandates 
under the UN Charter and plays a role as the executive power of the organiza-
tion. The resolution establishing a subsidiary organ, in this case, is an interna-
tional institutional law with fully binding force, a substantive ‘international 
administrative law’, in other words. When the undp enters into a working 
agreement with a government or another international body, such as UN Spe-
cialized Agencies, or even with private enterprises in conducting its technical 
assistance activities, these agreements or contracts constitute procedural ‘in-
ternational administrative law’.
The UN Security Council decisions are the same. Being an executory organ 
of the UN, the Security Council is performing an administrative act by making 
decisions under Article 25 of the UN Charter, among others, to maintain peace 
and security. In the controversial case of Kadi v Commission, a decision by the 
UN Security Council judged by the Court of Justice of the EU to be infringing 
Mr. Kadi’s human rights (not properly heard before the confiscation of his as-
sets) was nothing but an ‘international administrative law’, a law enacted by a 
UN organ to execute its function of maintaining peace and security.2 All these 
decisions are ‘international administrative law’, in the literal legal sense of the 
term. If we accept the old theory of Georges Scelle of dėdoublement fonction-
nel, even an administrative act in the domestic legal system can also be an ‘in-
ternational administrative law’ at the same time.3 In other words, custom offic-
ers at the airport confiscating products being imported against the provisions 
of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fau-
na and Flora (known as the Washington Convention) are not only national 
Law: Harmonization? Fragmentation? Dialogue?’ <https://www.imf.org/external/imfat/pdf/
Symposium3.pdf> accessed 18 November 2019.
2 ecj, Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European 
Union et al. (2008).
3 Scelle, ‘Le phénomène juridique du dédoublement fonctionnel’ 1956.
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administrative officers exercising their domestic administrative power, but at 
the same time are agents of public international law, in this case the  Washington 
Convention. The customs officers would thus be executing ‘international ad-
ministrative law’.
iats, on the other hand, are judicial bodies that are not performing execu-
tive functions of the international organizations in a strict sense. Their deci-
sions are not administrative acts, but judicial ones and they are not applying 
‘international administrative law’ in its literal legal sense, but instead laws gov-
erning the employment relations within an international organization. Profes-
sor Amerasinghe correctly put in his treatise: ‘…the sources of international 
administrative law or the law governing employment relations in international 
organizations’.4
A debate on the literal legal definition of ‘international administrative law’, 
a debate that can be traced back even into the 19th century will be avoided 
here.5 Depending on the background, time and place, (internationales Verwal-
tungsrecht, diritto internazionale amministrativo, droit international adminis-
tratif), the meaning of the concept varies greatly.6
Properly, therefore, the notion of ‘international administrative law’ is closer 
to the concept of ‘international institutional law’7 or the so-called Global Ad-
ministrative Law (gal), proposed by a research group at New York University.8 
Both notions are based on the assumption that there is an international public 
interest (intérêt public international) or global governance which is adminis-
tered by a set of international rules. gal, as presented by Professors Kingsbury, 
Stewart and Krish, covers a wide range of phenomena that present ‘administra-
tive’ relationships among various stakeholders in the global society.9 In that 
sense, it may not be too wrong to assert that the ‘international administrative 
law’, as referred to by iats, is a small component of gal. Afterall, iats perform 
internal administrative functions in international institutions, with a view to 
maintaining integrity in their internal employment law system. As long as the 
4 Amerasinghe 1988, 102 (emphasis added). Although Chapters 5 to 15 of the book is under 
a section titled ‘Sources of International Administrative Law’, the ‘Introductory’ section of 
the book, Chapters 1 to 4, only use the term “employment relations in international or-
ganizations”, instead of “international administrative law”.
5 Yamamoto 1967.
6 Von Stein 1982, 23, 37; Rapisardi Mirabelli 1939; Scelle, ‘Theorie du gouvernement interna-
tional’ (1935).
7 Bowett 1970. However, Bowett’s concept of international institutional law is narrower 
than that of the author or Yamamoto (see Yamamoto 1967).
8 Kingsbury and others 2005; Kingsbury and Stewart 2012.
9 Kingsbury and others 2005.
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maintenance of internal employment law can be conceived as a part of inter-
national public interest, judges at iats are executing administrative functions, 
hence applying a part of gal. However, ‘international administrative law’ does 
not seem to be an appropriate term to define the laws applied by iats. The fact 
that iats are organs of an international administrative institution does not 
automatically lead us to conclude that they apply ‘international administrative 
law’ in its literal legal sense.
The chapter shall analyze where the problem lies and why this author is 
uncomfortable when judges refer to the notion of ‘international administra-
tive law’ in their decisions, under the following headings: Use of the Term ‘In-
ternational Administrative Law’ in the Judgments of iats (Section 2); Sources 
of ‘International Administrative Law’ (Section 3); Inaccuracy of the Term ‘In-
ternational Administrative Law’ (Section 4); and Application of ‘International 
Administrative Law’ in Practice (Section 5); before offering a conclusion 
 (Section 6).
2 Use of the Term ‘International Administrative Law’ in Judgments of 
iats
This section shall consider the use of the term ‘international administrative 
law’, firstly in the decisions of iats themselves; and second, by the respondent 
international organizations and applicant international civil servants appear-
ing before iats.
2.1 Reference in Various Decisions of iats by Judges
A short definition of ‘international administrative law’ (as referred to in iat 
decisions) is, for instance, given in a decision of the United Nations Dispute 
Tribunal (undt) in 2010, according to which “[i]nternational administrative 
law is the law which regulates the relationship between inter-governmental 
organizations and their staff members”—without going too much into detail.10 
This may be a correct definition of ‘international administrative law’ known to 
iats, but it is silent on the content of the concept. Similarly, the undt in a re-
cent decision stated:
The Respondent’s refusal to exercise [their] discretion in favour of the 
Applicant was based on the reasoning that the costing for retroactive 
promotion was too high and that payment of [a Special Post Allowance] 
10 undt, Samardzic et al. v Secretary-General of the UN 2010, para 20.
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meant that [their] obligations under international administrative law 
had been met. Such reasoning and considerations were a complete abdi-
cation of the Respondent’s responsibilities vis-à-vis the staff member and 
the correct position of international administrative law.11
The Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization (il-
oat) in a case against the European Patent Office (epo) mentioned:
The contract with [a collective insurance broker] is […] to be governed by 
a German statute of 1908 and by the Civil Code of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. But such legislation cannot affect relations between the epo 
and its staff, which are governed solely by its Service Regulations and the 
material rules of international administrative law.12
The World Bank Administrative Tribunal (wbat), likewise referred to the con-
cept of ‘international administrative law’:
Since according to well-established principles of international adminis-
trative law, grade should correspond to position and compensation 
should correspond to grade, the Respondent has not acted in violation of 
the Applicant’s terms of employment in adopting a two-year salary 
grandfathering.13
Most recently, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(ebrd) Administrative Tribunal stated:
The Tribunal deliberated the procedural aspects of the decision to termi-
nate the Appellant’s employment during the probationary period and 
concluded that the applicable law (Staff Regulations, the Staff Handbook 
and general principles of international administrative law) had been ap-
plied, and that the decision taken by the Bank was the exercise of its dis-
cretionary rights and the procedure applied was taken in compliance 
with the applicable law.14
11 undt, Elmi v Secretary-General of the UN 2016, para 38.
12 iloat, Kasperski v epo 1988, para 5.
13 wbat, Rosario Cardenas v ibrd 1988, para 21.
14 ebrdat, Applicant v ebrd 2019, para 62 (emphasis added).
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The judgments of iats also provide ample evidence of the widespread use 
of the term ‘international administrative law’ amongst the respondent interna-
tional organizations and applicant international civil servants before them, as 
we shall see in the next sub-section.
2.2 Reference by Respondents and Applicants
Respondents equally refer to the notion of ‘international administrative law’. 
In an iloat case, the respondent, the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (opcw) argued:
If the State Party does not reimburse the opcw for any national taxation 
which it has levied, the opcw will be compelled by international admin-
istrative law to reimburse the affected staff member for that amount.15
In a undt case, the counsel for the respondent,
submitted that a staff member’s conduct may extinguish any claim he or 
she may have concerning the legality of an administrative decision. A 
staff member may not approbate and reprobate, that is, ‘blow hot and 
cold’ and that the principles of waiver and estoppel are well-established 
principles of international administrative law.16
Applicants too, appear conversant with ‘international administrative law’. In a 
case of the undt, the applicant maintained that,
The Respondent’s reliance on the unifem Human Resources Selection 
Guidelines as a basis for the impugned decision is inconsistent with gen-
eral principles of international administrative law, and the United Na-
tions hierarchy of properly promulgated instruments.17
In an Asian Development Bank Administrative Tribunal case in 2017, an ap-
plicant requested: “A written, public apology by adb to the Applicant for the 
15 iloat, Mr M. L. v opcw 2003, para 19 (emphasis added).
16 undt, Ruyooka v Secretary-General of the UN 2013, para 86 (emphasis added).
17 undt, Alquzaa v Secretary-General of the UN 2018, para 4 (emphasis added).
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breach of his dignity due to him under the basic principles of international 
administrative law”.18
3 Sources of ial
While judges and the parties before iats constantly refer to the notion of ‘in-
ternational administrative law’, the Statutes or rules of procedures of iats 
themselves have been largely silent on this concept. This is unlike the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (icj), for instance, that enumerates clearly in its Statute 
the laws applied by the Court (in its Article 38). Professor Amerasinghe, after 
studying meticulously all the constitutive instruments of various iats, con-
cluded that: “The Statutes of iats which govern the powers of such tribunals 
are generally silent in regard to the detailed description of the sources that 
may be referred to in the application of law to the cases to be decided by 
them”.19 This classic text by Professor Amerasinghe has a whole chapter about 
possible sources of ial, from staff regulations, staff rules, statutes of tribunals, 
constitutive instruments, general principles of law, equity, municipal law, judi-
cial precedents, and so forth.20
Even if it is accepted that the constitutional instruments of iats do implic-
itly have those sources of law in mind, these enumerated sources are not help-
ful in knowing what sources judges at iats actually apply when they hear a 
case. True, they apply contracts of employment, but what legal principles they 
apply in interpreting the source is not clear. Are they the interpretation rules of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (vclt), or are they general prin-
ciples of law, as mentioned in the icj Statute? What seems to be crucial are the 
legal rules that are used to interpret these sources. More importantly, there 
seems to be a confusion about the use of ‘international administrative law’ as 
a group of norms from which legal rights emerge, on the one hand, and legal 
principles employed in interpreting or applying the sources of law, on the oth-
er. Some judicial decisions and references by both applicants and respondents 
are using the team ‘international administrative law’ to mean positive rules to 
be applied, be they employment contracts or Statutes of iats, but some others 
are using the term to show the background for their application, in other 
words, means by which they come to a legal conclusion or means for 
interpretation.
18 adbat, Mr. H v adb 2017, para 32(e) (emphasis added).
19 Amerasinghe 1988, 108.
20 Ibid, chs 5–15, 101–197.
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A concrete example could be given in this context: an applicant claims their 
contract of employment was unlawfully terminated. The Tribunal, after look-
ing into the facts, does not find proof that the management’s decision was 
wrong. However, by a comparison with another employee, who was in the 
same situation but was not terminated, the Tribunal found that the manage-
ment’s decision was discriminatory, rescinds the termination decision and or-
ders the applicant to be reinstated or be compensated. Here, the secondary 
source of law is the contract of employment, but the law applied by the Tribu-
nal to come to the conclusion (the primary rule) is perhaps a general principle 
of law or general international law. The contract of employment might be a 
source of law (secondary rule), but not a legal rule (primary rule) applied in the 
judgment.
Confusing the substantive law with the procedural law can easily be demon-
strated when case law is referred to as one of the sources of ‘international ad-
ministrative law’. A great number of iat decisions refer to the decisions of 
other tribunals or courts. The de Merode case21 by the wbat for example, has 
been cited in many iats.22 The interpretation methods used by the wbat to 
come to its conclusion in this particular case of de Merode cannot have refer-
enced earlier decisions, logically by being the very first in the wbat. It must 
have been derived from somewhere, but where?
iats have not been explicit in answering this question and they have tended 
simply to refer to ‘international administrative law’ whenever they could not 
clearly say what they were applying. When the ebrd Administrative Tribunal 
states, for instance: “The Tribunal also noted that there is no principle in inter-
national administrative law that imposes 100% of salary be paid in case of ser-
vice incurred illness”, the Tribunal appears to justify its decision by referring to 
‘international administrative law’ because otherwise it may be open to a criti-
cism that the Tribunal made a decision in vacuum.23 Likewise, when the wbat 
states: “Since according to well-established principles of international admin-
istrative law, grade should correspond to position and compensation should 
correspond to grade”, there persists an uncertainty as to the concrete law, with 
which the Tribunal came to its decision.24
21 wbat, Louis de Merode et al. v World Bank 1981.
22 See imfat, Mr. E. Verreydt v imf 2016, paras 80, 87 and 106; ebrdat, Appellant v ebrd 
2007, paras 72–73; unat, Mirella et al. v Secretary-General of the UN 2018, para 23; adbat, 
Ferdinand P. Mesch and Robert Y. Siy v adb (No 4) 1997, paras 14, 18, 21, 26, 41 and 45 (and in 
the Dissenting Opinion).
23 ebrdat, Appellant v ebrd 2018, para 16.
24 wbat, Rosario Cardenas v World Bank 1988, para 23.
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4 Inaccuracy of the Use of the Term ‘International Administrative 
Law’
In order to show the inadequacy or inaccuracy of using the notion of ‘interna-
tional administrative law’, as it is normally used in iats’ decisions, it may be 
useful to illustrate it by comparing the notion with similar ones. One example 
can be drawn from the field of ‘international economic law’. The Marrakesh 
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (wto) is undoubtedly 
the source of law applied in the activities of the wto, including dispute- 
settlement bodies (dsbs).25 However, is it helpful to understand the real pic-
ture of the application of DSB (Dispute-settlement Understanding, Annex I of 
the wto Agreement) by saying that ‘international economic law’ is applied in 
the dispute-settlement body? There is no agreement among the scholars in 
international law how to understand the whole system of wto law. The major-
ity view seems to be that wto is a special regime, a self-contained one, to 
which the general international law does not directly apply.26 What are the 
rules applied by members of the Panels and the Appellate Body to make their 
decisions? It is again not helpful to say that ‘international economic law’ is ap-
plied. When the majority view is accepted, namely, that the legal framework of 
the wto is a self-contained regime, what is applied there must be a sui generis 
group of norms derived basically from public international law.
Another example can be given from notion commonly referred to as ‘inter-
national labor law’. The International Labour Organization (ilo) has adopted 
nearly 200 international labor conventions in the past 100 years. Maintaining 
that ‘international labor law’ is applied in the ilo, or saying that the conven-
tions adopted by the ilo are sources of ‘international labor law’ is not helpful 
in understanding the true picture of the applicable rules in the ilo’s standard-
setting and supervisory activities. There must be a distinctly different set of 
rules, a part of international legal rules, which are applied in the ilo’s activi-
ties. One thing is certain that not all of the principles enshrined in the vclt 
apply to the ilo (for instance, Reservation to an ilo convention is customarily 
not permitted). It is a collection of all kinds of administrative acts by the ilo, 
namely the International Labour Conference, the Governing Body, as well as 
the supervisory bodies, such as the committees set up in accordance with Arti-
cles 24 and 34 of the ilo Constitution and the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations, which will eventually es-
tablish a coherent set of norms governing the activities of the ilo as an 
25 Marrakesh Agreement establishing the wto.
26 Iwasawa 1995, 212–214 (in Japanese).
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 international legal entity.27 It may be called an international institutional cus-
tomary law of the ilo, or ‘ilo law’, but not ‘international labor law’.
It would appear that each legal system is in itself a self-contained regime 
where sui generis law applies. There must be a sui generis group of norms be-
ing applied in the iat regime.
Therefore, the notion of ‘international administrative law’, used in the con-
text of iats, is potentially confusing and there is some uneasiness in its use. 
Professor Amerasinghe in his book discussed quite rightly “the sources of [in-
ternational administrative law] or the law governing employment relations in 
international organizations”.28 The title of his book itself is ‘The Law of the 
International Civil Service’. The notion of the law of international civil service 
or law governing employment relations in international organizations is much 
more convincing.
Having said so, an answer to the question “What is the law governing em-
ployment relations in international organizations?” is still to be provided. As a 
party to the employment contract is an international legal entity, one thing 
certain is that the contract is not a pure employment law in the domestic law 
sense. It becomes even closer to an agreement reached within the system of 
public international law as the employee themselves is an international civil 
servant, who has a certain degree of immunities from the local law. It follows 
that public international law applies here, in principle. But which internation-
al law? That is a question for which an answer cannot be immediately offered. 
A tentative submission may be that international administrative tribunals are 
applying a group of sui generis law, which is a part of public international law 
or international institutional law, composed of a number of statutory rules, 
customary international law and case laws of iats.
5 Application of ‘International Administrative Law’ in Practice
There seems to be a tendency for judges at iats, while not consciously realiz-
ing it, to apply sets of legal criteria developed in their own jurisdictions 
when determining what constitutes the law of employment relationships in 
27 The Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations is 
not entitled to authoritatively interpret Conventions. Only the icj, or a tribunal estab-
lished for that purpose, has been authorized by the Article 37 of the ilo Constitution. 
However, throughout its history over 90 years, supervisory bodies have been continuously 
applying Conventions in formulating their comments and a sort of case law (administra-
tive case law) has been created therefrom.
28 Amerasinghe 1988, 102 (emphasis added).
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 international institutions. As a matter of principle, it is established that iats 
do not apply national laws.29 However, various national labor law principles 
concerning unfair labor practices seem to be tacitly applied in some cases 
without being explicitly referred to. When judges apply laws that are not offi-
cially recognized as sources of applicable laws in iats, they tend to refer to the 
concept of ‘international administrative law’, a notion which is not definable.
A very interesting finding was made in a undt decision. In 2017, when the 
undt was to judge whether the ‘equal pay for equal value of work’ principle is 
to be applied in that particular case, the applicant stated: “This principle of the 
inclusion of pensions into the concept of equal pay for work of equal value has 
been accepted in the context of jurisprudence and general International Ad-
ministrative Law under the Equal Remuneration Convention 1951”.30 The Equal 
Remuneration Convention 1951 is an ilo convention and, as such, it cannot 
bind the UN because the UN cannot ratify it. It is therefore to be assumed that 
the words ‘general International Administrative Law under’ had to preface ref-
erence to the ilo Convention. This argument seems to maintain that the prin-
ciple of equal remuneration for equal value of work enshrined in the ilo Con-
vention of 1951 (Number 100) had become customary international law, 
therefore, it could be used as a source of law in the adjudication of the iats. 
The Tribunal, although rejecting the applicant’s plea that they should have 
been entitled to a higher pension payment in their Special Post Allowance po-
sition, judged on the basis of the equal remuneration for equal value of work 
principle, thereby agreeing tacitly to accept application of ilo Convention 
Number 100, which had been transformed itself into a general international 
law. The Tribunal even accepted that the remuneration, as defined by the ilo 
Convention, included also pension payment.31 The scope of application of ilo 
Convention Number 100 and the passage “payable directly or indirectly”,32 in 
particular, was considered by the ilo’s supervisory machinery to include pen-
sion paid under social security schemes financed by the undertaking.33 In a 
way, the undt accepted the ‘interpretation’ of the Convention by the ilo’s su-
pervisory body. This fact makes it difficult to judge whether the Tribunal had 
applied general international law or whether it did apply the ilo convention 
directly—probably the latter.
Judges with special expertise in ‘ilo law’ would be inclined to take the defi-
nition of ilo Convention Number 100 on equal remuneration as a criterion to 
29 Amerasinghe 1988, 175.
30 undt, Glavind v Secretary-General of the UN 2017, para 26 (emphasis added).
31 Ibid.
32 Equal Remuneration Convention, art 1(a).
33 ilo, ‘General Survey’ 1986, para 17.
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define wages, if the scope of wages were at stake. However, even judges recep-
tive to ‘ilo law’ would hesitate to apply ilo Convention Number 15834—on 
the termination of employment at the initiative of the employer—before an 
iat. For this sets quite a high burden on employers and perhaps not enforcea-
ble as general international law. Convention Number 100, on the other hand, is 
one of the fundamental conventions of the ilo, which can be construed as 
pronouncing established customary law. The same applies to other fundamen-
tal ilo Conventions, such as one on non-discrimination in employment and 
occupation (Number 111)35 or another on the prohibition of forced or compul-
sory labor (Number 29).36
6 Conclusion
It would be appropriate to recapitulate the findings made so far. The applicable 
law in iats, the law governing employment relations in international organiza-
tions, is composed of the following: (i) substantive rules, such as employment 
contracts, staff regulations, staff rules, administrative orders; and (ii) proce-
dural and interpretative rules, such as statutes of tribunals, general principles 
of law (such as estoppel, good faith, equity, non-abuse of rights, due process), 
customary international law (including certain human rights principles, such 
as non-discrimination), judicial precedents (of other courts, both national as 
well as international, including other iats—as far as they are consistent with 
customary international law). The last qualification—consistency with cus-
tomary international law—is important. Judicial decisions of national courts 
or regional courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights, and of other 
iats are valid laws applicable in iats, basically to the extent that they reflect 
established rules in customary international law. For other courts’ decisions, 
those of national courts, in particular, have no res judicata on iats.
On the other hand, it is an undisputed reality that judges refer to other iat’s 
decisions and more generally to ‘international administrative law’, whenever 
they have difficulties identifying concrete rules to support their arguments. 
This is not inappropriate. As adjudications always have law-making elements, 
some of the findings of iats may have a law-creating factor. The wto’s dsb, as 
well as the ilo’s supervisory bodies do create a sort of sui generis rules, which 
had not existed before the establishment of the organization concerned. What 
34 Termination of Employment Convention.
35 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention.
36 Forced Labour Convention.
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is called ‘wto law’ or ‘international institutional law of the ilo’ (or ‘ilo Law’) 
aforementioned in this chapter, is not only composed of black letter laws, but 
also of newly emerging principles of law that spring up from the daily activities 
of the organizations, a spontaneous law of international organizations.
So, the answer to the question raised at the very beginning of this chapter 
would be that ‘international administrative law’ is a potentially misleading 
concept when referred to in the judgments of iats, because there is no such 
thing as an a priori ‘international administrative law’. However, a look at the 
whole legal framework of adjudication in the internal justice system of inter-
national organizations makes us assume that there is an emerging group of 
legal norms within the specific regime of iats, which can be called the ‘Law 
Governing Employment Relations in International Organizations’, or ‘Interna-
tional Civil Service Law’. It is a group of sui generis law, basically rooted in 
public international law or ‘international institutional law’, applying to the 
specific legal regime of the international civil service.
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Chapter 5
The Terms and Conditions of Employment of 
International Civil Servants: Implied Terms 




This chapter examines the ‘terms and conditions of employment’ applicable under the 
law of the international civil service, with a focus on ‘implied terms’ of employment 
arising in the context of the case law of the Administrative Tribunal of the Asian De-
velopment Bank (adbat). Why is this important? Clearly, as a matter of good govern-
ance and good order, an employee ought to have an understanding and appreciation of 
the respective duties and obligations applicable to the employment relationship be-
tween the individual and the employer organization, and by the same token, the em-
ployer should have an understanding of the standards against which its actions will be 
assessed. It is also important because it crystalizes the basis upon which the jurisdic-
tion of an international organization’s administrative tribunal can be invoked. Interna-
tional administrative tribunals are creatures of limited jurisdiction, and they are gen-
erally confined to hearing and adjudicating disputes alleging a breach of the ‘terms 
and conditions of appointment’. This argument is therefore developed through an ex-
amination of the jurisprudence surrounding the terms and conditions of employment 
of international civil servants, and in particular by analyzing the expansive approach 
to identifying the terms of appointment adopted by the adbat.
* Damien J. Eastman, Assistant General Counsel, Asian Development Bank (ADB), deastman@
adb.org. The author wishes to thank Ms Melissa Su Thomas, Senior Counsel, ADB, for her as-
sistance in preparing this chapter. The views expressed in this publication are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of ADB or its Board of Governors 
or the governments they represent. ADB does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included 
in this publication and accepts no responsibility for any consequence of their use. The men-
tion of specific companies or products of manufacturers does not imply that they are en-
dorsed or recommended by ADB in preference to others of a similar nature that are not men-
tioned. By making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area, 
or by using the term ‘country’ in this document, ADB does not intend to make any judgments 




Practitioners in the field of international administrative law are often called 
upon to interpret the scope and meaning of the terms and conditions of em-
ployment of staff. Considerable time has been spent by the various interna-
tional administrative tribunals established by international organizations to 
resolve employment-related disputes in addressing the scope of an organiza-
tion’s authority to revise ‘fundamental and essential’ terms of the  appointment, 
and to that end how to identify whether a term is fundamental and essential.1 
However, a more basic question merits analysis: what comprises the terms of 
employment applicable between an international civil servant and the em-
ployer organization?
This chapter begins with a brief examination of the jurisprudence sur-
rounding the terms and conditions of employment of international civil serv-
ants (Section 2), and then explores the jurisprudence of the Asian Develop-
ment Bank’s (adb) Administrative Tribunal (adbat) where the Tribunal has 
implied a term of appointment in order to exercise jurisdiction over a staff 
grievance (Section 3) and otherwise the Tribunal’s expansive approach to iden-
tifying the terms of appointment (Section 4), before offering some conclusions 
(Section 5).
2 Terms and Conditions of Employment
At the adb, as in many other international organizations, the terms and condi-
tions of employment begin with the letter of appointment, which typically de-
scribes the job title and position description, the salary and the applicable law 
(for example, public international law).2 At the adb, the letter of appointment 
will also include reference to the Charter of the adb,3 the Headquarters Agree-
ment between the Government of the Philippines and the adb,4 the Staff 
Regulations,5 and adb’s internal staff rules.6
1 wbat, Louis de Merode et al. v The World Bank 1981; adbat, Perrin et al. v adb (No 3) 2018; 
adbat, Eisuke Suzuki et al. v adb 2008; imfat, Daseking-Frank et al. v imf 2007; iloat, Ayoub 
et al. v ilo 1987; iloat, Ayoub (No 2) et al. v ilo 1989; and UN Administrative Tribunal, 
 Applicant v United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board 2005.
2 wbat, Louis de Merode et al. v The World Bank 1981, para 16; wbat, aq v ibrd 2009, paras 
50–51; wbat, Wilfred Biswas v ibrd 2002, para 2; imfat, Mr. D’ Aoust v imf 1996, para 11.
3 Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank.
4 adb Headquarters Agreement.
5 adb Staff Regulations.
6 adb Administrative Orders.
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For the purposes of invoking the jurisdiction of the adbat, the Statute of 
the adbat defines the ‘contract of employment’ and ‘terms of appointment’ to 
include “all pertinent regulations and rules in force at the time of the alleged 
non-observance including the provisions of the pension plan and staff benefit 
plans provided by the Bank to its staff”.7 Internatonal administrative tribunals 
have also recognized sources other than the written contract and incorporated 
policies. Famously, in Louis de Merode et al. v The World Bank, the World Bank 
Administrative Tribunal recognized that the practice of the organization—to 
the extent that it is followed as a legal obligation—and general principles of 
law, may form part of the conditions of employment. The International Mon-
etary Fund’s Administrative Tribunal in Mr. R v International Monetary Fund 
has recognized that information published on the organizations’ internal web-
site may constitute the ‘living law’ of the Fund, and thus create legally binding 
obligations on the employer.
For the most part, therefore, the question as to what constitutes the terms 
and conditions of appointment is relatively straightforward and the source 
and content of those terms and conditions are normally relatively easy to iden-
tify. However, the issues and concerns that might give rise to staff grievances 
are not as straightforward, and a staff member may have, or wish, to raise con-
cerns about matters that do not neatly fit with traditional notions of contract 
law based on the concepts of ‘consent and agreement’ in the sense the parties 
agree to a certain set of mutually corresponding obligations. This is ideally 
written in clear and understandable terms, where the parameters of a legal 
relationship are express, defined and have been explicitly agreed.
The law applicable to implying terms into contractual relations in the 
sphere of national law systems differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. As a 
general principle, a contractual term will normally only be ‘implied’ when a 
court determines that the ‘intention of the parties’ at the time the contract was 
formed is that such term was to be included.8 Domestic courts have taken vari-
ous approaches, such as implying a term to give the contract ‘business efficacy’ 
or to reflect a certain ‘custom or practice’ (for example a contractual term that 
is notorious) in a particular sector or industry.9 Alternatively, a term may be 
implied in the interest of public policy, if enacted through domestic legislation.
The approach of implying contractual terms has been examined and ap-
plied by the adbat. By implying contractual terms into the terms and condi-
tions of appointment, the scope for considering and adjudicating a staff griev-
ance becomes potentially wider than if there is a more narrowly focused 
7 adbat Statute, art ii (1).




inquiry on the written contractual exchanges between the staff member and 
the organization.10
3 Implied Terms and Conditions of Employment
There are two key rulings, which coincidentally both involved the fatality of 
adb staff members, that illustrate the adbat’s approach to implying terms 
and conditions into the terms of appointment. The facts and findings of these 
two key rulings are described in more detail below.
3.1 Bares v adb
Mr. Bares was an adb staff member assigned to the legal department.11 As they 
were leaving work for the day, and when proceeding to the staff car park, they 
were approached and assailed by a security guard employed by a vendor firm 
which was contracted by adb to provide security for adb’s Manila-based 
Headquarters premises in the Philippines. Mr. Bares and the assailant were in-
volved in a physical altercation, which resulted in Mr. Bares becoming the vic-
tim of a homicide.
The facts and circumstances leading to Mr. Bares death remain a mystery. 
There had been suggestions that Mr. Bares and the assailant were involved in a 
financial transaction that had gone wrong, precipitating the physical alterca-
tion. An independent report commissioned by adb found no conclusive evi-
dence that this was the reason for the attack, nor could any other reason be 
identified.12 The assailant was arrested, tried and convicted for murder under 
the laws of the Philippines.
Following this death, the family of Mr. Bares and his estate commenced le-
gal proceedings against adb before the adbat claiming usd 4.5 million in 
damages in respect of liability of the Bank for torts committed as employer of 
the deceased staff member. No legal proceedings were pursued by the family 
against the Philippines-based security company who employed the assailant, 
in the local courts of the Philippines. The gravamen of the dispute therefore 
did not relate to the vicarious liability of the employer of the assailant, but 
rather the extent to which adb breached its obligations to Mr. Bares as an 
employer.
10 adbat Statute, art ii (1) (‘The Tribunal shall hear and pass judgment upon any applica-
tion by which an individual member of the staff of the Bank alleges non[-]observance of 
the contract of employment or terms of appointment of such staff member’).
11 adbat, Bares v adb 1995.
12 Ibid., para. 7.
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When considering the case, the Tribunal explicitly stated that although the 
dependents and estate has framed its claim principally in tort—‘wrongful 
death’—which would indeed have been a reasonable way to have framed their 
cause of action in some national legal systems, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction was 
controlled by its own Statute, where its jurisdiction was limited to claims in the 
law of contract. The adbat summed up the constraint, stating:
This Tribunal has to determine whether the death of Mr. Bares at the 
hands of the security guard operating on the Bank’s own premises in-
volves a breach of contract on the part of the Bank. The Tribunal must, 
therefore, identify the relevant contractual terms.13
Having stated this constraint, the adbat went on to find that, as a general prin-
ciple of employment law, adb owed all members of its staff an implied con-
tractual duty to exercise ‘reasonable care’ to ensure their safety and security 
whilst on adb’s premises, thus establishing a basis for the Tribunal to assume 
jurisdiction and determine the case.14 Having articulated that the Bank had an 
implied contractual obligation to exercise ‘reasonable care’, the Tribunal went 
on to evaluate whether adb had exercised reasonable care in the selection and 
oversight of the security firm consistent with its contractual ‘duty of care’ in 
this case.15 After considering the case, including the documents that evidenced 
the procedure leading to the selection of the security firm, the Tribunal found 
there was no evident lack of reasonable care on adb’s behalf and, as such, adb 
had acted consistently with its implied contractual duty of care to its employ-
ees, and the case was dismissed.
The Bares case was decided only a few years after adb’s Tribunal was estab-
lished. The ruling established the legal principle that adb has an implied con-
tractual duty of care to ensure the safety and security of its staff whilst on 
adb’s premises, and the method for the selection and management of vendors 
contracted to perform such services was subject to review by the Tribunal. The 
question that then arises is the scope of that contractual duty and what the 
organization must do in order to ensure that it acts consistently with that im-
plied contractual duty of care. The Tribunal’s decision served to highlight that 
in undertaking its institutional procurement functions, the adb must under-
take diligence not simply as the contractual counterparty, but with a view to 
meeting its duty of care to its employees.
13 Ibid., para. 18.
14 Ibid., para. 21.
15 Ibid., paras. 28–41.
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3.2 Jesieline C. Chang et al. v adb
This case concerned the death of an adb staff member from lung cancer.16 
Before describing the specific facts of this case, it is important to provide some 
general background and context to the medical services that are provided to 
adb staff.
For some time, adb had provided its staff with access to an ‘in-house’ medi-
cal clinic at its Manila-based Headquarters. The clinic is operated by an exter-
nal vendor, including the provision of the clinic’s staff, supplies and operations. 
adb also employs in its own staff a medical doctor, separate from the medical 
and nursing personnel supplied by an external vendor. The medical doctor’s 
duties include pre-employment medical screening and to be available to inter-
act with the vendor’s staff on difficult or unclear cases. Although the role is not 
to supervise the clinic per se, the doctor may provide some quality control in 
certain cases.
Under the adb’s medical insurance scheme that is made available to adb’s 
staff members, adb staff are entitled to undergo an annual physical examina-
tion, which involves bloodwork, ecg tests, x-rays, and other examinations one 
might expect. Such annual physical examinations may be conducted by the 
in-house medical clinic.
In the case of Jesieline C. Chang et al. v adb, Mr. Chang had availed of the 
in-house clinic services and undergone annual physical examination at the in-
house clinic for several years. Mr. Chang had undergone x-ray procedures, 
 including chest x-rays, as part of the annual physical examination. Shortly after 
undertaking a routine annual physical examination, Mr. Chang was unable to 
overcome a cough and sought medical treatment outside of adb, where they 
were diagnosed with late-stage lung cancer.
Mr. Chang lodged a grievance against adb for what they claimed to be the 
Bank’s failure to have in place an adequate system to check the quality of the 
services provided by adb’s in-house medical provider, so as to avoid any medi-
cal misdiagnosis. Mr. Chang sought usd 4 million in compensation to cover 
lost income, pain and suffering and punitive damages for the alleged negli-
gence in overseeing the vendor who provided the in-house medical facili-
ties.  Not long after commencing their grievance, Mr. Chang passed away. 
Mr. Chang’s dependents and his estate stepped in and continued the claim 
against adb on the deceased’s behalf.
Similar to the Bares case, the Chang claim was framed partly in tortious con-
cepts, but following the Bares precedent, the claim also included allegations 
that adb had breached its implied contractual duty to exercise reasonable 
16 adbat, Jesieline C. Chang et al. v adb 2008.
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care. adb argued that the claim, when properly considered, fell entirely out-
side the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, because the claim was really based on 
principles of tortious liability, and the present case did not concern the im-
plied contractual duty for the staff ’s safety and security in the Bares context.
adb argued that, threefold: (i) the allegations that the provider of the in-
house clinic had allegedly misdiagnosed the x-rays, or failed to pick up the 
symptoms of cancer, were not violations of the employees terms and  conditions 
of appointment and instead, these were properly claims against the third party 
vendor, and should be pursued against them separately; (ii) if it did have an 
implied contractual responsibility, then it had ‘disclaimed liability’ because 
the relevant provisions of the staff rules included language to the effect that if 
staff availed of the in-house medical clinic services, they did so at their own 
risk and by doing so, acknowledged that adb bore no responsibility for any loss 
or damage suffered by them as a result; and (iii) if there was an ‘implied’ con-
tractual duty, adb had appropriately discharged its duty by acting with all rea-
sonable care in the selection and oversight of the external vendor.17
The Tribunal ruled that since the Bank voluntarily undertook to provide an 
in-house clinic providing medical services to staff, the Bank assumed an im-
plied contractual duty to exercise all necessary and appropriate care in select-
ing and overseeing the chosen vendor, and that this responsibility was not di-
minished by language in the staff rules disclaiming liability for loss.18 After 
stating that adb had assumed an implied contractual duty, the Tribunal went 
on to dismiss Mr. Chang’s claim. The adbat accepted adb’s defense that it had 
taken all reasonable steps in the process to select an external provider, and 
providing a reasonable standard of oversight, through monitoring by adb’s 
medical doctor.
The Chang ruling is significant because it confirmed the Tribunal’s willing-
ness to imply contractual terms into the employment relationship and clari-
fied that it was prepared to do so when the Bank ‘voluntarily’ provides a service 
to its staff members. Although the Tribunal did not appear to expand on the 
earlier Bares jurisprudence that adb’s contractual duty of care was limited to 
an examination of the process for selecting and providing oversight to third 
parties vendors.
The ruling is also significant because the Tribunal ruled that adb could not 
disclaim liability for loss or damage arising from the use of the services that 
were voluntarily provided to the staff.19 This is an interesting point, because 
17 Ibid., paras. 19–23.
18 Ibid., para. 28.
19 Ibid., para. 29.
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norms of contract law typically permit parties to agree to limit or waive liabil-
ity for loss and harm suffered, and that express terms typically override im-
plied terms (unless provided by statute). Accordingly, it suggests that the Tri-
bunal sees certain duties as higher norms that cannot be contracted away 
between an international organization and international civil servants.
4 The ‘Ensemble of Conditions’: Broadly Construing Other Terms and 
Conditions of Employment
In addition to demonstrating a preparedness to imply terms and conditions 
into a staff member’s contract, the adbat has also taken an expansive ap-
proach to the breadth and scope of adb policies that can form part of a staff 
member’s terms and conditions of employment.
This approach is illustrated by the recent case of Ms. D v adb (No. 3).20 This 
case addressed the question of whether a former adb staff member could 
bring a claim concerning their non-selection for a consulting role in adb some 
years after their employment as a staff member had been terminated. As the 
title of the case suggests, this was the third occasion upon which the adbat 
was called upon to address a grievance lodged by Ms. D. The two earlier pro-
ceedings concerned unsuccessful attempts to contest termination of employ-
ment after Ms. D’s appointment was not confirmed at the conclusion of a one-
year probationary period.
At some point in 2016, around seven years after their employment was ter-
minated, Ms. D put herself forward as a member of a team of consultants who 
had applied for an adb-funded consultancy assignment. Before addressing the 
specific facts of the case, and the adbat’s ruling, it is important to provide 
some background and context on the nature of consultants and the manner in 
which they are recruited.
adb consultants can be either individual persons or firms, and they pro-
vide consulting services which are required to administer adb loan and tech-
nical assistance projects.21 Consultants are not adb staff members, and do 
not come within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal—there is a separate dispute 
resolution process that is set forth in their individual consulting contracts.22 
There is a volume of internal rules and procedures governing the selection and 
20 adbat, Ms. D v adb (No 3) 2018.
21 adb, Consulting Services Operations Manual 2008.
22 Article ii(2) of the adbat Statute provides access to staff, namely, “any current or former 
member of the Bank staff who holds or has held a regular appointment or a fixed-term 
appointment of two years or more, any person who is entitled to claim upon a right of a 
member of the staff as a personal representative or by reason of the staff member’s death, 
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recruitment of consultants at adb. These are known as adb ‘Project Admin-
istration Instructions’ or ‘pais’. These pais include provisions applicable to re-
cruiting former adb staff as consultants.
Generally, former adb staff are eligible to be recruited as an adb consultant, 
unless that former staff member had disciplinary, performance or similar is-
sues during their staff tenure. The policy on non-recruitment of former staff 
members with performance, disciplinary or other related issues reflects adb’s 
policy for managing the potential risks associated with former staff members 
taking consulting assignments, when considering the track record of their pre-
vious employment relationship, and the potential for negative implications for 
adb’s reputation generally.
As Ms. D had such performance issues as a staff member—resulting in non-
confirmation of their probationary appointment—they were considered ineli-
gible for a consulting assignment.23 This information was communicated to 
Ms. D, following which they lodged a complaint with the adbat, alleging they 
were unfairly denied the consulting assignment because of the earlier unfa-
vorable views of their supervisor, which Ms. D alleged were flawed.
adb argued that Ms. D had no standing to bring the claim to the Tribunal 
because the pais (which govern the recruitment and selection of adb consult-
ants) did not form part of the terms and conditions of Ms. D’s appointment. 
Instead, adb argued that the pais reflected more general policies and proce-
dures applicable to consultants, which are not justiciable as a term or condi-
tion of employment of staff. In this regard, adb has in place various policies 
which address the terms and conditions upon which adb will engage with ex-
ternal contractors. For example, bidders for certain contracts must agree to 
abide by aspects of adb’s anticorruption policies to be considered for a con-
tract. Likewise, adb has rules where it will generally only engage with service 
providers from member countries. If an external party does not wish to abide 
by those aspects of adb’s policies, adb can choose not to engage with or do 
business with those external parties.
In adb’s submission to the Tribunal in Ms. D’s case, the pais were no differ-
ent from other general policies that govern the manner in which adb chooses 
to engage with external parties. In other words, adb’s position was that Ms. D’s 
claim was an objection to a more general adb policy and was not a grievance 
arising under the terms and conditions of her appointment. In the alternative, 
adb argued that the relevant parts of the pais were properly applied, and there 
and any person designated or otherwise entitled to receive a payment under any provi-
sion of the Staff Retirement Plan or any staff benefit plan provided by the Bank”.
23 adbat, Ms. D v adb 2011.
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was no abuse of discretion when the determination was made not to further 
consider Ms. D for the adb consulting assignment.
On the important question of whether the pais formed part of Ms. D’s terms 
and conditions of appointment, thus grounding the adbat’s jurisdiction 
to consider the claim, the adbat ruled that the pais did indeed form part of 
Ms. D’s terms and conditions of appointment. The adbat cited to the seminal 
de Merode ruling from the World Bank Administrative Tribunal case,
The contract may be the sine qua non of the relationship, but it remains 
no more than one of a number of elements which collectively establish 
the ensemble of conditions of employment operative between the Bank 
and staff members.24
The adbat ruled that the pais, including the provisions addressing recruit-
ment of former staff members, formed part of the ensemble of conditions of 
employment and thus the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the claim.25 After 
finding that it had jurisdiction to hear the claim, the adbat went on to dismiss 
the case and ruled that Ms. D had not established that the pais had been incor-
rectly applied, and if the only reason was linked to the previous supervisors’ 
alleged improper motivations relating to the assessment of their performance 
during the probationary period, that had already been adjudicated by the Tri-
bunal in Ms. D’s earlier applications and was thus res judicata since the Tribu-
nal had already dismissed these earlier claims.26
Although not relying on the technique of implying terms into the terms and 
conditions of appointment, the adbat took what seems to be an expansive 
view of the ‘pertinent rules and regulations’ that might be considered to make 
up the ensemble of employment conditions. As a practical matter, this leaves 
some uncertainty as to the applicability of adb’s general policies and when 
such policies may be considered to be part of the ensemble of the terms and 
conditions of appointment. This ruling does clarify that to the extent that such 
policies are inextricably linked with a staff member’s employment, or former 
employment, with the adb, they stand to be reviewed by the Tribunal. This 
raises the question as to whether this leads to unequal treatment amongst by 
the adbat potential vendors, with former staff members having greater rights 
of recourse against non-selection decisions than others.
24 wbat, Louis de Merode v The World Bank 1981, para 18 (internal emphases omitted).
25 adbat, Ms. D v adb (No 3) 2018, para 58.
26 Ibid, para 60; adbat, Ms. D v adb 2011; adbat, Ms. D v adb (No 2) 2012.
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5 Conclusion
The review of the cases decided by the adbat described above leaves us with 
at least three key lessons when thinking about the ensemble of conditions that 
go beyond the clear text of the letter of appointment.
Firstly, the adbat has adopted expanded notions of contract (indeed, with 
some looking much more like norms of tort law) through a willingness to  imply 
contractual terms that venture beyond the four corners of a letter of appoint-
ment, including implied contractual obligations of a duty of care owed by adb 
to its staff.
Second, implied contractual duties extend to a duty to provide an appropri-
ate standard of oversight and monitoring of third-party vendors providing ser-
vices for which adb staff are beneficiaries. Thus, the failure by a vendor may 
lead to a finding against adb, in the event the Tribunal finds that adb has not 
discharged the implied contractual duty of care by failing to exercise sufficient 
diligence over the vendors. It is also somewhat concerning that the Chang rul-
ing potentially limits adb’s scope to disclaim liability when staff take advan-
tage of services voluntarily provided to its staff.
Finally, the ensemble of conditions of the contract can extend deep into 
adb’s policies and procedures that may not, on their face, seem to govern the 
relationship between the Bank and its staff and may have application to the 
relationship, and to issues that arise well after a staff member’s employment 
has ended.
These cases demonstrate that the adbat has taken an expansive approach 
to the characterization of the terms and conditions of appointment. One could 
say that this inclusive approach is necessary in order to ensure that staff have 
recourse to a dispute resolution forum for claims that would otherwise have no 
other venue, given the immunities enjoyed by the adb from jurisdiction in its 
member’s national court systems. This may also be partly explained by local 
considerations. For example, one might postulate that, as in the Bares and 
Chang cases, perhaps there was a reluctance by the families to pursue local le-
gal proceedings against the third party vendors, in what would be an unfamil-
iar jurisdiction, where the chances for recovery are uncertain.
These cases also raise questions for an international organization when it is 
assessing its policies and procedures, and to ensure that adequate attention 
has been paid to the selection and retention of vendors who provide services 
to and for the benefit of staff members. These rulings do raise questions as to 
how far the principles of liability extend to an international organization un-
der the implied contractual terms. The standards of reasonable care arising 
from implied contractual duties before international administrative tribunals 
are not well defined nor articulated and those standards may differ between 
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national legal systems—so what norms apply? What are, then, appropriate se-
lection and oversight procedures that are sufficient to meet the reasonable 
standards that a Tribunal might examine? Thus far, the adbat has not articu-
lated when such a standard was not met.
Other questions that arise from these rulings concern the scope of an inter-
governmental institution’s financial liability if it was found to be in breach of 
an implied contractual duty. To date, the jurisprudence of the adbat has not 
addressed this issue, since the Tribunal has not found adb to have transgressed 
any of the implied contractual duties. However, damages are capped by the 
adbat Statute at the equivalent of three years of the applicant’s basic salary, 
and damages over the cap may only be awarded in “exceptional circumstances”.27 
How would these be reconciled in a case, for example, where the institution 
was found to have transgressed from the relevant standard of care, but where 
principles of damages for a breach of duty of care under tortious principles 
would result in punitive damages, meriting considerably larger awards than 
envisaged by the statutory cap?
These are and remain interesting legal questions, and as principles of inter-
national civil service law continue to evolve, either the adbat or another in-
ternational administrative tribunal may have an opportunity to further con-
sider and develop some or all of these questions in due course.
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Chapter 6
To Join or Not to Join: A Comparative Analysis of 
Joining or Creating an International Administrative 
Tribunal
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Abstract
How well an international organization functions and upholds its privileges and im-
munities is closely intertwined with the existence of an internal justice system to settle 
disputes between the institution and its staff. At the apex of such system is the adminis-
trative tribunal, mandated to provide final, binding decisions on internal, employment-
related issues, taking into account the needs of both the international organization and 
its staff. Some of such international organizations have opted to join and submit to a 
multi-jurisdictional tribunal, while others have established their own, independent 
tribunals (arbitration may also be an option, but due to its substantially different na-
ture and procedures, it falls outside the scope of this chapter). This chapter appraises 
two different scenarios for international organizations: joining a multi-jurisdictional 
tribunal that receives appeals from various international organizations or establishing 
a stand-alone tribunal, either independently or in conjunction with other intergovern-
mental institutions. This assessment provides a brief retrospective of international ad-
ministrative tribunals, whilst highlighting governance consideration, jurisprudential 
issues, as well as other operational points that may arise under each option. Although 
informed by legal advice and other institutional considerations, the final decision is 
ultimately a political one made by, and in appropriate consultation with, the relevant 
stakeholders of the international organization (including the membership, the host 
State, the mandate beneficiaries, and the staff and management of the international 
organization). So, to join or not to join? There is no right or wrong answer to this ques-
tion; instead this chapter strives to inform stakeholders when evaluating their options.
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How well an international organization functions1 and upholds its privileges 
and immunities is closely intertwined with the existence of a suitable internal 
justice system to properly address its needs and those of its staff.2 At the apex 
of that internal justice system is an international administrative tribunal, the 
ultimate adjudicator, issuing final and binding judgments on employment- 
related matters. As bodies of judicial character, these tribunals adjudicate in-
ternal, employment disputes between international organizations and their 
staff,3 balancing “respect for human rights and the need to eliminate the inter-
ference of national courts”.4 Further, they support organizations in applying 
administrative actions following principles of equivalent treatment and pro-
portionality for staff, irrespective of their place of recruitment or posting.5
The earliest administrative tribunal was established in 1927, merely seven 
years after the creation of the first modern international organization, the 
League of Nations.6 Since then, such tribunals have multiplied and adjusted to 
meet the demands of an equally increasing number of intergovernmental in-
stitutions.7 As part of this evolution, some international organizations have set 
up their own legal forum, whilst others opted to join one of the tribunals which 
allow membership of intergovernmental institutions that have not created the 
tribunal.8 Although informed by legal advice, the final decision is ultimately a 
political one taking into account multiple considerations; further, it is a deci-
sion made by and in consultation with the relevant stakeholders of the inter-
national organization (including the membership, the host State, the mandate 
beneficiaries, and the staff and management of the entity).
In this context, it is incumbent upon the relevant stakeholders of interna-
tional organizations to assess whether it should establish its own tribunal or 
join a multi-jurisdictional one. This is the case for stakeholders of both new 
and long-established international organizations, with the latter reviewing 
1 icj, Effect of Awards 1954, 55–56.
2 International organizations are established under an agreement among their respective 
member states. These agreements typically grant intergovernmental institutions with privi-
leges and immunities, which generally exempt them from the jurisdiction of national legal 
systems and courts. Consequently, international organizations rely on their internal justice 
systems for the adjudication of disputes with their staff rather than submitting them to the 
purview of local courts and their legal framework.
3 Romano 2011, 248.
4 Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations 1996, 489.
5 Amerasinghe, ‘International Administrative Tribunals in the UN System’ 1998, 227.
6 ilo, 90 Years of Contribution 2017, 21.
7 Romano 2011, 241.
8 Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations 1996, 495.
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periodically whether their respective tribunal continues being the most ap-
propriate legal forum. Whilst some intergovernmental institutions have cho-
sen arbitration for staff dispute resolution,9 this option will not be addressed 
as its nature as a private forum renders it substantially different from the man-
date and procedures of an administrative tribunal.
After providing a background overview of such fora, this chapter will exam-
ine in turn the complex issues of governance, jurisdiction and operational con-
siderations in both multi-jurisdictional tribunals which admit jurisdiction 
over multiple international organizations, as well as newly created, stand-
alone tribunals. More specifically, this chapter provides a general overview of 
international administrative tribunals, based on an assessment on their his-
toric background (Section 2), governance and procedures (Section 3) as well as 
jurisprudence (Section 4) and operational considerations (Section 5) on their 
functioning. (Section 6 offers a conclusion.) The chapter is limited to legal fora 
issuing final decisions relating to employment-related disputes and does not 
review mechanisms that may handle preliminary proceedings such as first-in-
stance review boards. This examination of international administrative tribu-
nals does not intend to prefer one option over any other, but rather to provide 
an overview and analysis of the current landscape for stakeholders evaluating 
these important questions.
2 Historic Background of Administrative Tribunals of International 
Organizations
In its early jurisprudence, the International Court of Justice (icj) stated that 
“the power to establish a tribunal, to do justice as between the [United Na-
tions] and the staff members, was essential to ensure the efficient working of 
the [organization]”.10 While the constituent instruments of most international 
organizations are silent on the matter of the establishment of an international 
administrative tribunal, it is nonetheless widely accepted that the authority to 
determine the appropriate tribunal rests with a governing body of an interna-
tional organization.11
International administrative tribunals are subsidiary organs of judicial 
character established or recognized by an international organization with the 
purpose to serve as the ultimate reviewer and arbiter on employment-related 
9 Kim and Lee, 19 September 2019.
10 icj, Effect of Awards 1954, 57.
11 See as an example the following acts of governance organs of ios establishing interna-
tional administrative tribunals: Statute of wbat; Statute of unat; Statute of iloat.
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disputes between international organizations and their staff.12 For example, 
the United Nations General Assembly (unga), in its capacity as the United 
Nations’ (UN) governing body, established the United Nations Dispute  Tribunal 
(undt) and the United Nations Appeals Tribunal (unat), both of which are 
subsidiary UN organs. With this clear role in mind, a survey of existing tribu-
nals reveals a broad spectrum. This comprises long-standing, highly respected 
tribunals founded 60 to 80 years ago, stand-alone tribunals of international fi-
nancial institutions often founded 20 to 50 years ago, as well as bodies estab-
lished as recently as in 2019 at international organizations at a smaller scale.
2.1 Tribunal as Final Arbiter
As noted earlier, most international organizations have a first-level, independ-
ent review board or similar entity to review employment-related disputes be-
tween staff and the intergovernmental institution applying its internal legal 
framework (that is, the relevant internal regulations, including the interna-
tional organization’s corporate, human resources and related rules, policies 
and procedures) and generally accepted principles of international adminis-
trative law. Should the staff member believe that a first-level decision is not 
appropriate,13 appeal to an international administrative tribunal is normally 
the next and final recourse, while some tribunals also allow the international 
organization to submit an appeal. Whilst historically both the unat and the 
Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization (iloat) al-
lowed for the possibility of a member organization to request an advisory 
opinion before the icj,14 unat’s predecessor abandoned this approach in 
1995.15 Later in 2016, iloat followed suit.16 These amendments sought to end 
the inequality of access to the icj between the international organization and 
its staff members.17
As the final arbiter on these issues, unat, iloat and other such fora study 
the facts of the matter before them and review the international organization’s 
relevant internal regulations and analysis. There are differences among tribu-
nals in their consideration of the underlying factual record—for example, 
12 Romano and others 2014, 14.
13 While some first-tier bodies issue independent and binding decisions, others issue rec-
ommendations for ultimate decision by the President or Secretary-General of the inter-
national organization, as applicable.
14 Amerasinghe, ‘Cases of icj Relating to Employment in International Organizations’ 2009, 
201.
15 ilo, ‘Amendments to the Statute of iloat’, 14 June 2016.
16 Ibid.
17 icj, Judgments of iloat upon Complaints Made Against unesco 1956, 85.
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some tribunals such as the International Monetary Fund Administrative Tribu-
nal (imfat) apply de novo review18 to cases while reviewing the relevant 
 factual record established below,19 while others such as unat and iloat con-
sider whether there was a discernible error in the judgment of the first-tier 
body.20 Following the relevant review and analysis, the tribunal then makes 
the final reasoned decision applying the internal regulations of the respective 
international organizations under international law.21 Thus, the international 
tribunal is the final arbiter of employment-related disagreements between 
staff and the relevant international organization.
2.2 Survey of Long-Existing and Newly Founded Tribunals
Many international organizations have opted to recognize the jurisdiction of 
long-standing tribunals which accept external membership.22 Within the in-
ternational legal community, iloat and unat are the two long-established, 
highly respected examples. iloat is the successor of the Administrative Tribu-
nal of the League of Nations, originally established in 1927,23 and the functions 
of which were transferred to the International Labour Organization in 1946.24 
Meanwhile, unat was first established as the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal in 1949 until it was substantially reformed in 2009 when it adopted its 
current title, albeit its acronym has remained.25 As discussed further below, 
given their long-standing nature, these entities have an extensive jurispru-
dence that has evolved over the decades.
Other international organizations have founded their own independent 
tribunals. Historically, this trend began with the main international finan-
cial institutions establishing stand-alone administrative tribunals including 
those of the World Bank (1980), the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
18 De novo judicial review is used in addressing questions of how the law was applied or in-
terpreted by a lower tribunal. This is a non-deferential standard of review, meaning that 
the reviewing tribunal applying a de novo review standard does not place weight on (or, 
absent a clear error, does not defer to) the findings of the previous court. Accordingly, 
lower tribunal findings under a de novo standard of review may be varied or even over-
turned by the reviewing tribunal. Other standards of review applied by the appellate or 
senior tribunal are more deferential, with the senior tribunal placing some weight on the 
lower tribunal’s decisions absent discernible errors therein.
19 imf, ‘imfat Reports’ 2008, 60.
20 iloat, P. (No. 2) v who 2018, consid 5; UN, ‘Appeals and Answers’.
21 Ibid.
22 ilo, 90 Years of Contribution 2017, 25–26; see also ilo, ‘Membership’.
23 Uddin and Uddin 2012, 669.
24 ilo, ‘ilo Administrative Tribunal’.
25 Reinisch and Knahr 2008, 449 and 482.
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Development, the Asian Development Bank (1991) and the International Mon-
etary Fund (1992).26
Over the last decade, it has become apparent that the size of an interna-
tional organization is not a prerequisite for founding a stand-alone tribunal. 
While intergovernmental institutions with significant staff numbers, such as 
the International Organization for Migration, with more than 13,000 staff 
members,27 have decided not to establish their own,28 others at a smaller scale 
have more recently reviewed setting up their own fora. One such example is 
the 2019 founding of the tribunal of the Technical Centre for Agricultural and 
Rural Cooperation acp-EU (cta), an entity with less than one hundred staff 
members.29 Furthermore, it may be noted that this option could also be car-
ried out jointly by a handful of smaller intergovernmental institutions which 
share a similar mandate, geographical location or the like.
3 Governance of Stand-Alone Versus Multi-Jurisdictional Tribunals
All international administrative tribunals enjoy full independence of judg-
ment,30 enabling their impartial review of the relevant law and evidence with-
out improper interference or influence. While ensuring full independence of 
judgment, tribunals at the same time exercise their powers within the relevant 
statutes and procedures of their establishment. Accordingly, international or-
ganizations which opt to establish their own stand-alone legal forum must 
generally outline the relevant logistical rules and procedures, as well as cover 
the concomitant establishment costs. Conversely, those which choose a multi-
jurisdictional body would accede to the procedures of the established govern-
ing body of the parent organization and be required to pay fees per case 
brought before the tribunal and, in some cases, the concomitant costs of yearly 
membership.
3.1 The Stand-Alone Tribunal: a Tribunal Under One’s Own Rules
Whilst tribunals have complete independence of judgment on cases brought 
before them, the back-office and logistical functions of tribunals differ in ap-
plication for stand-alone versus multi-jurisdictional tribunals. An  international 
26 World Bank, ‘World Bank Administrative Tribunal’; adb, ‘Administrative Tribunal’; imf, 
‘imf Administrative Tribunal’.
27 iom, ‘iom Snapshot 2019’.
28 iom has recognized the jurisdiction of the ilo Administrative Tribunal. See, ilo, ‘Mem-
bership (iloat)’.
29 Statute of the cta Administrative Tribunal; Council of Europe, ‘cta at faq’.
30 Gomula 1991, 87.
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organization that establishes its own tribunal effectively creates a stand-alone 
court. As such, the intergovernmental institution has the additional burden of 
establishing systems, policies and procedures—potentially tackling every-
thing from the required qualification and on-boarding of judges to the manda-
tory typeface and font of briefs submitted.
At the same time, the international organization may possibly benefit by 
more nimble and efficient adjustment of the tribunal’s processes to the evolv-
ing needs of the intergovernmental institution and its staff. Such adjustments 
might, for example, take into account changes in the international organiz-
tion’s size or location, financial and operational capabilities, novel staff or in-
stitutional concerns. In this context, the Asian Development Bank and the 
World Bank amended their tribunals’ statutes in 199531 and 200932,  respectively, 
in order to enhance their independence, allowing the tribunals to manage 
their budget independently and stating explicitly that they function indepen-
dently form the management of the respective organizations. Similarly, the 
Asian Development Bank introduced a second reform in 2006 to discourage 
actions brought for frivolous reasons or as potential harassment. Specifically, 
the entity introduced statute amendments to potentially require applicants to 
pay compensation for a maximum of three years of their base salary when 
their submission was “without foundation either in fact or under existing law” 
or “…intended to delay the resolution of the case or to harass the bank or any 
of its officers or employees”.33
3.2 The Multi-Jurisdictional Tribunal: A Tribunal Under the Rules of 
Others
An international organization that opts to join a multi-jurisdictional tribunal 
accedes not only to the relevant jurisprudence (discussed in the next section), 
but also to the relevant policies, procedures, institutional memory and best 
practices reflected across the multi-jurisdictional tribunal’s legal and opera-
tional framework. While such framework may be influenced by the insights of 
academia, practitioners and the thousands of parties that have been involved 
in the tribunals’ proceedings, multi-jurisdictional tribunals remain nonethe-
less under the exclusive oversight of their parent international organization’s 
governing body. Hence, in the case of tribunals such as iloat and unat, any 
amendment to their Statutes remains under the discretion of the International 
Labour Conference of the International Labour Organization (ilo),34 and the 
31 adb, The Administrative Tribunal of adb 2012, 78.
32 World Bank, ‘Amendments to the Statute of the Tribunal’.
33 Statute of adbat, art x(6).
34 Statute of iloat, art xi.
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un General Assembly,35 respectively. Moreover, a multi-jurisdictional tribunal 
may prescribe substantial requirements for the first-tier bodies of the interna-
tional organizations under its jurisdiction, including on their composition and 
on the authority who issues the final decision.
As a result, international organizations subject to these tribunals benefit 
from their long-established legal and operational frameworks, while at the 
same time having an often broad-ranging consultative role when seeking to 
initiate or shape potential amendments. Given the high number of hosted par-
ticipant international organizations, both iloat and unat provide the benefit 
of broad consultation with staff and participant institutions before changes 
are made. Further, given that potential statute amendments fall within the 
purview of the highest governing body, it may be natural that the process of 
potential reviews and evolution is a more gradual one for multi-jurisdictional, 
than for stand-alone, international administrative tribunals.
It is interesting to study, by way of example, the unat, which has a long his-
tory of reviewing procedures and policies to evolve and adapt as appropriate 
for staff and participating international organizations. unat’s predecessor was 
subject to calls to reform its system since the 1970s in order to, among other 
things, establish a two-tier system of administrative justice and to foster better 
representation for staff in disputes with international organizations.36 Reviews 
continued by means of reports and recommendations as late as 2002,37 and 
2005.38 Full reform was ultimately approved in 2009 with the establishment of 
the current unat.39 This tribunal continues to evolve and adapt to the needs 
of participant intergovernmental institutions and their staff. For example, in 
2000, the unat’s Statute was amended to require appropriate legal qualifica-
tions and experience for its judges,40 as a response to concerns that previous 
judges may have lacked sufficient relevant qualifications.41 This was further 
strengthened in 2005, when the Statute was again amended to specifically re-
quire “judicial experience in the field of administrative law or its equivalent”.42 
35 Statute of unat, art 12.
36 Reinisch and Knahr 2008, 473–474.
37 UN, ‘Reform of the Administration of Justice’ 2002.
38 unga RES/59/283, 13 April 2005.
39 Reinisch and Knahr 2008, 482.
40 Ibid, 460; Statute of UN Administrative Tribunal, art 3(1) (as amended by unga 
RES/55/159, 12 December 2000).
41 Pescatore 1994, 236.
42 Gulati 2011, 520.
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The 2009 reform further specified a requirement of a minimum number of 
years for such judicial experience.43
Therefore, an intergovernmental institution that subjects itself to a multi-
jurisdictional tribunal will reap the benefits of simultaneously adopting the 
jurisprudence and long-established procedures of the entity. At the same time, 
the parent international organization’s ongoing review of its legal framework, 
procedures and practices to best adapt to the evolving needs of staff and par-
ticipant intergovernmental institutions may be a more gradual process than 
that of stand-alone international administrative tribunal.
4 Jurisprudence
This section now turns to considering the jurisprudential ramifications of 
 multi-jurisdictional versus stand-alone international administrative tribunals, 
in terms of, firstly, ‘Foreseeability and Certainty’; and second, ‘Standards of 
Proof and Jurisprudential Consistency’.
4.1 Foreseeability and Certainty
Established multi-jurisdictional tribunals such as iloat and unat have a 
deep history of over half a century of comprehensive jurisprudence on a wide 
variety of matters. In a sense, their far-reaching jurisprudence is a blueprint 
showing the evolution of international administrative law since its creation. 
This extensive case law serves as reference and guidance to all intergovern-
mental institutions and their staff, regardless of whether or not they fall under 
their jurisdiction. By way of example, iloat alone has issued over 4,200 judg-
ments and it is now open to more than 58,000 international civil servants from 
57 international organizations.44
Nevertheless, newly created international administrative tribunals also 
have some established baseline for their case review. Indeed, the internal law 
of the international organization itself, both formal and informal, provides a 
standard for the rights and obligations governing the relationship between the 
intergovernmental institution and its staff. This includes formal sources such 
as the articles of agreement and by-laws or other constitutive documents of 
43 Statute of unat, art 3 (‘To be eligible for appointment as a judge, a person shall possess at 
least 15 years of aggregate judicial experience in the field of administrative law, employ-
ment law or the equivalent within one or more national or international jurisdictions. 
Relevant academic experience, when combined with practical experience in arbitration 
or the equivalent, may be taken into account towards 5 of the qualifying 15 years’).
44 ilo, ‘ilo Administrative Tribunal’.
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the international organization, as well as its rules and regulations relating to 
internal human resources, legal and related policies and procedures. Included 
as a source of this baseline administrative law are related recruitment and oth-
er documents, such as the provisions of the appointment letter of the staff 
member submitting a challenge.45 In addition to these formal texts, other 
sources include the administrative practice of the entity as well as generally 
accepted principles of international administrative law. Indeed, the commen-
tary to the imfat Statute discusses these sources, also indicating that the tri-
bunal should generally not exceed standards of review and limitations applied 
by other tribunals of international organizations.46 To foster a quick database 
of legal precedents, a new tribunal could also explicitly adopt by reference the 
generally recognized principles of international administrative law.47 Regard-
less of having adopted by reference other precedents, it is also common prac-
tice for a tribunal to support its judgment by referring to the ruling of another 
international administrative tribunal.48 It should be noted, however, that dis-
crepancies remain: for example, while tribunals may rule on the supremacy of 
general principles of law over an intergovernmental institution’s express direc-
tives or the language in a letter of appointment,49 it remains the case that the 
interpretation of what constitutes the general principles themselves may vary 
depending on civil or common law traditions50 and the like.51
In considering formation of a new tribunal, the jurisprudential  foundation—
including precedents and sources of applicable law—should be reviewed to 
support foreseeability and certainty for staff and the international organiza-
tion itself in handling disputes. For example, this could impact the manner in 
which legal practitioners advise their intergovernmental institution on a par-
ticular matter, including through settlement, as they may have somewhat more 
limited resources to predict how the case may develop during litigation. The 
same issue may also affect staff ’s view of and expectations regarding a particu-
lar dispute—perhaps even fostering excessively high or low expectations given 
the lack of known precedent. Further, in the event of proceedings, counsel of 
45 Amerasinghe, ‘International Administrative Tribunals’ 2014, 317.
46 Commentary on the Statute of imfat, art iii.
47 See as an example: Statute of imfat, art iii; Statute of the AfDBT, art v; and ebrd Ap-
peals Procedures , art 3.02.
48 adb, The Administrative Tribunal of adb 2012, 80.
49 Ibid, 79.
50 The main difference between the two systems is that common law uses case law as a pri-
mary source, whereas in civil law systems, codified statutes predominate.
51 Powers 2019, 109–112.
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staff and the intergovernmental institution alike may find it more challenging 
to align their legal arguments with the tribunal’s precedent and views.
4.2 Standards of Proof and Jurisprudential Consistency
Stakeholders of international organizations and legal practitioners should also 
carefully review the case law of a multi-jurisdiction international administra-
tive tribunal prior to joining it, including matters such as standards of proof 
and jurisprudential consistency. Understanding that each international organ-
ization’s governing body may accord varying focus or importance on different 
elements, this assessment should take into consideration whether the rulings 
emphasize with appropriate weight and consistency the key institutional is-
sues highlighted by the tribunal’s own governing body.
One threshold issue to examine in either joining a multi-jurisdictional tri-
bunal or creating a new international administrative tribunal is the standard 
of proof to be applied to allegations in the case. For example, one distinction 
between iloat and unat is the standard of proof for cases involving potential 
misconduct. In the former, the tribunal applies a ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ 
standard,52 while the latter has opted for ‘clear and convincing evidence’.53 
Whilst there may be differing applications of these standards in practice, this 
matter gains relevance in the recent efforts to strengthen institutional tools 
and mechanisms against all types of harassment, including of a sexual nature. 
A recent study indicates that a majority of the allegations of harassment at 
international organizations under the jurisdiction of tribunals that require a 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’ are found to be unsubstantiated as a result of an 
intergovernmental institution’s limited capacity to make a case in the “absence 
of corroborative or independent evidence of the alleged incident”.54 This may 
imply a potential chilling effect on complainants as such a high standard can-
not be met due to missing corroborative or independent proof given the na-
ture of these matters.55 In contrast, the same study found that ‘clear and 
52 The ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard is generally considered the highest, most rigor-
ous standard of proof, which requires that no other logical explanation can be derived 
from the facts except that the staff member committed misconduct. See iloat, v. v fao 
2017, consids 7–9.
53 The ‘clear and convincing’ standard of proof generally requires that the evidence being 
presented must be ‘highly’ and substantially more probable to be true than untrue. See 
unat, Molari v Secretary-General of the UN 2011, para 30.




 convincing evidence’ is a more appropriate threshold in the context of an in-
ternational organization’s investigation powers in light of these allegations.56
An assessment of the tribunals’ legal precedent should also take into ac-
count the manner, consistency and proportionality in which they have inter-
preted their statutes and rules. When a tribunal has a large number of mem-
bers with a concomitantly high caseload, it is important to review the 
consistency of similar judgments based on similar facts across the judicial 
oeuvre.57
The consistency in the interpretations of an international organization’s le-
gal framework is also closely related with the renewals and length of the judg-
es’ appointments. Indeed, the longer appointments and renewals of a tribunal 
membership enables it to establish a stronger doctrine and strengthens its rul-
ings.58 Similarly, the weight and proportionality of decisions is a crucial factor, 
particularly regarding certain remedies such as damages and specific perfor-
mance. These factors may also vary significantly across institutions—both 
multi-jurisdictional tribunals and stand-alone tribunals. For example, whilst 
the damages that the unat can award are capped at the equivalent of two-
year’s compensation of the applicant,59 other administrative tribunals such as 
the one of the Inter-American Development Bank have a one-year compensa-
tion cap, except if specific circumstances are met.60 This suitability assessment 
should take into consideration whether the rulings reflect sufficient jurispru-
dential consistency and an appropriate weight of their decisions based on the 
matter under its purview, as well as on key issues for the intergovernmental 
institution.
5 Operational Considerations
Furthermore, there are a series of operational and logistical support matters 
with a potential substantial impact for an international organization and its 
56 Ibid, 45.
57 Kryvoi 2015, 288.
58 A conference on international administrative law held in Paris, France, on 16 May 2000 in 
commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the World Bank Administrative Tribu-
nal. During the conference, Ibrahim Shihata stated that the renewals of tribunal mem-
bers ‘enabled the Tribunal to establish a doctrine on many issues and to take strong stands 
in spite of the complexities of the situations that it has had to address’. See Ziadé, Prob-
lems of International Administrative Law 2008, Preliminary Materials xv.
59 UN, ‘Administration of Justice’ 2004, 3.
60 Statute of idbat, art ix(2).
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staff, regardless of whether it establishes its own tribunal or submits to a multi-
jurisdictional international administrative tribunal. This section shall examine 
three: (i) the secretariat function; (ii) on-boarding and logistical support of tri-
bunal judges; and (iii) the length of time it takes to issue decisions. Most of 
these aspects would imply additional expenses for a stand-alone tribunal, 
whilst they are normally included in the cost associated with a multi-jurisdic-
tional tribunal, which require payments on a case-by-case basis and in some 
cases in addition to an annual retainer fee depending on the number of staff.61
5.1 Secretariat
Establishing a stand-alone international administrative tribunal requires the 
international organization to review and set up appropriate structural and lo-
gistical procedures which themselves align with its diversity of its staff nation-
alities, its regional versus global missions and the like. Joining an established 
multi-jurisdictional tribunal requires a similar examination. In this vein, it is 
crucial for stakeholders to closely analyse the proposed secretariat structure 
and functioning so as to identify one most suitable to the needs of the indi-
vidual international organization and its staff from perspectives including 
confidentiality, information distribution, and requirements for pleadings (in-
cluding the potential use of multiple official languages).
The establishment of a secretariat or a registrar function requires enabling 
a back-office information technology system and related procedures that seg-
regate information and assures the highest level of confidentiality due to the 
sensitive nature of the information. By way of example, such a system should 
be capable of electronic or mail case-intake from external parties in order to 
receive submissions from former staff or external attorneys. Rigorous proce-
dures should be established to maintain data privacy and support confidenti-
ality for those concerned. The more sophisticated the system chosen, the larger 
the likely financial impact on the international organization—particularly one 
establishing a stand-alone tribunal.
Multi-jurisdictional tribunals have adopted different methods to receive 
submissions from international organizations and their staff members. Whilst 
not a strictly legal matter, it would be also advisable to carefully review the dif-
ferent options which may directly impact resources and skills needed, includ-
ing as to required languages of pleadings and back-office support needed to 
complete submissions in a timely manner. For example, although the iloat 
employs both French and English as its working languages, it requires the in-
ternational organization to draft pleadings in the same language in which the 
61 ilo, ‘Financing of the Tribunal’ 2010, paras 3–4.
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staff member initiated the proceedings (that is, French or English) and to sub-
mit six hard copies via courier and one in electronic version.62 unat, on the 
other hand, allows the intergovernmental institution to conduct submissions 
in any of the six United Nations official languages (with may result in pleadings 
by the international organization and the staff member being in different lan-
guages) and with solely electronic means of submission.63 Although other tri-
bunals, such as the World Bank Administrative Tribunal and the Asian Devel-
opment Bank Administrative Tribunal, are silent on the matter, “the practice 
has been to consider English as the official language”.64 Hence, the official lan-
guages of an international organization may not necessarily mirror those of its 
tribunal. Given the breadth of differences across intergovernmental institu-
tions including varying staff nationalities, working and official languages, re-
gional versus global missions, it is crucial to closely examine the secretariat 
structure and functioning to identify one most suitable to the individual inter-
national organization and its staff.
5.2 On-Boarding and Logistical Support for Judges
A new stand-alone tribunal would require its own judges, either selected spe-
cifically through an open call or from a roster of renowned experts or a similar 
exercise. It is considered a best practice to engage seasoned, highly respected 
jurists with specific legal expertise on employment matters;65 the recruitment 
of such legal professionals with strong experience and objectivity allows them 
to make robust, seamless contributions to the tribunal.
At the same time, each international organization has a unique mission and 
manner of operation, as reflected in both its legal framework and its practices. 
Accordingly, it is not surprising that different international administrative tri-
bunals have tailored requirements for the legal expertise of their judges. For 
example, the international tribunals of international financial institutions 
normally select judges with expertise on international civil service and inter-
national organization administration;66 while undt and unat require 
62 Rules of iloat, art 8(2).
63 Rules of Procedure of unat, art 9(2)(b).
64 Ziadé, ‘Some Practical Issues’ 2008, 88.
65 Reinisch and Knahr 2008, 460–462.
66 Statute of wbat, art iv(1); Statute of adbat, art iv(1). Some multilateral development 
banks now require experience in litigation and/or arbitration; see, for example, ebrd, 
‘ebrd Administrative Tribunal—Appointment of Judges’, 7 September 2016.
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 experience on national employment law67 and iloat on appellate judicial 
expertise.68
Whilst a clear separation must be kept between the international organiza-
tion and the judges to preserve the independence of the latter, a tribunal famil-
iar with its parent organization’s rules, policies and procedures may be better 
suited to determine whether an international organization met its obligations 
vis-à-vis its staff members. This organizational familiarity can be enhanced 
through the professional and appropriate on-boarding and logistical support 
for its independent judges.
A multi-jurisdictional tribunal would absorb the task of supporting its judg-
es; indeed, given the long histories of many such international administrative 
tribunals, they boast a demonstrated track record of successful on-boarding 
and logistical support for their roster of judges. However, an international or-
ganization that opts to submit itself to this jurisdiction should note that such 
support would likely be comprehensive and applicable across diverse intergov-
ernmental institutions, rather than tailored to a specific participant interna-
tional organization. As a result, although the judges will be familiar with the 
overall system of international organizations, it is likely that they will not be in 
a position to take into account the nuances and specifics of a responding inter-
national organization during proceedings, beyond the information communi-
cated through the pleadings.
On the other hand, an entity that creates its own stand-alone tribunal will 
not benefit from such a time-tested administrative structure supporting its ju-
rists. Instead, suitable on-boarding and logistical assistance would be needed 
to support its independent judges to become familiar with the international 
organization’s rules, policies and procedures, as appropriate. While this will 
involve a financial and time commitment for the international organization, 
offering such support for judges should enhance their organizational familiar-
ity and ability to operate efficiently within the context. In turn, this should 
support the jurists’ ability to execute their functions in an independent and 
objective manner to ensure that the international organization meets its obli-
gations vis-à-vis its staff members.
5.3 Time to Issue Decisions
The length of time that it takes an international administrative tribunal to re-
view the pleadings, make its analysis and issue the final decision will likely 
have a substantial impact on the international organization and its staff. As to 
67 Elias and Thomas 2012, 164–165.
68 Reinisch and Weber 2004, 103–104.
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the first, the timing will implicate the promptness with which the intergovern-
mental institution can solve pending matters with staff members and, in the 
event of an adverse decision, adjust its legal framework. As to the latter, the 
timing will provide staff members with an outcome to the administrative deci-
sion they challenge without undue delay, fostering a sense of fairness and effi-
ciency. Relatively prompt decisions also reduce the time of ambiguity and pos-
sibly tension waiting for an outcome, thus supporting a sense of foreseeability 
and certainty for both staff and the international organization.
Therefore, an international organization that establishes its own stand-
alone tribunal or joins an existing multi-jurisdictional international adminis-
trative tribunal, should carefully review the statute of the tribunal as well as 
the rules of procedures thereof, particularly as to the relevant bureaucratic and 
logistical considerations that allow for the issuance of prompt judgments. This 
would normally include the stated maximum timeframes for the various stages 
of the process including initial pleadings, rejoinders and sur-rejoinders; the 
timing and logistics for meetings of the tribunal (for example, whether there 
are oral hearings in which witnesses may be called; whether judges meet in 
person at a pre-determined number of sessions per year; whether in person or 
electronic meetings are used; the sufficiency of administrative support and so 
forth) and the timing for the issuance of decisions. Such procedures would 
normally be established and periodically reviewed by the judges themselves 
and set forth in the rules of procedure for the relevant tribunal. The procedures 
would, of course, be within the overall framework and time limits for issuance 
of decisions as set forth in the statute of the tribunal itself.
6 Conclusion
Evolving over the years since 1927, administrative tribunals of international or-
ganizations continue responding to the same need: providing an impartial le-
gal forum to resolve employment-related disputes between staff members and 
the international organization, whilst upholding institutional privileges and 
immunities. A diversity of tribunals now exists to address an equally varied 
number of international organizations with different missions, sizes, opera-
tions, practices and legal frameworks.
Throughout the decades, each international organization has answered the 
question: to join or not to join? While some intergovernmental institutions 
have opted to join and submit to a multi-jurisdictional tribunal, others have 
established their own, stand-alone tribunals. Both options allow international 
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organizations to provide staff with an independent avenue of review of admin-
istrative decisions whilst protecting the privileges and immunities of the inter-
national organization. Indeed, this assessment by the relevant stakeholders 
should take into consideration intrinsic characteristics, institutional commit-
ments and needs of each individual organization and their staff.
International organizations joining an existing multi-jurisdictional inter-
national administrative tribunal may benefit from long-established jurispru-
dence (which may entail more robust certainty and foreseeability), a demon-
strated track record of established governance structures (including entities 
such as a secretariat, registrar, as well as existing on-boarding and back-of-
fice support for judges and tribunals) and well-documented procedures and 
policies. In benefiting from these elements, the participating international 
organization would of course be required to pay the concomitant costs of 
yearly membership and fees per case brought before the tribunal which may 
be more costly than establishing a stand-alone tribunal. Likewise, a multi- 
jurisdictional tribunal may adapt its own rules and procedures more gradually 
to institutional or other changes, and may not have as deep an understand-
ing of the characteristics of each individual participating institution and 
their staff.
On the other hand, an international organization that establishes its own 
tribunal effectively creates a stand-alone court. This may allow the interna-
tional organization to be more nimble and efficient in creating the tribunal 
and on-boarding judges, and may allow a more tailored approach to the needs 
of the international organization (for example as to jurisprudential standards, 
languages of pleadings, time limits, location of any sessions whether in per-
son or via electronic means). Creating a tribunal, though, may also bring with 
it the additional burden of potentially insufficient jurisprudence, as well as 
the need to establish governance frameworks (including a secretariat, registrar 
and support for judges) and also clearly documented policies and administra-
tive support.
This broad-ranging review of international administrative tribunals high-
lights one consistent factor—namely, that in choosing a tribunal, there is no 
‘one-size fits all’ approach. Whilst informed by legal advice and other consid-
erations, the final decision is ultimately a political one made by the relevant 
stakeholders of the international organization (including the membership, the 
host State, the mandate beneficiaries, and the staff and management of the 
entity). So, to join or not to join? While stakeholders may ultimately choose 
different options, we argue that their underlying assessment should consider 
the various complex (and sometimes competing) factors outlined in this 
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 chapter in light of the key institutional needs, mission and practice of the in-
ternational organization and its staff.
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Chapter 7
Arbitrating Employment Disputes Involving 
International Organizations
Rishi Gulati and Thomas John*
Abstract
This chapter argues that international arbitration needs to be used more frequently 
in resolving employment-related disputes of international organizations. Especially in 
the context of claims against international organizations which tend to possess func-
tional immunities, arbitration can play a significant role in ensuring that individuals 
raising employment claims against them have access to fair trial-compliant modes of 
dispute resolution. However, this chapter also submits that any arbitral regime must 
be implemented in good faith. And crucially, without implementing a robust arbitral 
framework that takes into account the particularities involved in international ad-
ministrative dispute resolution, any arbitral mechanism is unlikely to fully yield the 
inherent advantages of arbitration over litigation before traditional international 
administrative tribunals. Finally, using the example of the arbitral scheme recently 
implemented by the Hague Conference on Private International law, this chapter pro-
vides a potential blueprint for other international organizations.
1 Introduction
International arbitration is much talked about but little used as a forum of 
choice to resolve employment-related, or similar, disputes of international 
 organizations—‘international administrative disputes’. This must change. 
Firstly, international administrative tribunals (iats) are under ever-increasing 
workloads and serious delays in the administration of justice to staff members 
is much too common. It is trite to say that ‘justice delayed is justice denied’. 
Second, there has been an exponential rise in the number of consultants and 
* Rishi Gulati, Barrister at the Victorian Bar, Australia and Fellow in Law at the London School 
of Economics and Political Science (LSE), rishi.gulati@vicbar.com.au; Thomas John, Found-




contractors engaged by international organisations (ios) who neither have ac-
cess to iats, nor to national courts, given ios’ immunities. Of course, the situ-
ation faced by this latter category of individuals is especially precarious. At the 
outset, it is clarified that it is not our intention to conduct a legal analysis on 
how personnel working for ios should be categorized (in other words, the 
 traditional dichotomy between ‘staff members’ and ‘contractors’), but simply 
to suggest the role international arbitration can play in enhancing access to 
justice for all individuals working for ios, regardless of how an io may choose 
to characterize employment status. To further this aim, we highlight why inter-
national arbitration needs to be used more frequently in resolving internation-
al administrative disputes.
Following this introduction, we commence by discussing the advantages ar-
bitration can yield (Section 2). Especially in the context of claims against ios, 
international arbitration can play a significant role in ensuring that individuals 
raising employment claims against ios have access to fair trial compliant 
modes of dispute resolution (Section 3). However, any arbitral regime must be 
implemented in good faith (Section 4). Finally, we argue that without imple-
menting a robust arbitral framework that takes into account the particularities 
involved in international administrative dispute resolution, any arbitral mech-
anism is unlikely to fully yield the benefits identified. Using the example of the 
arbitral scheme recently implemented by the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law (hcch), an io headquartered in The Hague, we provide a 
potential blueprint for other organizations (Section5).
2 Why Arbitrate?
Arbitration is typically understood as a “non-judicial process for the settle-
ment of disputes where an independent third party—an arbitrator—makes a 
decision that is binding”.1 The resolution of disputes through arbitral processes 
dates back to ancient Greek and Roman times, and has been practiced in one 
form or another in all cultures around the world.2 In modern times, especially 
when it comes to resolving international disputes, the arbitral process has been 
highly institutionalized, albeit ad hoc arbitrations occur from time to time. 
International arbitrations are now mostly administered by  well- established 
1 ciarb, ‘Arbitration’.
2 Kidane 2017, 24–26.
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arbitral institutions,3 with arbitrators performing their role in a manner simi-
lar to judges, with heavy reliance on past cases.4
International arbitration has been used to resolve all manner and form of 
claims, ranging from typically private disputes (including large-scale commer-
cial disputes), to disputes having a public dimension (especially in the context 
of investor-State arbitration), as well as employment disputes.5 Therefore, ar-
bitral tribunals can be used to resolve a large variety of disputes, including in-
ternational administrative disputes, should all parties to a dispute agree to do 
so. Moreover, international arbitration possesses some inherent advantages 
over traditional litigation. The key advantages include neutrality (staying out 
of national courts); informality and flexibility (arbitral procedures being less 
cumbersome than traditional court litigation and existence of party control); 
speed of the delivery of justice; and crucially, enforceability of arbitral awards 
through the regime of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, commonly known as the New York Convention, 1958, 
which has meant that, subject to some exceptions, arbitral awards can be en-
forced transnationally with relative ease. All those advantages have been sub-
jected to much commentary and there is no need to precis that discussion 
here.
However, international arbitration has come under some backlash in recent 
times due to ever-increasing costs associated with arbitrations; issues of 
opaqueness especially where disputes have a public or administrative law 
character (such as the case with investor-State disputes); and concerns about 
the independence and impartiality of arbitrators. Indeed, commentators tend 
to be either strong supporters of arbitral processes (the pro-arbitration lobby),6 
3 The International Chamber of Commerce is one prominent arbitral house; the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (icsid) is best known for investment arbi-
tration; for a discussion of the role of global and regional centres, see Stone Sweet and Grisel, 
The Evolution of International Arbitration: Judicialization, Governance, Legitimacy 2017, 49.
4 See Stone Sweet and Grisel, ‘The Evolution of International Arbitration: Delegation, Judiciali-
zation, Governance’ 2014, 32 and 43.
5 International commercial arbitration is a forum of choice for resolving large scale cross- 
border commercial disputes. Parties can include States and ios as well. Investment arbitra-
tion (such as pursuant to the icsid Convention) is a forum of choice to resolve investment 
claims (having significant public law elements) between private persons and States; see 
Menon 2015, 230. Employment disputes are also increasingly being subjected to arbitration 
where a claim has connections with more than one legal order; see generally, pca, Labour 
Law Beyond Borders 2003.
6 Advocates of international arbitration point to the enforceability of awards across jurisdic-
tions, avoidance of national jurisdiction, flexibility and ability to select arbitrators as its key 
advantages; see Kidane 2017, 26.
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or strongly oppose it, referring to it as a ‘mafia’ comprising of a limited number 
of repeat players that arbitrate most major disputes.7 Putting that sharp con-
trast to one side, we consider that whether arbitration is a desirable mode of 
dispute resolution or not, depends on the context and nature of the dispute to 
be resolved. More importantly, how an arbitral scheme is implemented is likely 
to ultimately determine whether it provides for an effective dispute resolution 
forum. We treat the debate on arbitration as a means to an end—that is, as a 
framework that can help secure the effective administration of justice—as op-
posed to an end in its own right. As we argue in the next section, in the context 
of international administrative claims, international arbitration can play a sig-
nificant role given the particularities at play.
3 The Impact of Jurisdictional Immunities and the Obligation to 
Provide Reasonable Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution
The fact that ios have an internationally binding obligation to provide for “ap-
propriate modes” or “reasonable alternative means” of dispute resolution is 
not contested.8 If such an obligation is not complied with, an io’s immunity 
may be breached, for this may result in an impermissible interference into the 
right to a fair trial. As the European Court of Human Rights has said:
[A] material factor in determining whether granting [an io] immunity 
from […] jurisdiction is permissible under the Convention is whether the 
applicants had available to them reasonable alternative means to protect 
effectively their rights under the Convention.9
Obviously then, the obligation to provide reasonable alternative means of dis-
pute resolution is necessary to ensure compliance with the right to access a fair 
trial, and from the perspective of the io, there are strong incentives to provide 
such alternatives. Failure to do so may open up an io to the exercise of national 
jurisdiction. In this respect, ios justifiably wish to stay out of national courts, 
fearing intrusions into their independence. Therefore, international arbitra-
tion can readily provide for a forum of choice in claims against ios given that 
one key advantage of arbitration is its ability to avoid the parties having to liti-
gate claims before national courts.10 An arbitral process can indeed form an 
7 See Michaels 2014, 53–54.
8 See, for example, General Convention, s 29.
9 ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy v Germany 1999, para 68.
10 See Kidane 2017, 99–100; Caron and others (eds) 2016, 1.
145Arbitrating Employment Disputes Involving Int. Organizations
<UN>
adequate mode of dispute settlement. As early as 1954, in its Effect of Awards 
Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice said that private persons 
affected by io conduct (in that case, it was UN employees) may be delivered 
justice through a judicial mechanism or through arbitral means, drawing a 
functional equivalence between courts and arbitration.11 In more recent times, 
the European Court of Human Rights has accepted that arbitration can satisfy 
the io’s obligation to provide for reasonable alternative means of dispute 
resolution.12
Since ios generally wish to stay out of national courts, adopting an arbitral 
mechanism should be an ideal vehicle for ios to fulfil their access to justice 
obligations. More specifically, where justice at iats is noncompliant with fair 
trial standards, for example, as a result of undue delays in the delivery of jus-
tice, arbitral procedures could be a supplement. Albeit, the specific mechanics 
of how such enhanced choice is implemented will require careful considera-
tion to avoid parallel proceedings and the risk of inconsistent decisions. As we 
said at the outset, the possibility of arbitration is especially relevant to the 
large number of individuals engaged by ios (contractors and consultants) who 
do not have access to iats at all. For this category of individuals, international 
arbitration will then be the only means to access reasonable alternative means 
of dispute resolution. Clearly, arbitration can play a significant role in interna-
tional administrative dispute resolution. However, should an arbitral frame-
work be adopted, its success depends on how it is ultimately implemented, a 
matter on which the remainder of this chapter focuses on.
4 The Need for a Good Faith Implementation of an Arbitral Regime
If an arbitral framework is chosen as a forum of choice, it must be implement-
ed in good faith. Without such a good faith implementation, the regime will 
fail to provide for reasonable alternative means of dispute resolution. Unfortu-
nately, the io experience with arbitration has been characterized by the ap-
pearance of a lack of good faith, manifesting itself in several forms.13 Three 
points may be made.
Firstly, significant issues can arise in relation to the enforcement of the 
award. Given that one key strength of the international arbitral regime is 
the enforceability of awards, any lack of certainty in this respect can reduce 
11 icj, Effect of Awards 1954, 57.
12 ECtHR, Klausecker v Germany 2015, para 76.
13 The principle of good faith includes acting honestly, fairly and reasonably. It also prohib-
its the abuse of rights; see International Law Association, ‘Berlin Conference’ 2004, 11.
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the effectiveness of the system. Regarding this important issue, national courts 
have tended to take inconsistent approaches on whether consent to arbitrate 
also results in a waiver of immunities from enforcement.14 Recent develop-
ments have, however, indicated that where an io enters into an arbitral 
 agreement, any resulting award may be enforced against the io.15 Be that as it 
may, given the uncertainty on the issue of enforcement, in the absence of an 
express clause in the arbitration agreement removing an io’s immunity from 
enforcement in respect of the award in question, a private party can have little 
confidence that arbitration will be an effective way to resolve claims against 
ios given the lengths (and associated costs) to which they may be required to 
seek enforcement. In this context, the lack of good faith shown by ios in imple-
menting arbitration becomes even more apparent when the practice of some 
key ios is considered. Taking the example of the United Nations (UN), on the 
bases of only two arbitrations, the UN determined that arbitration is not finan-
cially viable.16 Yet, it continues to include an arbitration clause in its general 
conditions of contracts.17 In those conditions, the UN also includes a provision 
that submission to arbitration does not amount to a waiver of UN immuni-
ties.18 Whether or not courts will hold this provision to be valid is a separate 
matter—the point being that a private person can have little confidence that 
even if they succeed in an arbitration, the award will be enforced.
Second, apparent lack of good faith on the part of some ios is confirmed 
and demonstrated by the arbitration experience specifically in the employ-
ment sphere. For example, in one case, the defendant io (unesco) refused to 
appoint an arbitrator despite entering into an arbitration agreement with one 
of its personnel. The French courts came to the rescue of the claimant by exer-
cising jurisdiction over the io, holding that the arbitration agreement waived 
14 See Fox and Webb 2015, 394–400.
15 Relying on French jurisprudence, where an io refused to honour an arbitration award 
against it concerning a dispute about rental payments, a Lebanese court categorically 
held that an agreement to arbitrate waived any io immunities from enforcement; see 
Obeid Law Firm, ‘Arbitration and Immunity from Execution’, 10 April 2014, citing Leba-
nese Execution Bureau decision dated 18 July 2013; also discussed in Mansour, 19.
16 UN, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’ 2010, paras 168 and 170–172.
17 See UN, General Conditions of Contracts for the Services of Consultants and Individual 
Contractors 2013, s 16.
18 This is the case regardless of the subject matter of the dispute. For the purported applica-
bility of UN immunities even where arbitration is entered into, see Ibid., s 17; for other 
cases, a standard clause used by the UN in all its contracts was noted in UN, ‘Report of the 
Secretary-General’ 1995, para 6 (“Nothing in or relating to this Contract shall be deemed a 
waiver of any of the privileges and immunities of the United Nations, including, but not 
limited to, immunity from any form of legal process”).
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its immunities.19 However, in another case, national courts did not come to the 
claimant’s aid. In a case that ultimately reached the European Court of Human 
Rights, a candidate was denied a job at the European Patent Office (epo) based 
on their disability.20 The aggrieved party approached the epo’s internal review 
mechanism to challenge this allegedly discriminatory treatment, however, the 
epo dismissed their claims for lack of standing.21 The epo suggested to the 
claimant that they may approach the Administrative Tribunal of the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (iloat) even though it was clear that the claimant 
did not possess standing for they were not an epo employee, a pre-condition 
to standing before the iloat.22
The claimant approached German courts arguing that their right to access 
to a court had been breached as they could neither access justice within the 
epo, nor at the iloat (for lack of standing); and that the epo had unlawfully 
discriminated against him.23 German courts refused to lift the epo’s immuni-
ties.24 The complainant then filed a claim before the iloat. The Tribunal un-
surprisingly determined that the complainant did not possess standing be-
cause it was only open to individuals already employed at the epo. However, it 
took a dim view of the epo’s conduct, urging it to submit the dispute to arbitra-
tion given the legal vacuum that the claimant faced.25 Following the iloat’s 
decision, after two years of litigation, the epo offered the claimant the possi-
bility to arbitrate.26 While the claimant was willing to enter into an arbitration 
that protected their due process rights (right to a public hearing without un-
due delay), they did not agree to do so on the terms the epo offered.27 The ar-
bitration never eventuated.
The claimant subsequently approached the European Court of Human 
Rights lodging a claim against Germany arguing that the epo had failed to pro-
vide them with reasonable alternative means of dispute resolution. Without 
analyzing the overall circumstances of the claim where significant delays had 
already occurred (more than three years had passed since the claimant first 
19 Court of Appeal of Paris, unesco v Boulois 1998.
20 See ECtHR, Klausecker v Germany 2015, paras 4–8. The organization stated that at some 
unknown time in the future, the applicant may not be able to perform their job due to 
their disability, and that purportedly justify refusing the candidate the relevant job for 
which they were found to be otherwise suitable.
21 Ibid., para 10.
22 Ibid., para 11.
23 Ibid., para 12.
24 Ibid., paras 14–16.
25 Ibid., paras 19–20.
26 Ibid., paras 21–22.
27 Ibid., para 25.
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approached the epo), the European Court dismissed the claimant’s conten-
tions, holding that the belated offer of arbitration constituted reasonable alter-
native means.28 In the final analysis, over a period of 10 years, a job applicant 
who was possessed with allegations of discrimination by the epo approached 
four dispute resolution forums (the io itself, German courts, iloat and the 
European Court), being rejected jurisdictionally by each one of them. One may 
query whether this belated offer to arbitrate in fact is capable of constituting a 
reasonable alternative means given the delays that had already occurred.
Finally, and perhaps most concerningly, ios may choose to agree on an arbi-
tration clause simply to oust the jurisdiction of an iat. For example, at the 
iloat, individuals categorised as non-staff members (such as contractors to 
an io) may not access the iloat if that tribunal is not expressly selected as a 
choice of forum in the contract. In its case law, where no alternative mecha-
nisms for such individuals exist, the iloat has taken jurisdiction to ensure 
that access to justice is maintained.29 However, where an arbitral mechanism 
purportedly exists, the iloat refuses to take jurisdiction.30 This the iloat 
does without satisfying itself that the arbitral mechanism is in fact implement-
ed. Such an approach has resulted in the outcome that an io can oust the juris-
diction of the iloat simply by incorporating an arbitration clause in the con-
tract of individual services.
At the UN, it is worth noting that the now discontinued UN Administrative 
Tribunal did take jurisdiction over cases advanced by certain claimants on the 
basis that without its intervention, the claimants would suffer a denial of jus-
tice.31 However, the present-day United Nations Dispute and Appeals Tribu-
nals have not taken the same approach. It bears mentioning that in respect of 
its consultants and contractors, the UN provides the possibility of arbitration. 
However, there is no evidence that such arbitrations are actually conducted. 
The record is poor. As has already been pointed out, there is evidence of only 
two arbitrations ever being carried out.32 Tellingly, where a UN agency had not 
appointed an arbitrator despite the presence of an arbitration clause, the 
French Courts asserted jurisdiction over the defendant international organiza-
tion on the basis that jurisdictional immunity was waived.33
28 Ibid., para 76.
29 See the broad interpretation given to the term ‘staff member’ by the iloat (an approach 
not adopted at the UN tribunals) in the well-known case of Chadsey v World Postal Union 
(now upu) 1968.
30 See for example iloat, J.-D. M. v ilo 2010, consid 6.
31 See UN Administrative Tribunal, Teixeira v Secretary-General of the UN 1977.
32 UN, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’ 2010, para 146.
33 See Court of Appeal of Paris, unesco v Boulois 1998.
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What is apparent is that a carefully crafted dispute resolution framework 
ought to be implemented if an arbitral regime is to have any prospects of pro-
viding for a reasonable alternative means of dispute resolution. Below, through 
the example of the hcch, we suggest just one blueprint for such a regime 
which addresses several of the concerns raised above. Of course, different ios 
will have distinct needs that should be reflected in any arbitral framework.
5 A Framework for Arbitrating Employment Disputes in ios—The 
Hague Conference on Private International Law
A possible example for the use of arbitration by an io are the Staff Rules Ap-
plicable to Officials and Personnel of the Hague Conference on Private Inter-
national Law (hcch Staff Rules).34 The hcch Staff Rules are broadly based on 
those of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, but 
were changed in many regards to account for the very specific realities and re-
quirements of the hcch.35 One significant change was the inclusion of an ar-
bitration framework that governs certain employment disputes. It was includ-
ed to provide a fast, efficient and cost-effective dispute resolution mechanism 
which provides just solutions as well as finality of outcome to the organization, 
its staff and, in limited circumstances, non-staff members. The hcch Staff 
Rules were adopted by the Members of the hcch and entered into effect on 1 
January 2018. This section will now examine this form of dispute resolution 
under the following four headings: (i) The hcch Staff Rules—A Brief Intro-
duction to Their Architecture; (ii) Dispute Resolution for hcch Personnel; (iii) 
Availability of Arbitration for Others; and (iv) Costs not Addressed in the 
hcch Staff Rules.
34 A redacted version of the hcch Staff Rules can be found at <https://assets.hcch.net/
docs/fa7da3e6-f05d-4721-84be-3da3b411bd0d.pdf>accessed 23 November 2019. The rule 
relevant to this paper is Article 62 of the hcch Staff Rules.
35 The hcch is affiliated to the enlarged Co-ordinated Organizations. As the Introduction to 
the hcch Staff Rules explains, “In 1963, the Member States of the hcch decided to follow 
the Staff Regulations of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(oecd). Based on this decision, the Secretary General of the hcch decided in 1979 to 
adopt the Staff Regulations of the oecd ‘sous réserve des adaptations nécessaires’ to ac-
count for the differences between the oecd and the hcch”. Over the years, a hotchpotch 
of directly and indirectly applied oecd Regulations, Secretary General Decisions, but 
also practices and usages evolved. Transparency and clarity of the rules applicable to staff 




5.1 The hcch Staff Rules—A Brief Introduction to Their Architecture
The hcch Staff Rules distinguish between two categories of staff.36 The first 
category is ‘officials’ who are appointed by instrument in accordance with 
Chapter 1, Article 2 of the hcch Staff Rules. The term ‘official’ is not defined. 
However, the hcch Staff Rules provide that officials are all persons employed 
by the organization whose Letter of Appointment states that they are an offi-
cial of the hcch.
In addition, the hcch Staff Rules also include provisions for so-called ‘per-
sonnel’ of the organization. The term ‘personnel’ is quasi-defined by demark-
ing this category of staff against officials. Article 47 stipulates that personnel 
include all persons engaged by the organization who are not appointed offi-
cials, and whose letter of engagement, as opposed to the instrument appoint-
ing an official, states that they are personnel of the hcch.
The difference between officials and personnel reflects the hcch’s ap-
proach to planning its human resources. Officials are the core of the hcch’s 
workforce. They are appointed to substantive positions, even if their initial ap-
pointment is temporally limited.37 Officials are paid from the budget of the 
hcch. Their roles and functions are required generally for the pursuit of the 
mandate, and strategic priorities, of the hcch. Personnel are engaged to pur-
sue specific purposes or support defined projects. The salaries of personnel are 
paid from sources other than the organization’s budget, that is, from voluntary 
contributions. The specifics of the engagement of personnel relevantly shapes 
the conditions for this category of staff. The relationship with the hcch is gov-
erned in a separate Chapter of the hcch Staff Rules (Chapter 3). The terms of 
personnel are generally short and may only be longer than 24 months if excep-
tional circumstances require.38 Renewals are possible but only for a maximum 
term of 48 months.39 A term does not carry any expectation for renewal or 
conversion to the status of an official.40
36 The two categories of staff members engaged by the hcch are those that are appointed 
by the Secretary General as ‘officials’, and those that are engaged as ‘personnel’. The main 
difference is their role within the Permanent Bureau as explained below. The hcch also 
engages consultants. These are not considered staff and their retainers are not governed 
by the hcch Staff Rules but by individually agreed contracts.
37 Article 11 of the hcch Staff Rules provides the rules for limited and unlimited appoint-
ments as well as the conversion procedure.
38 hcch Staff Rules, art 52.
39 Ibid., art 53.2.
40 Ibid., art 53.3.
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5.2 Dispute Resolution for hcch Personnel
The dispute resolution procedure that applies to personnel can be found in 
Articles 62 and 63 of the hcch Staff Rules, including the relevant Instructions. 
It is based on arbitration. In opting for arbitration as its dispute resolution pro-
cedure, the hcch sought to balance the shortness of term of personnel with 
the obvious length and complexity of the dispute resolution procedure appli-
cable to officials. The final resolution of a dispute through the Council of Eu-
rope Administrative Council after personnel had ended their term, was consid-
ered to be particularly troubling. Rather, the hcch considered solutions that 
would avoid that as a result of lengthy procedures, disputes became entrenched 
beyond the term of personnel. A faster resolution of disputes was considered 
to promote access to justice for personnel and to bring quicker closure for the 
disputants.41 These policy considerations led to selecting arbitration as the 
preferred dispute resolution procedure for personnel. It is envisaged that arbi-
tration will offer the hcch as well as its personnel the anticipated fast, effi-
cient and cost-effective dispute resolution procedure it was designed for.
Article 62.2 of the hcch Staff Rules stipulates that personnel may have, un-
der certain circumstances, access to what is called a ‘simplified dispute resolu-
tion procedure’. This simplified dispute resolution procedure is an arbitration 
procedure that is used to decide certain employment disputes. The circum-
stances in which this simplified dispute resolution procedure is available are 
defined in Articles 62.2(a) and 62.2(b) of the hcch Staff Rules and they are 
connected to the length of the term of the member of the personnel. Firstly, in 
accordance with Article 62.2(a) of the hcch Staff Rules, arbitration is the sole 
dispute resolution procedure available to personnel members whose engage-
ment with the hcch is less than, or equal to, 24 months. Especially consider-
ing the shortness of the term of this segment of personnel, the exclusive avail-
ability of arbitration should greatly facilitate the timely resolution of disputes, 
that is, within the term.
Second, arbitration is also available to those personnel who are engaged for 
a term longer than 24 months (and less than, or equal to, 48 months) if they 
choose this procedure. While Article 62.2(b) of the hcch Staff Rules provides 
that these personnel are prima facie governed by the dispute resolution proce-
dure that is available to officials, in accordance with Article 62.3 of the hcch 
Staff Rules, they can choose arbitration as the preferred dispute resolution pro-
cedure. This choice was included as it was thought possible that longer-serving 
41 Throughout this chapter, any references to underlying policy considerations are included 




personnel may see benefits in having access to arbitration. It also gives expres-
sion to the principle of party autonomy in the context of the law of ios.42
The basic rules set forth in Articles 62 and 63 of the hcch Staff Rules are 
further reinforced through a set of detailed Instructions. Instruction 62.1 of the 
hcch Staff Rules reinforces, in essence, the rules laid down in Article 62.2 of 
the Rules, but further clarifies that the simplified dispute resolution procedure 
is available to those personnel who have been aggrieved by an administrative 
act made by the Secretary General. Instruction 62.2 of the hcch Staff Rules 
also reinforces the rule established by Article 63, repeating that personnel who 
have been aggrieved by a decision by an administrative act and serve for longer 
than 24 months (but less than, or equal to, 48 months) can choose a simpli-
fied dispute resolution process. Moreover, the Instruction further supplements 
the rule in Article 63 by stipulating that the parties may choose arbitration 
either at the time of the engagement of the personnel member, or may do so 
on an ad hoc basis, after a dispute has arisen.43 This approach was included 
to pursue two goals: firstly, to maximize flexibility in creating a relationship 
between the organization and its personnel that is most suited to the situation, 
and second, to ensure that personnel members and the hcch can choose this 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism to gain adequate access to justice at 
any stage of their term, even if no arbitration clause was included in their Let-
ter of Engagement.
Instruction 62.4 of the hcch Staff Rules then provides that arbitrations be-
tween personnel and the organization are to be conducted under the auspices 
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (pca) in The Hague.44 This includes 
that in accordance with Instruction 62.8 of the hcch Staff Rules, the arbitra-
tion is to be conducted in accordance with the pca’s ‘Optional Rules for Arbi-
tration between International Organizations and Private Parties’ (Optional 
Rules).45 Instruction 62.5 does provide that the personnel member’s Letter of 
42 The policy consideration involved, prima facie, the overarching principle that the length 
of the applicable dispute resolution procedure should be commensurate to the length of 
working with the hcch. This principle was then balanced with considerations relevant to 
access to justice, the rule of law and the equality of arms. This led to the inclusion of this 
choice: the overarching principle can give way to a personnel member’s choice, a unilat-
eral selection of arbitration as preferred dispute resolution procedure.
43 This policy was included in order to increase the flexibility of the availability of the 
procedure.
44 The seat of the Permanent Bureau of the hcch is The Hague, so the choice of the pca, 
also based in The Hague, was a natural one.
45 The fact that the pca offers such dedicated rules was a further factor adding weight to 
choosing the pca as central to the arbitration procedure for personnel members. The 
rules are available on the website of the pca <https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/
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Engagement shall include a model arbitration clause as a jurisdictional basis 
for the arbitration.
When thought was given to devising a suitable arbitration clause, it was 
considered unnecessary to draft one from scratch if a suitable ready-made 
clause could be found. It was ultimately found in the form of the ‘Model Arbi-
tration Clauses for use in connection with the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
Optional Rules for Arbitration between International Organizations and Pri-
vate Parties’, comprising two model arbitration clauses, one used for existing, 
and one for future, disputes.46 The model arbitration clause for future disputes 
is included in the Letter of Engagement for personnel members engaged for a 
period of service of less than or equal to 24 consecutive months. It is also used 
for personnel members who are engaged for longer than 24 months (and less 
than, or equal to, 48 months) if they choose arbitration as their preferred dis-
pute resolution procedure. If a dispute ensues, and the personnel and the 
hcch wish to resolve it by arbitration, the model arbitration clause for existing 
disputes would be selected.
For the purpose of the Model Arbitration Clauses, Instruction 62.6 of the 
hcch Staff Rules then stipulates certain parameters relevant to conducting 
the arbitration.47 Firstly, the Instruction provides that the arbitration is con-
ducted by one arbitrator. This counters the default position in Rule 5 of the 
Optional Rules, according to which arbitrations should be heard by three arbi-
trators, and thus has been included to keep the costs for the resolution of dis-
putes using arbitration as low as possible. Second, to avoid that the arbitrator 
needs to set the language of the arbitration in accordance with Rule 17 of the 
Optional Rules, which could result in argument, delay and with that further 
costs, arbitrations are to be conducted in English. Third, the hcch opted for 
the Secretary General of the pca as the appointing authority for the arbitra-
tion. Fourth, the seat of the arbitration is The Hague, the seat of the hcch’s 
Headquarters as well as of the pca. Fifth, and most importantly, the agreement 
to arbitrate constitutes a waiver of any rights to immunity from execution, to 
which a party might otherwise be entitled with respect to the enforcement of 
any award rendered by an arbitral tribunal constituted pursuant to that agree-
ment. This gives effect to Rule 1.2 of the Optional Rules according to which a 
sites/6/2016/01/Optional-Rules-for-Arbitration-Between-International-Organizations-
and-Private-Parties-1996.pdf> accessed 23 November 2019.
46 pca, ‘Model Arbitration Clauses’.
47 These express rules, some of which modify default approaches suggested in the Optional 
Rules published by the pca, seek to devise a system which balances considerations of 
speed, cost-efficiency and the equality of arms among the parties.
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waiver of immunity relating to the execution of an arbitral award must be ex-
plicitly stated.48
While Instruction 62.6 of the hcch Staff Rules sets these parameters as de-
fault for the arbitration, there is a level of flexibility to accommodate any cir-
cumstances that may be encountered in practice. In accordance with Instruc-
tion 62.7 of the hcch Staff Rules, the Secretary General may vary some of the 
parameters as appropriate.49 For example, the Secretary General may decide 
that the arbitration shall be heard by three arbitrators or that the arbitration 
shall be conducted in the other official language of the of the hcch, namely 
French. The Secretary General may also choose a different appointing author-
ity or select a seat of the arbitration other than The Hague. However, the Sec-
retary General has not been given a similar discretion in relation to a waiver of 
any right to immunity from execution. Shielding this mandatory waiver from 
any discretion is consequent in light of the architecture of the dispute resolu-
tion procedure and to provide not only a fair procedure, but also a procedure 
the outcome of which can be enforced against the hcch, if required. This pro-
tects a fundamental aspect of providing personnel of the hcch with appropri-
ate access to justice.
5.3 Availability of Arbitration for Others
As mentioned above, the hcch Staff Rules only govern officials and personnel 
of the organization. Other categories of persons providing services to the 
hcch including, most notably, consultants, are not governed by the hcch 
Staff Rules. However, Instruction 62.2(b) contains an important exception to 
this principle. This Instruction allows ‘candidates’ applying for appointments 
with the hcch to trigger the arbitration procedure to complain of irregulari-
ties in the selection procedure. Within the hcch Staff Rules, candidates are 
persons external to the hcch, who applied for a position with the hcch 
through a competitive selection procedure and were short-listed, but who 
were ultimately not selected. The term ‘candidates’ is used in relation to both 
positions for officials and personnel and Instruction 62.2(b) should be read 
broadly to give access to arbitration for any candidate. If read this way, the 
48 For the purpose of providing effective access to justice, the hcch considered it para-
mount to ensure the adequate enforcement of any award rendered by an arbitral tribunal. 
To put this issue beyond doubt, an express waiver was included in the hcch Staff Rules.
49 These variations are thought to ensure maximum flexibility with regards to the proce-
dure, without, however, compromising its certainty and effectiveness.
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 exception broadens the group of those who have standing vis-à-vis the hcch, 
thus strengthening access to justice.50
5.4 Costs Not Addressed in the hcch Staff Rules
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the hcch Staff Rules do not include ex-
press provisions in relation to the costs of the arbitration. Thought was given to 
including such rules for they could help control the cost of the arbitration and 
to improve fairness as well as access to justice overall.
There was thought given to including a rule which would have capped the 
arbitrator’s fees. The cap was to be set at eur 5,000, with the fee payable in 
equal shares by the parties. The cap was to be subject to a discretion to increase 
the fee where the complexity of the dispute so required. To ensure adequate 
transparency, any increase needed to be discussed between the arbitrator and 
all parties, with the arbitrator required to propose a higher fee in clear and 
detailed terms.
A second rule pertaining to costs was also considered for inclusion, being 
designed to abrogate the general principle that costs follow the event. It was 
felt that this rule can increase parties’ uncertainty in relation to the costs of 
dispute resolution and, if the uncertainty becomes particularly significant, 
may be detrimental to access to justice. Instead, it was considered to include a 
rule which mandated that each party was to cover its own legal costs. One issue 
that remained open was whether this rule should be absolute, or whether an 
arbitrator should have a very limited discretion to award costs, for example in 
circumstances of hardship.
These two rules on costs were conceived late in the development of the 
hcch Staff Rules and ultimately did not find their way into the latter. There-
fore, it was decided to include the two rules in the Letters of Engagement, or 
arbitrations pertaining to existing disputes, on a case-by-case basis. This prima 
facie gap ought to be addressed, for example by amending the Instructions in 
accordance with Article 64.3 of the hcch Staff Rules. Overall, subject to some 
gaps, such as on the issue of costs, we suggest that the hcch regime provides 
for a blueprint for ios in terms of how to implement an arbitral framework. Of 
course, ios based in different geographical locations may wish to use the ser-
vices of arbitral institutions more proximate to them. However, the particulari-
ties of the hcch regime are well suited to balance the interests of an io and 
access to justice.
50 Extending the availability of the dispute resolution procedure to candidates is a direct 
reaction to the ECtHR’s decision in ECtHR, Klausecker v Germany 2015 (see para 76 there-




Arbitration can, in principle, constitute an effective and desirable vehicle for 
ios to comply with their access to justice obligations and ensure the delivery 
of justice to all those individuals working for ios. However, if arbitration as a 
mode of dispute resolution is to succeed in providing a reasonable alternative 
to national courts, it must be implemented in good faith. Several matters need 
to be resolved. Some of these include ensuring certainty about the enforceabil-
ity of awards by providing for express clauses in the contract of employment 
confirming that ios’ immunities have no role to play when it comes to the en-
forcement of arbitral awards; incorporating appropriate rules on appointment 
of arbitrators; and clearly prescribing how costs are to be allocated. Finally, 
through the example of the hcch, we provide just one blueprint for other in-
ternational organizations. We consider the hcch model, with appropriate ad-
aptations, to be a useful model to implement a strong arbitral regime that pro-
tects individual rights as well as assists ios in discharging their obligations to 
provide reasonable alternative means of dispute resolution.
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Chapter 8
The Global Fund to Fight aids, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria: The Journey of a Public-Private Partnership
Fady Zeidan and Jean Abboud*
Abstract
The Global Fund to Fight aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund) is a unique 
multilateral institution: originally conceived as a public-private partnership, it was es-
tablished as a not-for-profit foundation under Swiss law, before gradually evolving into 
an international organization. The Global Fund Secretariat is based in Geneva and is 
composed of some 780 employees. This chapter examines the role international ad-
ministrative law has played in the effective and efficient functioning of the Global 
Fund. The genesis of the Global Fund, its institutional features and governance struc-
tures are presented in Section 1 and the initial administrative arrangements concluded 
between the Global Fund and the World Health Organization to enable the Global 
Fund to conduct its operations are discussed in Section 2. Sections 3 and 4 examine the 
internationalization of the status of the Global Fund through the prisms of the privi-
leges and immunities of the organization and its officials, and the resolution mecha-
nisms of employment-related disputes, respectively. Considerations regarding the 
 legal framework applicable to Global Fund employees are also addressed.
1 Genesis, Institutional Features and Governance Structures
The Global Fund to Fight aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund) was 
created in 2002 following a recognition by the international community that a 
joint and novel effort was necessary to combat Human Immunodeficiency 
 Virus (hiv)/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (aids), tuberculosis and 
* Fady Zeidan, General Counsel and Head of the Legal and Governance Department of the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund), fady.zeidan@the-
globalfund.org; Jean Abboud, Principal Legal Counsel, Legal and Governance Department of 
the Global Fund, jean.abboud@theglobalfund.org. The views expressed in this presentation 
are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Global Fund.
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malaria which had reached historical heights of infection at the turn of the 
millennium. The nascent stages underlying the creation of the Global Fund go 
back to the Group of Eight (G8) summit held in Okinawa, Japan in 2000.1
In April 2001, at the African Summit on hiv/aids, Tuberculosis and Other 
Infectious Diseases, Kofi Annan, the then Secretary General of the United Na-
tions (UN), proposed the creation of a global fund “dedicated to the battle 
against hiv/aids and other infectious diseases”.2 Interestingly, he alluded in 
his remarks to the public-private nature of this new structure when he noted 
that the fund,
must be structured in such a way as to ensure that it responds to the 
needs of the affected countries and people. And it must be able to count 
on the advice of the best experts in the world—whether they are found 
in the United Nations system, in governments, in civil society organiza-
tions, or among those who live with hiv/aids or are directly affected 
by it.3
Shortly thereafter, in June 2001, the UN General Assembly called for the,
establishment, on an urgent basis, of a global hiv/aids health fund to 
finance an urgent and expanded response to the epidemic [mobilizing 
contributions] from public and private sources, with a special appeal to 
donor countries, foundations, the business community, including phar-
maceutical companies, the private sector, philanthropists and wealthy 
individuals.4
Immediately after the adoption of the Declaration of Commitment on 
hiv/aids, the G8 countries expressed in Genoa, in July 2001, their determina-
tion “to make the fund operational before the end of the year” and committed 
usd1.3 billion. Interestingly again, the G8 countries noted that the fund will be 
a “public-private partnership” and called “on other countries, the private  sector, 
foundations and academic institutions to join with their own  contributions—
financially, in kind and through shared expertise”.5
1 G8 Communiqué Okinawa 2000.
2 Annan, 26 April 2001.
3 Ibid.
4 unga Res S-26/2, 27 June 2001, Annex, para 90.
5 G8 Communiqué Genova 2001.
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Given the urgent need to mobilize resources and initiate large-scale finan-
cial disbursements to fight the three diseases—in support of the attainment, 
initially, of the Millennium Development Goals—a Transitional Working 
Group, established in July 2001, decided in December 2001 to incorporate the 
fund in Switzerland and conclude agreements with the World Bank, as the 
trustee, and the World Health Organization (who), as the support service pro-
vider. This recommendation was acted upon and the Global Fund was regis-
tered as a not-for-profit foundation under Swiss law on 24 January 2002, hold-
ing its first Board meeting four days thereafter. At the time, it was considered 
that this approach would help to speedily implement the public-private part-
nership nature of the nascent institution consistent with the desire expressed 
by the UN General Assembly in the Declaration of Commitment on hiv/aids 
and avoid the delays usually associated with the establishment of a traditional 
international organization. Reflecting the urgency for the Global Fund to start 
its operations, the Board of the Global Fund approved in April 2002 the first 
round of grants.6
Since its inception, the core principles, governance structures and modus 
operandi of the Global Fund have substantially remained the same. Indeed, 
there are four core principles based on which the Global Fund operates, 
namely: partnership; country ownership; performance-based financing; and 
transparency.7 The idea underlying the first principle is that governments, civil 
society, communities affected by the diseases, technical partners, the private 
sector, faith-based organizations and other funders must work together and be 
involved in the decision-making process to achieve impact. Country ownership 
is based on the recognition that local experts are best placed to structure pro-
grams and implement grants; as such, countries design, lead, make investment 
decisions and manage their programs. More generally, on-going financing de-
pends upon performance and proven results and a high degree of transparency 
is adhered to in all Global Fund work including applications for funding, fund-
ing decisions, grant performance, results, governance and oversight.
These core principles are visible in the governance structures of the Global 
Fund and in its operational model. Indeed, the highest governing body of the 
Global Fund is the Global Fund Board which is currently composed of 20 
 voting constituencies and eight non-voting members, representing mainly the 
technical partners with whom the Global Fund works.8 The voting constituen-
cies are divided into two groups—namely, on the one hand, the donor group, 
6 The Global Fund, Board Decision GF/B02/DP06.
7 The Global Fund, ‘The Framework Document’ 2001.
8 The Global Fund, Bylaws, art 7.1.
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which consists of eight donor country representatives, one private sector rep-
resentative and one private foundations representative; and, on the other 
hand, the implementer group which encompasses seven developing country 
 representatives, two nongovernmental organization (ngo) representatives 
and a representative of an ngo who is a person living with hiv/aids or from 
a community living with tuberculosis or malaria.9
The Board’s composition reflects, in this sense, the partnerships between 
donor and recipient governments, civil society, the private sector, private foun-
dations, communities affected by the diseases and the technical partners, on 
which the Global Fund is based. To strengthen further the balance between the 
various stakeholders, the Board’s decisions require the support of a qualified 
two-thirds majority of the constituencies of each group to pass. These features 
are also present in the structures and charters of the Board’s standing 
 committees—namely, the Strategy Committee, the Audit and Finance Com-
mittee and the Ethics and Governance Committee—and represent a marked 
evolution from the traditional multilateral model where each State receives an 
equal vote, but also from the development bank model where shareholders 
hold votes in proportion to their financial participation.
The Global Fund raises and invests nearly usd 4 billion a year to support 
programs in more than 100 countries. The money, which is raised in replenish-
ment conferences held every three years, comes in a predominant proportion 
from governmental donations and, to a lesser extent, from non-governmental 
donations. Broadly speaking, the money raised by the Global Fund is trans-
formed into grants and allocated to recipient countries to respond to the plans 
developed by each country coordinating mechanism to fight the diseases in a 
given country. These plans are reviewed by an independent panel of experts to 
determine if they will achieve the envisaged results. Once finalized, the plan is 
submitted to the Global Fund Board for approval and local experts and part-
ners can start using the grant money to deliver programs and implement the 
plans. The programs and grants are continuously monitored by local fund 
agents and subject to the audits and investigations conducted by the Office of 
the Inspector General.10
9 Each constituency can be formed by one or more members. See full list of constituencies 
available at <https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/board/constituencies/> accessed 28 No-
vember 2019. The seven developing country seats are allocated to six constituencies based 
on each of the six who regions and to an additional constituency from Africa. The who 
has no role in selecting Board Members. who regions are used only as a reference for ag-
gregating developing countries into regional groups.
10 The Global Fund, ‘Overview’.
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2 Initial Hosting and Employment Arrangements
Prior to the establishment of the Global Fund, the who and the Swiss Govern-
ment submitted a joint proposal to host the Global Fund in Geneva. The who 
promised to provide administrative services to the Secretariat through a unit 
dedicated solely to the support of the Global Fund and the Swiss Government 
contributed to the establishment of the Secretariat in Geneva and committed 
to provide the Global Fund over time with certain tax exemptions and other 
benefits.
As such, shortly after its establishment in Switzerland, the Global Fund con-
cluded, in May 2002, an Administrative Services Agreement (asa).11 The offi-
cials hired to work for the Global Fund were employed by the who, in accord-
ance with the who’s Staff Regulations, and thereafter assigned to Global Fund 
projects. Through this arrangement, the Global Fund formally had no employ-
ees of its own but maintained a legal personality and governance structures 
distinct from the who’s. And while the Global Fund had no privileges and im-
munities until 2004 (see Section 3 below), who employees assigned to the 
Global Fund projects enjoyed the privileges and immunities, not only as de-
fined in the Agreement concluded between the Swiss Federal Council and the 
who to determine the legal status of this organization in Switzerland, but also, 
more broadly, under the Convention of 21 November 1947 on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies.12 In conjunction with this agreement, 
and notably to ensure the funds contributed to the Global Fund could be effi-
ciently held and managed, and also benefit from immunities from execution 
and jurisdiction consistent with funds held by multilateral organizations, a 
Trustee Agreement was entered into between the Global Fund and the World 
Bank in May 2002. This arrangement, with some amendments, remains appli-
cable today.
Some five years after the conclusion of the asa, the Global Fund Board de-
cided in November 2007, that the Global Fund would discontinue the asa with 
the who not later than December 2008, and that new administrative and em-
ployment arrangements would be put in place.13 Accordingly, when the asa 
was terminated in 2008, who officials assigned to Global Fund projects were 
simultaneously offered contracts of employment directly with the Global Fund 
and a Human Resources Policy Framework (hrpf), effective as of 1 January 
11 The Global Fund, Board Decision GF/B02/DP10.
12 Specialized Agencies Convention.
13 The Global Fund, Board Decision GF/B16/DP21.
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2009, was adopted by the Board to cater to the Global Fund’s administrative 
autonomy from the who.14
The hrpf defined a new compensation and benefits package for the Global 
Fund, which would differ from the who’s in several ways. In view of these 
changes, to avoid imposing any material financial disadvantage on staff as a 
result of their transfer from the who to the Global Fund, the hrpf committed 
that who staff would not be disadvantaged by the transition to the new com-
pensation and benefits package. To fulfill this commitment, the Secretariat 
adopted a set of grandfathering rules, which were incorporated by reference to 
Global Fund employment contracts signed by staff transferring from the who, 
which identified certain who benefits that would remain in effect for such 
staff and provided a time-limited compensation mechanism to cover individ-
ual cases where the package on offer by the Global Fund would prove less ad-
vantageous compared to the package offered by the who. The new employ-
ment contracts were effective as of 1 January 2009.
While the termination of the asa broadened the Global Fund’s autonomy 
and flexibility to fulfill its mandate, one consequence was the loss of privileges 
and immunities enjoyed by former who officials under the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies.
3 Privileges and Immunities of the Global Fund
In addition to the privileges and immunities enjoyed by who employees as-
signed to Global Fund projects under the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, Switzerland and the United States 
had granted, in 2004 and 2006 respectively, privileges and immunities, prior to 
the Global Fund’s separation from the who.
Indeed, shortly after the initial establishment of the Global Fund as a Swiss 
foundation, the Global Fund Board considered options regarding the future 
legal status of the Global Fund; namely, to keep status quo, to expand the im-
munities of the Global Fund by way of a headquarters agreement, to move to 
the status of an independent international organization or to become a spe-
cialized institution within the United Nations. Among these options, the ex-
pansion of the privileges and immunities through a headquarters agreement 
was considered the most optimal way forward.15 At the time, it was noted that 
the Global Fund was “engaged in high-risk activities of a scope and scale 
14 The Global Fund, Board Decision GF/B17/EDP08/16.
15 The Global Fund, ‘Report of the Governance and Partnership Committee’ 2003, pt 6.
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 typically undertaken only by international organizations and governments, 
and that it [was] exposed to potential legal liabilities that are significant”.16 The 
conclusion of a headquarters agreement was seen therefore as a significant 
step to protect the Global Fund in Switzerland against liabilities that may arise 
based on its activities.17
As such, the Global Fund and the Swiss Federal Council concluded in 2004 a 
Headquarters Agreement which recognizes the international juridical person-
ality and legal capacity of the Global Fund in Switzerland and provides to the 
Global Fund a similar set of privileges and immunities as those enjoyed by 
other international organizations in Switzerland.18 The Global Fund was also 
designated—by President George W. Bush in 2006 pursuant to Executive Or-
der 13395—as a public international organization entitled to enjoy the privi-
leges, exemptions and immunities under the International Organizations Im-
munities Act19 in the United States.
However, following its separation from the who, the only set of protections 
that applied to the Global Fund, its officials and assets were those granted by 
Switzerland and the United States, and the protection afforded to its funds un-
der the trusteeship of the World Bank. Against this background and in recogni-
tion of the significance of this consequence, a working group of legal experts 
was convened shortly after the separation from the who to develop an 
 instrument—the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities (P&I  Agreement)—
to enable countries to grant privileges and immunities to the Global Fund and 
to recognize its legal personality beyond its original anchor as a Swiss founda-
tion. The Global Fund Board affirmed the importance of privileges and immu-
nities, acknowledging the challenges and risks faced by Global Fund and its 
staff without such protections, and formally called upon States, in December 
2009, to consider granting privileges and immunities to the Global Fund 
through  either the P&I Agreement or domestic laws.20
16 The Global Fund, ‘Report of the Governance and Partnership Committee’ 2004, pt 4.
17 Ibid. The options of maintaining status quo or becoming a quasi-governmental organiza-
tion were considered to present limited benefits that were outweighed by a number of 
disadvantages. The options of becoming an intergovernmental organization or a special-
ized institution within the United Nations were considered burdensome, given treaty 
making formalities, and less appropriate as the private sector and ngo members of the 
Global Fund Board would not be able to be party to the treaty creating the Global Fund 
and the Global Fund was never intended to be part of the United Nations system. See, the 
Global Fund, ‘Report of the Governance and Partnership Committee’ 2003, pt 6.
18 Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the Global Fund.
19 US Executive Order 13395, 13 January 2006.
20 The Global Fund, Board Decision GF/B20/EDP04.
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Under the P&I Agreement—which entered into force in April 2019 follow-
ing the deposit of the 10th ratification instrument by Senegal—the Global 
Fund is afforded juridical personality; Global Fund assets, income and prop-
erty, wherever located, are immune from all forms of legal process; and offi-
cials, representatives of States and other persons constituting the organs of the 
Global Fund, members of technical groups or other experts are granted privi-
leges and immunities broadly similar to those granted to such officials of other 
international organizations.21
As a result of the entry into force of the P&I Agreement, the Global Fund 
now enjoys privileges and immunities in some 15 countries; namely, the coun-
tries that ratified the P&I Agreement, in addition to Switzerland and the Unit-
ed States.22
4 Resolution of Employment Disputes
Prior to the termination of the asa with the who, the Global Fund applied to 
recognize the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal of the International 
Labour Organization (iloat). Considering the eligibility criteria for member-
ship set out in the Tribunal’s Statute, the Global Fund outlined in its request its 
compliance with the criteria and highlighted, in this regard, its international 
character by referring to the Headquarters Agreement concluded with the 
Swiss Federal Council and its designation as an international organization in 
the United States.23 The Global Fund also underscored that it is exempt from 
applying national law in its relations with its employees and enjoys immunity 
21 The Global Fund, ‘Global Fund Agreement on Privileges and Immunities Enters into 
Force’, 17 April 2019.
22 Burkina Faso, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Georgia, Liberia, Malawi, Moldova, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe. A small number of countries, Burundi, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Montenegro and Niger have already signed the P&I Agree-
ment, but the process of ratification is still ongoing.
23 iloat Statute, art ii, para 5 and related annex (“To be entitled to recognize the jurisdic-
tion of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization in accord-
ance with paragraph 5 of article ii of its Statute, an international organization must either 
be intergovernmental in character, or fulfil the following conditions: (a) it shall be clearly 
international in character, having regard to its membership, structure and scope of activ-
ity; (b) it shall not be required to apply any national law in its relations with its officials, 
and shall enjoy immunity from legal process as evidenced by a headquarters agreement 
concluded with the host country; and (c) it shall be endowed with functions of a perma-
nent nature at the international level and offer, in the opinion of the Governing Body, 
sufficient guarantees as to its institutional capacity to carry out such functions as well as 
guarantees of compliance with the Tribunal’s judgments”).
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from legal process under its Headquarters Agreement. It also observed that it 
has a permanent governance structure and its Board accepted that awards ren-
dered by the iloat are chargeable to the Global Fund budget—thereby ensur-
ing compliance with such awards—and added that “Global Fund staff mem-
bers expressed support for the use of the iloat as it is the dispute settlement 
mechanism employees are already familiar with and trust”.24 In November 
2008, the request was approved by the International Labour Organization Gov-
erning Body and the iloat became the final arbiter for the resolution of em-
ployment-related disputes at the Global Fund. In this respect, the admission of 
the Global Fund to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and the conferral, on the same 
year, of observer status for the Global Fund to participate in the sessions and 
works of the United Nations General assembly represent additional steps in 
the evolution of the Global Fund into an international organization.25
As is often the case in other international organizations, employees must 
exhaust the internal means of redress prior to submitting a complaint before 
the iloat. To that effect, an employee must first file a grievance through a re-
quest for resolution which is reviewed by the Head of Human Resources. If the 
employee is dissatisfied with the response from the Head of Human Resources, 
they can challenge the same before the Appeal Board. The appeal is reviewed 
by a panel composed of an independent Chair and two peer colleagues. After 
the appeal process, a recommendation of the Appeal Board is submitted to the 
Executive Director who has the option to accept or reject it, and the employee 
may then decide to challenge the final decision of the Executive Director be-
fore the iloat. Apart from the formal internal mechanism, informal mecha-
nisms for the resolution of employment-related disputes are also made avail-
able to staff, including a staff counselor, an ombudsman and mediation 
services.
Since the recognition of the jurisdiction of the iloat in 2008, to date, the 
iloat has rendered more than 30 judgments in relation to complaints brought 
by Global Fund employees on a wide variety of topics, regarding, among other 
things, termination of appointments (as a result of restructurings, unsuccess-
ful probations, disciplinary cases), performance evaluations, modifications of 
salary and grading structures, and eligibility for benefits under specific Global 
Fund policies.
24 International Labour Office, ‘Matters relating to the Administrative Tribunal of the ilo’, 
November 2008, Appendix.
25 unga Res 64/122, 16 December 2009.
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Some of the cases were brought by former who officials alleging acquired 
rights considerations under the above-mentioned grandfathering rules.26 By 
way of example, some former who officials challenged the decision of the 
Global Fund to reduce the expatriate premium starting 1 January 2015. The pro-
gressive reduction was spelled out in the hrpf adopted by the Board shortly 
prior to the separation from the who and the employees were informed at the 
time of the progressive phasing out of this benefit. The employees sought how-
ever to have the expatriate premiums maintained at 100% without any reduc-
tions for the period of employment with the Global Fund based on an alleged 
breach of the Global Fund grandfathering rules. The iloat, however, rejected 
the complaints filed by these employees.27 Similarly, the challenge by a former 
who official to the decision of the organization to make changes to the grad-
ing system and salary structure was not successful. The employee in question 
argued, among other things, that the implementation of the revisions consti-
tuted a breach of the commitments of the Global Fund under the grandfather-
ing rules and thereby caused injury to him. The iloat rejected this argument 
and found that there was no evidence to support an allegation regarding an 
immediate or future injury to the employee as a result of the adoption of the 
revisions. The Tribunal noted in that respect that the complainant continued 
to hold the same title and responsibilities even if the nomenclature of their 
grade level changed.28
More generally, it has been observed that since its separation from the who 
in 2009, the Global Fund “has been trying to define its identity oscillating 
26 While international organizations may amend the employment conditions of their staff 
members, they must take into account the general legal principle of acquired rights. Ac-
cording to the iloat, “the amendment of a rule to an official’s detriment and without his 
consent amounts to breach of an acquired right when the structure of the contract of 
appointment is disturbed or there is impairment of any fundamental term of appoint-
ment in consideration of which the official accepted appointment” (see iloat, Ayoub et 
al. v International Labour Organisation 1987, consid 13). The Tribunal determines whether 
the altered term is fundamental and essential by assessing the nature of the altered term, 
the reason for the change and the consequences and effects of the change (consid 14).
27 iloat, R. M. (No 2) v Global Fund 2018; iloat, D. v Global Fund 2019. The Tribunal noted in 
consideration of 11 of D. v Global Fund 2019 that the complainant “provided no evidence 
to prove that by reducing the expatriate premium […], the Global Fund breached its com-
mitment to her under the ‘grandfathering’ clause. [The complainant did not show] how 
the reduction ‘created a financial prejudice’ to her by reference to the overall value of the 
benefits and allowances she received as a who staff member. In other words, she has not 
explained how the reduction of the expatriate premium as from January 2015 breached 
her guaranteed retention of the total value of the benefits and allowances to which she 
was entitled under the pre-existing conditions as a who staff member”.
28 iloat, B. (No 2) v Global Fund 2018.
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 between its affinities with the private sector and its history with the who”.29 
Indeed, while on the one hand, the work of the Global Fund is guided by a clear 
mission with specific targets and deadlines aiming to end the three diseases as 
public health threats by 2030 and a strong emphasis is put on agility, flexibility 
and differentiation, to ensure value for money for the beneficiaries of Global 
Fund grants and for the donor government, non-government and private sec-
tor contributors, on the other hand, the main features of the Global Fund’s 
disputes resolution mechanism resemble those of other United Nations-type 
intergovernmental organizations. These contrasts are also reflected in the Tri-
bunal’s jurisprudence. Indeed, while the Tribunal recognized that the Global 
Fund was a public-private partnership with a “unique international legal 
personality”30 and rejected the application of the Noblemaire principle to the 
Global Fund as it is not part of the UN Common system,31 the Tribunal sanc-
tioned the Global Fund when it considered that it disregarded some general 
principles of international administrative law applicable to international 
organizations.32
5 Conclusion
By and large, the journey of the Global Fund has been a successful one. Health 
programs supported by the Global Fund partnership have saved 32 million 
lives and overall, the number of deaths caused by aids, tuberculosis and ma-
laria each year has been reduced by 40% since 2002 in countries where the 
29 Otis 2016.
30 iloat, C. C. v Global Fund 2014, consid 2.
31 The Tribunal provided the following observations on the Noblemaire principle in B. 
(No 2) v Global Fund 2018, consideration 12, “the Noblemaire principle, which dates back 
to the days of the League of Nations and which the system of the United Nations took 
over, embodies two rules. One is that, to keep the international civil service as one, its 
employees shall get equal pay for work of equal value, whatever their nationality or the 
salaries earned in their own country. The other rule is that in recruiting staff from all 
Member States, international organisations shall offer pay that will draw and keep citi-
zens of countries where salaries are highest. However, it is a principle that generally has 
been applied to organisations which participate in the United Nations common system”. 
The Tribunal concluded in the same paragraph, “It cannot be assumed, as the complain-
ant seems to suggest, that the Noblemaire principle should be grafted on to those legal 
arrangements notwithstanding that the Global Fund is not part of the common system. 
The Tribunal rejects the suggestion it should be”.
32 iloat, M. F. A. A. v Global Fund 2015, consid 13; iloat, J. (No 2) v Global Fund 2019, 
consid 15.
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Global Fund invests.33 As an embodiment of the efforts of the international 
community to develop fora suitable to reinvigorate multilateral engagement, 
the Global Fund complements the mandate of existing treaty-based institu-
tions and has aimed to develop a specific approach to institutional governance 
based on its unique model of operation.
The Global Fund reflects the example of a novel multilateral organization 
seeking to increase its efficiency and to maximize its impact while operating—
due in large part to the non-application of national employment laws, to the 
immunity of the organization from national courts and the international civil 
servant character of its employees—within the confines of traditional employ-
ment dispute resolution mechanisms and international administrative law. 
Since the inception of the Global Fund, international administrative law has 
played a central role whether through the administrative arrangements con-
cluded with the who, the recognition of the jurisdiction of the iloat, or the 
continuous strengthening of the Global Fund’s employment-related processes 
and frameworks in support of the achievement of the overall strategy of the 
organization. The law of employment relations will certainly continue to play 
an important role within the next years of the Global Fund’s mission to end the 
epidemics of hiv/aids, tuberculosis and malaria by 2030.34
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Chapter 9
Evolution of the Grievance System of the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development: Lessons 
Learnt and Way Forward
Nobert Seiler*
Abstract
Vested with privileges and immunities, international organizations are neither subject 
to the substantive provisions of national employment law, nor to the jurisdiction of 
national labour courts or similar domestic judicial authorities for the adjudication of 
labour disputes. Nevertheless, it is generally recognised that staff members of interna-
tional organizations are entitled to have their grievances about decisions of the organi-
zation concerning their employment be heard by an internal dispute resolution mech-
anism, including the right to appeal such decisions to a judicial authority for an 
independent review. As an international organization promoting the rule of law in the 
countries where it operates, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(ebrd) has regularly adapted since its creation its internal dispute resolution mecha-
nism to emerging legal trends, and the ever-increasing requirements of the case law of 
international administrative tribunals. In the last reform of its internal justice system, 
initiated in 2017, the ebrd revised the first stage of its system with the aim to enhance 
its speed and effectiveness, at a reasonable cost for the staff members and the ebrd. 
Bearing in mind that the main purpose of the first stage is to establish the facts of the 
matter in dispute and to report the findings and recommendations to the ebrd Presi-
dent for decision, the ebrd has now evolved towards a more inquisitorial process. In 
force since February 2018, the new first stage of ebrd’s internal justice system offers 
the necessary due process and fairness to staff members for the review of their griev-
ances, without transforming the committee conducting that stage into a quasi-judicial 
body. After all, the purpose of the first stage of the system is to deliver a report and 
recommendation to the ebrd President, assisting them in their consideration of the 
matter in dispute.
* Norbert Seiler, Deputy General Counsel, European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (EBRD), seilern@ebrd.com. The contents of this chapter reflect the opinion of the indi-
vidual author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EBRD. The author gratefully 
appreciates the contribution of Elie Raimond, Principal Counsel, EBRD, in the preparation of 
this chapter.
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1 Introduction
As the International Court of Justice (icj) noted already in 1954 in the Advisory 
Opinion, Effects of awards of compensation made by the United Nations Admin-
istrative Tribunal, it was “inevitable that there would be disputes between the 
organization and staff members as to their rights and duties”.1 In order to ad-
dress these disputes, it is widely recognised that the right to an internal dispute 
resolution mechanism as well as to a subsequent appeal to a judicial authority 
are safeguards that the staff of international organizations shall enjoy.2 There-
fore, international organizations not subject to national employment law such 
as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ebrd), progres-
sively instituted mechanisms with the view to safeguard rights of their staff 
members, but also to protect their jurisdictional immunity.
In order to protect the rights of staff members, international organizations 
need to establish processes for the review of staff grievances meeting general 
principles of fairness and due process.3 In this respect, most international ad-
ministrative tribunals share the same view on the main principles to be ob-
served. For instance, the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour 
Organization (iloat) has held that an internal appeal process is an “extremely 
significant element of the entire system of review of administrative decisions 
affecting the rights of staff”,4 and that “an official should not, in principle, be 
denied the possibility of having the decision which he or she challenges effec-
tively reviewed by the competent appeal body”.5 In the same vein, the World 
Bank Administrative Tribunal (wbat) has noted that, in conducting its busi-
ness, an internal review committee “is, of course, bound to follow basic re-
quirements of fairness”.6
1 icj, Effects of Awards 1954, 57. See also Thévenot-Werner 2014, 26.
2 iloat, G. (No. 2) v upu 2017, para 2; see also iloat, C. T. v aitic 2009, para 15; iloat, e.e.é. a. 
v cta 2012, para 20 (“the right to an internal appeal is a safeguard which international civil 
servants enjoy in addition to their right of appeal to a judicial authority. This is especially true 
since internal appeal bodies may normally allow an appeal on grounds of fairness or advisa-
bility, whereas the Tribunal must essentially give a ruling on points of law”).
3 Talvik 2014, 63.
4 iloat, O. S. v epo 2013, para 9. See also Talvik 2014, 63.
5 iloat, v. C. v cde 2012, para 13. See Also Thévenot-Werner 2014, 29.
6 wbat, Yang-Ro Yoon (No. 12) v ibrd 2010, para 22 (“the Appeals Committee is, of course, 
bound to follow basic requirements of fairness, but it is not a judicial body that is required to 
comply with rules of judicial order and process”); see also wbat, Yang-Ro Yoon (No. 19) v 
ibrd 2012; Thévenot-Werner 2014, 33.
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The availability of an internal justice system for the review of administrative 
decisions affecting the rights of staff is also an important safeguard for the ju-
risdictional immunity of international organizations. It is now well established 
that, in the absence of adequate judicial review mechanisms, some national 
courts, on the basis of, notably, international public order principles, will not 
hesitate to declare themselves competent to adjudicate disputes between in-
ternational civil servants and their international organizations. For instance, 
in 2005 and 2014, the French Cour de Cassation held that the jurisdictional 
immunity of the African Development Bank7 and of the Pacific Community8 
does not protect these organizations from proceedings brought by an employ-
ee or a former employee of these international organizations in the domestic 
courts, when no alternative mechanism has been established to hear the em-
ployee’s complaint. Furthermore, since 1999 and the decisions in Waite and 
Kennedy v Germany and Beer and Regan v Germany,9 it is clear that the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) will not hesitate to assess the alterna-
tive dispute resolution mechanisms established by international organizations 
in the light of Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(echr),10 stipulating the right to a fair trial and the “right to a Court”.11
7 Court of Cassation of France, AfDB v x 2005. Unlike the appeal court in the same case, the 
Court of Cassation decision did not refer to the echr but to the international public 
order.
8 Court of Cassation of France, x v Pacific Community 2014. See also Thévenot-Werner 
2014, 26.
9 ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy v Germany 1999, para 67; ECtHR, Beer and Regan v Germany 
1999, para 57. For analysis of these judgments see notably Reinish and Weber 2014, 
59–100.
10 See also ECtHR, Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v The Netherlands 2012, para 
163. In this case, which related to a dispute between the applicants and the United Na-
tions based on the use by the Security Council of its powers under the UN Charter, the 
ECtHR reminded that it considered it a “material factor”, in determining whether granting 
an international organisation immunity from domestic jurisdiction was permissible un-
der the Convention, whether the applicants had alternative means to protect effectively 
their rights under the Convention. However, the ECtHR also made clear that the absence 
of an alternative remedy is not ipso facto constitutive of a violation of the right of access 
to a court. While this case provides a useful interpretation of Waite and Kennedy v Ger-
many 1999, it must be underlined that, as recognised by Cogan 2013, 889, ‘[t]he Court 
stressed repeatedly in its decision, as it had in previous cases, that the core mission at is-
sue here was of singular importance (the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity). Hence, the need for immunity, and the independence that such immunity confers 
on organizations, was, as a policy matter, critical. Article 6 had to be read accordingly’.
11 The right of access to a court was first established as an aspect of the right to a tribunal 
under art 6 (1) of the Convention in ECtHR, Golder v UK 1975, paras 28–36. In that case, the 
Court found the right of access to a court to be an inherent aspect of the safeguards en-
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The purpose of this chapter is to review the development of the internal 
dispute resolution mechanism of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (ebrd) since its inception, in the light of these trends and 
considerations.
2 Evolution of the ebrd Internal Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
Between 1991 and 2018
The ebrd was established in 1989 by a multilateral treaty, the Agreement Es-
tablishing the ebrd, and it commenced operations in April 1991. In the pream-
ble of the Agreement Establishing the ebrd, its members expressly declare 
their commitment “to the fundamental principles of multiparty democracy, 
the rule of law, respect for human rights and market economics.”12 Further-
more, a majority of ebrd member countries are also signatories of the echr.13 
Throughout its existence, the ebrd has therefore been keenly aware of the 
increasing judicial scrutiny of international organizations, leading the Bank to 
continuously adapt its internal justice system for addressing staff grievances.
Already in August 1991, the Bank adopted its Staff Regulations, which ex-
pressly called on the President of the ebrd to establish appropriate proce-
dures for the consideration of complaints and grievances of staff.14 Consistent 
with this provision, the President adopted the first version of the Bank’s Griev-
ance and Appeals Procedures (gap) shortly thereafter, in 1992. According to 
shrined in art 6, referring to the principles of the rule of law and the avoidance of arbi-
trary power which underlay much of the echr. See ECtHR, Guide on Article 6 of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights 2019, paras 84–125.
12 Agreement Establishing the ebrd, preamble; icj, Effects of Awards 1954, 57 (“It would, in 
the opinion of the Court, hardly be consistent with the expressed aim of the Charter to 
promote freedom and justice for individuals and with the constant preoccupation of the 
United Nations Organization to promote this aim that it should afford no judicial or arbi-
tral remedy to its own staff for the settlement of any disputes which may arise between it 
and them”).
13 It is however to be noted that the ebrd itself is not part to the echr. In this respect, in a 
case involving the epo, the iloat held that while “[t]he Member States of the [Organiza-
tion] are all signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights, the Organization 
[…] as such is not a member of the Council of Europe and is not bound by the Convention 
in the same way as signatory states” (iloat, J. M. W. v epo 2004, para 11).
14 Section 10 of the ebrd Staff Regulations then stated, “Appropriate procedures shall be 
established by the President for the consideration of complaints and grievances of indi-
vidual persons on the staff of the Bank on matters involving the consistency of actions 




these initial gap, grievances against decisions affecting the rights of staff 
members were to be heard by an Appeals Committee consisting of an external 
legal expert acting as chair, and staff members participating in the proceedings 
as assessors, some of whom were elected by staff and some appointed by the 
President. The role of the Appeals Committee was to hear cases, establish the 
facts of the matter and issue reports and recommendations to the President for 
final decision. The President was free to accept the recommendations of the 
Appeals Committee or to depart from them, as long as reasons were provided 
in his final decision.
The gap were first revised in 1995, providing for alternates of the elected 
and appointed staff members serving on the Appeals Committee. The second 
revision of the gap, which took place in 1997 following a thorough review of 
the gap and after consultations with ebrd’s Staff Council, introduced more 
substantial changes to the appeals process. The revised gap introduced new 
procedures for the election of staff representatives on the Appeals Committee 
as well as the reimbursement of legal expenses of up to gbp 2,500 of grieving 
staff. Also, and while this commitment was not expressly set out in the rules, 
the President undertook to accept and implement the recommendations of 
the Appeals Committee, giving it a de facto decision-making role. Simultane-
ously, the President approved the establishment of ebrd’s Ombudsman 
function.
In 1999, the Board of Directors of the Bank asked the chair of the Appeals 
Committee to consider whether the basic objective of the appeals system (to 
safeguard the employment rights of staff members in a manner that is practi-
cal, cost-effective while not prejudicing the Bank’s ability to carry out its man-
date) was met by the existing arrangements. The report of the chair of the Ap-
peals Committee concluded that the scope of matters that could be considered 
under the gap was too narrow and that the Bank should set up a system under 
which staff members could seek an independent review of substantially all 
administrative decisions adversely affecting their rights as employees. In order 
to do so, the Bank had the possibility to arrange for such an independent re-
view either by enabling its staff to submit grievances for adjudication to an 
administrative tribunal established by another international organization, 
such as the wbat or iloat, or by establishing its own administrative 
tribunal.15
In light of the conclusions of this report, in 2002, Section 10 of the Staff Reg-
ulations was amended and the grievance system was revised, introducing a 
15 Amerasinghe 2012 refers to the role played by the wbat as an inspiration for the creation 
of the ebrd Administrative Tribunal.
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new administrative tribunal which was to assume the functions of the Appeals 
Committee.16 The newly created ebrd Administrative Tribunal was also 
chaired by an independent legal expert and supported by staff assessors, some 
of whom are elected by staff and some appointed by the President. The juris-
diction of the Administrative Tribunal was wider than that of the Appeals 
Committee, including for the first time grievances of staff on probation and 
fixed-term contracts and appeals of decisions of committees under the Bank’s 
retirement plans. Unlike the former Appeals Committee, which reported to the 
President, the Administrative Tribunal rendered decisions in its own right on 
the matters falling under its jurisdiction.
Following the undertaking given in 2002 by the President to review the new 
grievance system in the 12-month period following the third anniversary of its 
implementation, the ebrd carried out another review of the system in 2006. In 
this exercise, the ebrd again paid attention to the grievance systems estab-
lished by other international organizations, with a particular focus on other 
international financial institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund, 
the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Asian Devel-
opment Bank). Up to this time, the Bank’s system featured the Administrative 
Tribunal as its only tier for the review of management decisions in staff mat-
ters giving rise to grievances. Following the review, the Bank decided to follow 
its peers and established a two-tier system for the review of such decisions,17 
with a Grievance Committee serving as the first tier, and an Administrative 
Tribunal as the second and final tier.18 The composition and function of 
the Grievance Committee shared many similarities with the original Appeals 
16 ebrd Staff Regulations, s 10 (“Appropriate procedures shall be established by the Presi-
dent in order to consider and address complaints and grievances of individual staff mem-
bers of the Bank based on individual or regulatory decisions taken by the Bank in relation 
to their employment, including decisions of any administration committee established in 
accordance with the rules governing any retirement plan of the Bank. These procedures 
shall include the creation of an Administrative Tribunal which will have power to make 
awards in favour of the staff member (or former staff member as the case may be) but not 
to make any awards inconsistent with any resolutions or decisions adopted or taken by 
the Board of Governors or the Board of Directors of the Bank”).
17 It resulted from the analysis carried out by the ebrd at that time that the World Bank 
(with the Appeals Committee), the International Monetary Fund (with the Grievance 
Committee), the Asian Development Bank (with the Appeals Committee) and the Inter-
American Development Bank (with the Conciliation Committee) had set up a system 
guaranteeing review by a Committee before potential challenge before their respective 
administrative tribunals.
18 The ebrd did not follow the path previously followed by the iloat and the United Na-
tions Administrative Tribunal and allowing the International Court of Justice to act as a 
final review body in staff member disputes. In this regard, see Gomula 2012.
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Committee—it was chaired by an external legal expert supported by two staff 
assessors, and its purpose was to hear cases and submit reports and recom-
mendations to the President for decision. Recommendations made by the 
Grievance Committee were not binding on the President, and grieving staff 
members were entitled to lodge an appeal against the President’s decision be-
fore a newly constituted Administrative Tribunal.19 The Administrative Tribu-
nal consists of a panel of judges appointed by the Board of Directors of the 
ebrd on the recommendation of the President, following consultation with 
the Vice President responsible for Human Resources, the General Counsel and 
the Staff Council.20 It is empowered to take final decisions on all matters be-
fore it.
3 The 2017 Reform and the Creation of the Administrative Review 
Committee
In 2017, 11 years after the establishment of the Bank’s two-tier system, and fol-
lowing a sharp increase in the number of grievance cases,21 the Bank once 
again embarked on a review of its internal dispute resolution mechanism. The 
review, which was focused on the first tier of the system, was completed in 
February 2018 with the entry into force of the new Directive on Administrative 
Review Process (Directive) and the establishment of the Administrative Re-
view Committee, replacing the Grievance Committee. The second tier of the 
system continues to operate in accordance with the Appeals Procedures 
adopted in 2006, which since then have only been amended occasionally to 
address minor technical aspects.
Just like its predecessor, the now-discontinued Grievance Committee, the 
Administrative Review Committee consists of a legal professional as its chair, 
and two assessors from a roster of ebrd staff, some of whom are elected by 
19 ebrdat, Staff Member “A” v ebrd 2017, para 81 (“The Tribunal does not find in the Bank’s 
law any indication that the President is barred from rejecting gc recommendations in 
whole or in part. To be sure, the President’s decision must comply with Bank law and must 
not be discriminatory, arbitrary or otherwise an abuse of discretion”). See also, ebrdat, 
Floriana Bajrami v ebrd 2016, para 16 (“The Tribunal accepts the Bank’s argumentation 
that in accordance with ss 1.03 and 8.01(a) of the Grievance Procedures, gc’s recommen-
dations are not mandatory for the Bank’s President”).
20 ebrd Directive on Appeals Process, s 2.02 (d).
21 The President received six requests for review in 2012, none in 2013 and 2014, seven in 2015, 
eight in 2016, eight in 2017 and 13 in 2018.
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staff and others appointed by the President. Also like the Grievance  Committee, 
the task of the Administrative Review Committee is to establish the facts giv-
ing rise to the grievance, and to submit to the President reports and recom-
mendations for their decision. The main elements of the reform can be sum-
marised as follows.
3.1 From a Quasi-Adversarial to a More Inquisitorial Process
The first and essential purpose of the reform carried out in 2017 was to change 
the fundamental character of the proceedings at the first tier of the Bank’s in-
ternal dispute resolution system. Indeed, over the years (and perhaps as the 
result of the influence of chairs familiar with litigation practices in common 
law systems), Grievance Committee proceedings had become increasingly ad-
versarial, with advocates representing their parties’ case or position to the 
Grievance Committee, offering evidence, examining and cross-examining wit-
nesses, and making written and oral submissions on behalf their clients. For 
most cases, proceedings started with a directions hearing where the chair of 
the Grievance Committee asked the parties to identify the evidence they in-
tended to present to the Committee in order to establish the facts.
Therefore, although the Grievance Committee was not designed to be a ju-
dicial or quasi-judicial body, and instead was responsible for determining the 
facts of the matter in dispute and submitting its recommendations for the 
President’s decision, staff members had almost no choice but to engage law-
yers and to rely on their support throughout the proceedings before the Com-
mittee. These complex proceedings had a deterrent effect on staff members 
who were reluctant to engage external counsel for an internal procedure. Fur-
thermore, they resulted in considerable financial costs for the Bank since it 
was the Bank’s general practice to cover the legal costs incurred by staff mem-
bers (even when the staff member did not prevail with the grievance).22
A review of the procedures of other international financial organizations 
revealed that, while certain organizations such as the International Monetary 
Fund allow staff members to be represented by external legal counsel in the 
first stage of their internal dispute resolution system, others go the opposite 
way. For example, the World Bank’s staff manual expressly provides that, dur-
ing the peer review process, the requesting staff member and responding man-
ager are required to draft submissions in their own words and that attorneys 
may not draft submissions.23 In the same vein, the staff manual specifies that 
22 Until 2017, legal costs awarded per case ranged from gbp 6,000 up to more than gbp 
43,000.
23 World Bank Staff Manual, s 8.04.
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attorneys are not allowed in hearings and that the staff member and manager 
involved may each be accompanied by an advisor which is a current or former 
staff member, but who may not be engaged in the practice of law.24
As a result of the ebrd’s latest reform, while staff members remain free to 
seek and receive legal advice on their case and to have their submissions pre-
pared by lawyers,25 they are not represented by lawyers in Administrative Re-
view Committee proceedings. Members of the Bank’s Office of the General 
Counsel do not appear in proceedings before the Administrative Review Com-
mittee on behalf of the Bank and do not participate in any hearing organised 
by the Administrative Review Committee.26
Instead, it is the duty of the Administrative Review Committee to make its 
own inquiries and to issue directions in order to establish the facts of the cases 
before it. Like in other inquisitorial proceedings, the Administrative Review 
Committee is free to hear the parties and conduct its inquiries on the basis of 
the evidence offered by either party to support their case, and on the basis of 
any other evidence it considers necessary for its report and recommendation 
to the President.
Nearly two years following the adoption of the new proceedings, it is evi-
dent that the reduced role of lawyers at the first tier has led to a significant re-
duction in costs, but has also resulted in a moderation of the tone of oral and 
written submissions to the Administrative Review Committee. As detailed fur-
ther below, in the absence of external counsel it is also more likely that both 
parties will be willing to pursue mediation.
3.2 A Faster and More Efficient Resolution of Internal Disputes
International organizations are not exempt from observing the legal maxim, 
justice delayed is justice denied. For example, the iloat held that 17 months 
24 World Bank Staff Manual, s 8.05.
25 ebrd Directive on Administrative Review Process, s 6.4.2 (“A Staff Member may also seek 
advice from a person from outside of the Bank, including a lawyer for the drafting of their 
request for review of an Administrative Decision which is subject to review in accordance 
with the Administrative Review Process set out in this Directive and for the drafting of 
any comments and/or expressing views in accordance with paragraph 6.4.2(g) above, 
subject to such person concluding a confidentiality undertaking […]”).
26 ebrd Directive on Administrative Review Process, s 6.4.2 (“The Staff Member and the 
representative of the Bank may be accompanied to a meeting with the Administrative 
Review Committee by a person of their choice, including another current or former staff 
member, so long as such person is not a lawyer or engaged in the practice of law, the Staff 
Legal Adviser, a lawyer in Corporate teams of the Office of the General Counsel, or the 
Ombudsperson”).
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for issuing a report on an internal appeal relating to disciplinary issues was 
unreasonable and granted the staff member involved substantial damages.27
By 2015, the average time required by the ebrd’s Grievance Committee to 
deliver a ‘Report and Recommendation’ to the President was nearly 15 months 
(with a minimum of 10 months and a maximum of 21 months). As a conse-
quence, in the interest of both staff members and the Bank, it had become 
apparent that the Bank had to speed up its process.28 The Bank addressed 
this specific issue by introducing strict procedural timelines for the proceed-
ings of its Administrative Review Committee. The Directive provides that the 
Administrative Review Committee has 90 working days from its receipt of a 
request for review (more or less four months) to complete its consideration 
of the matter and submit a Report and Recommendation to the President for 
decision.29
This is an ambitious procedural constraint and two years after the adoption 
of the Administrative Review Process, it can be observed that the reform had 
the effect to substantially speed up the treatment of requests for review. In 
practice, except in complex cases requiring more fact finding where the Ad-
ministrative Review Committee requested that the parties submit additional 
documents or address specific questions, all Administrative Review Commit-
tee Reports and Recommendations have been prepared within 90 working 
days. While the Bank does not formally have the ability to sanction the Admin-
istrative Review Committee if a Report is not delivered by the 90-day  deadline, 
27 iloat, R. (No. 2) v unesco 2019, consid 14.
28 See ebrdat, A. v ebrd 2017, para 51. The Administrative Tribunal criticised the time taken 
by the Grievance Committee for delivering its report and recommendations, underlining 
notably that the Grievance Committee had to inform the Appellant about the delay in 
preparation of its report. Had the applicant asked for such remedies, the Administrative 
Tribunal then added that it would have granted pecuniary remedies due to that delay.
29 ebrd Directive on Administrative Review Process, s 6.4.2(j) (“The Administrative Review 
Committee shall take all necessary steps to provide its Report and Recommendation to 
the President and to the Staff Member as expeditiously as possible, but no later than 90 
days after the request for review was referred to the Chair of the Administrative Review 
Committee by the President, unless the Administrative Review Committee determines 
that additional time is required and justified in exceptional circumstances beyond its 
control, such as: (i) significant complexity of the matter under review, requiring a consid-
erable volume of information and/or documentation to be collected and assessed; or (ii) 
delays, due to objective reasons (e.g. illness, travel), in obtaining essential information 
either from the Staff Member or the Bank or in obtaining written documentation. In the 
event that the Administrative Review Committee requires additional time, it shall 
promptly inform the Staff Member and the Bank in writing, specifying the reasons neces-
sitating the need for additional time”).
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the Bank has significantly accelerated the timeline of the proceedings before 
the Administrative Review Committee.
3.3 Streamlining of the Proceedings
The clarity of procedures is key to their success and to the smooth functioning 
and effectiveness of a grievance system.30 It is indeed essential for interna-
tional organizations not to create procedural traps or unnecessarily convolut-
ed procedures. As an example, international administrative tribunals such as 
the Administrative Tribunal of the International Monetary Fund (imfat) and 
the iloat notably alerted international organizations to the risks resulting 
from the multiplication of distinct internal review mechanisms and the subse-
quent effects on the lack of legal certainly.31 For example, the iloat expressed 
its scepticism about the “confusion in the relevant texts, the multiplicity of 
conflicting remedies and the inability on the part of the existing mechanisms 
[…] to exercise their […] powers effectively”.32
Facing similar issues after decades of regulatory evolution, other interna-
tional organizations such as the United Nations moved to abolish many of 
their specialised internal advisory bodies. Instead, creating one single inde-
pendent body, the management evaluation unit.33 After four reforms in the 
course of more than twenty years, the ebrd encountered similar challenges, 
with a broad diversity of ways to contest administrative decisions and the un-
necessary multiplication of layers of review. For instance, prior to the 2017 re-
form, every administrative decision had to be challenged first with the Manag-
ing Director, Human Resources. When unsatisfied with the outcome of this 
review, the staff member was then free to submit a new request for review to 
the Vice President responsible for Human Resources. It was only after receipt 
of the review decision of the Vice President responsible for Human Resources 
that the unsatisfied staff member was able to submit a request for review to the 
President—who in turn referred the matter to the Grievance Committee for its 
assessment. The multiplication of layers and procedural requirements had a 
deterrent effect on staff members. For example, the review of the matter by the 
Vice President responsible for Human Resources following the review and de-
cision by the Managing Director, Human Resources was generally perceived as 
a mere rubberstamping of that decision. With the adoption of the Directive, 
30 Thévenot-Werner 2014, 25.
31 imfat, Ms. “J” v imf, para 89.
32 iloat, A. T. v ilo 2004, para 6; see also Thévenot-Werner 2014, 30.
33 For an independent assessment of the new system in place, see unga, ‘Report of the In-
terim Independent Assessment Panel’ 2016.
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the Bank abolished this second layer of management review. Procedures are 
now faster and clearer because, unless the challenged administrative decision 
was taken by the Managing Director, Human Resources,34 the matter only 
needs to be reviewed by the Managing Director, Human Resources and not by 
the Vice President responsible for Human Resources before the staff member 
can file a request for review to the President.
The ebrd also simplified the procedures for determining whether requests 
for review submitted to the President are admissible (for instance, whether or 
not the required steps prior to such submission to the President have been 
duly undertaken and completed, whether the applicable time limits have been 
met and whether the request expressly articulates the outcome and remedies 
sought by the staff member). Prior to the reform, every request for review had 
to be referred to the Grievance Committee, even if it was manifestly inadmis-
sible. Then, the Bank had to challenge the competence of the Grievance Com-
mittee to hear the matter and enter into a new round of submissions with the 
staff member on such jurisdiction issues. Therefore, even manifestly inadmis-
sible request for review (such as time barred requests) often gave rise to a time 
consuming and costly exchange of submissions between the Bank and the 
staff member.
Under the new system, upon receipt of a request for review, the President 
has fifteen working days to assess the admissibility of the request for review. 
Should the President decide that the matter is inadmissible, the staff member 
will be informed and may file an appeal directly with the Administrative Tribu-
nal. By adopting this mechanism the Bank respects the rights of defence of the 
staff member without delaying the process and creating unnecessary costs and 
submissions for the Bank and the staff member.
Last, the Bank worked on the relationship between internal dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms and disciplinary proceedings as these two set of rules previ-
ously worked independently from each other. The Bank has introduced a pro-
vision guaranteeing that any process under the internal appeals procedure will 
be stayed pending receipt of the outcome of any disciplinary procedure 
launched in parallel on a related matter by or against the staff member using 
the internal dispute resolution process.
34 As an example, the decision to transfer a staff member is adopted by the Managing Direc-
tor, Human Resources so that it will first have to be challenged before the Vice President 
responsible for Human Resources.
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3.4 A Step Further Towards a More Frequent Recourse to Mediation
In multicultural environments such as international organizations where staff 
members are often informed by different moral sensibilities, engaging into 
costly and lengthy formal dispute resolution proceedings may not always be 
the most effective approach to address conflicts between the organization and 
its staff.
In this respect, the Bank has been following the global trend in international 
organizations towards the promotion of mediation mechanisms. Indeed, as 
notably underlined by Gheeta Ravindra, former mediator of the International 
Monetary Fund, “poorly managed conflict results in enormous costs in the 
form of wasted management time, higher turnover, lower productivity and for-
mal grievances”,35 and “simply having the option of mediation demonstrates to 
staff that their concerns are taken seriously and that they are in line with the 
values of the corporate culture”.36 Also, in the same vein, the ‘Report of the 
Interim Independent Assessment Panel on the System of administration of 
Justice at the United Nations’ makes clear that,
[M]anagers should be encouraged to respond positively to mediation at-
tempts. The prime consideration for both parties should be that an 
agreed solution is better than protracted legalistic debates. Conflict reso-
lution is about the continuation of working relationships, not about 
winning.37
Until 2017, the ebrd was offering mediation only prior to the filing of formal 
grievances. However, it was not possible to seek recourse to mediation once a 
request for review was submitted to the President. Since the reform, mediation 
is possible at every stage of the process, and can even be suggested as a course 
of action by the Administrative Review Committee itself. While the new sys-
tem enhances the possibilities to use mediation, mediation must remain an 
option dependent on the will of the parties and the Bank has not adopted the 
approach of other organizations consisting in imposing mediation or concilia-
tion as a preliminary step to any judicial challenge.38
35 Ravindra 2014, 35.
36 Ibid, 39.
37 unga, ‘Report of the Interim Independent Assessment Panel’ 2016, 2.
38 See for instance, eib Staff Regulations, art 41 (requiring that, prior to initiating any pro-
ceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union, an amicable settlement shall 
be sought and a request for conciliation made).
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3.5 Towards More Transparency and Legal Certainty
Prior to the 2017 reform, an abstract of every Report and Recommendation is-
sued by the Grievance Committee was published on the intranet of the Bank. 
However, staff members did not have access to the (redacted) subsequent de-
cision taken by the President after consideration of this Report, so that no 
great clarity was given to staff members about the Bank’s position in the mat-
ters in dispute. Following the reform, a summary abstract of the Report and 
Recommendation is still published, but it is accompanied by the subsequent 
decision of the President (in a redacted form). Staff members can now stay 
abreast of the Bank’s legal position on the issues which have given rise to griev-
ance proceedings.
Along with the main points of the 2017 reform discussed above, the ebrd 
has made a series of miscellaneous additional changes to its first-tier proceed-
ings. For example, staff members now have an express duty to cooperate with 
the Administrative Review Committee; all time limits are now expressed in 
working days while the previous rules offered a potentially misleading combi-
nation of days and months; last but not least, the previous system permitted 
the President to review regulatory decisions taken by the Board of Directors or 
the Board of Governors of the Bank (composed of Finance Ministers of mem-
ber countries). This anomaly has been corrected in the new proceedings, and 
regulatory decisions taken by the President, the Board of Directors or the Board 
of Governors can only be challenged in the ebrd Administrative Tribunal.39
4 Conclusion
As an international organization promoting the rule of law in the countries 
where it operates, the ebrd has adjusted its own internal dispute resolution 
system over time to satisfy prevailing international standards, taking into ac-
count emerging legal trends as well as the case law of international administra-
tive tribunals.
Following the latest reform, the Bank benefits from a system delivering both 
legal certainly and procedural flexibility, at a reasonable cost for the Bank and 
staff member. While there is always room for improvement, the current system 
provides staff members with the necessary due process and fairness protec-
tion, without transforming the committee conducting the first-tier review for 
the consideration of the President into a quasi-judicial body.
39 This is also the case for individual decisions taken by the committees established under 




A. T. v International Labour Organization, iloat Judgment No 2307 (2004).
A. v European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, ebrdat Decision No 
2017/AT/06 (2017).
African Development Bank v X, Court of Cassation, 25 January 2005, No 04-41012, ildc 
778 (fr 2005).
Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (29 
May 1990, entered into force 28 March 1991).
Amerasinghe C F, ‘Reflections on the Internal Justice System of International Organi-
sations’ in Elias O (ed), The Development and Effectiveness of International Adminis-
trative Law—On the Occasion of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the World Bank Admin-
istrative Tribunal (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012).
Beer and Regan v Germany App No 28934/95 (ECtHR, 18 February 1999).
C. T. v Agency for International Trade Information and Cooperation, iloat Judgment No 
2781 (2009).
Cogan J K, ‘Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands’ (2013) 107(4) The American 
Journal of International Law 884.
e.e.é. a. v Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation, iloat Judgment No 
3067 (2012).
Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal 
(Advisory Opinion) [1954] icj Rep 47.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Directive on Administrative Re-
view Process.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Directive on Appeals Process.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Staff Regulations.
European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights: Right to a Fair Trial (Civil Limb) (ECtHR, updated 31 August 2019) 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_ENG.pdf> accessed 4 March 
2020.
European Investment Bank, Staff Regulations.
Floriana Bajrami v European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, ebrdat Deci-
sion No 2016/AT/02.
G. (No. 2) v Universal Postal Union, iloat Judgment No 3732 (2017).
Golder v The United Kingdom App No 4451/70 (ECtHR, 21 February 1975).
Gomula J, ‘The Review of Decisions of International Administrative Tribunals by the 
International Court of Justice’ in Elias O (ed), The Development and Effectiveness of 
International Administrative Law—On the Occasion of the Thirtieth Anniversary of 
the World Bank Administrative Tribunal (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012).
J. M. W. v European Patent Organisation, iloat Judgment No 2292 (2004).
187Lessons Learnt and Way Forward
<UN>
Ms. “J” v International Monetary Fund, imfat Judgment No 2003-1 (2003).
O. S. v European Patent Organisation, iloat Judgment No 3229 (2013).
Ravindra G, ‘The Cost of Conflict and the Need for Conflict Competent Organizations’ 
in Talvik A (ed), Best Practices in Resolving Employment Disputes in International 
Organizations (ilo Geneva 2014).
Reinisch A and Weber U A, ‘In the Shadow of Waite and Kennedy: The Jurisdictional 
Immunity of International Organizations, the Individual’s Right of Access to the 
Courts and Administrative Tribunals as Alternative Means of Dispute Settlement’ 
(2004) 1 International Organizations Law Review 59.
R. (No. 2) v unesco, iloat Judgment No 4063 (2019).
Staff Member “A” v European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, ebrdat Deci-
sion No 2017/AT/05 (1).
Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v The Netherlands App No 65542/12 (ECtHR, 
8 October 2012).
Talvik A, ‘The ilo Administrative Tribunal: Shaping the Internal Review Process’ in 
Talvik A (ed), Best Practices in Resolving Employment Disputes in International Or-
ganizations (ilo Geneva 2014).
Thévenot-Werner A, ‘The Need to Develop Effective Individual Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms Prior to Judicial Appeals in International Organizations’ in Talvik A 
(ed), Best Practices in Resolving Employment Disputes in International Organizations 
(ilo Geneva 2014).
United Nations General Assembly, ‘Report of the Interim Independent Assessment 
Panel on the System of Administration of Justice at the United Nations’ (15 April 
2016) UN Doc A/71/62/Rev.1.
V. C. v Centre for the Development of Enterprise, iloat Judgment No 3127 (2012).
Waite and Kennedy v Germany App No 26083/94 (ECtHR, 18 February 1999).
World Bank, Staff Manual.
X v Pacific Community, Court of Cassation (Social Chamber), 13 May 2014, Application 
No 12-23805.
Yang-Ro Yoon (No. 12) v International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, wbat 
Decision No 436 (2010).
Yang-Ro Yoon (No. 19) v International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, wbat 








© Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), ���1 | doi:10.1163/9789004441033_011
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the cc-by-nc 4.0 License.
<UN>
Chapter 10
The Commonwealth Secretariat Arbitral Tribunal: 




This chapter seeks to interrogate the rationale for the establishment of the Common-
wealth Secretariat Arbitral Tribunal (csat) and examine how the Statute creating the 
Tribunal has evolved. Several applicants in the early cases before csat brought parallel 
litigation before the domestic courts of the United Kingdom. Arguments based on lo-
cal law acted as a counterpoint to developments in the case law and Statute of csat. 
The resulting csat decisions delineated key principles on human rights and access to 
justice, which are still relevant today. csat—and the nature of the applications before 
it—continues to evolve, and this chapter concludes by identifying some lessons 
learned so far and what to expect going forward.
1 Introduction
This chapter is divided into six sections. In this first section, the domestic law 
framework of the Commonwealth Secretariat is considered, together with 
identifying the present-day principle features of the Commonwealth Secre-
tariat Arbitral Tribunal (csat), as well as the wider context. Sections 2 and 3 
provide a brief history of the Commonwealth Secretariat and overview of its 
organizational structure and governance, respectively. Section 4 examines 
how employment-related disputes were initially resolved at the Common-
wealth Secretariat and the factors that led up to and informed the establish-
ment of csat. Section 5 then analyses how the early cases before the Tribunal 
in fact shaped csat, together with the evolving roles of the Board of Governors 
* Alice Lacourt, Legal Counsel, Commonwealth Secretariat, a.lacourt@commonwealth.int. I 
am grateful to colleagues, particularly the Commonwealth Secretariat Knowledge Centre 
and Archives team, for their contributions and comments. The views expressed are my own 
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and the Commonwealth Secretariat. In conclusion, Section 6 considers the 
present-day and future roles of csat as well as suggesting some lessons-learned 
for the future.
1.1 The Domestic Law Framework
In 1966, the Parliament of the United Kingdom (UK) enacted the Common-
wealth Secretariat Act to give effect to the 1965 Agreed Memorandum on the 
Commonwealth Secretariat.1 The Act conferred legal personality and granted 
the organization as well as its staff certain privileges and immunities. In 1995, 
the Governments of the Commonwealth decided to create a statute to estab-
lish an arbitral tribunal to hear contractual disputes, including disputes per-
taining to employment relations within the Commonwealth Secretariat. As the 
Secretariat evolved, it had identified a real need to provide a dispute resolution 
forum at the international level without recourse to dispute resolution in do-
mestic law and the need to waive immunity from local jurisdiction and en-
forcement. The creation of this tribunal, known as the Commonwealth Secre-
tariat Arbitral Tribunal, followed the reluctance of local courts to adjudicate 
over cases brought by employees of the Commonwealth Secretariat in view of 
its immunity from jurisdiction.2
1.2 The Principal Features of csat Today
csat was established under Article i of the Statute.3 Article ii explains the 
character of csat as an international administrative tribunal, with jurisdiction 
over applications by staff, the Secretariat or others contracting with it.4 There 
are eight members, including a President who presides over the first instance 
panel of three judges as described in Article iv.5 The Tribunal is supported by 
a suitably qualified lawyer as Executive Secretary, answerable only to the Tri-
bunal, who is appointed by the Commonwealth Secretary-General in accord-
ance with Article v.6 It always sits in London, although it can, under Article 
vii.2, convene elsewhere for reasons of efficiency and subject to budgetary 
considerations.7
1 Agreed Memorandum on the Commonwealth Secretariat. On use of informal instruments, 
rather than treaties, in the Commonwealth see Aust 1986, 788.
2 Court of Appeal of England and Wales, Gadhok v Commonwealth Secretariat 1977.
3 Statute of the csat (Statute), art i.
4 Ibid, art ii.
5 Ibid, art iv.
6 Ibid, art v.
7 Ibid, art vii.2.
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The Tribunal decides by majority, as set out in Article ix, and its decisions 
are posted on the Tribunal’s public website.8 Article x provides that the Tribu-
nal may order the rescission of the decision, specific performance or, or in 
 addition, compensation for any loss or damage.9 The President may convene a 
five-strong Review Board under Article xi, if a decision is challenged for error 
of fact or law or unreasonableness. The Review Board may substitute its own 
determination, order a re-hearing, or refuse to grant any remedy. Decisions are 
final and binding upon the parties.10 Concerning applicable law, Article xii 
provides that in employment cases, international administrative law applies to 
the exclusion of domestic law, whereas in contract cases, csat applies the law 
specified in or most closely connected with the contract.11
1.3 The Wider Context
csat is one of many international administrative tribunals (iats) created to-
wards the end of the 20th century for the purpose of adjudicating contractual 
disputes, principally staff employment claims, against international organiza-
tions. Since 1995, it has heard more than 40 cases.12 Its Statute has evolved in 
light of experience, and in accordance with international standards of trans-
parency and due process, as well as parallel litigation before the domestic 
courts of England and Wales in the early years of operation. To date, the do-
mestic courts have deferred to csat jurisdiction, upholding the immunity of 
the Commonwealth Secretariat from the jurisdiction of the domestic courts of 
the UK and steering clear of disturbing csat arbitral awards on grounds of ir-
regularity. Since 2005, the Tribunal and its members have enjoyed immunity 
from domestic jurisdiction and its decisions are no longer subject to a statu-
tory appeal function under UK arbitration law. The immunity of csat judges 
has never been tested.13
All iats may be said to be shaped by three factors: (i) what they are able to 
do—the powers and expectations vested in them by the member States that 
create them; (ii) what they do in practice—determining questions of contrac-
tual relationships frequently relating to employment with the relevant inter-
national organization; and (iii) the context in which they operate—applicants 
from time to time resort to the domestic or regional jurisdiction of the host 
8 See ibid, art xiii.2. The current Statute, Rules, judgments and list of members are available 
online at <https://thecommonwealth.org/tribunal> accessed 3 April 2020.
9 In employment cases, compensation is normally limited to three times net annual remu-
neration. See ibid, art x.1.
10 Ibid, art xi.
11 Ibid, art xii.
12 As of March 2020.
13 Commonwealth Secretariat Act 1966, s 1(2) and sch, paras 1 and 6.
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country, to address a perceived vacuum in the contractual dispute settlement 
process available at the international level.
A review of the formation of csat, and how and why its Statute has evolved 
since it was established, provides a useful insight for new international 
 organizations. It may inform the consideration of whether to establish a sepa-
rate iat for the organization, or whether to recognize the jurisdiction of an 
existing iat that allows for this. This assumes there is an obligation to provide 
for a dispute settlement forum, as appears to be the case in light of case law 
and the consistent practice of international organizations.14
2 A Brief History of the Commonwealth Secretariat
The origins of the Commonwealth may be traced back to the nineteenth 
 century. The association as known today was fused during decolonisation of 
former dominions from the UK.15 In 1949, the London Declaration recognized 
India’s independence as a Republic while continuing its full membership in 
the Commonwealth of Nations.16 The eight founding members—Australia, 
Britain, Canada, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, South Africa and Ceylon—
dropped the ‘British’ prefix and the requirement for allegiance to the British 
Crown to become ‘The Commonwealth of Nations’. Now it is known simply as 
‘The Commonwealth’. It is not a treaty-based organization but a voluntary as-
sociation of independent sovereign states. Members can leave without serving 
notice; and re-join, subject to verification that they comply with the funda-
mental values set out in the Commonwealth Charter.17
At first, the organization was administered by the UK Government’s Com-
monwealth Relations Office. As the membership grew, Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers decided in 1964 to establish an independent Commonwealth Secre-
tariat. The resultant intergovernmental instrument was concluded by Heads of 
Government, meeting in London in 1965.18 Last updated in 2005, the Revised 
Agreed Memorandum on the Commonwealth Secretariat (Revised Agreed 
14 See for example icj, Effect of Awards 1954, 57; Klabbers 2015, 246–252.
15 See the concise history in Roberts 2017; for a more detailed, historical review, see Dale 
1982.
16 London Declaration, 26 April 1949.
17 Zimbabwe left in 2003. Pakistan, The Gambia and Maldives have left and re-joined. See 
Commonwealth Secretariat, ‘Our History’. The Charter was adopted at the Common-
wealth Heads of Government Meeting (chogm) on 14 December 2012 and signed by hm 
The Queen on Commonwealth Day 2013. See Charter of the Commonwealth (Common-
wealth Charter).
18 See Commonwealth Secretariat, ‘Our History’.
195The Commonwealth Secretariat Arbitral Tribunal
<UN>
Memorandum)19 records that the UK will arrange for the Secretariat to be 
 accommodated in Marlborough House in London.20 The memorandum sets 
out the roles and functions of the Secretariat and of the Secretary-General as 
its Chief Executive. It assigns to the Secretariat, its staff, and members of csat 
privileges and immunities comparable to those enjoyed by High Commissions. 
The UK and other Commonwealth members have legislated accordingly, giv-
ing the Secretariat legal capacity and privileges and immunities under domes-
tic jurisdictions.
Today, the Commonwealth is a voluntary association of 54 independent, 
sovereign states, with shared principles and values reflected in the Common-
wealth Charter, and, in most cases, a shared common law legal system.21 The 
language of the Commonwealth meetings is English, and many, but not all, 
member countries have an historic association with the UK.22 The combined 
population of the Commonwealth is 2.4 billion, with more than 60% under 30 
years old. The Commonwealth is one of the largest international organizations 
after the United Nations, with enormous convening power across the five re-
gions of Africa, Asia, Caribbean and Americas, Pacific, and Europe. It also has 
two ‘sister’ organizations, the Commonwealth of Learning and the Common-
wealth Foundation, and over 80 Commonwealth Accredited Organizations.23
3 Organization and Governance
The Queen is Head of the Commonwealth.24 The principal organs of the Com-
monwealth are the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (chogm) 
and the Commonwealth Secretariat.
19 Revised Agreed Memorandum, 12 May 2005.
20 Marlborough House is a Royal Palace placed at the disposal of the Commonwealth by hm 
The Queen since 1964.
21 The Queen is Head of State in 16 of the 54 ‘member countries’, as they are known. Member 
countries are listed at <https://thecommonwealth.org/member-countries> accessed 3 
April 2020.
22 The Edinburgh Communiqué, 27 October 1997, para 20 (“Heads of Government […] 
agreed that in order to become a member of the Commonwealth, an applicant country 
should, as a rule, have had a constitutional association with an existing Commonwealth 
member; that it should comply with Commonwealth values, principles and priorities as 
set out in the Harare Declaration; and that it should accept Commonwealth norms and 
conventions”).
23 More information is available at <https://thecommonwealth.org/> accessed 3 April 2020.
24 At the chogm 2018 in London, Heads decided that the Prince of Wales should succeed 




chogms are held biennially in a Commonwealth city. Decisions are record-
ed in a communique at the end of the meeting, and the leader of the country 
hosting chogm is Chair-in-office until the next meeting. The Secretary- 
General is appointed by the Commonwealth Heads of Government acting col-
lectively. They are to be a person of high standing, and a significant part of 
their duties entails visiting member countries of the Commonwealth.25
The Secretary-General is the Chief Executive of the Commonwealth Secre-
tariat, which has approximately 220 members of staff, across 32 Common-
wealth nationalities. The Secretary-General and Secretariat staff derive their 
functions from the authority of the Heads of Government. They act in the ser-
vice of the Commonwealth countries collectively.26
The Board of Governors (BoG) meets annually or more frequently as re-
quired. It approves and monitors the four-year strategic plan and the annual 
delivery plan and budget.27 The BoG is made up of representatives of all Com-
monwealth governments and is comprised of senior officials of member 
 countries—in practice, at High Commissioner level. An Executive Committee 
(ExCo) of the BoG meets quarterly,28 and an independent Audit Committee, 
appointed by the ExCo and reporting to the BoG, meets quarterly with the Sec-
retariat and the internal and external auditors.
4 Resolution of Staff Disputes in the Early Years, and the Decision to 
Establish csat
From the outset, Heads of Government committed to legislate to provide the 
Secretariat legal personality and accord certain privileges and immunities. The 
exceptions were: when privileges and immunities were expressly waived; in 
respect of motor vehicle accidents; and when arbitration proceedings were 
25 Revised Agreed Memorandum, 12 May 2005, para 28. See also Doxey 1989, ch 3. Common-
wealth Secretaries-General to date, with country of nomination, are: Arnold Smith (Can-
ada, 1965–1975), Sir Shridath Ramphal (Guyana, 1975–1990), Chief Emeka Anyaoku (Nige-
ria, 1990–1999), Don McKinnon (New Zealand, 2000–2008), Kamalesh Sharma (India 
2008–2016) and the Rt Hon. Patricia Scotland qc (Guyana, 2016 to date).
26 Ibid, para 5.
27 The strategic plans, reports and financial statements are available at <https://thecom-
monwealth.org/about-us/accounts-internal-reports> accessed 3 April 2020.
28 The role and functions of the BoG and ExCo are set out in the Revised Agreed Memoran-
dum, 12 May 2005, Annex B.
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taken in respect of written contracts.29 The Commonwealth Secretariat Act 
1966 (1966 Act) provided for disputes to be resolved by arbitration, which could 
be enforced under the UK’s Arbitration Acts.30 There was no provision for ar-
bitration under the laws of other Commonwealth countries nor did contracts 
specify the governing law. In practice, employment and any other disputes 
were resolved informally. The arbitration process was never formally invoked, 
although it was already clear that the exception to immunity did not extend to 
litigation before employment tribunals.31
A restructuring of the Secretariat in 1993 brought matters to a head. One 
staff member, unhappy about redundancy, threatened to take their case to a 
UK employment tribunal. The then Secretary-General, Chief Anyaoku, after 
taking advice and consulting the Commonwealth Secretariat Staff Association 
and member Governments, proposed that Heads of Government amend the 
Staff Regulations regarding termination of appointment and oblige parties to 
submit disputes, including employment disputes, to a new csat to the exclu-
sion of other fora. According to the Statute of the new tribunal, international 
administrative law would apply to employment cases. Decisions would be final 
and binding but could be revised if new facts emerged.32
csat was modelled on the United Nations and the World Bank Administra-
tive Tribunals. Nonetheless, its jurisdiction extended beyond employment 
contracts governed by international administrative law, in that it also covered 
international enforcement of commercial contracts, applying the domestic 
law governing the contract. Building on the framework set in the Agreed Mem-
orandum, csat offered a comprehensive solution to potential contractual dis-
putes involving the Secretariat. In this way, it was ahead of the curve compared 
to tribunals whose jurisdiction is limited to international administrative law. 
The case noted above was settled in the end, without resort either to domestic 
arbitration or to csat, but from 1998 there were a series of cases testing the 
relationship between csat and the UK domestic courts.
29 Agreed Memorandum on the Commonwealth Secretariat, paras 39–40 and Annex A.
30 Commonwealth Secretariat Act 1966, s 1(3). The 1966 Act referred to the Arbitration Act 
1950 and Arbitration Act (Northern Ireland) 1937, was amended by the Arbitration Act 
1996, then omitted by the International Organisations Act 2005.
31 See Court of Appeal of England and Wales, Gadhok v Commonwealth Secretariat 1977, an 
unfair dismissal case where the employee’s application was rejected by the Employment 
Tribunal, eat and Court of Appeal.
32 Commonwealth Circular Letter (cl) No 23/94, 10 June 1994.
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5 How the Early Cases Shaped the Structure of csat and the 
Respective Roles of the Board of Governors and the 
Commonwealth Secretariat
This section will now track the history of this reformed csat under the follow-
ing seven headings: (i) The 1995 Statute; (ii) The 1998 Rules and the First Hear-
ing; (iii) Amendment to the Statute in 1999—Planning for Contingencies; (iv) 
Amendment of the Statute in 2004—Fairness, Transparency and Human 
Rights; (v) Amendment to the Statute in 2005—Immunity from UK Domestic 
Jurisdiction; (vi) The Sumukan Litigation Clarifies the Position on Immunity; 
and, lastly, (vii) Further Changes to the Statute in 2007 and 2015—Diversity, 
Review, Conflicts and Documents Production.
5.1 The 1995 Statute
From the outset, as noted above, the Tribunal was given jurisdiction over all 
contractual disputes involving the Secretariat. Cases could be brought by con-
tractors, the Secretariat or its staff. The Tribunal was initially designed as an 
arbitral mechanism, entitling parties with contracts with the Secretariat to 
have disputes settled by arbitration without recourse to dispute settlement un-
der the domestic law of the UK. The effect was to apply the growing body of 
international administrative law to the activities of the Secretariat rather than 
the domestic law of any one member State. The Tribunal could only exercise 
jurisdiction once internal remedies had been exhausted and only if an applica-
tion had been brought within three months of the dispute arising. An excep-
tion could be made where it was not reasonably practicable for the application 
to be brought within this timeframe.33
At its inception on 1 July 1995, the Tribunal was composed of three mem-
bers.34 All were Commonwealth judges, no two being nationals of the same 
country; of high moral character; and qualified for high judicial office or juris-
consults of recognized competence with at least 10 years’ experience. The Pres-
ident, appointed by the Secretary-General, had a three-year term renewable 
once, while the two remaining members were appointed ad hoc, one by the 
aggrieved staff member and one jointly by the Secretary-General and the Com-
monwealth Secretariat Staff Association (cssa). The Secretariat was responsi-
ble for the administrative arrangements and for meeting the Tribunal  expenses. 
33 Ibid, annexed Draft Statute of the Arbitral Tribunal of the Commonwealth Secretariat, 
art ii.
34 Commonwealth cl No 19/95, 5 June 1995.
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The Statute could be amended by the Secretary-General having consulted the 
Commonwealth Secretariat Staff Association and Governments.
Subsequently, with the adoption of the Arbitration Act 1996, the UK arbitra-
tion landscape changed, and the parties could no longer agree to exclude the 
right of appeal to the High Court of England and Wales completely.35 csat 
decisions could be subject to the jurisdiction of the UK Courts, which could 
order payment or mandate that the Secretariat take certain actions, thereby 
subjecting the Secretariat’s disputes indirectly to the jurisdiction of the UK 
domestic courts. The real possibility of challenge was illustrated by the early 
cases and parallel proceedings before the domestic courts.
5.2 The 1998 Rules and the First Hearing
In 1998, with Justice Ulrich Cross of Trinidad presiding, csat promulgated the 
‘Rules of the Commonwealth Secretariat Arbitral Tribunal’ and delivered its 
first judgment.36 In Hans (1998) an international recruit, appointed by the Sec-
retariat and based at the Commonwealth Youth Programme (cyp), Asia Re-
gional Centre in Chandigarh, India, was unable to bring their dispute before 
the local employment tribunal in view of the Secretariat’s immunity from suit. 
Bound by the principles of international administrative law under Article xii 
of its Statute, csat determined the purpose of probation with reference to ju-
risprudence of the World Bank and International Labour Organisation Admin-
istrative Tribunals and referred to C.F. Amerasinghe’s publication, ‘The Law of 
the International Civil Service’.37
The applicant won three months’ salary in damages for procedural injustice 
relating to the early termination of their contract, together with costs of the 
csat hearing; but they were unable to reclaim legal costs relating to the failed 
proceedings in India. csat held that,
[t]he Applicant is at liberty to pursue [their] interest in a court or tribu-
nal which [they think] could redress [their] perceived wrongs. It is not 
the fault or liability of the Respondents if [the Applicant] chooses a court 
or tribunal which has no jurisdiction over the Respondents.38
35 Arbitration Act 1996.
36 The current Statute, Rules, judgments and list of members are available online at <htt-
ps://thecommonwealth.org/tribunal> accessed 3 April 2020.
37 csat, Gurmeet Hans v The Commonwealth Secretariat and Ms Seelawathi Ebert, Regional 
Director cyp 1998.
38 Ibid, 10. In csat, Dr A S Saroha v The Regional Director, cyp (Asia) 2000, a local staff mem-
ber recruited directly by the cyp: Asia Centre could not bring a case against the  Secretariat 
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5.3 Amendment to the Statute in 1999—Planning for Contingencies
In light of lessons learned from Hans, and having consulted the Tribunal Presi-
dent and the cssa, Secretary-General Anyaoku amended the Tribunal Statute 
on 24 June 1999.39 The amendments provided for the contingency of the Tribu-
nal President being prevented from sitting, and increased the membership of 
the panel to the President plus four judges. The Tribunal would normally be 
composed of the President alone, and could sit as a panel of three in complex 
matters. Where a substantial number of applications had to be dealt with, sep-
arate chambers could be constituted. In addition, the revised Statute provided 
for an alternate Secretary and for decisions to be taken on the basis of the doc-
uments unless oral proceedings were warranted. It also introduced a time limit 
of 60 days for an application to review the judgment.
Mohsin (2001) tested the system.40 A former staff member won their case for 
procedural injustice after a performance review board did not provide them 
with an opportunity to comment on oral evidence heard in their absence. The 
oral hearing had been stalled due to the ill health of both the Tribunal Presi-
dent Ulrich, combined with the limited availability of the second Tribunal 
member, C.F. Amerasinghe, who eventually withdrew. The President desig-
nated the third panel member, Anesta Weeks qc, to conclude the case sitting 
alone, and this was enshrined in an order with the consent of the parties.
The applicant also brought a claim before the UK Courts, under the 1996 
Arbitration Act, alleging that the process did not comply with the European 
Convention on Human Rights, in that there had been extensive delays in deter-
mining the case, and the Tribunal was not composed in a way that was suffi-
ciently independent of the Commonwealth Secretariat. The Secretariat plead-
ed immunity and did not appear in the proceedings. Judge Steel held that the 
Secretariat had no immunity in respect of arbitration proceedings, applying the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Gadhok v Commonwealth Secretariat.41 Writ-
ten evidence disclosed in these domestic proceedings aired the extent to which 
for want of jurisdiction, because cyp was a separate legal entity from the Secretariat; cyp 
also had immunity from Indian jurisdiction.
39 Following Commonwealth cl No 14/99, 29 April 1999; cl No 23/99, 29 June 1999.
40 csat, Selina Mohsin v The Commonwealth Secretariat 2001 (CSAT/3 No 1; CSAT/3 No 2). In 
csat 3 No 1, csat laid the ground rules for csat jurisdiction, being the ‘internal law of the 
organisation’ and international administrative law principles to the exclusion of the na-
tional laws of member countries, while ‘[r]eference will be made to judgments of other 
international administrative Tribunals’ as recognized in wbat, Louis De Merode et al. v 
The World Bank 1981, para 28.
41 See High Court of England and Wales, Selina Mohsin v The Commonwealth Secretariat 
2002, paras 11–12.
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the csat judges  disagreed over the appropriate way to proceed. Nevertheless, 
Judge Steel ruled that the claimant had accepted csat jurisdiction in their em-
ployment contract with the Secretariat; had not challenged before csat the 
decision to proceed with a single arbitrator; and there had been no substantial 
injustice. The claimant could not show that they “did not know, and could not 
with reasonable diligence have discovered, the grounds for [their] objection”.42
The interface was tested again in Faruqi (2001–2002). The application in 
csat of international administrative law, which governs employment rela-
tions of the employees of international organizations, was compared with par-
allel arguments before the UK domestic courts about privileges and immuni-
ties, arbitration and human rights. Unfortunately, due to the illness and 
eventual retirement of the csat President, Ulrich Cross, and a change to the 
applicant’s legal team, an application to csat for urgent interlocutory relief 
could not be addressed for some seven months. The applicant requested in-
terim relief to maintain the status quo in respect of their employment at the 
Secretariat, together with an order against the Secretary-General for costs to 
date and assistance with future legal costs and a requirement to consult the 
applicant over the composition of the Tribunal.
The new csat President, Duncan Chappell, sitting alone, rejected this re-
quest. The Tribunal recalled that csat was an international body and Article 
ix of the Statute served as an exclusion agreement from the laws of any coun-
try. The European Court of Human Rights (echr) had already decided in Waite 
and Kennedy v Germany that the immunity of international organizations from 
domestic jurisdiction did not impair the right of access to the courts nor was it 
disproportionate to the objective of ensuring the proper function of interna-
tional organizations.43 The principles relied on were the same: in international 
administrative law, as in domestic and regional human rights law, there was an 
obligation to act impartially and afford a fair hearing. Other regional and inter-
national human rights tribunals addressed this.44 csat concluded:
It would be inappropriate for the Tribunal to adopt in toto any one of 
these international treaties. Rather, the Tribunal must distil from them 
the principles that do reflect the essence of international administrative 
42 Ibid, para 28.
43 csat, Runman Faruqi v The Commonwealth Secretariat 2002 (csat/5 No 1), paras 32–38, 
citing ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy v Germany 1994; ECtHR, Beer and Regan v Germany 1995; 
Court of Appeal of England and Wales, Gadhok v Commonwealth Secretariat 1977. See also 
ECtHR, Perez v Germany 2015; ECtHR, Klausecker v Germany 2015.
44 csat, Runman Faruqi v The Commonwealth Secretariat 2002 (csat/5 No 1), para 49.
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law in regard to the provision of an independent and impartial forum for 
the resolution of disputes.45
csat decided that general principles of fairness were reflected in the csat 
Statute and the Secretariat’s rules and regulations. Moreover, adequate consul-
tation, including with the staff association, ensured a transparent and fair se-
lection process by consensus in accordance with the Commonwealth’s govern-
ing principles. Urgent interim relief for pecuniary damage was not warranted 
because compensation, if awarded, could redress such damage.
In parallel domestic proceedings, the UK High Court declined to issue an 
injunction to stop csat from proceeding to a full hearing. Judge Brindle qc 
considered that any statutory power they had to issue an injunction was lim-
ited. It was exercisable only in a “very compelling case where justice could not 
be done without the grant of an order and the philosophy underlying the Act 
was not infringed by making such an order”.46 This was not such a case. csat 
was not a ‘public authority’ bound by the Human Rights Act 1998, and Article 
ix of the csat Statute was an exclusion agreement preventing an appeal to the 
domestic courts on a point of law. Nonetheless, the Tribunal President had ap-
plied similar principles in international administrative law. Should the appli-
cant pursue High Court litigation after the full csat hearing, the prospect of 
wasted costs, was “not the sort of overwhelming point or the sort of unusual or 
exceptional circumstance which justifies this court in intervening in the arbi-
tral process”.47 The High Court declined to issue an interim injunction, which 
would set a precedent and would be tantamount to opening the floodgates on 
“nearly every case where a complaint could be made against a provisional 
ruling”.48
csat convened an oral hearing before the full panel of the President, Anesta 
Weeks and Justice Hassan Jallow. It found that all the parties to the Agreed 
Memorandum, including the UK, had created an international tribunal whose 
judgments were final and not subject to further domestic law review. This did 
not result in a jurisdictional gap compared to the domestic law of member 
countries. Rather, it meant that csat had to apply the ‘internal law’ of the Sec-
retariat, including the Staff Regulations and Rules, Grievance Procedure and 
staff rotation policy; and its role was not to act as a merit review body but to 
45 Ibid, para 50.
46 High Court of England and Wales, Runman Faruqi v Commonwealth Secretariat 2002, 7.
47 Ibid, 10.
48 Ibid.
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ensure that discretionary authority was properly exercised.49 csat upheld the 
Secretary-General’s application of the new staff rotation policy, which had 
been set by Heads of Government, limiting the length of tenure of senior 
staff.50
An example of collective litigation by staff members of the cssa took place 
in 2003, when they argued that the Secretariat’s decision not to pay Cost of Liv-
ing Allowance (cola) was a breach of their contracts of employment. csat 
held that the Secretariat’s decision should be rescinded and reconsidered us-
ing appropriate methodology. Decisions of the International Labour Organiza-
tion Administrative Tribunal and other international administrative tribunals 
demonstrated that there was neither a right to receive the annual cost of living 
payments nor a right to the automatic indexing of salaries. Furthermore, the 
csat found that there had been adequate consultation with staff about the 
budget shortfall behind the decision to withhold the cola, but the informa-
tion methodology used to prepare the annual budget was inadequate. The Tri-
bunal ordered the Secretariat to pay each cssa member a nominal payment of 
gbp 100 as compensation.51 The applicants did not bring parallel litigation be-
fore the UK domestic courts.
5.4 Amendment of the Statute in 2004—Fairness, Transparency and 
Human Rights
By mid-2003, in light of the Faruqi litigation, the csat President and members 
again raised concerns about vulnerability to supervisory jurisdiction of the UK 
Courts under the 1996 Arbitration Act. A concern was emerging in exchanges 
with the Tribunal, and within the Secretariat, that Tribunal members—very 
distinguished judges and jurisconsults in their own right—might have their 
findings challenged in the UK Courts or even be sued over the way they con-
ducted arbitrations. They might decline to be appointed to csat as a result.
The Secretariat faced the following three choices as a result of this dilemma: 
firstly, accept that the (then) 54 members of the Commonwealth were, as 
might be perceived, beholden to the jurisdiction of one country—namely the 
UK; second, abolish the Tribunal, relying on UK employment law alone (which 
49 csat, Runman Faruqi v The Commonwealth Secretariat 2002 (CSAT/5 No 2), 8.
50 Ibid, 14.
51 csat, Commonwealth Secretariat Staff Association v The Commonwealth Secretariat 2003, 
12. The ensuing decision to pay an inflation-based cola by lump sum, rather than a regu-




could be expensive in terms of litigation costs and may not be the preference 
of non-UK staff); or third, accept the jurisdiction of another body, such as the 
International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal if it was willing, 
thereby ‘off-shoring’ the resolution of staff matters, out of reach of the jurisdic-
tion of the UK Courts.
Instead, the Secretariat sought to work with the UK as host country, pro-
vided that csat and its members were immune from the domestic jurisdiction 
of any member State. This would depend on the UK Government amending 
the 1966 Act when parliamentary time could be found. Limited time in the 
legislative programme meant that the issue could not be resolved until 2005 
(see Section 5.5, below).
In 2004, Secretary-General McKinnon proposed to Member Governments 
that the csat Statute be reviewed in light of lessons learned and in order to 
align it with other international administrative tribunals. The aim was to re-
flect fairness, transparency, and international human rights law principles, 
consistent with the Secretariat’s status as an international organization. There 
was also a need to limit the potentially large contingent liability to member 
Governments that would arise if the Tribunal’s decisions were open to chal-
lenge before the domestic courts of member States. The revisions to Article iv 
provided for the Tribunal to be composed of three members sitting together, 
empanelled by and including the President, out of a total component of the 
President and four other judges, each serving a four-year term renewable once. 
The President and members would henceforth be selected by Commonwealth 
Governments for appointment by the Secretary-General, on a regionally repre-
sentative basis and taking into account views of the Secretary-General and 
cssa. csat could take account of human rights principles and the practice 
and procedure of other international tribunals and oral hearings, if convened, 
would be held in public.
Importantly, henceforth the Statute would be amended by Commonwealth 
Governments, in consultation with the csat President, the Secretary-General 
and the cssa.52 Thus, from 2004 the Secretary-General pulled back from the 
facilitating role of appointing judges. From then on, this was done upon selec-
tion of the Heads of Government, initially at an Extraordinary Meeting of the 
BoG on 6 October 2004, and thereafter at BoG meetings or occasionally by 
correspondence.
52 Revision of 18 February 2004 further to Commonwealth CL No 17/2003, 29 October 2003; 
CL No 2/2004, 18 February 2004.
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5.5 Amendment to the Statute in 2005—Immunity from UK Domestic 
Jurisdiction
In 2005, the UK amended the 1966 Act to extend immunity from jurisdiction of 
the UK Courts over written contracts entered into by the Secretariat; to afford 
immunities to csat judges and officials and expert witnesses; and to institute 
an internal tax system. The International Organisations Act 2005 was brought 
into force once the BoG approved revisions to the Statute, included as Annex C 
to the Revised Agreed Memorandum. Proceedings before the Tribunal no long-
er constituted an ‘arbitration’ for the purposes of UK domestic law, and the 
Tribunal judgements were deliverable in an open sitting.53
5.6 The Sumukan Litigation Clarifies the Position on Immunity
The final case to consider in this series is Sumukan.54 This was the only csat 
case based on a commercial contract rather than a staff contract. The appli-
cant company was unsuccessful in a claim for ownership of a website created 
under a consultancy contract and alleged unfair early termination of the con-
tract. The Secretariat asked the csat President to stay on after the expiry of 
their term to complete these hearings, and the BoG was informed. The consult-
ant then brought a series of proceedings in the UK Courts challenging the 
outcome.
A director of the company also brought separate proceedings before the em-
ployment law courts in London. Their case was dismissed in view of the Secre-
tariat’s immunity from suit and legal process under the 1966 Act.55 The director 
argued in the Employment Appeal Tribunal that they had been subject to gen-
der and race discrimination, and that any immunity should therefore be 
waived because they would otherwise be denied access to a fair hearing in ac-
cordance with the European Convention on Human Rights. But Judge Lang-
staff doubted that the Commonwealth Secretariat was a ‘public authority’ 
within the meaning of Section 6 of the UK Human Rights Act 1998, such that 
immunity had to be waived. The Judge ruled that, “Save in an attenuated sense, 
an international organization cannot be said to be an arm of any one member 
53 Commonwealth BoG, Proposed Amendments to the Statute of the Arbitral Tribunal, 12 
May 2005. See also Commonwealth Secretariat Act 1966, s 1(2) and sch, paras 1 and 6.
54 csat, Sumukan Ltd v The Commonwealth Secretariat 2003 (CSAT/8 No 1); 2005 (CSAT/8 
No 2); 2005 (CSAT/8 No 3).
55 Decision of Mr Pearl, chairman sitting alone on 19 September 2005, case number 
2201284/2005, upheld on review by Ms Cook (sitting alone), judgment of 16 December 
2005. See United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal, Jananyagam v Commonwealth 
Secretariat 2007, judgment of 12 March 2007, para 9.
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or contracting State, though it may be regarded as an arm of several States act-
ing jointly”.56 There was an alternative remedy available to the claimant, 
through the rights of their company to apply to csat for breach of contract.
The company also sought to challenge the csat decision before the UK 
Courts, by invoking Section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996. The UK Courts held 
that the contract contained an enforceable exclusion agreement with regard to 
the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts.57 The Court of Appeal agreed that 
the limited waiver did not infringe upon Article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, because there remained a possibility of resort to the courts 
if there was an absence of impartiality or some other irregularity.58
In further proceedings before the UK Courts, Sumukan v Commonwealth 
Secretariat, the company argued that the Tribunal appointment process was 
not sufficiently independent of the Secretariat.59 Lord Justice Toulson presid-
ing, indicated that institutional independence was critical to immunity from 
suit to be compliant with Article 6 of the echr (in other words, the right to a 
fair trial).60 However, the same test did not apply to a case of a contractual 
dispute.61 The court would only intervene if there were a “serious irregularity 
causing substantial injustice”.62 At first instance, the judge was not persuaded 
that procedural defects and lack of consultation with the BoG regarding the de 
facto extension of the President’s tenure posed any “serious irregularity caus-
ing substantial injustice” for the purpose of Section 69, but the Court of Appeal 
held that these defects were fatal and that the Secretariat should have taken all 
appropriate steps to ensure that the Tribunal members had been properly ap-
pointed.63 The claimant did not take the case back to csat on the merits.
These cases conclusively determined that the Secretariat may invoke im-
munity before the UK Courts in employment and contract cases. csat pro-
vides a suitable dispute resolution forum and only in exceptional cases will the 
UK Courts consider the enforceability of an award. However, the point has not 
been tested beyond the Court of Appeal. It cannot therefore be ruled out that, 
56 Ibid, para 26.
57 High Court of England and Wales, Sumukan Ltd v The Commonwealth Secretariat 2006, 
paras 20–21.
58 Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Civil Division), Sumukan Ltd v The Commonwealth 
Secretariat 2007, para 61.
59 High Court of England and Wales, Sumukan Ltd v The Commonwealth Secretariat 2007, 
para 21.
60 Ibid, para 66
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Civil Division), Sumukan Ltd v The Commonwealth 
Secretariat 2007, para 48.
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despite the latest design of the Tribunal, as it has evolved over time, a signifi-
cant practical problem could lead to litigation before the UK Courts. An exam-
ple might be if long-standing vacancies on csat lead to a significant delay in 
dealing with applications, such as to cause a fundamental denial of justice.
5.7 Further Changes to the Statute in 2007 and 2015—Diversity, Review, 
Conflicts and Documents Productions
Following the Sumukan litigation, the Statute was further revised in 2007, 
when the Tribunal was expanded from five to eight members and a new review 
function was introduced, for manifest error of law or fact. Provisions were in-
troduced to ensure gender as well as regional balance; to deal with the eventu-
ality of a member passing away or being otherwise unable to continue sitting; 
to provide for cases to be determined on the papers; and for the President and 
other members to continue to sit in an ongoing case, after the expiry of their 
term, until an application was determined. The meaning of ‘Staff ’ was defined 
to include those at Commonwealth regional offices, the Commonwealth Youth 
Programme and the Commonwealth Small States facility in New York. csat 
jurisdiction was expanded to such other international or intergovernmental 
Commonwealth bodies as may wish to use the Tribunal to settle staff disputes, 
such as the Commonwealth of Learning or the Commonwealth Foundation—
in such a way as various other international administrative tribunals allow 
other organizations to submit to their jurisdiction, notably the Administrative 
Tribunal of the International Labour Organization.64
The Statute was amended again in 2015, to allow the Tribunal to receive late 
applications in view of extended delay by the Secretariat in taking necessary 
measures and to provide for recusal in the case of actual or perceived conflict 
of interest. Other changes empowered the Tribunal to require the production 
of documents or the attendance of officials as witnesses. These changes were 
tabled as points of clarification, to remain consistent with developments in 
other Tribunals, such as the International Monetary Fund Administrative Tri-
bunal, and in light of experience in cases since 2007.65
64 Commonwealth cl No 5/2007, 30 March 2007. To date, no such organizations have ad-
dressed a declaration to the Secretary-General recognizing csat jurisdiction.
65 Commonwealth BoG, Revision of the Statute of csat, 28 May 2015; proposals agreed by 
the Board on the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors 2015. The amendment to 
Article vi.4 for rules on application for anonymity followed the decision in csat, Julius 
Ndung’u Kaberere v The Commonwealth Secretariat 2014, paras 15–28.
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6 Conclusion: The Role of the Tribunal Today and in the Future
The Tribunal, which normally meets at the Commonwealth Secretariat’s head-
quarters at Marlborough House in London, offers accessible and quick access 
to justice to adjudicate those employment disputes which are not successfully 
resolved through the internal grievance system. This is highly valued by the 
Secretariat, its staff and the BoG—which maintains a close interest in any dis-
putes reaching the Tribunal.
A review of csat decisions shows a familiar range of workplace complaints, 
from interpersonal staff relationships that have deteriorated, to alleged unfair-
ness of pay increments, to non-renewal of contracts, regrading and redundan-
cy.66 Regular themes include the need to deal with staff cases promptly and 
fairly, ensuring that decisions are well-reasoned and well-evidenced and the 
need for transparency—staff cannot be deprived of their rights without due 
process and due notice. Reference is made in a number of cases to decisions of 
other international administrative tribunals. Even where there is no express 
reference, in practice, a background check of case law will have been made to 
ensure that principles are developed in step with key cases of other interna-
tional administrative tribunals.
Over time, csat and its Statute have evolved in light of the changing con-
text. Changes to the Statute have responded to developments in the legal 
framework of the headquarter's country, progressive best practice across other 
international administrative tribunals, and in light of csat’s own practice and 
jurisprudence. The Tribunal itself has matured as an independent and effec-
tive body, whose Statute and membership are decided upon by governments. 
As the Tribunal continues to progress, four lessons may be learned going 
forward:
(i) The overwhelming majority of csat cases have concerned employment 
matters. It is essential that the Tribunal has amongst its members a strong 
foundation in employment law and experience in managing written and 
oral proceedings, in addition to the statutory requirement of appropriate 
geographic representation and gender diversity.
(ii) Vacancies should be filled as soon as notified and not carried for longer 
than absolutely necessary. Even though the chances of an application be-
ing brought appear remote, or it is seen as unlikely that a litigant might 
challenge a decision by way of review, the Tribunal must be staffed and 
ready to deal with the possibility. Without sufficient judges, the President 
66 Beyond the scope of this chapter. See for example Borda 2013.
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is not in a position to form a Review Board. An inability to hear an appeal 
could trigger an application to the UK Courts for lack of due process. So 
might a procedural deficiency in an appointment.
(iii) Judicial members are paid an honorarium and per diem. There might be 
no cases for a long period of time—or several at once. Although the Tri-
bunal’s work may be highly rewarding and a valuable personal contribu-
tion to the Commonwealth, care should be taken to ensure that nomi-
nees for appointment to the Tribunal are aware of the variable time 
commitment involved in what is largely voluntary work.
(iv) csat was created to provide a forum for settlement of disputes about 
contracts with the Secretariat, including employment disputes, in view of 
statutory immunity from the jurisdiction and enforcement of the local 
courts. Other Commonwealth organizations that enjoy immunity from 
the domestic jurisdiction of the host country might consider whether to 
avail themselves of csat jurisdiction by making an application under the 
Statute. Any employment disputes that cannot be resolved informally 
might otherwise be referred to the local domestic courts, leaving the or-
ganization with little alternative to waiving immunity. If no waiver is 
forthcoming, the organization could face a challenge under domestic 
law, based on denial of justice.
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Chapter 11
The Effectiveness of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization in an Era of Adaptation: The Role of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Administrative Tribunal
Steven Hill and Nick Minogue*
Abstract
This chapter discusses the role that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato) 
Administrative Tribunal (at) plays in the work of the political and military alliance 
charged with defending the security of its 29 members in Europe and North America. 
It explores how the at’s creation in 2013 has contributed to organizational success, 
played a valuable role in upholding respect for the rule of law, and driven change with-
in the organization. nato has a peculiar legal structure that must take into account 
the interests of a wide range of stakeholders, including military and political elements. 
The successful work of nato is dependent upon effective and continual adaptation, 
both internally, with regard to its regulatory frameworks, and externally, with regard to 
nato’s primary mission of defense and deterrence. Success in the process of internal 
adaptation is not predicated only upon the smooth functioning of the at, but also 
upon the effectiveness of the entire civilian staff member complaint resolution pro-
cess. In the future, nato will continue to invest in its system of dispute resolution and 
rely upon the at to help demonstrate its commitment to the rule of law.
1 Introduction
In 2013, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato) completed a major 
overhaul of its employment dispute resolution processes leading to the 
establishment of a new administrative tribunal, the nato Administrative 
* Steven Hill, Legal Adviser and Director (until early 2020), Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), hill.steven@hq.nato.int; Nick Minogue, Assistant Legal 
Adviser in OLA, minogue.nicholas@hq.nato.int. The views expressed in this chapter are those 
of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the views of NATO or its Allies. The 
authors gratefully acknowledge the support provided by Mark Norris in OLA in the prepara-
tion of this chapter.
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 Tribunal (at). Since then, the at has registered approximately 25 new cases 
each year.1 Its at’s Annual Reports and its judgements (with names redacted) 
are available to the public through the nato website.2 The establishment of 
the at was a major reform that has influenced nato’s culture and how the 
organization functions.
In the broadest terms, the reform was an important indicator of nato’s 
commitment to the rule of law, including a respect for the rights of staff mem-
bers as reflected in international administrative law. The importance of the 
rule of law has been hardwired into the Alliance from the outset. The Preamble 
of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, which established the Alliance, affirms that 
nato was founded for the collective defense of its members, on the basis of 
the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.3 Respect for 
the rule of law and the role it plays in the security of the Allies is thus inherent 
in the exercise of nato’s core functions, including the way in which nato’s 
internal legal order is constituted.
This chapter begins by introducing nato’s legal structure, noting how its 
unique structure places emphasis on a culture of respect for the rule of law 
(Section 2). This is followed by two sections which, respectively, present the 
legal and the historical background to nato’s 2013 reform of its employment 
dispute resolution processes, providing the impetus behind the need for mod-
ernization and shedding light onto how it was done (Sections 3 and 4). The 
next section continues by explaining how the administrative tribunal was im-
plemented within nato, noting the importance of a broader commitment to 
dispute resolution (Section 5). It also explores how the existence of an admin-
istrative tribunal may affect nato’s work moving forward. This is followed by a 
conclusion (Section 6). Ultimately, the creation of, and successful functioning 
of, a robust rule of law-compliant dispute resolution procedure within nato 
plays a crucial and valuable role in nato’s adaptation and its very existence 
helps drive necessary change.
2 nato’s Legal Structure
This section provides an overview of the legal structure of the nato system, 
providing essential context to the successful functioning of the at. The North 
Atlantic Treaty established the North Atlantic Council (nac), the supreme 
1 nato, ‘2018 Annual Report of the nato Administrative Tribunal’, 5.
2 nato’s website has a section dedicated to the Administrative Tribunal (at). It provides basic 
information about the at as well as its judges, schedule of sessions, and its judgements. See 
nato, ‘nato Administrative Tribunal’, 14 June 2019.
3 The North Atlantic Treaty, Preamble.
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decision-making body of the Alliance on which all Allies are represented.4 The 
nac takes its decisions by consensus.
Below the nac are the civilian and military structures of the Alliance. The 
civilian structure was established by the 1951 Ottawa Agreement, which pro-
vides for the legal status of nato, and the formation of the International Staff, 
headed by the Secretary General.5 The International Staff supports the various 
civilian committees that carry out the preparatory work for decisions taken by 
the nac itself.6 The civilian side also includes a number of other civilian bod-
ies and agencies established by the nac, which share in the legal personality of 
nato, but are responsible for their own internal rules and finances. These in-
clude, for example, the nato Communications and Information Agency and 
the nato Support and Procurement Agency. Each of these entities in the civil-
ian structure is subject to nato’s internal personnel rules, the Civilian Person-
nel Regulations (cprs).7
The military command structure of nato also provides advice to the nac, 
but is very much a separate pillar from the civilian staff, and derives its legal 
status under the so-called Paris Protocol to the nato Status of Forces Agree-
ment.8 The Paris Protocol establishes the legal personality of the nato Su-
preme Commands—the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and the 
Allied Command Transformation—and provides for the establishment of 
their subordinate commands. On the military side, responsibility for the em-
ployment of the military staff remains with the Ally who contributes them. 
Therefore, this chapter focuses on the civilian side, who remain under the 
4 Ibid., art 9.
5 Ottawa Agreement.
6 ola operates as an independent office within the International Staff. ola’s primary role is to 
provide legal advice to the Secretary General of nato, the International Staff and, as appro-
priate, the nac and other nato bodies, on a very broad range of matters. In addition to advis-
ing on matters of public international law (such as international humanitarian law, treaty 
law and practice, privileges and immunities, and so on), it also advises on the interpretation 
of the nato legal texts, and the International Staff ’s internal rules and regulations. The two 
Military Commands and the various other nato civilian agencies each have their own office 
of legal advisers. ola works closely with these on questions engaging the responsibilities of 
the nac and the Secretary General. In terms of the role of ola in the dispute resolution 
process, the office cooperates with the relevant services at the decision stage to prepare le-
gally sound staffing decisions, and also provides advice during the internal review process. 
And in case of an appeal, ola defends the appeal on behalf of the Secretary General, both in 
writing and at formal hearings. But in addition, when an appeal concerns another nato 
Body, ola has the possibility to intervene in the case on its own initiative or to be invited to 
do so by the administrative tribunal, especially when the issue at stake could have conse-
quence of a nato-wide magnitude.




 purview of the 1951 Ottawa Agreement, and how employment is regulated and 
employment-related disputes are resolved.
3 Legal Framework for the nato Dispute Resolution System
This section describes the legal framework to nato’s 2013 reform of its employ-
ment dispute resolution processes. Current and past nato dispute resolution 
systems were created in accordance with the 1951 Ottawa Agreement that pro-
vides for nato’s legal status, and for its immunities from jurisdiction and exe-
cution before national jurisdictions, including domestic courts.9 Against this 
background, Article 24 of the 1951 Ottawa Agreement, which follows the model 
of Article 8 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations, states that the nac shall make provision for appropriate modes of set-
tlement of certain types of disputes, which include those between nato and 
civilian staff.10
Prior to the reforms sparked in mid-2013, Article 24 was implemented 
through the nato Appeals Board,11 yet over the years this institutional config-
uration came to be the subject of criticism. Created in 1965, the Appeals Board 
was the primary method of resolving employment disputes. In the early 2000s, 
scrutiny was placed on the adequacy of the Appeals Board as a modern dispute 
resolution mechanism, in light of evolving norms of human rights and stand-
ards of access to justice in nato’s member States. In particular, a number of 
cases were brought before national courts challenging the jurisdictional im-
munities of nato on the basis of the alleged incompatibility of the nato in-
ternal dispute resolution mechanism with Article 6 of the European Conven-
tion of Human Rights (echr), which provides for a right of due process.12 
Although nato would disagree in principle that its dispute resolution proce-
dures should be subject to the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) 
 substantive review, the ECtHR repeatedly found in such cases that the nato 
9 Ottawa Agreement.
10 Ibid., art 24.
11 Chapter xiv of the 1964 nato Civilian Personnel Regulations provided for the first itera-
tion of the nato Appeals Board. Such Appeals Board consisted of four individuals, in-
cluding: a Chairman; a representative of the Administration; a representative of the Staff 
Committee, a committee formed to protect the professional interests of members of the 
staff; and a member of the staff at the same grade as the appellant. The Appeals Board had 
15 days to give an opinion once a complaint was submitted by the appellant or head of 
nato body. Decisions made by the Appeals Board were final.
12 For example, ECtHR, Chapman v Belgium 2013.
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Appeals Board was of a sufficient standard under its Article 6 jurisprudence. 
For example, in the case of Gasparini v Italy and Belgium, from 2009, the ECtHR 
found that nato’s internal dispute resolution mechanism could not be found 
‘manifestly deficient’ specifically because a lack of publicity had not under-
mined procedural fairness and because the complainant had a mechanism to 
argue against partiality.13 Likewise, in the case of Chapman v Belgium, from 
2013, the ECtHR found that the nato Appeals Board was an effective internal 
procedure that afforded the appropriate protection to the complainant.14 The 
ECtHR reached similar conclusions with respect to the European Space Agen-
cy’s Tribunal in its 1999 judgments in the cases of Beer and Regan v Germany15 
and Waite and Kennedy v Germany.16
Despite the ECtHR judgments that the Appeals Board was indeed adequate, 
the nac decided, in 2011, to conduct a thorough review of the dispute resolu-
tion system with the aim of its modernization.17 It tasked an independent pan-
el of experts to assess the existing complaints and appeals system and make 
recommendations for its modernization in the light of organizational needs 
and contemporary standards of human rights and legal protections.
The panel of experts made a number of recommendations. These included 
an increased focus on the resolution of complaints earlier in the process before 
they escalate into formal disputes, and increased use of mediation and other 
forms of dispute resolution. To this end, the panel of experts endorsed the in-
troduction of an administrative review process, including at a senior level. The 
panel of experts then went on to suggest that the nato Appeals Board become 
an administrative tribunal with the rules governing its constitution and func-
tion to be reflective of its judicial character, its independence and its profes-
sionalism. With regard to the new administrative tribunal, the panel of experts 
recommended that it be given the possibility to award specific performance 
and other nonmonetary measures beyond mere rescission of decisions.
13 ECtHR, Gasparini v Italy and Belgium 2009.
14 ECtHR, Chapman v Belgium 2013.
15 ECtHR, Beer and Regan v Germany 1999, recognizing that the right of access to a court 
under Article 6 may be subject to a limitation so long as “limitations applied do not re-
strict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the 
very essence of the right is impaired” (para 49).
16 ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy v Germany 1999, recognizing that the right of access to a court 
under Article 6 may be subject to a limitation and that “the attribution of privileges and 
immunities to international organizations is an essential means of ensuring the proper 
functioning of such organizations free from unilateral interference by individual govern-
ments” (para 63).
17 nato, ‘nato Administrative Tribunal’, 14 June 2019.
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These recommendations were amongst those approved in the 2013 amend-
ments to nato’s internal personnel rules, the cprs. These amendments estab-
lished, with effect from 1 July 2013, the at that nato now utilizes. This was a 
major milestone in the internal nato reform process. It cemented the right of 
staff to have access to a full-fledged tribunal, both independent and impartial, 
to adjudicate appeals against decisions taken by nato and indicated the im-
portant role that a rule of law-compliant judicial review procedure should play 
in an international organization like nato.
4 Establishment of the Administrative Tribunal and New Rules since 
2013
Any administrative tribunal must be effectively organized and carefully struc-
tured to inspire a commitment to the rule of law within an organization and 
respond to the needs of its staff. nato’s revised system of dispute resolution 
was created to that end. This section considers how the revised system im-
proved upon the base of dispute resolution procedures established by the 
nato Appeals Board and notes an important emphasis on the revised system’s 
use of informal processes in tandem with the at.18
Structurally, the at is composed of five members of different nationalities, 
including a President, proposed by the Secretary General and appointed by the 
nac for a five-year term.19 The members of the at may be reappointed to one 
further term by the same procedure.20 The members of the at may not be 
members or former members of the staff or of the delegations to the nac, and 
are required to be completely independent in the exercise of their duties.21 The 
decisions of the at are taken by a panel of three judges or a full chamber of 
five.22 Further, it falls to the Secretary General to put in place the administra-
tive arrangements necessary for the functioning of the at, including designat-
ing a Registrar who, in the discharge of their duties in support of the at, is re-
sponsible only to the at.23 Finally, the at retains a critical level of independence 
18 nato, ‘2013 Annual Report of the nato Administrative Tribunal’.
19 ncpr, annex ix, arts 6.1.1–2.
20 Ibid., art 6.1.2(c).
21 Ibid., art 6.1.1.
22 Ibid., art 6.1.4.
23 Ibid., art 6.4.1.
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in terms of budget management, though expenses are ultimately borne by 
nato.24
After exhausting an internal review procedure,25 staff or former staff may 
appeal a decision taken by the Head of a nato body, such as the Secretary 
General, to the at.26 This can be done when staff members consider a decision 
to be affecting their conditions of work or service and when such a decision 
does not comply with the terms and conditions of their employment including 
their contracts or the internal personnel rules.27
The at is a valuable resource for staff complaint primarily because it is com-
petent to decide disputes and award remedies.28 Its decisions are final and 
binding on the parties, and not subject to any type of appeal, although there 
are limited procedures for clarification and correction.29 Available remedies 
include the annulment of a decision; the specific performance of an obligation 
(such as a pay increase, promotion, transfer or reinstatement of employment); 
and the payment of compensation.30
Importantly, the revised system is much more than the official procedures 
which characterize the operations of an administrative tribunal. The revised 
system also puts major emphasis on pre-litigation procedures, providing for a 
two-step administrative review,31 greater use of mediation,32 and an improved 
complaints procedure.33 The 2013 reform placed greater responsibilities on 
nato managers, and ultimately the Heads of the nato bodies, to address, and 
wherever possible, to resolve, issues instead of leaving them for resolution by 
the at through a contested legal proceeding.
In summary, the newly revised dispute resolution system is better equipped 
to help nato adapt to internal and external circumstances and to inspire or-
ganizational change. It does so primarily through the at, which was set up to 
respect human rights guaranteed to staff and former staff as evidenced by its 
impartial and independent structure and by an emphasis on pre-litigation 
procedures.
24 Ibid., art 6.4.2.
25 ncpr, ch xiv, art 61.
26 Ibid., art 62.1.
27 Ibid., art 61.
28 ncpr, annex ix, art 6.2.
29 Ibid., art 6.8.4(a).
30 Ibid., art 6.9.1.
31 Ibid., art 2.
32 Ibid., art 3.
33 Ibid., art 4.
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5 Impact on the Adaptiveness of nato
The creation of an administrative tribunal, together with an emphasis on in-
formal dispute resolution, more generally contributes to an international or-
ganization’s ability to adapt. It does so in the sense that it offers an interna-
tional organization legitimacy by presenting staff a forum to challenge changes 
and therefore provides an opportunity for an international organization to re-
ceive validation of changes made. Additionally, the creation of an administra-
tive tribunal supports adaptation in the sense that it promotes effectiveness by 
ensuring that an international organization adheres to its own rules, highlight-
ing areas for growth and evolution where needed.
nato’s ability to continually adapt has been central to its longevity and suc-
cess since the Alliance’s beginning. Indeed, nato’s defense and deterrence 
posture has had to continually shift over a wide variety of geopolitical environ-
ments, namely: from the Cold War years; to the 1990s unrest in the Western 
Balkans; to the transatlantic response to the 9/11 attacks; and, finally, to today’s 
challenging security environment headlined by new methods of warfare.34 Ad-
aptation is, in principle, a core principle in maintaining the defense and deter-
rence posture nato was founded upon.
This need to adapt, however, exists for internal procedures just as much as it 
does for the newsworthy external threats and political circumstances. Indeed, 
nato has the need to adjust its administrative and institutional organization 
according to developments of the law, culture and modernization. To this end, 
nato recently completed a functional review of its headquarters function in 
Brussels, in which nato reviewed how its headquarters works and where it 
may be able to change. This was done with the aim of streamlining decision-
making and increasing transparency.
The at plays a crucial role in such internal adaptation, not only where ac-
tual challenges are launched and the at opines on the lawfulness of changes 
introduced, but also as a spur to nato to ensure that employment decisions 
are taken consistently and on the basis of defined rules. One recent trend is 
toward more detailed guidance and policy definition on how decisions affect-
ing employees are taken, improving both transparency and consistency. The at 
has played an important role in encouraging this and in providing a certain 
degree of muscle to the arguments from in-house legal advisers advocating 
this sort of good practice.
Policymakers also benefit from the increasing body of jurisprudence gener-
ated by the at, providing important guidance to new employment policies as 
34 nato, ‘Strategic Concepts’, 12 June 2018.
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they are crafted. nato legal advisors similarly benefit from the wider body of 
jurisprudence generated from the administrative tribunals of other interna-
tional organizations. The at has cited both the Administrative Tribunal of the 
International Labour Organization and the Tribunal of the Council of Europe 
in its recent judgments. Notably, the nato internal civilian personnel regula-
tions specifically refer to the competence of the at to rule on the internal per-
sonnel regulations themselves in the event that a provision seriously violates a 
general principle of international civil service law.
Three recent cases brought before the at show the impact of the at’s judg-
ments on policymaking in nato, even in situations where there was no spe-
cific condemnation of nato processes or where nato’s management came 
out vindicated. In a case brought by a former medical adviser, who had sought 
the transformation of their contract into a permanent staff contract, the at 
concluded that it did not have competence to hear the case because the medi-
cal adviser’s contract contained a dispute resolution clause providing for arbi-
tration.35 Nonetheless, the case highlighted a lack of clarity and consistency in 
the drafting of similar contracts. This soon became the impetus for reform 
across all consultancy contracts.
In another case, the at ruled against a practice in nato of repeatedly pro-
viding temporary contracts, rather than offering a more long-term staff con-
tract.36 This then led to a full review of the chapter in the internal personnel 
rules on temporary staff. In a further case, the at ruled in favor of a staff mem-
ber’s claim for an allowance, notwithstanding that this was contrary to the ap-
plicable rules.37 The at did so on the basis of a previous example where man-
agement had allowed the allowance on an exceptional basis. Thus, the at 
found that management’s discretion was not to be unfettered in this regard, 
but must be exercised in a manner consistent with past decisions, or be over-
turned as discriminating between equivalent cases. The Organization has 
since taken this approach into account in its decision-making practices.
As exemplified in these cases, the administrative tribunal’s ruling may have 
an influence on nato regardless of whether or not nato’s defense was suc-
cessful. In the case of the former medical advisor, nato responded to the rul-
ing by reviewing how it contracts with consultants even though the at dis-
missed the case for lack of competence. Though nato may have been 
successful on procedural grounds, nato still recognized the need to change 
internal processes simply based on the issues raised by the case. Relatedly, the 
35 nato Administrative Tribunal, zs v nato International Staff 2015.
36 nato Administrative Tribunal, T v nato International Staff 2014.
37 nato Administrative Tribunal, ms v nato International Staff 2017.
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successful defense of policy in an administrative tribunal provides an opportu-
nity for nato to build legitimacy amongst the staff so long as the at is seen as 
a robust, independent arbitrator of issues. In these ways, the at plays an im-
portant role in the adaptability of nato and how adaptation is perceived by its 
staff.
Despite the benefits an administrative tribunal brings to an organization 
like nato, it is not without its risks. Namely, there is always the possibility that 
focus on a robust administrative tribunal at the expense of other aspects of an 
organization’s employment dispute resolution system leads to the creation of 
a litigation culture. This concern has yet to be realized at nato. While the ini-
tial volume of appeals were at a worrisome rate, the at’s workload has lately 
appeared to stabilize or even decline.38 This recent trend can, at least in part, 
be attributed to concerted measures to promote more informal forums or pro-
cesses for the resolution of disputes without recourse to litigation. At the same 
time, in common with all international organizations, nato needs to remain 
conscious of the risks of overreliance on formal dispute resolution procedures. 
Organizations risk a drift toward a culture of grievance and litigiousness unless 
they ensure that that vast majority of staff issues are addressed in a sensitive, 
transparent and effective way prior to the triggering of formal processes.
Noting this, nato is working hard to build up a myriad of ways to resolve 
disputes outside of the at. It is anticipated that the focus, in the near future, 
will remain on improving the processes by which staff concerns are raised and 
addressed earlier in the dispute resolution process. For example, the most re-
cent set of the changes to the internal personnel regulations introduced the 
possibility of mediation at all stages of the complaints process.39 Additionally, 
nato is also in the process of reviewing and revising its processes for dealing 
with inappropriate behavior in the workplace (notably including bullying and 
harassment), and is in the initial stages for considering the establishment of an 
ethics board. The exact parameters of such a board have yet to be conceived, 
but the very discussion signals an organizational desire to provide staff with 
accessible routes for addressing issues. Other ideas in the pipeline include po-
tentially establishing an Ombudsperson for administrative decisions, and also 
defining what role independent investigations might play within nato fol-
lowed by how and when these should be conducted.
For international organizations, ensuring access to justice for their staff is 
part of the corollary of an organization’s privileges and immunities. This is es-
pecially so because international organizations typically function outside the 
38 nato, ‘nato Administrative Tribunal Statistics 2013–2018’.
39 ncpr, annex ix, art 3; see also ncpr, ch xiv, art 61.
223The Effectiveness of the NATO in an Era of Adaptation
<UN>
purview of national judicial systems. An administrative tribunal, therefore, 
plays an important role in demonstrating an international organization’s com-
mitment to the rule of law and the upholding of individual rights. But the suc-
cess of any international organization comes down to the engagement and 
well-being of its staff, and this is driven much more by the confidence they feel 
that their concerns will be listened to and responded to by the international 
organization without recourse to formal process, than by the robustness of a 
final appeal.
The present work being done by nato on harassment supports this con-
cept. A harassment case that ends up before the administrative tribunal—
however the matter is determined—is already one with significant personal 
detriment to all those involved. Having the mechanisms in place to address 
such issues early, and in a way that has the confidence of staff, is the area that 
will have the largest impact on ensuring a positive and inclusive work culture 
within nato, and should be an area of key focus for the immediate future.
Clearly, not all disputes will be able to be resolved below this level. For in-
stance, increased life expectancy and related increases in medical costs are 
likely to continue to put pressure on budgets and the acquired rights of staff, 
and therefore require the at’s adjudication. Regardless, it is valuable for the 
staff to have multiple and tailored resolution procedures at their disposal, thus 
contributing to nato’s adaptation through organizational responsiveness and 
participation.
6 Conclusion
The at, and the dispute resolution process that sits beneath it, is essential to 
nato in supporting—and at times prompting—its effective adaptation, and 
as an expression of the adherence to the rule of law that underpins the Alli-
ance. As important as it is to get right the establishment and functioning of an 
employment administrative tribunal, it is only part of the story in establishing 
a system of dispute resolution that contributes to a happy and motivated staff, 
and it is this above all that drives any international organization’s successful 
adaptation.
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Chapter 12
Building an Administrative Tribunal of an 
International Financial Institution from Scratch: 
Lessons from the European Stability Mechanism
David Eatough*
Abstract
This chapter describes the background and decisions that lay behind the creation of 
the Administration Tribunal of the European Stability Mechanism (esm) in 2014. It 
explains the unusual options and policy choices that presented themselves, given that 
the esm was established as an international organization with its own treaty. The esm 
stands largely outside the European Union’s (EU) legal order, under public interna-
tional law, but operationally must be very closely coordinated with the competent EU 
institutions to ensure consistency with EU law. The chapter covers the procedural and 
resourcing issues the esm resolved with the help of the European Free Trade Associa-
tion, and its registry, to which the esm outsourced the forum for oral hearings and 
registry support. In addition, the chapter touches on the underlying philosophy and 
aspirations of the esm human resources and legal functions in the context of esm’s 
mandate and its desired relationship with a highly professional, expatriate staff. This 
chapter looks at the needs the esm sees for other means of dispute resolution for staff 
and how it is trying to meet these, possible avenues for case management before the 
relevant tribunal makes its final decision and the current ‘multi-forum’ situation of the 
jurisprudence which may adversely influence policy-making.
1 Introduction
The legal basis and operational context of the European Stability Mechanism 
(esm) are perhaps generally not well understood, even within Europe. The 
esm is often confused with the institutions of the European Union (EU), or the 
bilateral sovereign loan facility operated by the European Commission, the 
 European Financial Stability Mechanism. The situation is made even more 




confusing by the fact that the esm’s predecessor organization, the European 
Financial Stability Facility (efsf), is still in existence.1 The efsf is no longer 
able to lend money and cannot undertake new programmes but it is still a large 
presence in the international financial markets and continues to be governed 
as a separate and very different legal entity from the esm.
This chapter will first explain how the esm was formed and give some detail 
on its legal basis. In the context of addressing the formation of esm’s adminis-
trative tribunal, this is perhaps particularly important, as the esm is neither a 
body nor an agency of the EU, nor a multilateral development bank, nor even 
a fund like the International Monetary Fund (imf). Yet the esm is at the heart 
of the European Union—being arguably the first de facto institution to be 
formed by, and for, only those EU member States who participate in its cur-
rency union, the countries of the Euro area or ‘Eurozone’.
This chapter will rehearse very briefly the historical context for the esm’s 
formation (Section 2). Next, the interface that this has created—at least for the 
time  being—between the legal framework of the European Union on the one 
hand, and public international law as it affects other treaty-based internation-
al organizations, on the other, will be addressed (Section 3). This will be fol-
lowed by the choices the esm made, and the decisions taken in that context, 
regarding the establishment of the esm Administrative Tribunal, its Statute 
and its Rules of Procedure (Section 4). As a past practitioner of national em-
ployment law in the United Kingdom (UK), the author will also offer some 
observations, from their viewpoint as a relative outsider, on getting to grips 
with the law of the international civil service as the General Counsel of the 
esm and the efsf (Section 5).
2 The History and the Legal Framework of the esm
The sub-prime crisis in the United States in 2008 came immediately before the 
European financial crisis and there was a European conviction that this was a 
problem firmly ‘Made in America’.2 However, whatever the truth of that, by 
2010 Europe had its own, undeniably home-grown, financial meltdown. Some 
countries lost market access completely or looked likely to do so, even though 
they were full EU and Euro area members. The financial markets started spec-
ulating that the European currency union could not survive without some of 
its weaker members leaving and reinstating their own national currencies.3
1 esm, ‘efsf: An Active Issuer’.
2 Cossu-Beaumont and others 2015, 179.
3 Dabrowski 2019, 131.
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So, the efsf was set up as a ‘temporary’ firewall in June 2010. From a design 
point of view it was a far cry from an international organization made by trea-
ty. Instead, it was an ‘off the shelf ’ special purpose vehicle, formed under Lux-
embourgish company law, with very limited capital, and a staff of seven. All the 
same rights and obligations rested upon its directors and employees as in any 
other private company in that country. There were no privileges and immuni-
ties. It then borrowed in huge size on the international capital markets under 
sovereign guarantees provided by its shareholders, the Euro area member 
states. This money was the cash that formed the funds made available for simi-
larly large loans to those countries that required this ‘backstop’ facility. The 
efsf still exists as a legal entity today and continues to be a big issuer of bonds, 
but it can no longer make new loans.4
Then, in 2011, the esm was planned as the successor to the efsf. However, 
the finance ministers of the Euro area decided that it was impossible to estab-
lish the esm under the EU treaties.5 There was simply no time. Quite apart 
from the preparation, negotiation and drafting, the required treaty revisions 
would have led to referendums in some countries. The esm therefore was es-
tablished under its own treaty, as an independent international organization, 
much like the imf. A link was added to the EU legal framework by the addition 
of a new sub-paragraph (3) to Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (tfeu).6 This states that the countries of the Euro area 
are free to set up their own stability mechanism, to be activated if indispensa-
ble to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. It is a permanent solu-
tion for a problem that arose early in the sovereign debt crisis: the lack of a 
backstop for Euro area countries no longer able to tap the markets. The efsf 
and esm remain separate legal entities but share staff, facilities, and opera-
tions. Together, the efsf and the esm have a €1,000 billion balance sheet,7 and 
have disbursed €295 billion to five Euro area member states.8
There is a significant EU tradition of initial intergovernmental arrange-
ments being a transition state towards integration within the EU legal frame-
work. Examples are Schengen,9 the Prüm Convention,10 and the Social Policy 
4 esm, ‘efsf: An Active Issuer’.
5 esm, Safeguarding the Euro in Times of Crisis 2019, 134 and 135.
6 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art 136 (3).
7 esm, ‘Financial Report’; efsf, ‘Financial Statements’, 11.
8 esm, ‘Facts’.
9 Schengen Agreement (incorporated into EU law by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999).
10 Prüm Convention (partially incorporated into EU law in 2008).
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Agreement.11 These all started life as treaties or agreements outside the EU le-
gal framework and all have now been brought wholly or partially within it. 
Another such transitional example, signed in the same year as the esm Treaty 
in 2012, is the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (tscg).12 The tscg was established as an interna-
tional treaty, binding all EU member states barring Croatia, the Czech Repub-
lic and the UK. Accession by Croatia and Czech Republic is pending. The UK 
took the decision in 2012 not to accede. The tscg is intended to strengthen the 
‘economic pillar’ of the economic and monetary union, according to its own 
Article 1, and was established after the financial crisis. It aims, among other 
things, to foster stricter fiscal discipline and enhance economic policy coordi-
nation. Although it is a separate treaty, the tscg establishes strong links and 
makes many references to EU law and EU entities, as well as to the esm. By 
acceding to the tscg, Euro area member states have taken on obligations that 
extend beyond their obligations under the present EU Treaties. The tscg itself 
foresees, by Article 16, that its substance will become part of the EU legal 
framework.
We should therefore see the esm in its proper evolutionary legal context. 
The esm’s Managing Director has stated on many occasions that they fully ex-
pect the esm to become part of the EU legal order in due course and with its 
own enabling amendments to EU primary law.13
3 The Choice of the Employment Law System for the esm
So, how does this affect the esm regarding its employment law system and 
means of redress for esm staff? There are, of course, three well-recognized sys-
tems or ‘families’ of international civil service rules. These are the UN Com-
mon System; the Civil Service System of the EU; and the Civil Service System 
of the Coordinated Organizations. Then there is perhaps a fourth category into 
which, by default, the esm falls. This family is what Gerhard Ulrich has de-
scribed as the ‘Mixed (hybrid) civil service system’.14 None of us, however, 
11 Agreement on Social Policy (which went back to the Joint Agreement of the Social Part-
ners of 31 October 1991, was annexed to Social Policy Protocol of the Treaty of Maastricht 
1992 and became a revised Social Chapter of the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
1997).
12 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union.
13 Regling, 30 September 2019.
14 Ullrich 2019, 45.
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 operates in a vacuum, and, as Ulrich points out, within this quite disparate 
group of mostly smaller international organizations, there are discernible 
blocks which have similar staff regulations driven by the functional similarity 
of their work and mission. As is also apparent from Schermers and Blokker’s 
extensive comparative work set out in their ‘International Institutional Law’, 
there is some “unity within diversity” and indeed, as those authors also say in 
that work, and notwithstanding the title of this chapter, there is actually no 
such thing for a new international organization as truly ‘starting from scratch’.15 
One of the things which Ulrich says in his book is that he hopes that it will 
contribute to the development of more unity, in this family of civil service 
rules.16 This would be particularly beneficial when it comes to the jurispru-
dence created by our various tribunals and this point will be addressed later.
3.1 The Incompatibility of the Existing Civil Service Tribunals with the 
esm
The first decision point for the esm in establishing a dispute resolution mecha-
nism for its staff was whether to ask one of the tribunals for an existing system 
of civil service law to take jurisdiction. Given the esm’s location, mission, and 
shareholders, could it ask this of the Civil Service Tribunal of the EU? In for-
mulating the first version of its staff rules, the esm was necessarily outside the 
EU Staff Regulations itself, and indeed, it made a virtue of that necessity in a 
number of ways. One of the most relevant and important in the present con-
text is esm’s ability to hire staff from anywhere in the world rather than being 
restricted to nationals of its member States.17 Nevertheless, the esm consid-
ered that it would be natural to ask the Civil Service Tribunal of the EU (as it 
then was) to take jurisdiction over its staff cases. This was also certainly the 
view of several of the member States.
The legal basis of the competence of the EU Civil Service Tribunal (which 
has recently been subsumed into the General Court) is Article 270 of the tfeu 
which states that “[t]he Court of Justice of the European Union shall have ju-
risdiction in any dispute between the Union and its servants within the limits 
and under the conditions laid down in the Staff Regulations[…]”.18 The esm 
does not fit into this provision. Indeed, the Commission wrote the esm in 2014 
to say that there was simply no precedent for an attribution of competence to 
the EU Courts for disputes concerning the staff of an international  organization 
15 Schermers and Blokker 2018, 47.
16 Ullrich 2019, 45.
17 esm, Safeguarding the Euro in Times of Crisis 2019, 183.
18 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art 270.
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like the esm. The esm suggested concluding an agreement with the EU itself 
for access to the court for its staff, but the Commission pointed to the ‘closed’ 
categories of possible agreements with international organizations or third 
countries contemplated in Article 216 of the tfeu. This states that the EU may 
conclude an agreement with international organizations where the EU Trea-
ties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order 
to achieve, within the framework of the Union’s policies, one of the objectives 
referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is 
likely to affect common rules or alter their scope. Again, the Commission view 
was clear that this excluded such an agreement with the esm. The other pos-
sibility was the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organiza-
tion (the iloat), but this was ruled out on the grounds that, at the time at 
least, it appeared to be already overburdened with pending cases and the 
esm’s staff regulations were too different in character from those with which it 
was familiar.
3.2 The Establishment of the esm Administrative Tribunal
The incompatibility of any existing civil service tribunal left the esm with the 
necessity of creating its own. Quite apart from it being the right thing to do, not 
having an independent administrative tribunal at all would, of course, have 
exposed the ESM to the possibility of national courts taking jurisdiction, itself 
a threat to our privileges and immunities, in view of Article 6(1) of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (echr). This states that “in the determina-
tion of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law”. In the key judgment 
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the 1999 case of Waite and 
Kennedy v Germany, the ECtHR recalled that the rights set out under  Article 6(1) 
of the echr are not absolute, but could be subject to limitations. The Court 
said that it must be satisfied that any such limitations did not restrict or reduce 
the access left to the individual in such a way, or to such an extent, that the 
“very essence” of the “right to a court” was impaired.19
Furthermore, any limitation would not be compatible with Article 6(1) if it 
did not pursue a legitimate aim and if there were not a “reasonable relation-
ship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
achieved”.20 The ECtHR’s key finding for present purposes is that, a “material 
factor” in determining whether granting the European Space Agency  immunity 
19 ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy 1999, para 59.
20 Ibid, para 59.
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from the jurisdiction of German courts was permissible under the Convention 
was “whether the applicants had available to them reasonable alternative 
means to protect effectively their rights under the Convention”.21 In Stichting 
Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v The Netherlands, the ECtHR stepped back 
from the automatic contingency between jurisdictional and alternative means 
by ruling that “no such alternative means existed either under Netherlands na-
tional law or under the law of the United Nations. It does not follow, however, 
that in the absence of an alternative remedy the recognition of immunity is 
ipso facto constitutive of a violation of the right of access to a court”.22
The task therefore faced was how to build such a reasonable alternative 
means to protect the rights of staff while remaining within very tight budget 
constraints and being proportional to the esm’s small size. A dedicated esm 
staff tribunal implied significant initial and ongoing costs, plus the issue of 
providing for a forum for hearings and securing administrative support for the 
handling of the pleadings and court documents. The esm was designed as an 
organization which could be scaled up or down easily. Many staff were, and 
still are, recruited on fixed term contracts and many fully expect to go back to 
their career elsewhere, usually in their home country, after a spell with the esm 
in Luxembourg. But apart from this, the key to scalability in the operational 
design was that a high proportion of the esm’s internal functions were out-
sourced. The same logic was therefore applied to the formation of the esm’s 
very own administrative tribunal (the esmat).
Once its decision-making bodies had settled on this option of an adminis-
trative tribunal purely for esm staff cases, sceptical questions were asked in 
the European Parliament. One particular Member of the European Parliament 
(mep) went so far as to say that a tribunal for just 100 people (the esm’s total 
staff at the time) was “contrary to the principle of good administration and the 
appropriate use of public finances”.23 Other meps seemed to agree that it was 
“manifestly disproportionate”.24 The consensus seemed to be that instead of 
establishing its own tribunal, the esm could have used the Civil Service Tribu-
nal of the EU as the obvious and efficient solution. Yet, what meps missed, at 
least at first, (aside from permission to adhere to the EU Civil Service Tribunal 
had already been refused) was that this was to be conceived as an efficient 
procurement exercise. Experienced judges responded to public tendering and 
jurists were selected according to rigorous standards overseen by a panel which 
21 Ibid, para 68.
22 ECtHR, Stitching Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v The Netherlands 2012, para 164.




included an external member appointed by the chair of the esm’s Board of 
Governors.25 The esmat was duly formed of very high quality and experienced 
judges.26 Yet, crucially, there are very few fixed costs associated with this tribu-
nal. Each member of the panel only receives a predetermined, fixed sum, by 
way of remuneration for each case concluded and on which they sit, together 
with their reasonable expenses. Accordingly, the costs for the esmat are large-
ly proportionate to the number of cases with which it must deal. Finally, Arti-
cle 17 of the esmat Statute provides that should access to the Court of Justice 
of the EU be granted, the esmat will be wound up.27
4 The Infrastructure and Case Management of the esm 
Administrative Tribunal
A further innovation concerned the esmat’s infrastructure, its registrar sup-
port and its physical forum for oral hearings. Rather than invest significant 
time and money in providing a space for hearings and staff and an it system 
capable of receiving and dealing with the filing of pleadings, esm outsourced 
this. The provider of all these service to the esm is the Court of Justice of the 
European Free Trade Association States (the efta Court). After a period of 
intense and highly constructive negotiation and cooperation, principally with 
the Registrar of the efta Court at the time, Gunnar Selvik, the esm signed a 
comprehensive Memorandum of Understanding with the efta Court in De-
cember 2014.28 Importantly, the Registrar role itself is not performed by the 
efta Registrar. That responsibility stays with the esmat, but all the services 
required by the registrar function are fulfilled by the efta court using its own 
resources and staff. Financial compensation, in a fixed amount, was agreed at 
a very fair and proportionate level and, again, is entirely dependent, after the 
set-up costs, on the occurrence of actual cases. Perhaps the lesson to be drawn 
from this, is that necessity is the mother of invention.
In terms of the esmat’s Statute and Rules of Procedure themselves, there 
are three notable experiences in the context of the esm’s aim of efficiency and 
flexibility.29 Firstly, although the Statute of the esm was necessarily drafted as 
an internal legal department exercise at the start, the esm involved the full 
25 Ibid.
26 esm, ‘Composition of the Tribunal’.
27 esmat Statute, art 17.
28 efta Court, 18 December 2014.
29 Statute of esmat; Rules of Procedure of esmat.
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tribunal in the formulation of the Rules of Procedure and in a complete over-
haul of the Statute. This was a very valuable exercise in obtaining exposure to 
practice elsewhere. In addition, the judges had their own firm views. These 
included ensuring high standards for access to justice by staff, the timelines 
involved for filing an appeal, for rendering a judgement, and many others. They 
very much took the part of the potential litigant in this respect. The esm was 
also able to test the procedures by filing an appeal and running through all the 
administrative actions in a full dry run. Second, the esm principle of flexibility 
continued to apply so that more could be added later, if necessary, without try-
ing to second-guess every possible scenario at the outset. Article 28 of the es-
mat Rules of Procedure states that the full tribunal can decide to direct pro-
ceedings as they see fit, where nothing is otherwise specifically provided for, 
and gives very broad guidance on what this could include. Third, encourage-
ment was provided to conclude proceedings quickly, yet always mindful of the 
Waite and Kennedy v Germany requirement for proportionality.30 This included 
a reference in the Statute to the esm’s mandate and mission, its limited re-
sources and the imperative need to provide time critical interventions. An ex-
plicit provision was also included in Article 8(6) to the effect that, unless justi-
fied by exceptional circumstances, the tribunal must conclude any appeal 
within a period of six months following the day it has been validly lodged.
5 Conclusion
By way of conclusion, there are some things which are very noticeable to the 
author as a practitioner from a common-law, national jurisdiction. Some of 
these are perhaps inevitable, and go with the territory, and include a certain 
amount of simplification and slimming down of the options and rules of pro-
cedure available in a fully-fledged national system of law. Yet, as regards some 
others, could these be improved upon? Three such observations follow.
The number of important tribunals is not trivial. Each has its own jurispru-
dence and, of course, this is to a large extent specific to the civil service system 
or family to which it belongs. Yet, for a risk averse institution, as international 
organizations tend to be, there is perhaps a multiplication effect of the tribu-
nal decisions that frighten hr departments and decision-makers in our institu-
tions. The reality is that you can often find a tribunal decision which supports 
‘worst case scenario’ thinking as regards a potential staff dispute, whether this 
is when such a dispute is actually in prospect, or when drafting polices and 
30 ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy v Germany v Germany 1999, para 59.
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rules, at least where the law is perhaps not so clear. It may be that they can be 
distinguished one from the other by lawyers with the relevant knowledge and 
experience. Nevertheless, the author’s experience is that there remains a ten-
dency arising from this situation that the policy direction becomes more risk 
averse than is really warranted, or than is in the interests of the institution. 
Solutions to this are not so obvious, but the more one can support and encour-
age ‘unity within diversity’ in this crucial aspect the better.31
Second, the management of cases and the narrowing down of the issues in 
dispute in very busy courts, at least in the author’s jurisdiction of practice, have 
been the subject of intense scrutiny and focus in order to improve efficiency. 
Perhaps one of the leading examples of this, in terms of practical outcomes, is 
the Commercial Court in London. As one senior practitioner and judge recent-
ly put it, “it is not necessarily that it is difficult to make a decision, it is that it is 
often difficult to work out what needs to be decided—so that is where there is 
a lot of emphasis”. The Commercial Court insists on at least one ‘Case Manage-
ment Conference’, a ‘List of Issues’ and an agreed ‘Case Summary’, with a maxi-
mum limit on the length of this last document.32 The focus is on disclosure and 
the key facts in order to produce a crystal clear picture on which the parties 
can agree and which then provides the judges with the matters requiring their 
decision—and only those matters.33 Of course, one must be mindful of the 
context of an administrative tribunal, which does not always lend itself to this 
ultimate degree of case management—especially where the complainant is 
not represented. Nevertheless, some of these techniques are surely useful. The 
field of international administrative law certainly does yield one recent exam-
ple of ‘preventive’ or ‘determinative’ and pro-active dispute resolution in per-
haps a similar vein or spirit. This is the decision of the Asian Development 
Bank’s (adb) Administrative Tribunal in 2018 in relation to a broad revision of 
the adb’s compensation and benefits package which included changes to the 
education allowances for dependent children of certain of its staff.34 The nota-
ble feature in this context is not so much the result but the process. The deci-
sion was made after the adb and staff cooperated in order to agree a direct 
application to the tribunal on behalf of (initially) 106 staff members on a 
 tightly defined series of facts and legal issues. The process seems to have been 
highly efficient and very much in the category of a collaborative effort to make 
31 Schermers and Blokker 2018, 23.
32 Business and Property Court 2019, 14–15.
33 For a flavour of some of these techniques, see ibid, 16–17.
34 adbat, Perrin et al. v adb (No. 3) 2018, paras 1–3.
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sure that the judges only had to decide on the questions, not on what those 
questions were.
The third observation relates to the tendency for Staff Regulations and Rules 
in international organizations to increase in length and complexity over time, 
driven very often by the desire of staff for more clarity in specific situations, on 
the one hand, and by the need to produce auditable paper trails and black-
letter regulatory support for managers in taking decisions. Unfortunately, these 
completely understandable factors can result in an enormous rule book and a 
concomitant loss of perspective on the underlying relationship between em-
ployer and employee. That relationship should be a joint enterprise, a means 
to an end, not an antagonistic relationship of legal position taking and con-
stant recourse to rival interpretations of the Staff Regulations and Rules. Hav-
ing said all that, it is, of course, inevitable that conflicts will arise. Having a 
toolkit available, which includes, but does not begin and end with, the formal 
tribunal, is therefore important. The esm is reviewing its internal procedures 
for preventing, resolving and adjudicating staff concerns and grievances and 
the institution has committed considerable resources to make sure that people 
management training and conflict coaching are both available and actually 
taken up by staff. This includes guest speaker workshops and diversity training. 
In addition, the esm has appointed an external mediation service which can 
be particularly useful for longer standing grievances that have not otherwise 
been amenable to an internally brokered solution. Of course, this is only rele-
vant to grievances which do not include breaches of the esm’s Code of 
Conduct.
Lastly, this gives rise to an aspiration, much easier to articulate than to exe-
cute, of course. Nevertheless, aspirations are important. They frame the esm’s 
policy making and drive its internal culture. The esm’s aspiration is to keep its 
rule book slim, to keep flexibility high, to minimise the need for litigation and 
to maintain a healthy relationship of mutual respect and tolerance with the 
esm’s amazing staff.
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Chapter 13
The Manager’s Duty to Resolve or Report 
Misconduct: The Example of the International 
Monetary Fund’s Retaliation Policy
Brian Patterson, Pheabe Morris and Brenda Costecalde Orpineda*
Abstract
This chapter examines the International Monetary Fund’s (imf) retaliation policy, 
which was substantially updated in February 2019 following an extensive benchmark-
ing exercise against similar policies at comparable international organizations. The 
chapter discusses the key elements and changes to the policy, with an emphasis on the 
manager’s special duty in preventing and resolving retaliation. It makes the case for 
the importance of this manager’s duty and other key elements of the imf’s updated 
retaliation policy, for the operation and integrity of the organization’s dispute resolu-
tion system.
1 Introduction
It is axiomatic that protecting employees from retaliation is good for them and 
their employer. Anti-retaliation programmes are especially important in safe-
guarding the rights of international civil servants, who are not protected under 
national laws, by ensuring access to and the integrity of their dispute resolu-
tion systems. An effective anti-retaliation program requires several comple-
mentary elements. To be sure, there must be clear and specific policies against 
retaliation. Legitimate systems are also needed for addressing reports of retali-
ation. Not least, leadership at senior levels is critical to drive an organizational 
* Brian Patterson, Assistant General Counsel, Legal Department of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), BPatterson@imf.org; Pheabe Morris, Senior Counsel, IMF Legal Department, 
PMorris@imf.org; Brenda Costecalde Orpineda, Consulting Counsel, IMF Legal Department, 
BCostecaldeOrpineda@imf.org. The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board or IMF Manage-
ment. The authors would like to thank Aliya Levinstein-Kossover for her valuable research 
and editorial support.
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culture of valuing and addressing employee concerns and preventing retalia-
tion for raising such concerns.
This chapter presents a case study based upon an update in 2019 to the re-
taliation policy at the International Monetary Fund (imf).1 It summarizes the 
rationale for the update, and the key issues that were addressed following an 
extensive benchmarking exercise. We then turn to one element of the imf’s 
policy that was not substantively changed but deserves further attention: the 
manager’s special role in preventing retaliation. Our thesis is that, as a core 
feature of their managerial role and a function of the duty of loyalty to their 
multilateral employer, managers have—or they ought to have—a special duty 
to resolve or report policy violations, including ethical violations. The recogni-
tion of this duty, and steps to make it effective, are important for an organiza-
tional culture that is committed to preventing retaliation.
2 Description of the imf Retaliation Policy and Key Aspects
The following section will describe the imf Retaliation Policy at the time of 
writing, and four key aspects of that policy: (i) definitions of retaliation and 
protected activities; (ii) the expedited review process to address complaints of 
retaliation; (iii) higher standards of proof; and (iv) the mandatory duty for 
managers to resolve or report any ethical concerns.
2.1 Genesis of the 2019 imf Retaliation Policy
The imf first adopted a stand-alone retaliation policy in May 2011. This policy 
was substantially updated on February 2019, following an extensive bench-
marking exercise that was conducted against policies in place at comparable 
international organizations (ios).2 In mid-2018, the imf Ethics Office formed a 
working group comprised of several offices of the Dispute Resolution System 
1 For background information on the rule of law at the imf within which this retaliation policy 
exists, see generally Liu 2019, 61–78.
2 Benchmarking exercise included seventeen international organizations: African Develop-
ment Bank (AfDB) Group; Asian Development Bank (adb); European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (ebrd); Inter-American Development Bank (idb); International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (ifad); International Labour Organization’s (ilo) Inter-
national Labour Office; International Telecommunication Union (itu); Islamic Develop-
ment Bank (IsDB); Pan American Health Organization (paho); United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (unesco); United Nations Office for Project Services 
(unops); United Nations Fund for Population Activities (unfpa); United Nations Relief 
Work Agency (unrwa); United Nations Secretariat (UN Secretariat); World Health Organiza-
tion (who); World Intellectual Property Organization (wipo); World Meteorological Organi-
zation (wmo).
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(drs),3 and with the collaboration of the Legal Department and the Human 
Resources Department, to propose revisions to the retaliation policy.
The imf working group agreed in the context of its discussions that the pre-
vious imf retaliation policy lacked the detailed information on procedures 
found in most comparable organizations’ policies and that this might be a fac-
tor underlying the perceptions sometimes expressed by employees to drs Of-
ficers that use of the drs might lead to retaliation against them. It was agreed 
that such perceptions are incompatible with an effective dispute resolution 
system.
As a result of the imf’s review of its retaliation policy, the framework 
through which retaliation concerns are addressed was strengthened in four 
key aspects, notably by (i) introducing a clear and broad definition of retalia-
tion and the protected activities to which it relates; (ii) establishing a frame-
work that includes an expedited review process by the imf Office of Internal 
Investigations (oii) to address complaints of retaliation; (iii) establishing 
higher standards of proof when responding to retaliation allegations and 
(iv) retaining a mandatory duty for managers to resolve or report any ethical 
concerns. Each of these key aspects will be explored in the sections below.
2.2 Definitions of Retaliation and Protected Activity
The new imf retaliation policy4 introduced comprehensive definitions of re-
taliation and protected activity with the aim of ensuring that any employee 
raising a retaliation concern receives the full protection of the policy.5 Under 
the new imf retaliation policy, retaliation is “any direct or indirect adverse ac-
tion recommended, threatened, or taken because an individual engaged in a 
protected activity”. These adverse actions include, without limitation, termina-
tion of employment, demotion or denial of opportunities for promotion, det-
rimental reassignment or transfer, unfavorable performance evaluations, re-
moval from a team or project, withholding of funding or other resources for a 
work project and withdrawing delegated authority.
The imf’s policy defines protected activities more broadly than the policies 
of most other ios. In the imf’s review of its retaliation policy, it was ob-
served that for many ios their anti-retaliation measures only protect ‘whistle-
blowing’ activities. Whistleblowing is generally understood as the “disclosure 
3 In addition to the Ethics Office, the drs Offices at the imf are the Ombudsperson, the 
 Mediation Office, the Office of Internal Investigations, the Grievance Committee and the 
Registrar of the Administrative Tribunal.
4 imf Staff Handbook, Annex 11.01.6: Retaliation Policy (imf Retaliation Policy), paras 2.1–2.2.
5 The policy defines ‘employee’ broadly to include staff members, contractual employees, in-
terns and volunteers. Ibid, para 1.1.
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of  information related to corrupt, illegal, fraudulent or hazardous activities 
[…] to individuals or entities believed to be able to effect action”.6
The imf’s definition of a protected activity is broader as it includes not only 
whistleblowing, but also other specified activities done in good faith: using the 
imf dispute resolution mechanisms; participating in any type of related pro-
ceeding as a witness; assisting another employee in using those channels; or 
cooperating in proceedings led by the Office of Internal Audit or the Independ-
ent Evaluation Office.7 It was considered vital to the effective functioning of 
the drs that all employees should feel confident that they will not experience 
retaliation for participating in the drs in any capacity. Moreover, because re-
taliation can suppress the reporting and resolution of all other substantive 
claims (for example, harassment), it was determined that allegations of retali-
ation should be given heightened scrutiny and expeditiously addressed.
2.3 Expedited Review Process to Address Retaliation Complaints
In the new retaliation policy, the process for correcting the consequences of 
retaliation is clarified. Moreover, the timeframe for conducting the review of 
any retaliation allegation was shortened in line with procedures adopted by 
several other international organizations.8 Under the new retaliation policy, a 
retaliation allegation filed within six months of the allegedly retaliatory action 
is undertaken by oii against a 45-day timeline. This change was instituted for 
the purpose of ensuring that timely remedial action would be implemented if 
retaliation has occurred.
Furthermore, in accordance with best practice for whistleblower protection 
rights to guarantee comprehensive relief when a whistleblower prevails, the 
new process provides: (i) whether interim protective measures should be rec-
ommended to protect the staff member; and (ii) whether there has been a re-
taliatory action that should be invalidated. It is worth noting that this process 
6 Transparency International, 5 November 2013, 4.
7 imf Retaliation Policy, para 1.1.
8 See, for examples, other ios’ retaliation policies providing for an expedited review: ifad 
Whistleblower Protection Procedures, section ‘Reporting retaliation’ (ii)(b) (‘Normally with-
in 45 days of formal acknowledgement of the complaint, the Ethics Office shall provide the 
complainant with an indication of the expected period of time it considers reasonable and 
necessary to undertake the review and shall seek to complete such a review normally within 
90 days of the acknowledgement’); ilo Whistleblower Protection Policy, para 9 (‘The Ethics 
Office shall complete the preliminary review within 45 working days of the date of receipt of 
the complainant of retaliation’), note that ilo has since issued a new version of this rule in 
November 2019; unesco Whistleblower Protection Policy, para 19 (‘The Ethics Office will 
seek to complete its preliminary review within 45 days of receiving the complaint of 
retaliation’).
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is separate from any related misconduct investigation that may follow to estab-
lish the personal accountability of an employee who has engaged in retalia-
tion. Any related misconduct investigation is handled in accordance with the 
Fund’s general rules on misconduct.
2.4 Higher Standards of Proof
The imf retaliation policy was also amended to reflect best practices in terms 
of the standards of proof that apply to the initial review of allegations of retali-
ation. While the standard of review in the disciplinary context has not changed, 
there is a change in the context of the initial expedited review by oii to deter-
mine if corrective measures are needed.
2.4.1 Reversed Burden of Proof
In the context of the initial expedited review by oii, the new policy places the 
burden of proof on the imf, consistent with the importance the organization 
places on considering immediate interim corrective measures. This change is 
also aligned with the recognized practice in the administrative resolution of 
retaliation cases implemented by comparable international organizations. For 
example, the African Development Bank (AfDB) Group, the Asian Develop-
ment Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (idb), the United Nations 
Office for Project Services and others have followed this standard.9
9 See, for examples, other ios’ retaliation policies where the burden of proof rests with the 
organization: AfDB Group Whistleblowing and Complaints Handling Policy, para 6.6.7 
(‘Where Bank Personnel can show evidence that prior to the alleged Retaliation, the Bank 
Personnel had reported or was in the process of reporting an instance of Fraud, Corrup-
tion or any other Misconduct to the Hotline, Auditor General or the Division, or pursuant 
to any other reporting mechanism provided under this Policy, such Bank Personnel shall 
be deemed to have satisfied the minimal burden of proof. The burden of proof shall then 
shift to the Bank to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the action taken by the 
Bank against such Bank Personnel was for separate and legitimate reasons, and not in 
reprisal or Retaliation for the malpractice reported by the Bank Personnel’); adb Whistle-
blower and Witness Protection Policy, para 6.5 (‘If oai determines that there has been 
Retaliation against a staff for having report a suspected Integrity Violation or Misconduct 
or for having cooperated with an oai investigation and that the Staff ’s action related to 
the investigation was a contributory factor in the Retaliation, the burden of proof will 
shift to adb to show by clear and convincing evidence that the same action would have 
been taken in the absence of the Staff ’s report or cooperation’); idb Whistleblower Re-
porting and Protection Policy, para 13 ‘Where an employee has made a prima facie case of 
Retaliation for having acted as a Whistleblower (i.e., by showing that s/he is a Whistle-
blower, as defined herein, and that s/he has a reasonable belief that his/her having acted 
as a Whistleblower was a factor in a subsequent adverse employment action, the burden 
of proof would then shift to the Bank to show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
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Under the new imf retaliation policy, when a staff member complains of 
alleged retaliation, the organization bears the burden to demonstrate that the 
same adverse action would have been taken for separate and legitimate rea-
sons.10 This reversed burden of proof standard makes good practical sense in 
several ways: (i) it calls the organization to account because the organization 
has far better access to evidence of the reasons for the action taken, since the 
evidence is inherently owned and held by the organization and (ii) the nega-
tive consequences of not effectively addressing retaliation—discouraging 
 employees from raising concerns and using the drs—are considered to out-
weigh the negative consequence of mistake in unwarranted reversal of an ad-
ministrative action based on an erroneous conclusion it was retaliatory and 
unjustified.
2.4.2 Standard of Proof: ‘Clear and Convincing Evidence’
In addition to reversing the burden, also a higher standard of proof by “clear 
and convincing evidence” was adopted for oii’s review of retaliation allega-
tions against the organization (as compared to the preponderance of evidence 
standard that applies in the disciplinary context at the imf).11 In accordance 
with the new imf retaliation policy,12 during the expedited review of a retalia-
tion allegation, oii will “consider whether there is clear and convincing evi-
dence” to support a finding “that the same employment action taken by the 
organization would have been taken, for separate and legitimate reasons, even 
in the absence of the complainant’s protected activity”. If the standard for clear 
and convincing evidence has not been met, then it will be concluded that re-
taliation has occurred, and a recommendation will be made to management 
for remedial action.
The new wording of the imf retaliation policy establishes that, when 
 reviewing retaliation allegations as opposed to investigating misconduct, 
oii  will assess evidence in a manner that is much more favorable to the 
same employment action would have been taken absent the Whistleblowing’); unops 
Protection Against Retaliation Policy, para 2.2 (‘The present oi is without prejudice to the 
legitimate application of regulations, rules and administrative procedures, including 
those governing evaluation of performance, non-extension or termination of appoint-
ment. However, the burden of proof shall rest with unops to demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action absent the protected activ-
ity […] or that the alleged retaliatory action was not taken for the purpose of punishing, 
intimidating or injuring the individual who engaged in the protected activity’).
10 imf Retaliation Policy, para 4.3.
11 imf Staff Handbook, ch 11.02, para 5.9.
12 imf Retaliation Policy, para 4.3.
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 complainant. When deciding a dispute over the imf’s response to retaliation 
allegations as opposed to disciplinary action, the imf Grievance Committee 
and Administrative Tribunal will apply their own standards of review. Because 
the imf Administrative Tribunal (imfat) has not yet had the occasion to ex-
amine retaliation cases under the new retaliation policy, there is no guidance 
available yet on its application of the Fund’s retaliation policy and of the 
standards of proof.
2.5 Mandatory Duty for Managers to Act upon, Resolve, and/or Report 
Ethical Concerns
During the review of the imf’s retaliation policy, a specific duty for managers 
to “to act upon, resolve, and/or to report ethical concerns” was retained.13 
While the whistleblower policies of all comparator international organizations 
benchmarked during this exercise have a duty to report misconduct, there is 
wide diversity in the scope of this duty. For example, the idb’s whistleblower 
policy mandates that, “Supervisors, as defined herein, have a duty to report any 
misconduct, including suspected misconduct reported to them by others”.14 
Other comparators have gone even further, placing a duty to report on all em-
ployees. This is the case with the United Nations Secretariat’s policy, which 
includes a “duty of staff members to report any breach of the Organization’s 
regulations and rules”.15 Comparable language can be found in the policy of 
the AfDB Group’s, which provides that, “Bank personnel are required to dis-
close acts related to fraud, corruption, or any other misconduct that come to 
their attention”.16 The imf appears to be unique in requiring its managers to 
both resolve and report wrongdoing. The mandatory duty for managers will be 
further examined below in Section 4.
3 The Purpose and Origins of the Manager’s Duty to Resolve or 
Report Misconduct
The following section will address: (i) the manager’s duties of care and loyalty; 
(ii) the manager’s duty to report and/or resolve and (iii) the legal force of the 
duty to report.
13 imf Staff Handbook, ch 11.01, s 11, para 11.4.
14 idb Whistleblower Reporting and Protection Policy, para 4.1 (emphasis added, capitaliza-
tion of terms omitted).
15 UN Secretariat Protection Against Retaliation Policy, para 1.1.
16 AfDB Group Whistleblowing and Complaints Handling Policy, para 4.1 (capitalization of 
terms omitted).
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3.1 The Manager’s Duties of Care and Loyalty
The duty of imf managers to resolve or report ethical concerns that come to 
their attention is grounded in the common law of agency, under which a paid 
agent is subject to the duty to act with care and to be loyal to the principal.17 
Similar duties of loyalty are implied into employment contracts in certain civil 
law jurisdictions as well.18 These duties encompass the corollary duty of an 
agent to disclose to the principal information that is relevant to the affairs en-
trusted to the agent.19 In the employment context, these duties are commonly 
invoked as prohibiting self-dealing by an employee, but they also require atten-
tive performance on the part of the employee.20
In the United States (US), for example, these duties have been applied to all 
employees, regardless of whether they play a managerial role.21 However, US 
courts are more likely to apply higher standards of care and loyalty to manag-
ers, and especially senior managers, officers and directors, who are in positions 
of trust and confidence.22 These duties are implied and do not need to be in-
cluded in written employment contracts. These duties also have an important 
practical basis. It is beneficial for the employer to require its managers to act in 
the employer’s interest in order to limit its liability because the acts of the 
managers may be attributed to the employer itself.23
3.2 The Manager’s Duty to Report and/or Resolve
The imf manager’s duty to resolve or report wrongdoing is in line with a well-
established expectation in various jurisdictions and fora that an employer 
should take reasonable steps to address or report certain misconduct. For ex-
ample, in the case of Mr. “F” v International Monetary Fund, the imf was held 
liable by the imfat when supervisors failed to take effective measures to deal 
17 American Law Institute (ali), Restatement (Second) of Agency 1957, ss 379 and 387.
18 Global Legal Group, March 2011, 76, 83 and 123.
19 ali, Restatement (Second) of Agency 1957, s 381.
20 See generally, Grebe 2002, 1815–1828.
21 Employees are agents of their employers and owe the traditional fiduciary duties of loy-
alty and performance (ali, Restatement (Third) of Agency 2006, s 7.07(3)(a); US District 
Court for the Middle District of Florida, Aquent llc v Mary Stapleton and Italent llc 
2014), 1348–1349.
22 See generally, Cavico and others 2018; US District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, ed Numeric Analytics, llc v McCabe 2016.
23 ali, Restatement (Second) of Agency 1957, s 219(1) (‘A master is subject to liability for the 
torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment’); US Su-
preme Court, Burlington Indus v Ellerth 1998, 759 (holding the employer vicariously liable 
for hostile environment created by a supervisor).
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with religious intolerance and harassment in a work unit.24 The manager’s 
duty to address wrongdoing was reiterated in the imfat case of Ms. “gg” 
(No. 2) v International Monetary Fund.25 Here, the Applicant’s complaint in-
cluded an allegation that the managers of her former department retaliated 
against her for reporting misconduct of another staff member. The Adminis-
trative Tribunal noted the special responsibilities of managers and 
“underscore[d] in particular the following propositions: unfair treatment may 
take the form of inaction as well as action; supervisors carry special responsi-
bilities to ensure fair treatment of staff members […]”.
Likewise, in the US, a key factor in establishing an employer’s liability for 
harassment claims by employees is whether the employer knew or should have 
known of the harassment but failed to take immediate and appropriate correc-
tive action.26 The US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (eeoc) is 
the agency that administers and enforces federal civil rights laws against work-
place discrimination. In published guidance to employers, the eeoc empha-
sizes the employer’s responsibility to take immediate and appropriate action:
Employers are encouraged to take appropriate steps to prevent and cor-
rect unlawful harassment. They should clearly communicate to employ-
ees that unwelcome harassing conduct will not be tolerated. They can do 
this by establishing an effective complaint or grievance process,  providing 
24 imfat, Mr. “F” v imf 2005, paras 98, 100 and 122.
25 imfat, Ms. “gg” (No. 2) v imf 2015, paras 192–195.
26 See, US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Lipsett v University of Puerto Rico 1988, 901 
(‘in a Title ix case, an educational institution is liable upon a finding of hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment perpetrated by its supervisors upon employees if an official rep-
resenting that institution knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known, 
of the harassment’s occurrence, unless that official can show that he or she took appropri-
ate steps to halt it’) (emphases added); US District Court for the Eastern District of Wis-
consin, Zabkowicz v West Bend Co. 1984 (Despite the plaintiff ’s numerous complaints, her 
supervisor took no remedial action other than to hold occasional meetings at which he 
reminded employees of the company’s policy against offensive conduct); US Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit, Katz v Dole 1983, 256 (holding employer liable for hostile en-
vironment sexual harassment under Title vii if the ‘employer knew or should have known 
of the harassment, and took no effectual action to correct the situation’); US Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Hunter v Allis-Chalmers Corp 1986, 1421 (holding employ-
er liable for hostile environment racial harassment under section 1981 if management 
level employees ‘knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, about the 
campaign of harassment’ and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent it).
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anti-harassment training to their managers and employees, and taking 
immediate and appropriate action when an employee complains.27
In advising employers how to appropriately handle harassment in the work-
place, the eeoc also recommends that the employer “require managers and 
other employees with human resources responsibilities to respond appropri-
ately to harassment or to report it to individuals who are authorized to 
respond”.28
3.3 The Legal Force of the Duty to Report
Although the imf’s retaliation policy as well as the whistleblower policies of 
several other ios set forth a duty to report, it is not apparent whether that duty 
is merely aspirational or intended to give rise to accountability on the part of 
responsible employees for breach of the duty. That ambiguity may be contrast-
ed with certain other imf policies, including the harassment policy, which 
makes clear that a manager’s failure to act as prescribed may be considered a 
performance matter or even misconduct.29
The failure to state in the policy that a breach of the duty to report may con-
stitute misconduct probably forecloses the use of disciplinary measures to 
hold employees accountable for breach of the duty. But a manager’s failure to 
report retaliation could still be dealt with as a performance matter. By specifi-
cally articulating the imf managers’ duty to resolve or report ethical concerns, 
in the imf’s retaliation policy, the imf has indicated the criticality of that duty 
to the retaliation context. Consistent with the implied duties of care and loy-
alty, it is reasonable to hold managers accountable through performance man-
agement for supporting the rule of law within the institution by resolving or 
reporting misconduct that drains resources and detracts from the imf’s 
mission.
In a 2017 report, the eeoc stressed that a commitment to an inclusive 
and respectful workplace is not in and of itself enough. Leadership must en-
sure accountability mechanisms are in place. The report recommends that 
27 US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (eeoc), ‘Harassment’ (emphasis 
added).
28 eeoc, ‘Tips for Small Businesses’.
29 imf Staff Handbook, Annex 11.01.2, para 5.2 (‘Failure by a manager to effectively address a 
situation of potential harassment of which he or she becomes aware can be seen by staff 
as condoning, or complicity therewith. It may also be considered a performance matter 
and noted in the manager’s annual performance review. An egregious failure to act, if es-
tablished following an investigation, may also amount to misconduct warranting discipli-
nary measures’.
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 employers make mid-level and front-line managers responsible for their part 
in monitoring and stopping harassment, “including through the use of metrics 
and performance reviews”.30 ios could consider broader use of metrics and 
performance reviews to add greater force to the duty to report retaliation.
4 Aspects of the Manager’s Duty to Resolve or Report Misconduct
The following section will address: (i) the proper subjects of the manager’s 
duty to resolve or report misconduct; (ii) the standard of evidence that triggers 
the duty; (iii) the action the manager is required to take; and (iv) who is re-
quired to act.
4.1 What are the Proper Subjects of a Manager’s Duty to Resolve or 
Report Misconduct?
While all the comparator international organizations benchmarked during the 
exercise to reform the imf’s retaliation policy have a duty to report miscon-
duct included in their whistleblower protection or retaliation policies, the sub-
ject of this duty is not always clear and varies across organizations. The imf’s 
retaliation policy requires imf managers to resolve or report “ethical concerns 
that come to their attention”.31 It is unclear whether the term ‘ethical concerns’ 
covers the more common and weighty concepts of ‘breach of rules’ and ‘mis-
conduct’ or is meant to require the reporting or resolution of even mere ‘con-
cerns’. Moreover, this language is sufficiently vague to cover all subject matters, 
including subjective perceptions of bullying and discriminatory behaviors in 
any context. Yet, this duty is found only in the imf’s retaliation policy, indicat-
ing perhaps that the duty to report and resolve is limited to ‘ethical concerns’ 
however defined, solely in connection with retaliation.
Several other international organizations’ whistleblower policies require re-
porting of suspicions of wrongdoing and breach of the rules, while still other 
organizations attempt to specify the precise wrongdoing to be reported, such 
as fraud or corruption.32 This specificity is also provided in other imf policies 
30 National Sexual Violence Resource Center (nsvrc), 20 October 2017, 8–9.
31 imf Staff Handbook, ch 11.01, s 11, para 11.4.
32 See, for examples, other ios’ description of reportable subjects: unesco Whistleblower 
Protection Policy, para 2 (‘All staff members have a duty to report any breach of the Or-
ganization’s regulations and rules to officials whose responsibility it is to take appropriate 
action’); who Whistleblowing and Protection Against Retaliation Policy, para 17 (‘who 
staff members have a duty to report suspicions of wrongdoing. Individuals who report 
such cases in good faith are entitled to protection against retaliation in accordance with 
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such as its harassment policy which requires the imf manager to address or 
report “complaints of harassment, or harassment of which they otherwise be-
come aware”.33
Where the universe of matters mentioned to be reported may be vague, 
managers arguably have an implicit duty to resolve or report anything and eve-
rything within their ambit that could harm the employer. Such a broad and 
persistent duty may be impractical, and risks diluting the duty to report or re-
solve. Moreover, the consistent performance by managers of such a broad and 
persistent duty could impact staff morale by creating an informant culture. 
This in turn could discourage employees from disclosing substantive miscon-
duct that could harm the institution and so undermine the purpose of the duty 
to report or resolve. It would appear then, that a manager’s duty to report 
the provisions of this policy’); adb Whistleblower and Witness Protection Policy, para 4.1 
(‘As provided in ao 2.02, Staff have the duty to report any suspected Integrity Violation or 
Misconduct to oai’); AfDB Group Whistleblowing and Complaints Handling Policy, 
para 4.1:
In line with the Code, Rules, and Code of Conduct, Bank Personnel are required to 
disclose acts related to Fraud, Corruption, or any other Misconduct that come to their 
attention. Similarly, in line with the Bank’s Good Governance policy, the Bank requires its 
Development Partners and Stakeholders to disclose acts of Fraud, Corruption and Mis-
conduct including such acts that involve Bank Personnel and/or Bank Projects as well as 
actions that undermine operations and mission of the Bank. The typical disclosures thus 
required of Bank Personnel and concerned Third Parties include, without limitation, the 
following:
4.1.1 Unlawful acts or orders requiring violation of a law, gross waste, mismanage-
ment, abuse of authority, substantial and specific dangers to public health or safety;
4.1.2 Failures to comply with statutory obligations in host countries, duty stations, or 
countries of assignment;
4.1.3 Fraud, which means any act or omission, including a misrepresentation, that 
knowingly and recklessly misleads, or attempts to mislead, a party to obtain financial or 
other benefit or to avoid an obligation;
4.1.4 Corruption, which means the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting, directly or 
indirectly, anything of value to influence improperly the actions of another party;
4.1.5 Misconduct, which means failure by Bank Personnel to observe the Bank’s rules 
of conduct or standards of behavior;
4.1.6 Coercive practices, which mean impairing or harming, or threatening to impair 
or harm, directly or indirectly, any party or the property of the party to influence improp-
erly the actions of a party;
4.1.7 Collusive practices, which mean an arrangement between two or more parties 
designed to achieve an improper purpose, including influencing improperly the actions 
of another party; and
4.1.8 Any other activity which undermines the Bank’s operations and mission.
33 imf Staff Handbook, Annex 11.01.2, para 5.2.
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should strike a balance by mandating the reporting or resolution of certain 
substantive kinds of wrongdoing only in order to be effective.
4.2 What Standard of Evidence Triggers the Duty?
The effectiveness of the manager’s duty to report or resolve rests in part on the 
standard of evidence that triggers the duty. On the one hand, requiring the 
manager to have firsthand knowledge or tangible evidence of a wrongdoing 
could have a cooling effect and discourage the manager from reporting or ad-
dressing a legitimate issue that may exists. On the other hand, if the standard 
of evidence is mere ‘suspicion’ or ‘ethical concerns that come to their atten-
tion’ the volume of matters reported could be excessive and detract resources 
from the more significant instances of wrongdoing.
As a practical matter, information concerning employee wrongdoing often 
comes to the attention of the manager as hearsay rather than from the man-
ager’s own observation or other direct evidence.34 As a rule, courts in common 
law countries typically exclude hearsay evidence because it is potentially unre-
liable and is not subject to cross-examination.35 As a result, there is a misun-
derstanding that any hearsay statement is inherently untrustworthy. In fact, 
many exceptions to the hearsay rule have developed over time in common law 
legal systems, in cases where the evidence is deemed sufficiently trustworthy.36 
By comparison, a less restrictive approach to hearsay evidence is generally 
taken by civil law legal systems, wherein hearsay is admissible in principle and 
its origins considered for purposes of attributing its probative weight.37 This 
tolerance of hearsay evidence may be attributed to the limited reliance on ju-
ries in civil law jurisdictions and a high confidence in the ability of profes-
sional judges to properly weigh any unreliable or inappropriate evidence.38 
Among international courts and tribunals as well, there is generally no prohi-
bition against hearsay evidence.39
In the context of a manager’s duty to resolve or report, hearsay evidence is 
not being used to make a final determination or convict a wrongdoer. Instead, 
34 Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘Hearsay’ as ‘testimony given by a witness who relates, not 
what he knows personally, but what others have told him, or what he has heard said by 
others’.
35 See generally, Evans 1974, 261–301; Donnelly 1956, 455–483.
36 For exceptions to the hearsay rule in US federal courts, see US Federal Rules of Evidence, 
rr 801–807.
37 See generally, Maffei 2012; Blumenthal 2001, 93–116.
38 Blumenthal 2001, 99.
39 iloat, Y. G. v fao 2009, consid 17; iloat, Italo Danilo Coitinho Fraquelli v unido 2001, 
consid 17(d); undt, Applicant v Secretary-General of the UN 2013, para 43.
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it provides information for the manager to further investigate and may lead to 
other relevant evidence. Furthermore, because determinations about the ve-
racity or credibility of the hearsay evidence can be made in due course, it 
would be premature to exclude hearsay evidence from the manager’s duty to 
report or resolve.
4.3 What Action is Required?
Under the imf’s retaliation policy, the imf manager is required to take action 
in connection with ethical concerns by acting upon, resolving or reporting (or 
a combination of all three) the matter. This includes basics such as asking for 
clarification and additional information to ensure that the question or con-
cern raised is fully understood, consulting as needed with superiors to address 
the issues raised, and following up as soon as possible with the employee who 
raised the concern.40
The imf manager’s two-fold duty appears to go further than the comparator 
international organizations reviewed during the imf’s benchmarking exercise. 
Where the organization specifically identifies the manager’s role in its whistle-
blower protection or retaliation policy, the requirement is to report only.41 
However, the requirement that the manager act or report misconduct is not 
uncommon in the private sector workplace.42 The duty to act in response to 
wrongdoing is also recognized by the imfat in the case of Ms. “gg” (No. 2) v 
International Monetary Fund, where the tribunal noted that the plaintiff ’s re-
porting of wrongdoing was consistent with a manager’s “special responsibility 
to ensure fair the treatment of staff members” and duty under the imf’s Dis-
crimination Policy to “create and maintain a supportive and encouraging work 
environment for all employees and take all reasonable actions necessary to 
prevent and address undesirable or inappropriate behavior”.43
It may be that organizations that require managers, as well as other employ-
ees, to report misconduct through established reporting mechanisms and hu-
man resource or ethics officials, have determined that such potentially sensi-
tive matters are best handled by trained professionals. However, this approach 
arguably disempowers the manager who is closer to the front line where the 
40 eeoc, ‘eeoc Enforcement Guidance’, 25 August 2016, pt v(B).
41 idb Whistleblower Reporting and Protection Policy, para 4.1.
42 See eeoc, ‘eeoc Enforcement Guidance’, 25 August 2016, pt v(B); and nsvrc, 20 October 
2017, 12, for recommendations by the eeoc that managers and supervisors be trained how 
to effectively respond to harassment and retaliation claims that they observe or that is 
reported to them, of which they have knowledge or information, or report the matter, 
even before it reaches a legally actionable level.
43 imfat, Ms. “gg” (No. 2) v imf 2015, paras 193 and 195.
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matter arose, and who may be more attuned to various imperatives that could 
facilitate informal resolution. Where the manager is empowered to act to ad-
dress a wrongdoing, it is critical that the manager be properly trained.44 In re-
solving or reporting the wrongdoing that has come to their attention, imf 
managers are also expected to be familiar with the retaliation and other rele-
vant policies, to be vigilant for signs of retaliation against the reporting em-
ployee and, subject to their own obligations to report the matter to the desig-
nated human resources or ethics officials, they are expected to handle the 
matter discreetly and maintain its confidentiality.
4.4 Who Must Act?
The whistleblower policies of many of the benchmarked ios contain broad 
obligations on all employees to report wrongdoing.45 The only action required 
of reporting employees under these policies is participation in investigations 
or dispute resolution processes as requested. The other international organiza-
tions that separately require managers to report do not also require them to act 
to resolve the matter, as does the imf. As noted above, the restriction of an 
employee or manager with knowledge of wrongdoing to reporting only, has the 
benefit of ensuring that potentially sensitive matters are properly handled by 
trained professionals.
The approach taken in the imf’s retaliation policy also values this benefit, 
as indicated by the manager’s ability to report the matter to human resource or 
ethics professionals at any point. It also seeks the advantage of an earlier reso-
lution provided by the managers’ ability to themselves address and resolve dis-
putes. In this regard, the managers are the first of three lines of defense in miti-
gating the risks of employee wrongdoing as they are positioned all across the 
44 See note 42, noting that the eeoc advises employers to allocate sufficient resources to 
train middle-management and first-line supervisors on how to respond effectively to har-
assment and retaliation complaints.
45 See, for examples, other ios’ retaliation policies containing an obligation on all employ-
ees to report wrongdoing: AfDB Group Whistleblowing and Complaints Handling Policy, 
para 4.1 (‘In line with the Code, Rules, and Code of Conduct, Bank Personnel are required 
to disclose acts related to Fraud, Corruption, or any other Misconduct that come to their 
attention […]’); adb Whistleblower and Witness Protection Policy, para 4.1 (‘As provided 
in ao 2.02, Staff have the duty to report any suspected Integrity Violation or Misconduct 
to oai’); UN Secretariat Protection Against Retaliation Policy, para 1.1 (‘It is the duty of 
staff members to report any breach of the Organization’s regulations and rules to the of-
ficials whose responsibility it is to take appropriate action. An individual who makes such 
a report in good faith has the right to be protected against retaliation’); who Whistle-
blowing and Protection Against Retaliation Policy, para 17 (‘who staff members have a 
duty to report suspicions of wrongdoing’).
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organization and well placed to serve this role.46 The second line of defense is 
the trained and experienced professionals administering the informal drs, in-
cluding the ombudsman and the investigator. The internal audit function and 
the Administrative Tribunal are the third line of defense. This risk model pro-
vides for mutually reinforcing roles within the organization, where each line 
looks at risk from its unique perspective and the work of each complements 
and reinforces that of the others.
5 Further Considerations for ios When Formulating a New or 
Improving an Existing Retaliation Policy
Each international organization has its own mission, structure and organiza-
tional culture. Inevitably, given the diversity of ios, organizations will resort to 
different approaches to an effective anti-retaliation program, and it is not the 
intention of this chapter to advocate for a single ‘best’ practice. There is a range 
of best practices.
Some best practice standards for formulating new and improving existing 
whistleblower protection, as a subset of retaliation policy, have been collected 
by Transparency International under a list of international recognized princi-
ples.47 There is a guiding principle for,
protected individuals and disclosures all employees and workers in the 
public and private sectors need: (i) accessible and reliable channels to re-
port wrongdoing; (ii) robust protection from all forms of retaliation and 
(iii) mechanisms for disclosures that promote reforms that correct legisla-
tive, policy or procedural inadequacies, and prevent future wrongdoing.48
In addition to this guiding principle, the following practices are identified by 
Transparency International: the employer should (i) ensure preservation of 
confidentiality (“the identity of the whistleblower may not be disclosed 
46 See generally, The Institute of Internal Auditors (iia), January 2013: ‘The Three Lines of 
Defense’ is an audit risk model that provides a coordinated approach to risk management 
by organizing the groups responsible for managing the organization’s risks and controls 
into three levels or ‘lines of defense’. While it does not map precisely to the imf anti- 
retaliation program, the model nonetheless provides a useful framework for identifying 
the roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders within the program.
47 Transparency International, 5 November 2013, 4.
48 Ibid.
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 without the individual’s explicit consent”); (ii) have the “burden of proof on 
the employer”; (iii) guarantee personal protection for whistleblowers “whose 
lives or safety are in jeopardy”; (iv) maintain “whistleblower regulations and 
procedures [that are] highly visible and understandable”; (v) ensure “timely 
and independent investigations of whistleblowers’ disclosures”; (vi) provide 
for a “full range of remedies [covering] all direct, indirect and future conse-
quences of any reprisals, with the aim to make the whistleblower whole” in-
cluding “interim and injunctive relief; attorney and mediation fees; transfer to 
a new department or supervisor; compensation for lost past, present and fu-
ture earnings and status; and compensation for pain and suffering” and (vii) 
develop and offer comprehensive whistleblower training “for public sector 
agencies and publicly traded corporations and their management and staff”.49
Another consideration for ios, as intergovernmental institutions, are the 
positions of its member States. For example, international financial institu-
tions know well that the US Treasury is required by law to instruct its Executive 
Directors of each institution that it is the policy of the US that each institution 
effectively implement and enforce policies and procedures which reflect best 
practices for the protection of whistleblowers from retaliation.50 Although this 
advocacy by the US was not the proximate cause of the imf’s own review of its 
retaliation policy, the US policy informed the process.
Among other things, the US Treasury advocates for “(i) protection against 
retaliation for internal and lawful public disclosure; (ii) legal burdens of proof, 
(iii) statutes of limitation for reporting retaliation, (iv) access to independent 
adjudicative bodies, including external arbitration; and (v) results that elimi-
nate the effects of proven retaliation”.51 With regard to the legal burdens of 
proof requirement, the US Treasury advocates for a ‘clear and convincing’ bur-
den on the organization. In particular, if the complainant sufficiently alleges 
that an adverse action occurred because of lawful whistleblowing, the organi-
zation must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken 
the same action for independent reasons regardless of the protected activity.
The US policy also requires access to independent adjudicative bodies. This 
with the aim of guaranteeing an independent due process. Also, the US policy 
calls for comprehensive relief when a whistleblower prevails; this is also re-
quired under the US law. Any retaliation policy should require that the effects 
of retaliation be eliminated (namely, that the retaliatory action and all its con-
sequences be invalidated). Another requirement under the US standard is that 
49 Ibid, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10.
50 Consolidated Appropriations Act (US), s 7029.
51 Ibid, s 7048(b).
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international financial institutions implement a best practice statute of limita-
tions for reporting retaliation. According to best practices for national and in-
ternational organizations whistleblower policies, six months is the minimum 
functional statute of limitations for whistleblowers to become aware of or act 
on their rights. Although, one-year statutes of limitations are consistent with 
common law rights and may be preferable.
6 Conclusion
An effective anti-retaliation program is crucial for protecting the rights of in-
ternational civil servants and the operation and integrity of the international 
organization’s dispute resolution system. In the imf’s experience, a key feature 
of an effective anti-retaliation program is the manager’s special duty to resolve 
or report policy violations. Placing this obligation on the organization’s leader-
ship at senior levels best ensures an anti-retaliation organizational culture. 
This is particularly true where the duty is made effective by properly training 
managers to respond to retaliation claims or report the matter at the earliest 
opportunity and holding them accountable in this regard. Still, there are sev-
eral aspects of this duty that remain to be clarified at the imf and to be deter-
mined by any other ios intending to adopt this duty, including (i) the precise 
wrongdoings to be addressed; (ii) the standard of evidence that triggers the 
duty and (iii) the specific actions required of the manager to resolve or report 
the wrongdoing. While ios should tailor their own approaches to prevent and 
address retaliation given their diverse structures and cultures, the imf’s expe-
rience to date indicates that the manager’s special duty to resolve or report 
 retaliation is important for an organizational culture that is committed to pre-
venting retaliation.
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Chapter 14
Procedural Requirements in Staff Misconduct 
Cases: The Evolving Approach of the African 
Development Bank Administrative Tribunal
Eric P. LeBlanc*
Abstract
With specific reference to staff misconduct cases, this chapter examines, with exam-
ples from its case law, how the African Development Bank Administrative Tribunal 
(AfDBAT) addresses arguments of procedural irregularities and violation of due pro-
cess. The AfDBAT, in determining whether an irregularity exists or not according to 
the applicable rules and principles, takes into consideration elements such as the prej-
udice sustained by an applicant and the fairness of the process. When it determines 
that an irregularity exists, the AfDBAT takes into consideration the seriousness of the 
irregularity or other due process violation in deciding whether the decision to impose 
the disciplinary measure should be vitiated or sustained and whether the procedural 
irregularity or other due process violation should lead to the award of damages.
1 Introduction
International organizations depend on their staff members for the delivery of 
their important mandates. In so doing, the administration of employment rela-
tions causes international organizations to regularly make employment- related 
decisions. One type of decision affecting the employees of  intergovernmental 
institutions that is frequently challenged before international administrative 
tribunals is the imposition of disciplinary measures on staff members who are 
found to have committed misconduct. Grounds commonly used to legally chal-
lenge disciplinary measures include procedural  irregularities and violation of 
due process. Although the various administrative tribunals of international 
* Eric P. LeBlanc, Chief Legal Counsel, Administrative Affairs Division, Office of General Coun-
sel and Legal Services of the African Development Bank (AfDB), e.leblanc@afdb.org. The 
views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the 
views of the AfDB.
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organizations will generally recognize the principles that procedures should 
be followed and due process should be respected, the application of such prin-
ciples by the tribunals may vary.1
Following this introduction, this chapter will begin by briefly presenting the 
African Development Bank Administrative Tribunal (AfDBAT) and the legal 
framework within which it operates (Section 2) so as to better understand the 
Tribunal’s case law. Then, Section 3 of this chapter focuses on the approach 
taken by the AfDBAT when applicants raise arguments of procedural irregu-
larities or violations of due process in cases of staff misconduct. The chapter 
uses the case law of the AfDBAT to illustrate the Tribunal’s early recognition of 
the principles of respecting proper procedures and due process and how it de-
veloped its own jurisprudence regarding those principles over the years. Lastly, 
Section 4 presents some overarching observations and conclusions.
2 Legal Basis and Background to the African Development Bank 
Administrative Tribunal
The Board of Directors of the African Development Bank2 established the 
AfDBAT and adopted its Statute on 17 July 19973 and appointed the AfDBAT’s 
first judges on 16 December 1997.4 The Statute of the Administrative Tribunal 
of the African Development Bank (Statute) came into force on 1 January 1998.5 
The AfDBAT held its first session in July 1999 and, as of its latest session in 
April 2019, has issued 131 published decisions.
The AfDBAT is composed of six judges who must be nationals of member 
States of the AfDB at the time of their appointment.6 Although the Statute’s 
requirement regarding diversity is limited to prohibiting that two judges be 
nationals of the same State,7 historically, the Board of Directors appoints the 
six judges from among the ‘six regions’8 recognized by the AfDB to ensure bal-
anced geographical representation. The Board, in selecting judges, also takes 
1 Powers 2018, 115–120.
2 Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank.
3 AfDB, Board of Directors Resolution B/BD/97/11.
4 AfDB, Board of Directors Resolution B/BD/97/18.
5 Statute of the AfDBAT, art xvii.
6 Ibid, art vi (1).
7 Ibid.
8 The six regions consist of: Western Africa, Southern Africa, Eastern Africa, Northern Africa, 
Central Africa and Non-Regional Member States.
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into account diversity of gender, legal traditions and language.9 The judges 
must be persons of high moral character who possess the qualifications re-
quired for appointment to high judicial office or are jurisconsults of recog-
nized competence.10
According to the Statute, the applicable law before the AfDBAT shall be “the 
internal rules and regulations of the Bank, and generally recognized principles 
of international administrative law concerning the resolution of employment 
disputes of staff in international organizations”.11 The AfDBAT hears applica-
tions contesting ‘administrative decisions’12 that affect staff members’ condi-
tions of employment, after exhaustion of the Bank’s internal recourse mecha-
nism13 and hears appeals of staff members contesting disciplinary measures 
imposed on them.14
3 Review of the Case Law of the AfDBAT
This section chronologically reviews the case law of the AfDBAT in which ap-
plicants raised arguments of procedural irregularities or violations of due pro-
cess in cases of staff misconduct, whilst identifying a succession of eras. The 
purpose of this is to: (i) underline how the AfDBAT first incorporated in its 
jurisprudence, as important principles, the requirement to follow proper pro-
cedures and to respect due process; (ii) show how the AfDBAT developed its 
approach to assess the existence of a violation of those principles; and (iii) 
demonstrate how the AfDBAT now proceeds when it determines the existence 
of a violation.
3.1 Importance of the Principles of Respecting Proper Procedures and 
Due Process (1999–2005)
Arguments regarding procedural violations and disregard of due process were 
raised by applicants in some of the earliest applications before the AfDBAT.15 
9 The AfDB is a bilingual institution, with the two official languages being English and 
French.
10 Statute of the AfDBAT , art vi (1).
11 Ibid, art v (1).
12 Ibid, art ii (1) (i).
13 Ibid, art iii.
14 AfDB Staff Rule 102.09 provides, “A staff member against whom a disciplinary measure 
has been imposed shall have the right to appeal such a measure, and may lodge his/her 
appeal with the Administrative Tribunal within sixty (60) days of the date of the letter of 
notification of the disciplinary measure”.
15 ‘Due process’, in the context of disciplinary proceedings, broadly refers to the require-
ment that proceedings be fair and in accordance with the applicable rules and general 
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For example, in its first 20 judgments, the AfDBAT already dealt with argu-
ments pertaining to the right to obtain assistance from former staff members 
in defense against disciplinary charges,16 to the denial of access to documents17 
and to the denial of the opportunity to be heard and to defend oneself.18 In 
another early case, M. A. B. v AfDB, the AfDBAT, noting that the AfDB had not 
yet enacted rules for investigations and procedures preceding summary dis-
missal, decided that “The requirements to be complied with by the Bank must 
therefore be derived from principles of natural justice as evolved in the juris-
prudence of international administrative tribunals”.19
The AfDBAT indicated with clarity its position on the importance of due 
process in two judgments rendered on 1 December 2005, namely, Mr. C. G. S. v 
AfDB20 and Jenkins-Johnston v AfDB.21 These two cases arose from similar facts. 
The AfDB offers its staff members an education benefit whereby it covers a 
portion of the school fees of staff members’ children when certain conditions 
are met. One feature of the education benefit is that it can be paid in advance 
if a staff member provides evidence of registration in an acceptable school 
along with a pro forma invoice. In 2002, the AfDB engaged in an audit of the 
management of education benefits and, in the course of this audit, discovered 
that in both these cases, the staff members had each received an advance to 
cover school fees for their respective children, but that they failed to immedi-
ately inform the AfDB that their children had dropped out of university after 
the start of the school year. Both staff members were summarily dismissed.
In the first case, Mr. C. G. S. v AfDB, the applicant argued that due process 
was not complied with, claiming that they were not heard and that certain 
documents necessary for their defense were withheld. The disciplinary process 
followed was not the regular disciplinary process, which involves referring the 
matter to a disciplinary panel, but rather a summary dismissal which is appli-
cable only for cases of ‘serious misconduct’.22 The AfDBAT held as follows:
principles of law. As an example of such requirement incorporated in applicable rules, 
AfDB Staff Rule 101.02 (a) provides, “No disciplinary measure shall be imposed against a 
staff member unless and until he/she has been given the opportunity to answer the 
charges against him/her. The staff member shall be informed of the allegations against 
him/her by written notification”.
16 AfDBAT, Mr. I. U. I. v AfDB 2000, para 2.
17 AfDBAT, W. B. O.—O. v AfDB 2001, paras 40, 42.
18 AfDBAT, Mr. T. B. B. v AfDB 2002, para 33.
19 AfDBAT, M. A. B. v AfDB 2001, para 23.
20 AfDBAT, Mr. C. G. S. v AfDB 2005.
21 AfDBAT, Jenkins-Johnston v AfDB 2005.
22 AfDB Staff Rule 101.02 (c).
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The summary dismissal procedure is distinct and does not derogate from 
due process. The requirements that the Bank has been expected to ob-
serve derive from the principles of natural justice as evolved in the juris-
prudence of international administrative tribunal[s]. In observing these 
principles, a staff member must be unequivocally be put on notice of the 
charges laid against [them]. [They] must also be given an unrestricted 
opportunity to exonerate [themselves] on charges laid against [them].23
In that case, the AfDBAT found that due process was respected24 and ulti-
mately decided to reject the application on the merits, particularly because the 
applicant did not account for the money received and that they failed to dis-
close to AfDB that their child was no longer in school until after the conclusion 
of the audit.25
In the second case, Jenkins-Johnston v AfDB, the applicant also argued that 
due process was not respected in that their case should have been referred to a 
disciplinary panel instead of being dealt with under the summary dismissal 
procedure. Mr. Jenkins-Johnston’s situation was different than the one of 
Mr. C. G. S. in that Mr. Jenkins-Johnston, after realizing that they should have 
informed the AfDB about the change of status of their child, proceeded to in-
form the AfDB, recognized having committed an offence and started to 
 reimburse the AfDB nine months before they were even informed of the edu-
cation benefits’ audit.26 The AfDBAT sided with the applicant and decided 
that although the applicant did commit misconduct, the AfDB mischaracter-
ized the offence as a ‘serious misconduct’ and nullified the summary dismissal 
and ordered their reintegration, stating that the usual disciplinary procedure 
should have been followed for regular misconduct.27 The following quote from 
the judgment that underlines the importance ascribed to following proper 
procedure and respecting due process:
While understanding the highly appreciable and morally respectable rea-
sons for Bank Management to severely reprimand punishable offences in 
order to prevent misconduct detrimental to the Bank’s interests and the 
integrity of its staff, the Tribunal raises to an even higher level the princi-
ple of right to due process that fully guarantees the right to defence.28
23 AfDBAT, Mr. C. G. S. v AfDB 2005, para 38.
24 Ibid., para 39
25 Ibid., para 43.
26 AfDBAT, Jenkins-Johnston v AfDB 2005, para 53.
27 Ibid., para 54.
28 Ibid.
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This early jurisprudence clearly indicates that the AfDBAT was cognizant of 
the principles developed in the jurisprudence of other international adminis-
trative tribunals regarding procedures and due process and was keen to adopt 
them as part of its jurisprudence. This was expected considering Article v(1) of 
the Statute prescribes that the AfDBAT would apply “generally recognized 
principles of international administrative law concerning the resolution of 
employment disputes of staff in international organizations”.
3.2 Flexibility rather than Strict Formality in Determining the Existence 
of a Violation (2006–2009)
Although the AfDBAT took a strong stance on the importance of respecting 
the requirement to follow proper procedures and to respect due process, the 
AfDBAT has displayed, in its subsequent jurisprudence, a certain level of flex-
ibility in determining the existence of a violation of procedures or of due pro-
cess. The cases mentioned in this sub-section will illustrate that, instead of 
simply limiting its analysis to determining whether a procedural requirement 
was strictly followed, the AfDBAT takes into consideration the purpose behind 
that specific requirement in examining all the facts and circumstances of the 
case in order to determine if the purpose was met.
In Mr. Ablassé Ouedraogo v AfDB, the applicant, a special advisor to the 
AfDB President, was accused of leaking negative information to the press and 
was summarily dismissed on that basis.29 The trigger for the dismissal was an 
article published in a popular publication criticizing the management of the 
AfDB. The information contained in the article led to the suspicion that the 
applicant was at the origin of a leak. The applicant was verbally informed that 
they were suspected to be responsible for the leak. The applicant reacted by 
sending back a memorandum describing the verbal accusation and denying 
any involvement. The applicant was subsequently summarily dismissed by a 
letter that simply informed them of their dismissal, but without any reference 
to specific facts or charges.
The applicant argued that the procedure followed was irregular because the 
letter of dismissal did not state the offence with which they were charged.30 
The AfDBAT acknowledged that the letter of dismissal did not state the factual 
basis for the dismissal. However, considering that the applicant himself docu-
mented in a memorandum the charges verbally levied against him, the  AfDBAT 
held that “under these circumstances, it was not necessary to renew the points 
29 AfDBAT, Mr. Ablassé Ouedraogo v AfDB 2008.
30 Ibid., para 30; see AfDB Staff Rule 101.02(a) which requires that staff members be notified 
by written notification of allegations of misconduct.
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at issue in writing”31 and found that “the guarantees of due process […] were 
respected”.32
The AfDBAT could have taken a more formalistic approach and considered 
that the letter of dismissal, in the absence of details of the charges and facts 
supporting a dismissal, does not meet the procedural requirements and there-
fore the decision is vitiated. Instead the AfDBAT considered that, although the 
purpose of the letter was to inform the applicant of the charges, the applicant 
was clearly aware of the charges since they documented them themselves.
In Mr. S. S. M. D. v AfDB an AfDB manager was accused of soliciting a com-
mission from an AfDB supplier on a contract for the supply of photocopiers. 
After investigations, the applicant was summarily dismissed for serious mis-
conduct.33 The applicant submitted that they were denied due process be-
cause they were only given 10 days to respond to the charges against them, 
whereas Rule 101.03(b) of the AfDB Staff Rules requires that a staff member be 
given 14 days within which to respond. While acknowledging that the period to 
respond to charges given to a staff member in cases of summary dismissal 
should ordinarily be at least 14 days, the AfDBAT held that:
That said, in the particular circumstances of this case, the Tribunal is not 
persuaded that the brevity of the period provided to Mr. D. to respond to 
the charges against [them] compromised the fairness of these proceed-
ings. Not only did [they] not request any additional time to respond or 
suggest that the time provided was inadequate, [their] response was ac-
tually provided five days before the expiry of the time provided to [them]. 
Obviously, in this case, no additional time was necessary.34
Again, instead of taking a strict formalistic interpretation of the rules to decide 
that giving a shorter period to respond than the regulatory 14 days vitiates the 
process, the AfDBAT took into account the facts of the case in taking a flexible 
approach and determined that, in the circumstances of this case, the staff 
member being given a shorter period to respond did not compromise the fair-
ness of the process.
31 AfDBAT, Mr. Ablassé Ouedraogo v AfDB 2008, para 30.
32 Ibid. On the merits, the AfDBAT ruled in favor of the applicant because “no proof whatso-
ever was proffered by the Respondent”.
33 AfDBAT, Mr. S. S. M. D. v AfDB 2009.
34 Ibid., para 50.
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3.3 Consequences of Violations of Proper Procedure or Due Process 
(2010–Present Day)
In certain judgements issued after 2010, the AfDBAT determined the existence 
of a violation, but nevertheless did not rescind the challenged disciplinary 
measure. The AfDBAT took into consideration the particular facts of each case 
in order to determine what should be the appropriate consequence, if any, to 
procedural irregularities or violations of due process. The case law described 
below will show that the AfDBAT may maintain the validity of the challenged 
decision despite recognizing a serious breach of procedures.
K. M. R. v AfDB is an example where the AfDBAT declared that due process 
was not followed but decided not to rescind the termination and instead 
awarded damages as compensation for the violation.35 Mr. K. M. R. was a new 
staff member still on probation when the AfDB was contacted by their coun-
try’s authorities to pressure the applicant to provide income-related informa-
tion to a court within the context of divorce proceedings brought against them. 
The applicant was ordered by the AfDB to comply with the request.36 The ap-
plicant refused to comply and instead levied accusations of harassment against 
the AfDB. Although a disciplinary process was initiated, the applicant was ul-
timately terminated on the basis of non-confirmation of their appointment 
following probation.37
The AfDBAT found that the applicant was not accorded due process since 
no disciplinary panel was established to investigate or consider allegations 
against the applicant. Instead, the applicant’s contract was terminated without 
the applicant being afforded any opportunity to be heard. Having found that 
the process initiated by the AfDB in this case was clearly initially intended to 
be disciplinary in nature, it determined that the procedural safeguards guaran-
teed by the AfDB Staff Rules were not respected.38 However, the AfDBAT indi-
cated that:
Notwithstanding the procedural irregularities identified above, the Tri-
bunal observes that the Applicant significantly contributed to the 
 termination of his probationary appointment by stubbornly refusing to 
comply with official instructions and persisting in his combative and 
35 AfDBAT, K. M. R v AfDB 2010.
36 AfDB Staff Regulation 3.10 states, “…privileges, immunities and exemptions are granted to 
staff in the interests of the Bank. Consequently, they do not excuse staff members from 
discharging their civic or private obligations or from observing the laws and police regula-
tions of the host country”.
37 AfDBAT, K. M. R v AfDB 2010, para 26.
38 Ibid., paras 32–33.
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 disruptive behavior. [They] must therefore blame [themselves] for what 
befell [them]. This did not exonerate the Bank from its obligation to grant 
the Applicant proper due process before terminating [their] appoint-
ment. However, in light of the conduct of the Applicant, the Tribunal will 
limit the remedy awarded to moral damages for the Bank’s breach of 
procedure.39
Two factually-related decisions issued in 2016, B. O. v AfDB and E. O. v AfDB, are 
examples of decisions where the facts overwhelmingly established the exist-
ence of the misconduct, but the AfDBAT, although it maintained the termina-
tion decision on the strength of the evidence, found the AfDB liable to pay 
damages because of the existence of procedural violations.40 The facts of those 
two cases are virtually the same: both applicants were investigators in the 
AfDB department charged with investigating misconduct and sanctionable 
practices in projects financed by the AfDB. In the context of particularly sensi-
tive sanctions procedures initiated against a company accused of bribery in an 
AfDB project, the law firm representing the accused company informed the 
AfDB that they had received two anonymous letters containing AfDB confi-
dential information on the case, including the leaking of the strategy elabo-
rated by AfDB’s external counsel against the accused company. An initial 
screening identified the two applicants as likely suspects. The applicants were 
suspended with pay for 16 months pending the end of a lengthy investigation. 
The investigation determined that the two applicants were involved in the leak 
of information and in obstruction of the investigation. The applicants were 
subsequently dismissed after following the regular disciplinary procedure be-
fore disciplinary panels.
One of the arguments raised by the applicants to challenge their dismissal 
was with regards to the duration of their suspension. Rule 101.01(a) of the AfDB 
Staff Rules provides that a “staff member may be suspended from duty, pend-
ing investigation, for a period, which shall not exceed three [...] months but 
may be extended for not more than three [...] additional months to permit the 
completion of disciplinary proceedings”. They argued that the failure for the 
AfDB to comply with the time limits provided for in the Staff Rules with re-
gards to investigations and suspension should have the effect of vitiating the 
disciplinary actions.41 Since the judgments in B. O. v AfDB and E. O. v AfDB 
39 Ibid., para 36.
40 AfDBAT, B. O. v AfDB 2016 and E. O. v AfDB 2016.
41 AfDBAT, B. O. v AfDB 2016, para 67; AfDBAT, E. O. v AfDB 2016, paras 21, 81–82.
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contain very similar wording, we will only quote from the B. O. v AfDB decision 
to illustrate the AfDBAT’s position regarding that argument:
The question to be determined by the Tribunal is the effect of the Bank’s 
violation of Staff Rule 101.01(b) resulting in the suspension of the Appli-
cant for a period of 16 months. The Tribunal has previously cautioned the 
Bank to respect statutory time limits and noted that its failure to do so 
could, in appropriate circumstances, lead to the setting aside of a deci-
sion taken out of time. (s.a.c. v African Development Bank).
[…].
In light of the gravity of the allegations against the Applicant and the 
weight of the evidence incriminating [them], the Tribunal has concluded 
that it is not appropriate to set aside the disciplinary action on the basis 
of undue delay. However, having regard to the prolonged suspension and 
the flagrant disregard by the Bank of the statutory time-limits, it is ap-
propriate that the Tribunal award the Applicant a nominal amount of 
damages under this heading.42
A recent case, J. P. M. E. v AfDB, is another example of a case where the AfDBAT 
identified a violation of due process but did not set aside the challenged disci-
plinary measures.43 In that case, the AfDB accused the applicant of unlawfully 
using the travel card that was provided for the exclusive purpose of authorized 
missions. The applicant was found to have made numerous irregular cash 
withdrawals and payments with the travel card. When confronted with this 
accusation the applicant spontaneously admitted having misused the travel 
card. They also repeated this admission to the AfDB investigators and to the 
members of the disciplinary panel. The applicant was dismissed for miscon-
duct. However, the applicant subsequently learned that the disciplinary panel 
heard the testimony of several other staff members, including their erstwhile 
supervisor. The applicant argued before the AfDBAT that they were not given 
the opportunity to challenge their testimony. The AfDBAT agreed with the ap-
plicant that they were not afforded an opportunity to challenge the testimo-
nies before the disciplinary panel and indicated that,
[It] is concerned by the fact that the Disciplinary Panel received and re-
viewed evidence in the absence of the Applicant. The Applicant was not 
afforded an opportunity to rebut such testimony. This is a violation of the 
42 AfDBAT, B. O. v AfDB 2016, paras 72, 74; see also AfDBAT, E. O. v AfDB 2016, paras 98, 101.
43 AfDBAT, J. P. M. E. v AfDB 2018.
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ordinary rules of due process and could amount to a fundamental breach. 
However, in the circumstances of this matter, where the Applicant has 
admitted to the contraventions with which [they have] been charged and 
was given an opportunity to explain [their] conduct before the Discipli-
nary Panel, there has been no material violation of his rights. In addition, 
having regard to the financial documents produced by the Bank, the evi-
dence against the Applicant was indisputable. The Tribunal confirms the 
Disciplinary Panel’s actions on this issue.44
In that case, The AfDBAT rejected the application and did not award any dam-
ages for the violation of due process.45
4 Observations and Conclusion
From 1999 to 2005, relying heavily on the jurisprudence of other administrative 
tribunals, the AfDBAT clearly considered that general principles of law can be 
elaborated and evolve in other administrative tribunals’ jurisprudence and 
that such jurisprudence is relevant to it as a source of law. The AfDBAT clearly 
considered as important the requirement to follow proper procedures and to 
respect due process in cases of staff misconduct and proceeded in developing 
its own jurisprudence regarding arguments of procedural irregularities or vio-
lations of due process, building upon already established principles such as 
the respect of due process.
Between 2006 and 2009, the AfDBAT adopted a balanced approach to the 
issue of procedural irregularities and due process violation. Regarding proce-
dural requirements set out expressly in AfDB rules, the AfDBAT did not ap-
proach procedural requirements in a dogmatic way but sought to understand 
the objectives behind the rules and made its determination based on whether 
the objectives have been met or not.46
The examination of the case law developed in the latest era (since 2010 to 
the present day) presented in this chapter may raise the question as to whether 
the AfDBAT’s strong statement in Jenkins-Johnston v AfDB, to the effect that it 
“raises to an even higher level the principle of right to due process”,47 has been 
contradicted by more recent judgments. Has the AfDBAT softened its stance 
regarding procedural irregularities and violation of due process in the last 
44 Ibid, para 57.
45 Ibid, para 60.
46 See AfDBAT, Mr. Ablassé Ouedraogo v AfDB 2008 and Mr. S. S. M. D. v AfDB 2009.
47 AfDBAT, Jenkins-Johnston v AfDB 2005, para 54.
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 decade when compared to the earlier years of the Tribunal? Why has the AfD-
BAT maintained challenged disciplinary decisions in cases where it expressly 
recognized the existence of a violation of due process?
There is no contradiction between holding a principle to a high level and 
seeking to determine if a principle has been followed in spirit. The AfDBAT 
has in fact thus far shown consistency in its approach throughout its history—
in determining whether a violation exists or not, it will always consider the 
overall fairness of the process followed and whether applicants have been of-
fered the opportunity to be heard and to defend themselves.
The facts of each misconduct case brought before the AfDBAT differ, each 
case being unique. Although the AfDBAT has made it clear that due process is 
of paramount importance, this does not mean that any violation would auto-
matically vitiate the whole disciplinary process and lead to automatic rescis-
sion of disciplinary decisions if the process was otherwise fair. When it makes 
a finding that there is a procedural irregularity or other violation of due pro-
cess in a particular case, the AfDBAT then determines whether it is neverthe-
less possible to dispose of the case. If the violation has deprived the applicant 
from being heard or of being able to defend themselves, the AfDBAT will re-
scind the disciplinary decision like it did in Jenkins-Johnston v AfDB.48
However, if the AfDBAT determines that the violation did not deprive the 
applicant of a defense, then the AfDBAT will examine the case on the merits 
and make the appropriate decision based on the evidence and the parties’ ar-
guments. At the same time, the AfDBAT generally awards damages to the ap-
plicant to compensate the prejudice caused by the violation, even in cases 
where the original disciplinary decision is maintained, as has happened in B. O. 
v AfDB and in E. O. v AfDB, discussed above.49
The AfDBAT’s balanced approach, which consists in assessing the funda-
mental fairness of the disciplinary process, does not negate or otherwise di-
minish the importance of due process. The AfDBAT’s reluctance to automati-
cally rescind a decision on the mere existence of a violation without first 
determining whether the violation actually affected the fairness of the process, 
is indicative of its concern with ensuring that justice be fully rendered in disci-
plinary matters, taking into account due process.
In conclusion, the AfDBAT’s approach in misconduct cases amounts to an-
swering the following questions: Has there been a violation of procedures or 
due process? If the answer is ‘No’, then the case is heard on the merits. If the 
answer is ‘Yes’, the following question must be answered: Was the process nev-
ertheless fair, having allowed the accused to be heard and to present a proper 
48 AfDBAT, Jenkins-Johnston v AfDB 2005.
49 AfDBAT, B. O. v AfDB 2016 and E. O. v AfDB 2016.
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defense? If the answer to the second question is ‘No’, then the AfDBAT will set 
aside the decision on the basis that the violation amounts to a material viola-
tion of the accused’s rights. If the answer is ‘Yes’, however, the AfDBAT decides 
the case on the merits, but also systematically decides on whether the viola-
tion justifies imposing damages on the AfDB to compensate the applicant for 
this violation.
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Chapter 15
Macro-Trends in the Performance Management of 
International Civil Servants and Their Legal 
Implications
Laurent Germond and Estelle Martin*
Abstract
The purpose of this chapter is to explore three performance management trends with-
in international organizations and evaluate their legal implications. It seeks to identify 
different ways of combining well-settled principles of international civil service law, 
including the principle of ‘acquired rights’ and the right to appeal, with career systems 
increasingly focused on promoting meritocracy (the ‘what’), continuous feedback and 
feedforward (the ‘how’) and people managers (the ‘who’). Drawing on their experi-
ences as legal practitioners and on a selection of jurisprudence from international ad-
ministrative tribunals, the authors attempt to identify the balance between the legal 
features specific to managing the performance of international civil servants with the 
demands for accountability and sustainability in the delivery of a public service mis-
sion. The goal is not to provide a comprehensive study but rather to foster discussion 
and contribute to the overall debate on how to enhance the functioning of interna-
tional organizations whilst allowing them to best achieve their mission. The authors 
wish for an outcome where this public service mission can emerge strengthened.
1 The What: careers in International Organizations—From Seniority 
to Merit-Based Career Advancement
Career advancement in international organizations—the upward progression 
of an employee’s career in terms of remuneration and responsibilities—is 
dependent on two main drivers: seniority and merit. Whilst the first one re-
wards the time worked for an organization, the second rewards the employee’s 
* Laurent Germond, Director, Employment Law Division of the European Patent Office (EPO), 
lgermond@epo.org; Estelle Martin, Departmental Head, Employment Law at EPO, estel-
lemartin@epo.org. The views expressed in this chapter are the personal views of its authors 
and do not represent those of the EPO.
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contribution to the organization’s goals and is based on performance. Senior-
ity refers to the number of years or months employees have spent in service 
whilst performance refers to how well these employees have performed their 
duties. These two drivers seem to always be present in the design of career sys-
tems in international organizations, but the emphasis on one or the other—or 
the way they are combined—varies greatly from one organization to the next. 
At the risk of oversimplification, some general trends have nevertheless been 
observed.
On one side of the spectrum, advancement is directly correlated to the in-
dividual performance rating attributed to employees in their regular (usually 
yearly) performance evaluations.1 This means that better individual perfor-
mance leads to quicker career advancement in a way that is not pre- established. 
Such systems are found in some international financial institutions.
On the other side of the spectrum, advancement is granted through 
 organization-wide advancement exercises (usually yearly ones) but can be 
withheld on an individual basis when performance proves unsatisfactory.2 
This means that advancement is largely pre-established and, as a rule, the 
same for all employees irrespective of their individual levels of performance. 
In these career systems, which are found in some political and technical or-
ganizations, quicker advancement is reserved for only particularly meritorious 
employees and limited in number.
Between these two ends of the spectrum, different ways of shaping career 
progression have emerged where, for instance, advancement results from a 
merit-based selection of employees amongst those who perform well. This 
means that satisfactory performance is a pre-condition for advancement but is 
not necessarily sufficient.3
In recent years, some international organizations have undergone major ca-
reer reforms aimed at shifting from seniority-based advancement through an-
nual salary increments towards advancement schemes more focused on merit. 
The European Organization for Nuclear Research (cern) first had its Merit-
Oriented Advancement Scheme (moas) reform tested before (and upheld by) 
the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization (iloat) 
some 25 years ago.4 Since then, other technical organizations have followed 
suit, such as the European Patent Organization in 2015.
1 World Bank Staff Manual, r 6.01.
2 unhr Portal Guidelines on Withholding Salary Increment, 1.
3 epo Service Regulations, arts 47–49.
4 iloat, Antoine Guyen v cern 1994, para 1; iloat, Markus Audria v cern 1995, consids 1 
and 3; iloat, Edith Feldmann v cern 1995, para 1; iloat, Monique Häusermann v cern 1995, 
para 1; iloat, Eddy Penny v cern 1995, paras 1–3; iloat, Maryse Seissau v cern 1995, para 1.
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These career system reforms rely on the premise that merit-based advance-
ment will lead to higher staff engagement and better service delivery. Whilst 
each organization has its own policy reasons for venturing into the shift from 
seniority to merit-based advancement (be it financial sustainability, enhanced 
efficiency or both), it is interesting to explore the legal boundaries which inter-
national civil service law sets around such important shifts and whether the 
principle of ‘acquired rights’ has any place in the career advancement of an 
international civil servant. Indeed, the principle of acquired rights lies at the 
core of wide policy reforms in international organizations for it sets the legal 
parameters of permissible unilateral changes to employment conditions and 
has often been put forward in litigation to challenge such policy changes. It is 
of interest, for discussion purposes, to recap how some international adminis-
trative tribunals have defined the principle of acquired rights, and to then as-
sess the outcome of a few, illustrative, cases selected from the relevant 
jurisprudence.
1.1 The Principle of ‘Acquired Rights’
Using the expression ‘acquired rights’ is a convenient way to cover multiple 
references to the same reality in the jurisprudence of international administra-
tive tribunals. At the risk, here again, of oversimplification, this reality boils 
down to limiting the legislative power an international organization possesses 
to unilaterally amend key conditions of employment of its staff. The very term 
‘acquired rights’ implies and suggests the idea of protection and the notion 
that such rights may expect to survive future variation.5 Are there any such 
rights in relation to career advancement?
Firstly, in its famous decision in Louis de Merode et al. v The World Bank, the 
World Bank Administrative Tribunal (wbat) defined the Bank’s power of 
amendment and, as a counterpoint, the Tribunal’s power of review, particu-
larly in respect of acquired rights:
As has been stated, while the fundamental and essential elements of the 
conditions of employment may not be amended unilaterally, the non-
fundamental and non-essential elements are subject to unilateral amend-
ment. This power is discretionary and it is not for this Tribunal to substi-
tute its own judgment for that of the competent organs of the Bank in 
exercising that discretion. However, the Bank’s power to amend non- 
essential terms may be exercised subject to certain limitations. Discre-
tionary power is not absolute power.
5 iloat, Ayoub et al. v ilo 1987, consid 12, cited in unat, Lloret Alcañiz et al. v Secretary-General 
of the UN 2018, para 86; unat, Quijano-Evans et al. v Secretary-General of the UN 2018, para 52.
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First, no retroactive effect may be given to any amendments adopted 
by the Bank. The Bank cannot deprive staff members of accrued rights 
for services already rendered. This well-established principle has been 
applied in many judgments of other international administrative 
tribunals.
The principle of non-retroactivity is not the only limitation upon the 
power to amend the non-fundamental elements of the conditions of em-
ployment. The Bank would abuse its discretion if it were to adopt such 
changes for reasons alien to the proper functioning of the organization 
and to its duty to ensure that it has a staff possessing “the highest stand-
ards of efficiency and of technical competence”. Changes must be based 
on a proper consideration of relevant facts. They must be reasonably re-
lated to the objective which they are intended to achieve. They must be 
made in good faith and must not be prompted by improper motives. They 
must not discriminate in an unjustifiable manner between individuals or 
groups within the staff. Amendments must be made in a reasonable man-
ner seeking to avoid excessive and unnecessary harm to the staff. In this 
respect, the care with which a reform has been studied and the condi-
tions attached to a change are to be taken into account by the Tribunal.
The Tribunal must be satisfied itself in each case that the Bank’s power 
to change the non-fundamental elements in the conditions of employ-
ment of its employees has not been exercised either retroactively or in an 
arbitrary or otherwise improper manner.6
Secondly, although the iloat had already referred to the concept of acquired 
rights in its judgment Robert V. Lindsey v International Telecommunication 
Union,7 it is in its judgment Ayoub et al. v International Labour Organization, 
that it provided a generic definition of acquired rights and established a meth-
odology to assess an alleged breach of acquired rights:
In Judgment 61 (in re Lindsey) the Tribunal held that the amendment of 
a rule to an official’s detriment and without his consent amounts to 
breach of an acquired right when the structure of the contract of ap-
pointment is disturbed or there is impairment of any fundamental term 
of appointment in consideration of which the official accepted appoint-
ment. That calls for some explanation. Although there will be breach of 
an acquired right only if one of two conditions is fulfilled, the two are in 
6 WBAT, Louis de Merode et al. v The World Bank 1981, paras 45–48.
7 iloat, Robert v. Lindsey v itu 1962.
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fact but one. Disturbance of the structure of the contract posits impair-
ment of a fundamental term, and the latter the former. A somewhat 
broader framing of the doctrine is wanted so that it will cover not just 
terms of appointment that were in effect at recruitment but also terms 
that were brought in later and were calculated to induce the staff mem-
ber to stay on. The reference to a “term of appointment in consideration 
of which the official accepted appointment” was never meant to import 
a subjective test: did this term or that actually make the staff member 
sign on or decide to stay? What the Tribunal had in mind was a term of 
the sort that might sway his decision. In some instances only the exist-
ence of a particular term of appointment may form the subject of an ac-
quired right. But there are other contingencies in which the arrange-
ments for giving effect to the term may also give rise to such a right. Stated 
in that way the doctrine is broader than the rule against retroactivity. 
Whereas the doctrine looks to the future as well as to the past, the rule 
merely forbids altering what already belongs to the past. So before ruling 
on the plea the Tribunal must in each case determine whether the altered 
term is fundamental and essential.
There are three tests it will apply.
The first is the nature of the altered term. It may be in the contract or 
in the Staff Regulations or Staff Rules or in a decision, and whereas the 
contract or a decision may give rise to acquired rights the regulations and 
rules do not necessarily do so.
The second test is the reason for the change. It is material that the 
terms of appointment may often have to be adapted to circumstances, 
and there will ordinarily be no acquired right when a rule or a clause de-
pends on variables such as the cost-of-living index or the value of the 
currency. Nor can the finances of the body that applies the terms of ap-
pointment be discounted.
The third test is the consequence of allowing or disallowing an ac-
quired right. What effect will the change have on staff pay and benefits? 
And how do those who plead an acquired right fare as against others?8
This landmark judgment has consistently been referred to by the iloat ever 
since.9
8 iloat, Ayoub et al. v ilo 1987, paras 13–14.
9 For a recent example, see iloat, H. (No 4) et al. v epo 2019, para 7.
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Thirdly, in its recent judgment Quijano-Evans et al. v Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, the United Nations Appeals Tribunal (unat) defined its ap-
proach to acquired rights as follows:
An “acquired” right should be purposively interpreted to mean a vested 
right; and employees only acquire a vested right to their salary for ser-
vices already rendered. Promises to pay prospective benefits, including 
future salaries, may constitute contractual promises, but they are not ac-
quired rights until such time as the quid pro quo for the promise has been 
performed or earned. Moreover, the fact that increases have been granted 
in the past does not create an acquired right to the future increases or 
pose a legal bar to a reduction in salary.
The limited purpose of Staff Regulation 12.1, therefore, is to ensure that 
staff members are not deprived of a benefit once the legal requirements 
for claiming the benefit have been fulfilled. The protection of acquired 
rights therefore goes no further than guaranteeing that no amendment to 
the Staff Regulations may affect the benefits that have accrued to, or have 
been earned by, a staff member for services rendered before the entry 
into force of the amendment. Amendments may not retrospectively re-
duce benefits already earned. In the final analysis, the doctrinal protec-
tion of acquired rights is essentially an aspect of the principle of non-
retroactivity. The aim is to protect individuals from harm to their vested 
entitlements caused by retrospective statutory instruments.10
These judgments show multiple approaches towards the definition of ‘ac-
quired rights’: a broad and comprehensive one held by the wbat; a more ge-
neric one, combined with an assessment methodology, held by the iloat and 
a narrower one held by the unat.
1.2 Recognition of Acquired Rights
Whereas employees have often invoked the principle of acquired rights in liti-
gation to challenge a change in their employment conditions, including in re-
lation to career advancement, they have rarely achieved a successful outcome 
before the international administrative tribunals who seldom censure such 
changes—and those cases where they do, mostly involve compensation and 
benefits aspects or access to judicial review. The wbat has recognised  ‘acquired 
10 unat, Quijano-Evans et al. v Secretary-General of the UN 2018, para 52, citing unat, Lloret 
Alcañiz et al. v Secretary-General of the UN 2018, paras 90–91.
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rights’ to tax reimbursement on salaries,11 to periodic adjustment of salary12 
and to the availability of an impartial adjudicator of employment claims.13 
Similarly, the iloat has, for instance, considered a non-resident’s allowance14 
or pension entitlements to be ‘acquired rights’.15
The most specific legal considerations both directly relevant to career ad-
vancement and referring to the principle of acquired rights were identified in 
the jurisprudence of the iloat and address promotion as follows:
…rules on promotion do confer an acquired right insofar as they offer 
staff an expectation of advancement. But the particular arrangements for 
the grant of promotion confer no such right because on recruitment staff 
cannot foretell how they will fare in their career. […] In any event an or-
ganization may change the rules on promotion for the sake of efficiency 
and so as to cope with changing circumstances.16
One may conclude from the above that the only ‘acquired rights’ specifically 
conferred by a career system is an expectation of advancement or in other 
words, a career prospect—which can encompass different forms of career 
moves (upwards towards increased responsibilities or through a competitive 
process, across between technical and managerial functions). It is worth men-
tioning that the Tribunal has also left the door open to changes made neces-
sary by efficiency requirements or changing circumstances.
It would seem that it is therefore first and foremost the reason behind the 
reform that drives the robustness of a change in career system. This aspect is 
equally emphasised in the de Merode case of the wbat, where the manner in 
which the change is prepared or applied is to be taken into account when as-
sessing whether the change is permissible. Ultimately, the answer to the ques-
tion of permissibility seems to lie in the specific reasons for the change rather 
than in the change itself.
11 wbat, Louis de Merode et al. v The World Bank 1981, para 82.
12 wbat, Louis de Merode et al. v The World Bank 1981, paras 111 and 112; wbat, Lyra Pinto v 
ibrd 1988, para 40; wbat, Elena Gavidia v ifc 1988, para 26; wbat, Bechir C. Chakra v ibrd 
1988, para 30; wbat, Rosario Cardenas v ibrd 1988, para 31; wbat, Alan Berg v ibrd 1988, 
para 43.
13 wbat, ak v ibrd 2009, para 31.
14 iloat, Poulain d’Andecy v fao 1960, para 5.
15 iloat, Ayoub (No 2) et al. v ilo 1989, para 24.
16 iloat, M. S. et al. v epo 2014, para 14, citing iloat, Barahona and Royo Gracia (No 2) v 
icpo 1990, para 4.
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The interesting perspective given by these three international administra-
tive tribunals is that their findings can be used to frame in simple (yet hope-
fully not simplistic) terms, the fundamentals of career advancement in the lit-
eral sense of the word. Whether these tribunals have established a narrow or a 
broad interpretation of the concept of acquired rights, none appear to adopt a 
position in law which would prevent as such international organizations from 
moving towards performance-based career systems.
2 The How: Performance Evaluations—From Annual or Biannual 
Performance Reports to Continuous Feedback and Feedforward
In 2017, a leading consultancy firm stated that the performance management 
revolution was in full flight and that organizations across all sectors and re-
gions were changing the way employee performance was measured and evalu-
ated.17 Yearly formal performance evaluations are giving way to continuous 
performance feedback. Continuous feedback allows for the performance of an 
employee to be evaluated on an ongoing basis rather than in a formalised way 
(through evaluation reports) at pre-defined intervals (at the end of the year). 
This shift reflects the organization’s acknowledgement that performance man-
agement is an everyday task rather than a yearly one. It also relies on the prem-
ise that continuous feedback will lead to higher staff engagement and better 
service delivery in an organization.
Why would an organization venture into continuous feedback? The tradi-
tional end-of-year performance evaluation ‘ceremony’ creates dissatisfaction. 
Managers responsible for conducting evaluations and evaluated employees 
alike do not greet performance evaluations with enthusiasm. Beyond mere bit-
terness, this response is rooted in experience. Reasons for this may be that such 
exercises do not warrant the time invested, that they do not protect against 
managers’ bias, that they are usually focused on the past rather than the future, 
on tasks rather than individual development, and that they follow a judgmen-
tal approach in many ways, often lacking in the substance needed to truly steer 
professional development. Added to this is a high risk of cultural misunder-
standings which are common in international organizations. This combina-
tion of elements is a major cause for conflict in the workplace and for litiga-
tion, as evidenced by the rich body of jurisprudence of international 
administrative tribunals on the matter.18
17 Deloitte 2017, 65.
18 The iloat index of cases for instance shows 457 references under ‘Work appraisal’.
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By contrast, continuous performance feedback (and feedforward) provides 
more, and therefore better, data for people decisions, encourages conversa-
tions and focus on content and performance methods rather than on the sole 
results.19 It is presented as a means rather than an end. Overall, this is an attrac-
tive prospect for an organization wishing to increase its career system’s focus 
on performance.
What would be the consequences—from a legal perspective—of such a 
shift for those international organizations who are eager to catch up with the 
latest trends? A pre-condition to accessing means of redress under interna-
tional civil service law is the existence of an administrative decision which 
adversely affects the legal situation of an employee. In performance manage-
ment, this has long been embodied by the traditional evaluation report. The 
iloat thus held that:
…prima facie the complainant is entitled to have [their appraisal report] 
for what [they] thinks it to be worth; a doubt thrown on its value is not a 
ground for denying it. Furthermore, its usefulness to the complainant is 
not to be judged exclusively by reference to the main purpose of the re-
port as set out in [the] Staff Rule […]. Appraisal reports constitute a 
 record of service which as a general rule an official is entitled to have for 
his own satisfaction as well as for use if he is seeking other employment 
[…].20
What would happen—from a legal standpoint—if performance evaluations as 
we know them today were to become a means to steer future performance 
rather than an end to record past performance? What would happen—from a 
legal standpoint—if a formalised record at pre-defined intervals, so prevalent 
today in the legal framework of international organizations, were replaced by 
multiple discussions aimed at providing instant feedback, when and as need-
ed, as part of an ongoing manager-employee exchange? The proposition is that 
ongoing feedback discussions—taken separately—could not qualify as an ad-
ministrative decision adversely affecting the legal situation of an employee. 
Each conversation would be a step in the overall continuous performance 
evaluation, but could not, in and of itself, embody the evaluation or modify the 
legal situation of an employee. Otherwise, organizations would run the risk of 
multiplying decisions to an extent no longer sustainable.
19 Feedforward in performance management refers to a continuous and constructive con-
versation between employees and their manager, focused on future performance.
20 iloat, Francis Donal Schofield (No 2) v who 1980, para 4.
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Would there then be a challengeable decision adversely affecting the legal 
position of an employee? It is worth recalling that appraisal reports have not 
always been considered challengeable administrative decisions. In its early 
days, the iloat ruled that:
…the evaluation expressed in that report was made within the exercise of 
a discretion and constituted only an opinion preliminary to a decision by 
the Director General relating to the grant of an annual increment, and 
there can be no recourse to the Tribunal in relation to this evaluation 
[…].21
It later reiterated this position in more specific terms, and dismissed as irre-
ceivable a claim for the quashing of an evaluation report issued in the context 
of an employee’s probation:
A plea to quash can be directed only against a decision, that is, against an 
act deciding a question in a specific case. A performance report embod-
ies no decision capable of being rescinded. A complaint seeking such re-
lief is not receivable.22
The performance report was considered an intermediary step in the taking of 
a different administrative decision, be it termination of service, non-renewal 
of appointment or salary increment. Later, the iloat altered its approach and 
began to consider that judicial review was warranted:
The words complained of are contained in an appraisal report whose 
function it is to evaluate past performance and conduct and not to give 
directives for the future. Moreover, the facts as they appear in the dossier 
show that there was no act or omission by the complainant which could 
prompt any special directive for the future, let alone any criticism of the 
past. The Tribunal will not normally entertain complaints about the con-
tents of appraisal reports; it is essential to their value that the supervisor 
should be granted great freedom of expression and normally, if there be 
any errors of judgment on [their] part, they can be sufficiently remedied 
by the incorporation in the appraisal report of the staff member’s point 
of view. But in the circumstances of this case the Tribunal feels bound to 
conclude that the words complained of were inserted in the report under 
21 iloat, René Roux v ilo 1956, para 11.
22 iloat, P. C. de C. v who 1967, para 1.
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a total misconception of the situation and that justice requires that they 
should be expunged.23
It is worth noting here that the Tribunal relied on the assumption that the ap-
praisal report in question—in its classical form as is widely used today—was 
about evaluating past performance rather than steering future performance 
development.
Finally, the Tribunal asserted control over the appraisal report, and qualified 
it as a discretionary autonomous decision subject to judicial review, albeit a 
limited review:
The impugned decision, which relates to the assessment of an official’s 
performance, is of a discretionary nature. Hence the Tribunal may quash 
it only if it was taken without authority, or tainted with a flaw of form or 
of procedure, or based on an error of fact or of law, or if essential facts 
were overlooked, or if the decision is tainted with abuse of authority, or if 
clearly mistaken conclusions were drawn from the facts.24
So, what could be the way forward? Our proposition is to combine the features 
which safeguard access to means of redress specific to the international civil 
service so that continuous performance feedback may under certain circum-
stances become a challengeable act. Already today at the United Nations, only 
formal performance evaluations recording a rating below satisfactory may be 
contested via formal means of redress since the satisfactory ones are consid-
ered to have no adverse legal effect on their recipient. Only administrative de-
cisions taken on the basis of the results of a performance review that affects a 
staff member’s conditions of service may be appealed through the United Na-
tions’ internal justice system.25 The unat went as far as to reverse a decision of 
its predecessor, the United Nations Dispute Tribunal, in relation to the chal-
lengeable nature of a satisfactory evaluation report in the following terms:
Pursuant to Section 15.1 of ST/AI/2010/5, staff members having received 
the rating of “successfully meets performance expectations” cannot 
 challenge the performance appraisal by way of rebuttal. Section 15.1 
provides:
23 iloat, Gerard Joseph Glynn v who 1971, para 3.
24 iloat, Stefaan Bernard Peeters (No 2) v ipi 1978, para 3.
25 UN Secretariat Performance Management Policy, s 14.
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Staff members who disagree with a “partially meets performance ex-
pectations” or “does not meet performance expectations” rating given at 
the end of the performance year may, within 14 days of signing the com-
pleted e-pas or e-performance document, submit to their Executive Of-
ficer at Headquarters, or to the Chief of Administration/Chief of Mission 
Support, as applicable, a written rebuttal statement setting forth briefly 
the specific reasons why a higher overall rating should have been given. 
Staff members having received the rating of “consistently exceed perfor-
mance expectations” or “successfully meets [sic] performance expecta-
tions” cannot initiate a rebuttal.
Pursuant to Section 15.7 of ST/AI/2010/5, “[t]he rating resulting from 
an evaluation that has not been rebutted is final and may not be ap-
pealed. However, administrative decisions that stem from any final 
 performance appraisal and that affect the conditions of service of a 
staff member may be resolved by way of informal or formal justice 
mechanisms”.
In the instant case, there was no evidence of any adverse administra-
tive decision stemming from [the complainant’s] performance appraisal. 
The fro’s comment on [the complainant’s] output—a comment made 
in a satisfactory appraisal—was not a final administrative decision. It did 
not detract from the overall satisfactory performance appraisal and 
had no direct legal consequences for [the complainant’s] terms of 
appointment.
We find that the [United Nations Dispute Tribunal] erred in law in 
finding that [the complainant’s] satisfactory appraisal constituted an ap-
pealable administrative decision.26
There is therefore interest in finding a position which lies at the crossroads 
between the approaches of these tribunals, and which addresses pragmatic 
concerns around the severe consequences unsatisfactory performance may 
have on the very employment of staff.
It is worth highlighting that the jurisprudence of international tribunals is 
abundant regarding unsatisfactory performance and displays principles which 
have appeared stable over time and consistent across tribunals. These princi-
ples mainly revolve around the duties of an employer, namely: to inform in a 
timely manner and in specific terms about the unsatisfactory aspects of the 
performance; to give a reasonable opportunity for the employee to remedy 
26 unat, Ngokeng v Secretary-General of the UN 2014, paras 29–32.
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shortcomings; to warn in specific terms of the risks attached to the unsatisfac-
tory performance; and to afford due process.27
The proposition is that there would be no pre-established administrative 
decision in the context of continuous performance feedback. There is however 
always a need for legal certainty in the employment relationship. On the em-
ployee’s side, this is afforded by a particular act that allows for the possibility of 
redress without necessarily having to wait for dire consequences. On the em-
ployer’s side, this is afforded by an act that opens and closes a time limit for 
challenge by the employee. Both sides meet when the employee is notified of 
unsatisfactory performance likely to lead to consequences which are difficult 
to reverse in practice, such as termination of service. Such notification is al-
ready a prerequisite under general principles governing performance evalua-
tion. It is therefore a convenient starting point to embody the necessary ad-
verse legal effect.
In conclusion, with feedback and feedforward becoming an ever more 
prominent trend, there is a need, from a legal standpoint, to identify the chal-
lengeable decision in the interests of both the employee and the employer. 
There is also a need, in more general terms, to strike the right balance between 
the legitimate right to appeal and the possibility for international organiza-
tions as employers to see performance evaluations evolve according to the lat-
est trends without having to fear a paralysing volume of litigation.
3 The Who: Performance Management—From Technical Experts to 
People Managers
There can be no performance management without managers. The best man-
agement tools would fail without good managerial practices and the profes-
sionalisation of managers is high on the agenda of reformers.
In recent years, we have witnessed a trend whereby behavioural competen-
cies have become more prevalent in international organizations’ performance 
management schemes. Whilst behavioural competencies (namely, motiva-
tional, interpersonal or managerial skills) are intrinsic capabilities that are 
typically applicable to any role or organization, technical competencies are 
focused on disciplinary expertise (for example, law and jurisprudence for a 
lawyer, accounting standards for an accountant) and the application of this 
expertise to perform effectively in a given role. It is no longer solely what an 
27 iloat, A. R. v oie 2012, consid 9; wbat, Kiran Singh v ibrd 1988, para 21, citing N. Samuel-
Thambiah v ibrd 1993, para 32.
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employee delivers that contributes to their performance but how this techni-
cal output is delivered.
This trend has been translated into jurisprudence to an extent that employ-
ees’ shortcomings in few (but essential) behavioural competencies can afford 
sufficient ground for termination of service. The unat has observed in this 
respect:
[The complainant’s] claim that it was wrong to terminate [their] service 
on the basis of the concerns about only two of the eleven competencies 
in [their performance evaluation] is not supported by any authority. In 
addition, it is reasonable for the Administration to view the competen-
cies of leadership and communication as the important requirements for 
[their] position […].28
In the same vein, the wbat has observed:
In this case, there can be no doubt that the Applicant was a competent 
staff member whose technical and professional abilities were never at 
issue. The problem was essentially one of difficulties in [their] interper-
sonal relationships.29
The main legal issue behind the growing importance of behavioural compe-
tencies lies in performance assessment by managers. Managers have to evalu-
ate people rather than technical output, and behavioural competencies can-
not be measured with figures. The jurisprudence of international administrative 
tribunals has long acknowledged the discretionary and non-mechanical na-
ture of the assessment made by managers of their employees. The iloat has 
articulated it as follows:
Assessment of merit is an exercise that involves a value judgement. It is 
usual to refer to decisions or recommendations involving a value judge-
ment as “discretionary”, signifying that persons may quite reasonably 
hold different views on the matter in issue and, if the issue involves a 
comparison with other persons, they may also hold different views on 
their comparative rating. The nature of a value judgement means that 
point-to-point comparisons are not necessarily decisive.30
28 unat, El Sadek v unrwa 2019, para 55.
29 wbat, Kiran Singh v ibrd 1998, para 9.
30 iloat, J. T. M. v epo 2011, para 7.
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Overall, international administrative tribunals have exercised restraint 
when reviewing performance assessments conducted by managers:
The undt made several errors of law when it found unicef’s decision 
not to renew [the complainant’s] contract for poor performance was not 
supported by the [Performance Evaluation Report] and was unlawful. 
Initially, the Dispute Tribunal reviewed de novo the Agency’s decision. It 
did not accord any deference to unicef’s conclusion that [the complain-
ant’s] performance was poor. Instead, it placed itself in the role of the 
decision-maker and determined whether it would have renewed the con-
tract, based on the [Performance Evaluation Report]. This is not the role 
of a reviewing tribunal under the undt Statute.31
In the context of increased value judgment entailed by the evaluation of be-
havioural competencies, and with due deference to the conclusions drawn by 
managers as to the satisfactory nature of their employees’ performance, inter-
national administrative tribunals are likely to place more emphasis on proce-
dural or substantive safeguards which are critical to governing the way unsat-
isfactory performance is determined.
As far as procedural safeguards are concerned, the checks and balances put 
in place by international organizations in the evaluation of performance can 
take many shapes and forms and can to some extent be decisive. The iloat 
has for instance insisted on the role of the manager’s own manager in supervis-
ing an evaluation exercise where the relationship between the employee and 
the manager is at issue:
…it is well settled by the Tribunal’s case law that if the rules of an interna-
tional organization require that an appraisal form must be signed not 
only by the direct supervisor of the staff member concerned but also by 
[their] second-level supervisor, this is designed to guarantee oversight, at 
least prima facie, of the objectivity of the report. The purpose of such a 
rule is to ensure that responsibilities are shared between these two au-
thorities and that the staff member who is being appraised is shielded 
from a biased assessment by a supervisor, who should not be the only 
person issuing an opinion on the staff member’s skills and performance. 
It is therefore of the utmost importance that the competent second-level 
31 unat, Said v Secretary-General of the UN 2015, para 40.
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supervisor should take care to ascertain that the assessment submitted 
for [their] approval does not require modification.32
International organizations have also set up various bodies whose role it is to 
calibrate, harmonise or review the evaluation of performance by managers, or 
to monitor performance evaluation exercises at organization level.33 What 
these safeguards have in common is that they create peer or institutional pres-
sure to ensure fairness in the process.
As far as substantive safeguards are concerned, some international adminis-
trative tribunals are placing particular emphasis on the record available to sup-
port the conclusion that an employee’s performance falls short of expecta-
tions, as well as on the existence of “a rational objective connection between 
the information available and the finding of unsatisfactory work performance”.34 
To put it in the words of the wbat when defining its scope of judicial review 
for discretionary decisions, this safeguard is about whether the adverse perfor-
mance evaluation was made on an “observable”—this goes to the record—
“and reasonable basis”—this goes to the link and proportionality between the 
record and the performance findings.35
In summary, the shift in the way managers evaluate performance and place 
greater emphasis on behavioural competencies necessarily brings wider dis-
cretion into the performance assessment exercise. Given dominant and recent 
trends observed in the jurisprudence of international administrative tribunals, 
it is suggested that the robustness of a finding of unsatisfactory performance is 
likely to increasingly revolve around the robustness of the process conducted 
and around the wealth of record available.
4 Conclusion
It is hoped that this concise exploration of macro-trends in performance man-
agement will resonate with professionals familiar with the functioning of in-
ternational organizations and that it will feed the discussion around the legal 
implications of these trends. This chapter will have fulfilled its purpose if it has 
fostered the appetite of international organizations to adapt their approach to 
32 iloat, B. (No 2) v epo 2016, para 14.
33 See, for instance, un Secretariat Performance Management Policy, s 14; epo Guidelines 
on Performance Development, s ii (1); World Bank Staff Manual, r 9.06.
34 unat, Sarwar v Secretary-General of the UN 2017, para 74.
35 wbat, EG v ibrd 2017, para 86.
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performance management, bearing in mind how best to achieve their mission. 
Its goal will have been met if, at the same time, it has contributed to identifying 
adequate safeguards of the independence and impartiality of international 
civil servants through an evolution of the jurisprudence of international ad-
ministrative tribunals on the matter.
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Chapter 16
2019 aiib Law Lecture: The Rise of Sustainable 
Development in International Investment Law
Nico Schrijver*
Abstract
In recent decades, sustainable development gained currency as a principle of interna-
tional law remarkably quickly. It is an integrated concept, having economic, environ-
mental, social and governance dimensions. Sustainable development is by now well 
anchored in various sources of international law, especially treaty law and soft law in-
struments, and ranging from international environmental law and human rights law to 
international economic law and investment law. As to the latter, (inter-)regional eco-
nomic treaties and bilateral investment treaties increasingly incorporate sustainable 
development. This also gave rise to the concept of responsible investment, which is an 
approach to conducting business and managing assets that includes environmental, 
social and governance factors as well as taking public values into account in invest-
ment strategy. The UN General Principles of Business and Human Rights (Ruggie Prin-
ciples) and the Sustainable Development Goals of the World Development Agenda 
2030 are closely related to the evolution of the principles for responsible investment. 
Obviously, many obstacles to their implementation do exist. These include the lack of 
enforcement mechanisms, controversial investment practices and widespread pat-
terns of unsustainable production and consumption. This chapter concludes by exam-
ining what the role of international investment law, both as a value system and a con-
crete regulatory framework, can be for achieving sustainable development and 
responsible investment.
1 Introduction
This lecture examines the rise of sustainable development in international in-
vestment law. For this purpose, the meaning of the concept of sustainable 
* Nico Schrijver, Member and President (2017–2019) of the Institut de Droit International, State 




 development and its inception into international law is first discussed (Section 
1). Secondly, the gradual incorporation of sustainable development into inter-
national investment law and the emergence of the concept of ‘responsible 
 investment’ is addressed (Section 2). Obviously, many obstacles do still exist 
for the implementation of the principles and rules of sustainable development 
and responsible investment. Therefore, the last part of this lecture (Section 3) 
discusses how to overcome these obstacles and what the role of international 
law in general and international investment law in particular can be in achiev-
ing sustainable development and responsible investment.
2 The Meaning of Sustainable Development and Its Inception into 
International Law
‘Sustainable development’ is a key term in international politics which in a re-
markably short period of time has also become firmly established in interna-
tional law.1 The World Commission on Environment and Development headed 
by former Prime Minister Brundtland of Norway defines this concept in its re-
port ‘Our Common Future’ as development that “meets the needs of the pre-
sent generation without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs”.2 This is still an admirably concise description of the 
core of the meaning of sustainable development. Firstly, this description dem-
onstrates an awareness of the finite capacity of our planet and its natural re-
sources. Second, it also takes into account the interests of future generations, 
including our grandchildren, to meet their own needs, hence highlighting the 
principle of intergenerational equity.
In a way, sustainable development builds on and combines three principal 
chapters of international law. Firstly, international environmental law, which is 
a relatively young chapter of international law;3 second, international eco-
nomic law, especially as far as it relates to development;4 and third, human 
rights law.5 This lecture refers both to substantive rights—such as the right to 
life, the right to health and the right to an adequate living standard—and to 
procedural human rights—such as citizens’ access to information, access to 
1 Schrijver, The Evolution of Sustainable Development in International Law 2008, 173–207; also in 
The Hague Academy of International Law (ed), Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of 
International Law 2007, vol 329, 217–412.
2 World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, 43.
3 See Sands and Peel 2018; Birnie and others 2009.
4 See Schrijver and Weiss 2004; Bhuiyan and others 2014.
5 See Danish Institute for Human Rights, ‘Human Rights and Sustainable Development’, 13 July 
2018.
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justice and participation in environmental decision-making. Hence, in a way, 
sustainable development represents the best of all worlds.
The work of the present author has distinguished seven main elements of 
the principle of sustainable development.6 The first, and perhaps the most 
firmly grounded in international law, is the sustainable use of natural resourc-
es. Many treaties now emphasize this dimension, whether in relation to fishery 
agreements, sustainable timber production or preserving biological diversity. 
Second, also very important, is sound macroeconomic development and what 
the facilitating role of international law can be toward this end. The third ele-
ment is environmental conservation, a key component of sustainable develop-
ment. The fourth is equity, both between current and future generations (that 
is intergenerational equity), but also equity for and among the people living 
now: that is intra-generational equity. Fifth, there is the element of time. The 
time dimension of sustainable development is both short and long-term. This 
is particularly evident in the Paris Climate Agreement.7 In the short-term, we 
have to act now if we would like to prevent further destruction of the precious 
planetary climate system. But there is also a need for a sustained, long-term 
strategy. In terms of the Paris Agreement: by 2050 we should operate as energy-
neutral as much as possible and by 2100, the global temperature rise should be 
well below two degrees Celsius.8 Element number six relates to human rights, 
public participation and justice for all. Lastly, number seven, perhaps the most 
important but at the same time the most complicated element, is how to inte-
grate the environmental, the developmental and the human rights concerns 
and how to blend them into a comprehensive integrated and effective interna-
tional law system in the pursuance of sustainable development.9
Sustainable development did not come about overnight in international 
law. Its roots can be traced to some early treaties, for example, nature manage-
ment treaties and anti-pollution in river treaties, some of which even date 
back to the nineteenth century. Furthermore, we can also note the concept of 
the maximum sustainable yield in international fisheries law of the early part 
of the twentieth century.10 Yet the concept of sustainable development was 
really launched through so-called soft law in the period of the United Nations. 
In particular, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration11 and the 1992 Rio Declaration on 
6 Schrijver, The Evolution of Sustainable Development in International Law 2008, 208–219.
7 Paris Agreement.
8 Ibid., art 2, para 1(a).
9 See New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable De-
velopment, princ 7.
10 Cf UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos), arts 61(3) and 119(1).
11 See UN, ‘Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment’, 16 June 
1972, 3–5. For a comprehensive analysis of the debates and the text, see Sohn 1973.
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Environment and Development12 have been instrumental in putting sustaina-
ble development high on the international political agenda. In their track, 
soon new multilateral environmental agreements were concluded. Examples 
of follow ups of the Stockholm Declaration include the Convention on Inter-
national Trade in Endangered Species (cites, 1973),13 the Convention on Wet-
lands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (1974)14 and 
the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (clrtap, 1979).15 
Off-springs of the Rio Declaration include the first Climate Change Conven-
tion (unfcc)16 and the Convention on Biological Diversity (both from 1992),17 
in addition to the earlier adopted Ozone Convention and its Montreal Proto-
col, which have proven to be effective for the protection of the ozone layer.18 
Furthermore, we now see the incorporation of the principle of sustainable de-
velopment also in international economic agreements. The agreement to es-
tablish the World Trade Organization adopted in 1994 serves as an important 
example since it integrates sustainable development as an important objective 
of this new international economic institution.19
In Europe, we can also note that the 2007 Reform Treaty of Lisbon on the 
Functioning of the European Union (EU) includes as many as 27 references to 
the concept of sustainable development.20 Somewhat hesitantly behind are 
human rights treaties as well as international investment agreements, but that 
may be a matter of time.
Apart from consolidating and codifying sustainable development in treaty 
law, soft law is instrumental in further clarifying and progressively develop-
ing the scope and meaning of sustainable development. This brings us to the 
role of the Sustainable Development Goals (sdgs), adopted in 2015.21 Their 
 forerunners are the eight Millennium Development Goals, adopted at the 
12 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio 
Declaration).
13 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(cites).
14 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat 
(Ramsar Convention).
15 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (clrtap).
16 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (unfccc).
17 Convention on Biological Diversity (Biodiversity Convention).
18 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna Convention); Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol).
19 See the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the wto (wto Agreement).
20 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community (Treaty of Lisbon).
21 UN, ‘Sustainable Development Goals’.
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 beginning of this millennium.22 In 2015, they have been succeeded by 17 sdgs 
with as many as 169 targets.23 They are part and parcel of the wider United Na-
tions World Development Agenda 2015 to 2030.24 These sdgs are of course not 
hard law, but they do carry some important normative value. It could well be 
argued that in part they embody ‘programmatory’ law and ‘aspirational’ law, in 
the sense of guidelines for the desirable future development of international 
law in support of sustainable development.25 The sdgs also have concrete tar-
gets and include monitoring, reporting and evaluation procedures. Many gov-
ernments, international organizations, and non-state actors, including busi-
nesses, have subscribed to the sdgs.26 The various elements of the concept of 
sustainable development as discussed above, come clearly to the fore. For ex-
ample, sdg 1 is that of poverty reduction (‘leaving nobody behind’); sdg 3—of 
paramount interest to all of us—relates to good health; sdg 6 on the availabil-
ity and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all; sdg 13 on 
combating climate change and its impacts; sdg 14 on conserving and sustain-
ably using the oceans, seas and marine resources; sdg 15 on the sustainable 
use of terrestrial ecosystems, forests and biological diversity; sdg 16 refers to 
promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, pro-
viding access to justice for all and building effective, accountable and inclusive 
institutions at all levels.27 To achieve this, we need cooperation. This is also 
amply reflected in sdg 17 on global partnership for the achievement of the 
global goals.28
There is also an increasing body of international jurisprudence including 
from the International Court of Justice.29 In the Danube Dam case between 
Slovakia and Hungary for the first time in 1997, in the Pulp Mills case between 
Argentina and Uruguay in 2010 and most recently in the case between Costa 
Rica and Nicaragua regarding certain activities and the construction of a road 
by Nicaragua in the border area, we can note the Court’s recognition of sustain-
able development as a concept in international law.30
22 UN Millennium Declaration. An extensive analysis of the substance and the state of af-
fairs of the Millennium Development Goals is given by undp in Human Development 
Report 2003; and in the annual Millennium Development Goals Reports.
23 For a general overview of the sdg-making process, see Kamau and others 2018.
24 UN, ‘Transforming Our World’, 25 September 2015.
25 For the notion of ‘programmatory’ law, see Dupuy 1977, 245–258.
26 See Weiss and Browne 2014.
27 UN, ‘Sustainable Development Goals’.
28 Ibid.




In sum, we can amply note the rise of sustainable development in interna-
tional law: firstly, in areas of direct environmental relevance, such as rivers, 
seas, oceans, water resources, biological diversity, living and non-living natural 
resources and transboundary resources. In many of these fields, there has been 
intensive treaty-making. But now sustainable development is also on the rise 
in some other areas, such as trade agreements, economic cooperation treaties, 
rights of indigenous peoples, trade and investment and protection of the envi-
ronment during armed conflict.31
What about sustainable development in international investment law? That 
is Section 3 of this lecture.
3 Sustainable Development in International Investment Law
International investment law is the branch of international law that deals with 
the promotion and protection of foreign investment as well as with the regula-
tion of its activities.32 Traditionally, it was focused on how to minimize risks 
and how to maximize benefits for foreign investors as well as for capital im-
porting countries.33 For long, there was hardly a relationship between interna-
tional investment law on the one hand and international environmental law 
and sustainable development on the other.34 Currently, a trend can be noted in 
international investment law to address also the impacts of foreign investment 
that go beyond the economic and financial domain. For in recent decades, the 
impact of investment activities has given rise to significant political, environ-
mental, human rights, sustainable development and other public interest con-
cerns.35 In response, quite some transformation is taking place in modern in-
ternational investment law in this regard. For example, trends can be discerned 
toward recognizing the need for expanding the regulatory space of States for 
public policies and toward subjecting foreign investment increasingly to du-
ties. Examples of these public policy concerns include compliance with labour 
standards, respect for human rights and promotion of sustainable develop-
ment and public health. These public policy concerns are leaving their marks 
on international arbitration, albeit hesitantly.36
31 Dam-de Jong 2015.
32 See Muchlinski and others 2008.
33 Schwarzenberger 1969.
34 See Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1997, ch 4, 120–142.
35 See the analysis by Subedi 2016; Chi 2018.
36 See Beharry and Kuritzky 2015, 383–429; Marley 2014, 1003–1039; Kube and Petersmann 
2016, 65–113.
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International investment law is based on a variety of sources. They include 
international investment agreements (bilateral, regional, multilateral), cus-
tomary international law norms, general principles of law, national investment 
law and soft law norms. In most of these sources, sustainable development, as 
a concern, is a late comer in international investment law.37 Only recently is it 
starting to manifest itself.
As regards existing investment agreements, few of those in force do refer to 
sustainable development and environment. However, this is changing because 
there is a clear trend among the newest treaties to address labour, environmen-
tal and sustainable development concerns.38
For example, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between 
the EU and Canada, commonly known as ceta, contains a separate chapter 
on sustainable development (Chapter 23), next to chapters on labour and the 
environment.39 Similarly, the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (cptpp) contains chapters on labour, the environment 
and development.40 Furthermore, in negotiation instructions, for example for 
the China-EU bilateral investment treaty (bit)—called the Comprehensive 
Agreement on Investment—the parties have made it clear that the bit should 
also build upon the sdgs.41
A similar trend can be noted when examining the most recent bits. Most of 
the newly concluded treaties after 2014 contain clauses related to sustainable 
development. These can be in the form of general references to protection of 
the environment or promoting sustainable development in the preamble or 
more specific substantive provisions in the body of the bits such as, for exam-
ple, by preserving regulatory space for public policies of host States and dis-
couraging parties to relax environmental standards in an effort to attract for-
eign investment. This trend can also be noted in recent Model bits. This 
lecture will use the Netherlands as a point of reference, but could also have 
taken the US Model bit or that of Belgium-Luxembourg as examples.42 On 22 
37 See the analysis by Chi 2018.
38 See Prislan and Zandvliet 2015.
39 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, of the One Part, and 
the European Union and its Member States, of the Other Part (ceta between the EU and 
Canada), especially chs 23 (sustainable development), 24 (labour) and 25 (environment).
40 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (cptpp), 
respectively chs 19 (labour), 20 (environment) and 23 (development).
41 See Bian and Li 2020, 40–53. See also Chi 2018, 167.
42 2012 US Model bit; 2019 Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union Model bit.
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March 2019, the Netherlands published its new model bit.43 The amended text 
serves as a policy response to the changing economic landscape and the rise of 
public values and the increasingly leading role of the EU in the field of foreign 
investment regulation as a result of the Lisbon Reform Treaty on the EU; but 
also to discontent concerning the Dutch liberal coverage of investor and in-
vestment in its bit, enabling many shell companies and sandwich corpora-
tions to benefit from protection under Dutch bits. Furthermore, in the Neth-
erlands and in the EU at large there is a clear tendency in favour of strengthening 
the right of the state to regulate, especially on environment and sustainable 
development issues as well as combating tax avoidance. Among the objec-
tives  of the new Dutch Model bit feature the goals to attract and promote 
“ responsible foreign investment” and “contribute to sustainable economic 
development”.44 The model bit refers at nine places to sustainable develop-
ment and includes an extensive Article 6 entitled ‘Sustainable development’, 
consisting of seven clauses:
Article 6—Sustainable development
1. The Contracting Parties are committed to promote the development 
of international investment in such a way as to contribute to the objec-
tive of sustainable development.
2. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that its investment laws and poli-
cies provide for and encourage high levels of environmental and 
labour protection and shall strive to continue to improve those laws 
and policies and their underlying levels of protection.
3. The Contracting Parties emphasize the important contribution by 
women to economic growth through their participation in economic 
activity, including in international investment. They acknowledge the 
importance of incorporating a gender perspective into the promotion 
of inclusive economic growth. This includes removing barriers to 
women’s participation in the economy and the key role that gender-
responsive policies play in achieving sustainable development. The 
Contracting Parties commit to promote equal opportunities and par-
ticipation for women and men in the economy. Where beneficial, the 
Contracting Parties shall carry out cooperation activities to improve 
43 The full text of the 2019 Netherlands Model Investment Agreement is available at: 
<https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-
files/5832/download> accessed 8 March 2020.
44 2019 Netherlands Model Investment Agreement, preamble, para 1.
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the participation of women in the economy, including in international 
investment.
4. The Contracting Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to lower the 
levels of protection afforded by domestic environmental or labour 
laws in order to encourage investment.
5. A Contracting Party shall not adopt and apply domestic laws contrib-
uting to the objective of sustainable development in a manner that 
would constitute unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restric-
tion on trade.
6. Within the scope and application of this Agreement, the Contracting 
Parties reaffirm their obligations under the multilateral agreements 
in the field of environmental protection, labor standards and the pro-
tection of human rights to which they are party, such as the Paris 
Agreement, the fundamental [International Labour Organization] 
Conventions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Furthermore, each Contracting Party shall continue to make sustained 
efforts towards ratifying the fundamental [International Labour 
Organization] Conventions that it has not yet ratified.
7. The Contracting Parties are committed to cooperate as appropriate on 
investment-related sustainable development matters of mutual inter-
est in multilateral fora.45
This Dutch Model bit reflects the clear trend not to seek the lowering of pro-
tection in domestic environmental law or labour law so as to encourage foreign 
investment and clearly reaffirms state obligations under multilateral treaties, 
such as fundamental International Labour Organization (ilo) conventions 
and the Paris Climate Agreement. In addition, stricter definitions on both ‘in-
vestment’ and ‘investor’ have been included in Article 1 of the Dutch Model 
bit.46 In order to qualify under the terms of the bit a legal person must have 
“substantial business activities” in the territory of the Contracting Party.47 
(This means that the so-called ‘Salini criteria’ are incorporated in the bit.48) 
Furthermore, some new obligations are incumbent upon the Contracting Par-
ty, including: good administrative behaviour; providing access to affective 
mechanisms of dispute resolution; and protecting against business-related 
45 Ibid., art 6.
46 Ibid., art 1(a)-(b).
47 See Ibid., art 1(b)(ii).




 human rights abuses.49 Moreover, it is notable that some new obligations have 
been formulated for investors in the sense that they have to demonstrate cor-
porate social responsibility.50 A last notable feature to mention is the clear 
preference for the establishment of a Multilateral Investment Court rather 
than continuing investor-State dispute settlement through ad hoc or institu-
tionalized international arbitration.51
An important normative role is also played by all kinds of soft law instru-
ments, most notably well-drafted declarations, guidelines and general princi-
ples in the context of international organizations. Early examples include the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines on 
Multinational Enterprises (1976, revised in 2011), the ilo Tripartite Declaration 
on Social Policies and Employment (1977, revised in 2017), the ilo Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998) and the UN Global Com-
pact (2004), initiated by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.52 Closely 
related are the Principles for Responsible Investment (pri), launched in 2006, 
which is an investor initiative in partnership with the UN Environment Pro-
gramme, the Finance Initiative and the UN Global Compact.53
More recent efforts incorporate sustainable development more clearly. Key 
documents in this regard are the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Hu-
man Rights, also known as the Ruggie Principles and endorsed by the Human 
Rights Council in 2011.54 These 31 Guiding Principles come under the three pil-
lars of Protect, Respect and Remedy (prr), which reflect corporate social re-
sponsibility and human rights diligence in a variety of ways.55 They have been 
further elaborated as regards sustainable development in:
− The unctad Comprehensive Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable 
Development;56
− The Sustainability Framework of the International Finance Corporation 
(ifc), member of the World Bank Group;57
49 See 2019 Netherlands Model Investment Agreement, art 5.
50 Ibid., art 7.
51 Ibid., art 15.
52 oecd 2011; ilo, Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises 
and Social Policy; ilo Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its 
Follow-up; UN, ‘The Global Compact Leaders Summit 2004—Final Report’, 24 June 2004.
53 See UN, ‘Principles for Responsible Investment’.
54 See UN, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’, 21 March 2011.
55 See Ruggie 2013.
56 See Chi 2018, 28–30.
57 ifc Sustainability Framework.
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− Numerous self-regulatory codes of conduct of industry and individual 
businesses;58
− A Renewed EU Strategy 2011–14 for Corporate Social Responsibility;59 and
− The aiib Environmental and Social Framework, adopted in 2016.60
Of course, here I should also mention sdg 8 on ‘Decent Work and Economic 
Growth’. Its targets include promoting policies that focus on entrepreneurship, 
creativity and innovation. They may well relate to sustainable development 
and responsible investment since they aim at creating jobs that stimulate eco-
nomic growth without harming the environment.61
3.1 Key Decisions of International Courts and Tribunals
Also mentioned under this sub-section is the integration of sustainable devel-
opment in the decisions of international courts and tribunals. Section 2, above, 
already referred to some cases before the International Court of Justice in 
which sustainable development was recognized as a relevant legal concept, 
including the Danube Dam case, the Pulp Mills case and the Certain Activities 
Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) case. We 
can also identify an increasing number of environment-related, sometimes 
sustainable development-related cases in Investor-State Disputes. Categories 
of such cases include the following sectors of economic activity:62
− Access to water cases involving water supply as a public service and sewage 
services, especially in Latin America—Aguas del Tunari v Bolivia or Urbaser 
v Argentina, among other cases;63
− Chemicals cases—Methanex v usa;64
− Waste management—Metalclad v Mexico;65
58 See the extensive resource website which also includes codes and statements of individ-
ual companies at <www.business-humanrights.org> accessed 20 March 2020. See also 
International Chamber of Commerce (icc), ‘Business Charter for Sustainable Develop-
ment’, September 2015, also available at <https://iccwbo.org/publication/icc-business-
charter-for-sustainable-development-business-contributions-to-the-un-sustainable-de-
velopment-goals> accessed 20 March 2020.
59 EuroCommerce, 7 March 2012.
60 aiib Environmental and Social Framework.
61 See also the work of unido in this field at <www.unido.org>.
62 See the informative reports by International Institute for Sustainable Development 
(iisd), Key Cases from 2000–2010 2011; iisd, Key Cases from the 2010s 2018.
63 iisd, Key Cases from 2000–2010 2011, 95; iisd, Key Cases from the 2010s 2018, 25–30.




− Mining—Gold Reserve v Venezuela or Pac Rim v El Salvador;66
− Oil and gas—Chevron v Ecuador;67
− Tourism—concerning resorts or wildlife sanctuaries in Kenya, Barbados or 
Costa Rica;68
− Energy—Vattenfall v Germany; Eiser v Spain;69
− Good governance—Churchill Mining v Indonesia; Metal Tech v Uzbekistan;70
− Public health—Philip Morris v Uruguay; Philip Morris v Australia.71
In combination, these may suffice to demonstrate that in international invest-
ment law sustainable development is also on the rise, both in standard-setting 
through normative instruments and in arbitral decisions in environment and 
sustainable development-related cases.
4 Conclusion: Shortcomings, Obstacles and Solutions
Sections 1 and 2 of this lecture have amply demonstrated that sustainable de-
velopment has gained currency in international law relatively quickly. A fasci-
nating feature is that sustainable development functions as an integrative con-
cept, having economic, environmental, developmental, social and governance 
dimensions. Sustainable development is by now well anchored in various 
sources of international law, most notably treaty law and in other normative 
instruments, often with a soft law character. In addition, sustainable develop-
ment is also frequently being addressed in the proceedings and the decisions 
of international courts and tribunals. Sustainable development is in the pro-
cess of being integrated in various fields of international law, ranging from in-
ternational environmental law, human rights law (albeit hesitantly) to interna-
tional economic law and international investment law. However, a coherent 
framework to incorporate sustainable development concerns in international 
law is still lacking. Rather, one notes a disordered patchwork of all kinds of 
66 icsid, Gold Reserve Inc. v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 2009; iisd, Key Cases from the 
2010s 2018, 36–41.
67 pca, Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v The Republic of Ecuador 
2009.
68 iisd, Key Cases from 2000–2010 2011, 162–174; pca, Peter A. Allard v The Government of Bar-
bados 2012; icsid, Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena s.a. v The Republic of Costa Rica 
1996.
69 icsid, Vattenfall ab and Others v Federal Republic of Germany 2012; iisd, Key Cases from 
the 2010s 2018, 10–14.
70 iisd, Key Cases from the 2010s 2018, 31–35, 61–66.
71 Ibid., 42–47; pca, Philip Morris Asia Limited v The Commonwealth of Australia 2012.
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 international norms in a wide variety of sources with an unequal status, rang-
ing from treaties through judicial decisions to a host of non-binding normative 
guidelines. Some authors have compared it with an Asian noodle bowl.72
For long, international investment law and sustainable development have 
been at odds with each other. However, that situation has drastically changed 
in the two recent decades. Foreign investment regulation has started to include 
linkages with public interest concerns, such as labour standards, environmen-
tal protection, sustainable development, public health and animal welfare. In-
tegrated standard-setting is still subject to considerable improvement. There is 
a need to reform the international investment agreement system in order to 
address more effectively the sustainable development concerns associated 
with foreign investment activities. Simultaneously, more efforts should be 
made to promote that these foreign investment activities assist in achieving 
sustainable development in a positive way, by introducing environmentally 
friendly technology and by being instrumental in reducing patterns of unsus-
tainable production and consumption, rather than foreign investment imped-
ing the efforts toward achieving sustainable development.
In one way or another, the international community has to arrive at a more 
coherent international investment regime, with not only dispute settlement 
procedures but also with enhanced monitoring, reporting and inspection pro-
cedures for reasons of prevention, transparency and accountability. Some have 
advocated the establishment of a specialized world investment organization.73 
However appealing, this very idea may itself be contradictory to embedding 
sustainable development concerns in a host of different chapters of interna-
tional law, economics and politics. Rather, one should pursue a strongly inte-
grative function of sustainable development as a normative concept.  Obviously, 
this should start with the international investment agreements themselves, 
bilaterally as well as regionally and multilaterally. They serve as the main glob-
al norm supplier of the investment governance system and we are in need of a 
new generation of these treaties. Obviously, the entire specialized system of 
international investment law should be made more compatible with sustain-
able development. However, this will not be sufficient. It is of paramount inter-
est that other regimes such as those in the areas of trade, finance, environment 
and human rights should also be better attuned to sustainable development. 
This also calls for an active role of all major stakeholders in international in-
vestment regulation and an enabling environment conducive toward such a 
role in a balanced and coordinated way. Apart from states, the business 
72 Chaisse and Hamanaka 2014, 12–17.
73 Butler and Subedi 2017, 43–72.
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 community itself, trade unions, civil society organizations and arbitrators 
should be allowed and even be encouraged to perform their respective roles. 
Obviously, this includes development institutions such as the Asian Infrastruc-
ture Investment Bank specialized in sustainable green financing.
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2019 aiib Legal Conference Report
Yongqing Liu and Graciela Base*
1 Introduction and Overview
On 11 and 12 September 2019, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (aiib) 
held its third annual Legal Conference at aiib Headquarters in Beijing, China. 
The Legal Conference was organized by aiib’s Office of the General Counsel 
(ogc) as part of ogc’s legal outreach, which also includes the annual aiib Law 
Lecture.
The Legal Conference brought together over 40 prominent legal practition-
ers and academics to examine the role of the law of employment relations of 
multilateral institutions—known commonly as international administrative 
law. The panelists comprised senior officials and legal advisers from major in-
ternational organizations and international financial institutions including 
the United Nations (UN), the Commonwealth Secretariat, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (nato), the European Patent Office (epo), the Global 
Fund to Fight aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund), the Credit Guar-
antee and Investment Facility (cgif), the World Bank, the International Mon-
etary Fund (imf), the Asian Development Bank (adb), the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (ebrd) and the African Development Bank 
(AfDB). Scholars from the London School of Economics and Political Science, 
Ritsumeikan University and Kyushu University also joined.
Over two days, the panelists, divided into five panels, with each chaired by a 
senior lawyer of aiib’s ogc, addressed the following topics: (i) the extent to 
which international administrative law is inherent to the international legal 
status of multilateral institutions; (ii) the formal dispute resolution role afford-
ed by international administrative tribunals and the part they play in the suc-
cessful mandates of multilateral institutions; (iii) the considerations of em-
ployment-related dispute resolution and international administrative law in 
creating an efficient workplace culture for multilateral institutions; (iv) the 
legal basis and dynamics of international administrative law and (v) the  critical 
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aspects of international administrative law that go to the heart of the efficien-
cy and effectiveness of multilateral institutions, namely integrity and perfor-
mance management. Following the panel discussions, the Legal Conference 
was concluded by a plenary session chaired by aiib’s General Counsel, Gerard 
J. Sanders.
This report is intended to provide a summary (reflecting the Chatham 
House Rule) of some of the key discussions and conclusions of the Legal Con-
ference. It is structured by following the order of the Conference sessions, with 
each session focused on one of the topics outlined above.
2 International Administrative Law and the International Legal 
Status of Multilateral Institutions
The first panel examined the international legal status of multilateral organi-
zations. In particular, it discussed the tension between jurisdictional immunity 
of international organizations and the human rights principle of access to jus-
tice. It also discussed how international organizations address and reconcile 
this tension.
International organizations are established by their member States to pur-
sue collective goals. They are not sovereign states, although some international 
organizations (such as the European Union) may exercise sovereign functions 
bestowed upon them by their member States. On the one hand, jurisdictional 
immunity is granted to international organizations to enable them to effective-
ly, independently and efficiently fulfill their mandates. This immunity derives 
directly from various legal sources, including (i) the constituent instruments of 
international organizations, such as aiib’s Articles of Agreement and the Char-
ter of the United Nations; (ii) multilateral treaties, such as the Convention on 
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (UN General Convention) 
and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agen-
cies; (iii) bilateral treaties between international organizations and their host 
states and (iv) national legislation, such as the US International Organizations 
Immunities Act and the UK International Organisations Act 2005.
The right to access to courts, on the other hand, is established in various hu-
man rights instruments adopted by international or regional communities, 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights 
(echr) and the American Convention on Human Rights. There tends to be an 
inherent tension between the jurisdictional immunity of international organi-
zations and the right of individuals to access to court.
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In respect of the interplay between these conflicting principles, the panel 
noted that various international organizations, whilst afforded immunity from 
national jurisdictions, do provide aggrieved parties with alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms. For instance, the UN General Convention states that 
the UN shall make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) dis-
putes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private law character to 
which the UN is a party and (b) disputes involving any official of the UN who 
by reason of their official position enjoys immunity, if immunity has not been 
waived by the Secretary-General.
Drawing on judgments of various international tribunals and national 
courts, the panel examined the issue of whether the jurisdictional immunity of 
international organizations is conditional on the availability of alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanisms. In particular, the panel explored the issue of 
whether existing internal dispute resolution mechanisms, including the pro-
ceedings of international administrative tribunals, meet the standards of the 
various human rights instruments such as article 6(1) of echr. In its advisory 
opinion, on the Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal, the International Court of Justice (icj) found the Tri-
bunal to be “an independent and truly judicial body pronouncing final judg-
ments without appeal within the limited field of its functions”.
It was noted that the European Court of Human Rights set a useful standard 
for upholding the jurisdictional immunity of international organizations in 
the Waite and Kennedy v Germany (1999) case. It formulated the view that the 
jurisdictional immunity afforded to international organizations served a ‘le-
gitimate objective’, that is, to ensure the proper functioning of such organiza-
tions free from unilateral interference from individual governments. In addi-
tion, the Court ruled that the extent of jurisdictional immunity must be 
proportionate to the objective of enabling international organizations to per-
form their functions efficiently. Over time, this standard has been taken to 
mean that where there is no alternative dispute resolution mechanism within 
an international organization, or the alternative mechanism available is con-
sidered inadequate, such organization’s jurisdictional immunity may not be 
upheld. In a number of cases before national courts, the jurisdictional immu-
nity of international organizations was not confirmed due to the inadequacy 
of their internal dispute resolution mechanisms. Even international adminis-
trative tribunals recognized the significance of providing an alternate dispute 
resolution mechanism to the enjoyment of jurisdictional immunity. The Inter-
national Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal (iloat), whilst dis-
missing a case for being beyond its competence, nevertheless noted that its 
judgment created a legal vacuum and considered it highly desirable for the 
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respondent organization, in this case, the epo, to seek a solution affording the 
complainant access to a court, either by waiving its immunity or by submitting 
the dispute to arbitration.
In other cases, however, the panel noted that although the availability of an 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism is material, its absence or inadequa-
cy does not automatically deprive international organizations of jurisdictional 
immunity. In a case before the Canadian Supreme Court, for instance, it was 
decided that the availability of an internal appeals mechanism was not deter-
minative of whether an international organization will be afforded jurisdic-
tional immunity.
Drawing on the example of the Commonwealth Secretariat Arbitral Tribu-
nal (csat), the panel discussed the role of the csat in upholding the Com-
monwealth Secretariat’s privileges and immunities, and the relationship be-
tween international administrative law and international, human rights and 
domestic laws.
The Commonwealth Secretariat was established by the Commonwealth 
member countries as an international organization to help them achieve de-
velopment, democracy and peace. In fulfillment of its obligations under the 
Agreement Memorandum on the Commonwealth Secretariat, the UK Govern-
ment passed the Commonwealth Secretariat Act in 1966, which gives the Com-
monwealth Secretariat legal personality and accords it certain immunities and 
privileges. In the early years of its operations, however, the Commonwealth 
Secretariat did not have a dispute resolution mechanism. Disputes were re-
solved informally. The csat was established in 1995 to meet the requirements 
of the Agreement Memorandum in connection with the institutional immuni-
ties and privileges conferred on the Commonwealth Secretariat.
The panel referred to the csat’s judgment in the Faruqi case (csat/5(No. 1)) 
in which the csat considered the immunity it enjoys and its relationship with 
international, human rights and domestic laws. Relying on the reasoning in the 
Waite and Kennedy case and a previous case, the csat concluded that, as an 
international body, it is not subject to those laws, and nor are its decisions sub-
ject to appeal to national courts. This notwithstanding, a number of challenges 
had been made in the UK High Court, attempting to subject csat’s judgments 
to judicial review. These challenges led to the revision of the Commonwealth 
Secretariat Act 1966 by the International Organizations Act 2005, which re-
peals the section of the Commonwealth Secretariat Act under which the judg-
ments in question were challenged.
The panel then examined the international legal status of the Global Fund, 
especially through the prisms of the privileges and immunities of the organiza-
tion and the mechanisms for the resolution of employment-related disputes. 
A public-private partnership, the Global Fund was originally established in 
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2002 as a nonprofit foundation under Swiss law, but gradually evolved into an 
international organization. It entered into a headquarters agreement with the 
Swiss Government in 2004 to ensure that privileges and immunities are afford-
ed to it as to other international organizations in Switzerland. In 2006, the 
Global Fund was recognized by the US as an international organization under 
the US International Organizations Immunities Act. In 2009, the Global Fund 
Board approved the Global Fund Agreement on Privileges and Immunities 
(Agreement) and recommended states to consider granting privileges and im-
munities to the Global Fund. The Agreement entered into force on 17 April 2019 
after 10 countries ratified it.
Despite its unique business model and governance feature as a public- 
private partnership, international administrative law plays a significant role in 
the evolution and administration of the Global Fund. Like many other interna-
tional organizations with jurisdictional immunity, the Global Fund has estab-
lished alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including by subjecting it-
self to the jurisdiction of the iloat for staff grievances. In addition, it has 
established a staff association and created an ombudsman to resolve employ-
ment-related disputes.
In the ensuing discussion, the panel shared their views on the adequacy of 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms available to international civil serv-
ants in the context of considering the jurisdictional immunities enjoyed by 
international organizations. One participant enquired into the adequacy of 
remedies available to complainants, including their reinstatement, in cases 
where they were unlawfully dismissed. One of the panelists remarked that the 
statutes of some international administrative tribunals give them the authori-
ty to order reinstatement or grant the employing organizations the option to 
pay damages as an alternative. In this regard, one participant concurred that 
although the UN Dispute Tribunal (undt) and Appeals Tribunal (unat) have 
the power to order reinstatement, they are also mandated to order financial 
compensation as a remedy. The tribunals would take account of the practical 
realities in relation to reinstatement, including the amount of time for a case 
to be concluded. For instance, reinstatement becomes practically impossible 
where the peace keeping mission in which the successful complainant served 
has been closed. With regard to the status of the Global Fund, another partici-
pant asked whether the Global Fund would resort to the fact that it has ac-
cepted iloat’s jurisdiction as evidence of its status as an international organi-
zation. In response, one of the panelists remarked that the Global Fund’s status 
as an international organization derives from the Agreement and domestic 
laws which afford it the privileges and immunities required for its operations. 
The fact that the iloat has accepted the Global Fund’s application and recog-
nition of its jurisdiction, which requires that the admitted organizations enjoy 
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jurisdictional immunity from domestic courts, supports the Global Fund’s 
 status as an international organization. In addition to sharing their experience 
on the review mechanism of decisions rendered by csat, the panel also ex-
changed their views with the participants on the substantive laws that local 
courts would apply in cases in which they are unsatisfied with the adequacy of 
the alternative mechanisms provided by international organizations and de-
cided to intervene.
3 International Administrative Law and the Formal Resolution of 
Employment-Related Disputes of Multilateral Institutions
The second session focused on the establishment, evolution and development 
of formal dispute resolution mechanisms of various international organiza-
tions. Panelists from the UN, ebrd and nato, among others, shared their 
views on the predominant features of their respective internal justice systems. 
They also discussed some potential reforms to such systems, incorporating the 
lessons learned from their application. Finally, they reflected on the contribu-
tions of an internal justice system to the efficiency and accountability of inter-
national organizations.
The panelists introduced their employing organizations, including their his-
tories, mandates and governance structures. They also discussed the contexts 
in which the internal justice systems in these organizations were established 
and reformed. It was commonly recognized that an effective formal dispute 
resolution mechanism plays a central role in the resolution of staff disputes 
and the promotion of functional efficiency of international organizations. 
A panelist reported that the nato Administrative Tribunal encourages and 
promotes changes to the rules and policy of the organization. This tribunal’s 
jurisprudence provides guidance to both managers and staff in their decision-
making. Counsel could also rely on the tribunal’s jurisprudence when provid-
ing legal advice. In the case of the UN, the role of its internal justice system is 
to make the organization more accountable, supporting multicultural staff 
members and allowing them to effectively discharge their duties. Efficient res-
olution of staff grievances affects not only the staff members; it also impacts 
the efficient functioning of the entire organization. Indeed, the jurisprudence 
of administrative tribunals tends to enhance the predictability and certainty 
of the legal relations between the organization and their staff, thus encourag-
ing the parties to pursue an informal, amicable resolution of their disputes.
It was further noted that while each organization has the discretion to es-
tablish its own internal justice system, all systems have, since their inception, 
gradually evolved over time to adapt to the changing circumstances and to 
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 improve the efficiency, transparency and fairness of the processes. ebrd, for 
instance, has gradually reformed its internal dispute resolution mechanism by 
broadening its scope and enhancing the due process protections afforded to 
staff. It has maintained a two-tier system for the review and adjudication of 
staff grievances since 2006. In early 2018, ebrd introduced changes to the first 
tier of the process to enhance its efficiency without compromising the legiti-
mate interests of both the organization and staff. Similarly, nato carried out a 
reform of its internal justice system in 2013, resulting in the creation of its Ad-
ministrative Tribunal. The reform took account of the interests of various in-
ternal stakeholders and the recent external legal developments. In the case of 
the UN, following extensive consultations and review by a special panel, the 
UN implemented a new internal system for the administration of justice for its 
staff in 2009.
Some common features were considered in the reformed internal justice 
systems in the different international organizations, including, notably, en-
hanced professionalism, transparency, independence and accountability. In 
terms of professionalism of the systems, for instance, a minimum amount of 
national judicial experience is required of judges for the undt (10 years) 
and the unat (15 years). The judges’ qualifications must also be verified by 
the newly established Internal Justice Council to ensure the professionalism 
of the new system. At ebrd, the Administrative Review Committee com-
prises an independent legal professional as chair and one member elected 
by staff and one appointed by ebrd’s President. The increased professional-
ism in the nato internal justice system is manifested in the conversion of 
the internal Appeals Board to an administrative tribunal with a judicial 
character.
Increased transparency is another notable feature of the new systems. 
A panelist pointed out that the selection process of the judges of undt and 
unat is transparent. In addition, undt has courtrooms in New York, Geneva 
and Nairobi and may hold public hearings therein, to which all would be al-
lowed access. Furthermore, all resultant judgments are published on the offi-
cial websites of the tribunals. Similarly, both nato and ebrd publish judg-
ments of their respective administrative tribunals to promote transparency. 
Independence was also highlighted by the panel. In the UN, the Office of Ad-
ministration of Justice (oaj) was established to safeguard the independence of 
the entire system. Both undt and unat, whilst supported by the oaj, are in-
dependent from the UN’s Secretariat. The Internal Justice Council was also 
created to ensure the independence, impartiality and accountability of the 
new system.
The panel also discussed the role of lawyers in the functioning of the inter-
nal justice systems. ebrd proceedings are conducted in an inquisitorial 
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 manner and staff are not allowed representation by external counsel in the 
administrative proceedings (though they are free to seek legal advice). Like-
wise, the legal counsel of ebrd does not appear in these proceedings on behalf 
of ebrd. nato, on the other hand, does not prohibit or restrict participation 
by external counsel in the proceedings. In the case of UN, the Office of Staff 
Legal Assistance was established in 2009 to provide legal advice and represen-
tation to staff in relation to the organization’s formal internal justice system. 
Legal advisers of the Secretariat also play an active role in the process, includ-
ing by advising, negotiating and litigating on behalf of the employing organiza-
tion. In addition, other stakeholders, such as the Human Resources Depart-
ment, Ethics Office and Staff Union, contribute to the efficient functioning of 
the system.
It was emphasized that the internal justice system must resolve staff griev-
ances not only effectively, but also in a timely and efficient way, since justice 
delayed is justice denied. In this regard, a panelist noted that ebrd has consid-
erably shortened the process of the Administrative Review Committee from 
one and a half year to 90 working days, whilst also simplifying the process for 
claims that are manifestly inadmissible or unrelated to an administrative 
decision.
While the formal means of redress ensures that effective and efficient rem-
edies are provided in case of disputes, it was noted that the use of informal 
dispute resolution mechanisms, including mediation and ombudsman servic-
es, are constantly encouraged. ebrd has lifted the restrictions on the use of 
mediation, previously limited to pre-administrative review and now available 
at any time. nato has also been trying to make greater use of mediation in 
resolving staff disputes. Likewise, the UN places great emphasis on the infor-
mal resolution mechanism, including by establishing the Office of the UN Om-
budsman and Mediation Services, to assist staff to resolve their disputes 
through informal means.
In the resultant discussion, the panel exchanged their views and experience 
with the participants on multiple issues associated with the reformed admin-
istration of justice systems. One participant asked the panel whether their re-
spective tribunals have established a code of conduct for their judges, includ-
ing standards for the disqualification and recusal of judges from a particular 
case. It was remarked that the UN General Assembly has adopted an extensive 
Code of Conduct for the Judges of the undt and the unat to preserve the in-
dependence, impartiality, integrity and propriety of the judges’ conduct. In ad-
dition, the UN General Assembly has also adopted a Mechanism for Address-
ing Complaints Regarding Alleged Misconduct or Incapacity of the Judges of 
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the undt and the unat. In respect of the administrative tribunals of nato 
and ebrd, it was noted that while a code of conduct has yet to be established 
for judges, the code of conduct for staff members of the organizations is equal-
ly applicable to them. Another participant asked the panel whether there had 
been any concerns that the revised internal justice systems, which seem to be 
‘very staff-friendly’, could lead to an increase of unfounded claims by staff or a 
chilling effect on managers. It was remarked that the UN has yet to measure, 
but is conscious of, the chilling effects of the revised system on managers’ ac-
tions and decisions. As regards envisaged frivolous claims, it was noted that 
staff members have full access to the internal justice system and that there is 
no limit on the number of cases a complainant may file. However, each case 
will turn on its merit, and matters that have already been adjudicated will be 
considered inadmissible. In addition, the conference extensively discussed the 
settlement culture within their organizations, the breakthrough in the UN 
case law attributed to the reformed administration of justice system, the varia-
tion in the costs awarded by different tribunals and their relations with the 
equality of arms, as well as the percentage of cases ruled by international ad-
ministrative tribunals in favor of their organization, among others.
4 International Administrative Law and the Creation of Efficient 
Workplace Cultures of Multilateral Institutions
The third session related to other means—alternative to international admin-
istrative tribunals—of resolving employment-related disputes within interna-
tional organizations, including resorting to arbitration, as well as informal pro-
cedures to supplement formal dispute resolution mechanisms. In terms of 
arbitration, a panelist elaborated on such questions as why there is a need to 
arbitrate, what disputes to arbitrate and how to arbitrate such disputes within 
multilateral institutions. It was noted that arbitration provides the parties with 
a flexible, neutral and independent avenue for the resolution of their disputes, 
and that arbitration has increasingly assumed a judicial character, with the re-
sultant arbitral decisions being final and binding on the parties. In terms of 
enforceability, arbitration awards are enforceable in the state parties to the UN 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(the ‘New York Arbitration Convention’). In light of these advantages, and in 
order to stay out of the jurisdiction of national courts, international organiza-
tions with functional immunity are motivated to choose arbitration as an alter-
nate dispute resolution mechanism. The question remains, however, whether 
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arbitration constitutes a reasonable, impartial, alternative means of  resolution, 
as prescribed in the Waite and Kennedy case, for jurisdictional immunity af-
forded to international organizations to be upheld.
In terms of how to arbitrate disputes, the panel highlighted the importance 
of ensuring the independence and impartiality, and thereby fairness, of the 
arbitration process. Independence entails that, structurally, there exists a ‘sep-
aration of powers’ between an arbitral tribunal and the employing organiza-
tion, whereas impartiality, albeit related, requires individual arbitrators to be 
neutral vis-à-vis the parties in dispute. Related to these is the selection and 
appointment of arbitrators, and the allocation of associated costs. Arbitration 
of employment-related disputes of international organizations could be costly, 
given the limited availability of the right expertise required of arbitrators in 
the field of international administrative law. The challenge of ensuring equal-
ity of recourse to courts, including determining who should be granted access 
to arbitration, was also discussed. It was commonly recognized that consult-
ants and contractors of international organizations are granted such access by 
the arbitration clauses in their contracts. Where arbitration clauses are availa-
ble, arbitration should be conducted by an international organization in good 
faith to avoid putting the jurisdictional immunity afforded to them at risk.
The question of what disputes to arbitrate pertains to the arbitrability of the 
subject matter in dispute. It was considered that nothing prevents arbitral tri-
bunals from arbitrating international administrative law disputes, except for 
the costs that the arbitration may entail relative to the monetary value of the 
matters in dispute. A panelist related the experience of an international or-
ganization in the arbitration of employment-related disputes with the assis-
tance of the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre. To create a workable 
arbitration regime, it was further suggested that consideration be given to the 
establishment of an appeal mechanism for arbitral awards on limited grounds.
In addition to arbitration as an alternate mechanism of dispute resolution, 
informal means of redress, including ombudsman and mediation services, 
were also considered as an important way of addressing employment-related 
grievances within international organizations. As an example, the Office of the 
United Nations Ombudsman and Mediation Services (Ombudsman Office) 
was established in 2002 to assist in the informal resolution of employment-re-
lated concerns and conflicts within the UN. Guided by the key principles of 
evenhandedness, neutrality, confidentiality and informality, the Ombudsman 
Office is unique in adopting an informal and collaborative approach to resolv-
ing workplace disputes. In addition to assisting in resolving workplace con-
flicts, the Ombudsman Office identifies and addresses systemic issues, thus 
improving the management of the organization. Since its establishment, the 
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Ombudsman Office has addressed approximately 20,000 cases, ranging from 
non-extension of employment to performance management. It was recog-
nized that informal dispute resolution is complementary to the formal mecha-
nism, since not all cases are suitable or admissible to the UN’s administrative 
tribunals, the undt and unat. By resolving disputes informally, the Ombuds-
man Office reduces the number of cases that are brought before the adminis-
trative tribunals. The tribunals’ judgments, on the other hand, provide the Om-
budsman Office with guidance in addressing workplace disputes informally, 
including through mediation. The panel concluded that, given the diversity of 
backgrounds of the UN staff, potential conflicts may inevitably arise and the 
value of the Ombudsman Office in properly managing them cannot be 
overemphasized.
In the ensuing discussion, the conference exchanged views on the informal 
and alternative means of redress available to international civil servants. For 
instance, one participant expressed concerns with the transparency and fair-
ness of arbitration processes (vis-à-vis international administrative tribunals) 
and the role of arbitration in filling jurisdictional gap. One of the panelists re-
marked that none of the systems is perfect. While they advocated an enhanced 
degree of transparency in arbitration and the publication of arbitral awards, 
this must be subject to the agreement of both parties involved. Another par-
ticipant enquired which organizations, in addition to the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (pca), have opted for arbitration (to the exclusion of administra-
tive tribunals) in resolving employment disputes. While the number of inter-
national organizations (in addition to pca) opting for arbitration was un-
known to the panel, it was proposed that international organizations with a 
geographic or thematic commonality may consider working together to estab-
lish a joint entity, with personnel of different backgrounds, to adjudicate on 
their employment disputes. In addition, drawing on their experiences, the con-
ference also shared views on the selection and appointment of arbitrators and 
how to entice people to choose arbitration to resolve staff disputes. Lastly, the 
panel also shared their experience in the use of mediation to settle personnel 
conflicts, including through developing a code of conduct for mediators and 
establishing standard operating procedures and other guidance.
5 International Administrative Law and the Internal Legal 
Framework of Multilateral Institutions
At the fourth session, the panel discussed the international legal framework of 
multilateral institutions, including the concepts and origins of international 
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administrative law, as well as the terms and conditions of employment of staff 
of international organizations. The panel also analyzed the role of the jurisdic-
tional immunity of international institutions in shaping the development of 
international administrative law by, for instance, bridging the gaps between 
national and international norms governing employment matters.
Drawing on their experience as a judge of an international administrative 
tribunal, one panelist discussed their understanding of the concepts and ori-
gins of international administrative law. In the panelist’s view, international 
administrative law is a body of law applied by international administrative tri-
bunals in adjudicating the cases before them. However, it remains to be an-
swered what constitutes this specific body of law. While the notion of interna-
tional administrative law was referenced by many on multiple occasions, 
international administrative tribunals have been silent on this concept and its 
origins in their constituent statutes. Consideration was given to whether pub-
lic international law should be the source of international administrative law, 
but it does not seem to be the case. Scholarly studies undertaken by some ex-
perts (including C.F. Amerasinghe) seem to suggest that international admin-
istrative law is a body of law comprising the internal rules (such as staff regula-
tions and rules) of international organizations, the general principles of law 
(such as non-discrimination), equity and judicial precedent. However, the 
panelist noted that, distinct from what is commonly understood, their under-
standing of international administrative law is closer to the concept of Global 
Administrative Law adopted by some scholars in New York University, which 
comprises a whole system of administrative procedure to regulate the activi-
ties of international organizations, rather than substantive law. Referring to 
the rules by the World Trade Organization on international trade disputes and 
the labor standards established by the International Labour Organization, the 
panelist considered that, like international economic law or international la-
bor law, international administrative law is a sui generis, ‘self-contained’ sys-
tem of law. This system of law, as applied by international administrative tribu-
nals, includes terms of contract of employment, general principles of law and 
case law developed by each administrative tribunal.
Related to the concept and origins of international administrative law, an-
other panelist focused their discussion more specifically on the terms and 
conditions of appointment that define the employment relationship between 
staff of an international organization and the employing international organi-
zation. The basic question is what constitutes the terms and conditions of em-
ployment, beyond those expressly provided in the staff ’s contract of employ-
ment. The panelist analyzed the jurisdiction of the Asian Development Bank 
Administrative Tribunal (adbat), as provided in its Statute, to hear claims of 
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 “nonobservance of the contract of employment or terms of appointment” of 
a staff member. The Statute then defines the expressions “contract of employ-
ment” and “terms of appointment” to include all pertinent regulations and rules 
in force at the time of alleged nonobservance, including the provisions of the 
Staff Retirement Plan and the benefit plans provided by the Bank to the staff. 
This statutory jurisdiction is mostly identical to that of the World Bank Admin-
istrative Tribunal (wbat), whereas the imf Administrative Tribunal possesses 
a slightly different and more expansive jurisdiction over staff grievances.
The adbat’s jurisdiction is limited to contractual relations between adb 
and its staff. In order to sustain a claim before the adbat, therefore, a claim-
ant’s application must relate to the non-observance of their contract of em-
ployment and terms of appointment, otherwise such application will be dis-
missed as inadmissible. The panelist referred to three cases before the adbat 
to elaborate on the latter’s approach in interpreting the terms and conditions 
of a staff member’s employment. The first case arose from the homicide of a 
staff member, committed on the Bank’s premises by a security guard employed 
by a contractor to the Bank. Following the death of the staff member, their 
spouse filed legal proceedings against adb, claiming damages in respect of 
adb’s alleged liability for the tort committed against the staff member, as well 
as other damages and costs. The adbat held that it may deal only with an ap-
plication which “alleges non-observance of the contract of employment or 
terms of appointment” of a staff member and its proceedings “are limited to 
claims in contract”. The adbat then turned to the issue of whether adb had 
failed to fulfill an obligation expressly or impliedly laid down in the contract of 
employment. While adbat considered that as a matter of the general princi-
ples of the law of employment, adb owes to its staff a contractual duty to exer-
cise reasonable care to ensure their safety whilst on adb’s premises, it found 
no evidence to establish that the staff member’s death was caused by any fail-
ure on the part of adb to exercise reasonable care. adbat thus dismissed the 
application.
The second case arose from the failure by an external medical service pro-
vider contracted by adb to diagnose lung cancer of a staff member, who died 
afterwards. The staff member and, following their death, their family, filed le-
gal proceedings against adb, claiming that adb breached its duty of care in the 
selection and supervision of the service provider. The adbat considered that 
adb had a duty to exercise reasonable care in selecting the service provider 
and supervising its operation. However, it was not persuaded that there had 
been a breach of such duty by adb and thus dismissed the case accordingly.
The third case was filed by an applicant against the restrictions imposed by 
adb on their eligibility to be engaged as an adb consultant or staff subsequent 
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to the non-confirmation of her appointment as a staff member due to perfor-
mance issues. adb contended that the applicant had no standing before 
adbat since their claim did not relate to non-observance of their “contract of 
employment or terms of appointment” as a former staff member and, in any 
event, that the internal policy whereby the restrictions were imposed did not 
form part of the applicant’s terms of employment or appointment. The adbat 
found that the contract of employment or terms of appointment under its 
Statute include “pertinent regulations and rules in force at the time of the al-
leged nonobservance”. Cross-referring to the wbat’s decision in the de Merode 
et al. v International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1981) case, 
adbat concluded that it had jurisdiction over the applicant since the contest-
ed policy formed part of the ‘ensemble of conditions’ that comprise the rela-
tionship between adb and the applicant.
The panelist discerned from these three cases an expansive approach by 
adbat in considering the terms of appointment of a staff member. They con-
sidered that this expansive approach, including the implied contractual duty 
of care identified by adbat, would expose the institution to potential legal 
action by third parties. This approach also raises a question regarding the 
scope of the institution’s financial liability in case of a breach of its contractual 
duties. This issue has yet to be clearly addressed by adbat.
Another area of discussion focused on the role of international organiza-
tions’ jurisdictional immunities in shaping the development of international 
administrative law. It was noted that jurisdictional immunities play a dual role 
in this regard: not only do they serve as boundaries within which a separate 
body of law has flourished, they also provide bridges between national and 
international norms.
The panelist first discussed how jurisdictional immunities, as a boundary, 
contribute to the development of international administrative law. As elabo-
rated by other panelists, jurisdictional immunities do not simply create a juris-
dictional void. International organizations and member states have estab-
lished internal accountability mechanisms. The most highly developed of 
these accountability mechanisms are international administrative tribunals. 
These tribunals, as judicial bodies, provide a forum for the application and de-
velopment of a unique international legal system governing the employment 
relationship between international organizations and their staff. Resorting to 
this mechanism is not only about a choice of forum, but a choice of law. As an 
example, the csat Statute provides that the tribunal shall be bound by the 
principles of international administrative law which shall apply to the exclu-
sion of the national laws of individual member countries. Similarly, under the 
iloat Statute, an international organization which accepts iloat’s  jurisdiction 
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shall not be required to apply any national law in its relations with its officials. 
The boundary created by jurisdictional immunities of international organiza-
tion thereby nurtures the growth of international administrative law.
The panelist then examined how jurisdictional immunities create bridges 
between international and national norms. Because international organiza-
tions’ immunities exist by the consent of States, and are accordingly vulnera-
ble to withdrawal, the dialogue across the boundary of immunities also shapes 
the content of international organizations’ internal law. For instance, interna-
tional organizations often incorporate into their standards of staff conduct 
that noncompliance with local laws may result in disciplinary action. While 
this does not mean that local laws shall apply to the employment relations of 
international organizations, there are instances where public policies of the 
host state were transformed into the internal policies of an international or-
ganization. In this way, the host state communicates powerfully the norms of 
its own community across the boundary of immunities.
Subsequently, the conference discussed the case law and jurisdiction of 
various international administrative tribunals. One participant asked whether 
adbat or imfat, like iloat, accept the recognition by other international or-
ganizations of their jurisdiction and which organizations have done that. The 
panel responded that the current statute of adbat does not contain a provi-
sion that enables other international organizations to accept their jurisdiction. 
It was enquired whether the implied contractual duty of care under adbat’s 
jurisdiction would encompass all potential tortious claims by adb staff mem-
bers and, if not, what other remedies they may have in respect of those tortious 
claims. It was noted that adb’s contractual duty of care towards its staff only 
covers a limited aspect of tort law and, since the organization does not have 
jurisdiction to examine tortious claims, there is indeed a jurisdictional gap. In 
those cases, the organization may need to provide the complainants with alter-
native, external means of redress. In addition, the conference exchanged views 
on the relevance of third party’s liability towards claimants to that of the em-
ploying organization under its contractual duty of care, and the tendency of 
judges of an international administrative tribunal to cite the jurisprudence of 
other tribunals, among others.
6 International Administrative Law and the Integrity and 
Performance Management of Multilateral Institutions
The fifth session related to essential characteristics of the international civil 
service, governed by international administrative law, namely the integrity and 
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performance management of international organizations. Ensuring high 
standards of integrity of international civil servants is important to the effi-
cient and effective functioning of international organizations. A panelist intro-
duced the most recent revision of the imf’s code of staff conduct and whistle-
blower protection policy. While it is commonly required by all international 
organizations that their staff have a duty to report suspected misconduct, the 
question remains what standards of evidence may trigger this duty. For in-
stance, would hearsay information or subjective suspicions suffice? The stand-
ards adopted by international organizations vary from one to another. imf 
adopts a relatively low standard, as staff are required to report any ethical con-
cerns that came to their attention. The International Telecommunication Un-
ion, in contrast, adopts a relatively high standard, as it requires that the staff 
member reporting misconduct should have information or evidence to sup-
port a reasonable belief. The panelist also discussed the consequences of fail-
ure to report misconduct; it may not only be considered as a performance is-
sue, but as a violation of the code of conduct for which the staff may be subject 
to disciplinary procedures.
Associated with the staff ’s duty to report suspected misconduct is the or-
ganization’s obligation to protect them from retaliation. Retaliation against 
staff for having reported suspected misconduct is commonly prohibited in all 
organizations, as it amounts to misconduct for which disciplinary sanctions 
may be imposed. The panel also discussed the burden and standard of proof of 
retaliation. At the imf, when a staff member reports retaliation, it is for the 
organization to prove, on clear and convincing evidence, that retaliation has 
been committed. Given the significance of integrity, the panelist highlighted 
that the organization shall establish clear and enforceable rules to foster a cul-
ture of accountability.
The panel turned to the discussion of procedural requirements in staff mis-
conduct cases. Drawing on the case law of the African Development Bank Ad-
ministrative Tribunal (AfDBAT), a panelist discussed how allegations of pro-
cedural irregularities and violation of due process in disciplinary cases are 
addressed under international administrative law. In a disciplinary case result-
ing in the summary dismissal of a staff member, AfDBAT held that the staff 
member must be notified unequivocally of the charges against them and be 
provided with an opportunity to respond to those charges. In a similar case, 
AfDBAT emphasized that the right to due process is essential to the staff mem-
ber’s right of defense and that it must be respected. On the extent to which a 
procedural irregularity, if proven, may vitiate the resultant disciplinary deci-
sion and lead to the award of damages, AfDBAT takes into account such 
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 elements as the prejudice sustained by an applicant, the fairness of the process 
and the gravity of the misconduct. In a case where a shorter notice was given 
than prescribed, AfDBAT was not convinced that this compromised the fair-
ness of the procedure, since the applicant did not request additional time and, 
in any event, responded to the allegations against them prior to the expiration 
of the given time. In another case where an applicant contested the non- 
confirmation of their appointment, AfDBAT found that due process was vio-
lated. However, in light of the gravity of the misconduct by the applicant, 
 AfDBAT limited the award to moral damages, without an order of reinstate-
ment. It was noted that, in this way, AfDBAT takes a flexible approach in ad-
dressing due process violations.
The panel’s discussion subsequently moved to the examination of the 
prominent performance trends within international organizations and the 
evaluation of their legal implications. A panelist noted that the new macro-
trends increasingly focused on promoting meritocracy (the ‘what’), continu-
ous feedback (the ‘how’) and people manager (the ‘who’) of the performance 
of a staff member.
On the ‘what’, it was highlighted that there has been a shift from seniority-
based progression to merit-based performance management and, as a conse-
quence, the advancement of a staff member’s career is now based more on the 
merit of their performance than on their time spent serving the organization. 
This shift raises the question whether privileging merit over seniority conflicts 
with the generally recognized principles of international administrative law, 
including the notion of ‘acquired rights’—in other words, a right that staff may 
legitimately expect to survive all amendment to the international legal frame-
work of the employing international organization. In this regard, the iloat 
considers the nature, the reasons and the consequences of shifting to meritoc-
racy as basis of performance assessment to determine whether there was a 
breach of acquired rights. wbat takes a similar approach. unat, however, 
takes a different approach, assessing whether the new merit-based policy is 
applied retroactively.
On the ‘how’, international organizations have changed the way in which 
they manage their staff ’s performance. A year-end evaluation has been re-
placed or supplemented by continuous feedback. It was noted that continuous 
feedback provides better data for informed personnel decisions, encourages 
conversation and allows for a focus on the content rather than the outcome of 
performance. A panelist opined that, from a legal perspective, continuous 
feedback does not qualify as an administrative decision that can be appealed, 
otherwise the organization may face endless litigation. However, in some 
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 cases, the final evaluation outcomes (such as formal findings of unsatisfactory 
performance in UN) may be open to challenge. In those cases, it has been 
widely accepted by international administrative tribunals that performance 
evaluation is a value judgment and thus is subject to only limited review.
On the ‘who’, the trend of performance management is to involve more 
stakeholders in the process. Feedback from peers, supervisors and colleagues 
in client departments, for instance, are taken into consideration in the assess-
ment of the merits of a staff member’s performance. This would also put a 
checks and balances mechanism in place and provide safeguards against po-
tential flaws in the evaluation process.
The panel noted a conflict between the organizations’ need to adapt to the 
changing circumstances in pursuit of operational efficiency and the staff ’s le-
gitimate rights and interests in the stability of employment relations. It was 
concluded that a balance needs to be struck between the legal features specific 
to managing the performance of employees of international organizations on 
the one hand, and the demands for accountability and sustainability in the 
delivery of their public service mission, on the other.
In the ensuing discussion, the conference shared views and analysis on 
the management of staff relations and due process in disciplinary cases. One 
participant asked whether and how the jurisdictional immunities enjoyed 
by international organizations may affect their employment relations with 
their staff. One panelist remarked that jurisdictional immunities only set 
boundaries between international organizations and their member states 
and do not define the employment relations with their staff. Another pan-
elist added that the immunity enjoyed by their organization does not create 
an antagonistic relationship with their staff and that, in their practice, they 
have always consulted with the staff union before taking a systemic decision 
that affects the staff as a whole. In relation to whistle-blower protection, one 
participant asked whether such policy extends to witnesses who are obliged 
to cooperate with disciplinary investigations. One panelist noted that while 
witnesses are not whistle-blowers who proactively report misconduct, they 
are equally protected under the whistle-blower protection regime. In addi-
tion, the conference exchanged views on such issues as whether and how the 
grievance systems contribute to international organizations as attractive em-
ployers in both recruiting new staff and retaining existing staff, the burden 
and standard of proof of due process violations allegedly committed by em-
ploying organizations in disciplinary cases, and whether different standards 
of proof adopted by various tribunals would lead to a forum-shopping by the 
organizations.
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7 Conclusion
The third annual aiib Legal Conference covered important aspects of the law 
of employment relations of multilateral institutions—international adminis-
trative law. Firstly, international organizations are established by their mem-
ber States to achieve common objectives. Vested with international legal per-
sonality, they function on the international plane independently from their 
member States and are usually afforded jurisdictional immunities. The tension 
between the jurisdictional immunities afforded to international organizations 
and individuals’ fundamental rights of access to court was a central issue for 
discussion and deliberation.
Second, in the light of the jurisdictional immunities afforded to internation-
al organizations, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, whether formal 
or informal, have been widely established by international organizations. As 
part of the formal mechanisms, most international organizations have either 
established their own international administrative tribunal or accepted the ju-
risdiction of a tribunal already established by their peer institutions (such as 
the iloat and unat). The feasibility of recourse to arbitration as an alterna-
tive to the use of an international administrative tribunal warrants  examination. 
In addition to formal dispute settlement mechanisms, international organiza-
tions also encourage and establish informal dispute resolution procedures to 
facilitate amicable settlement of staff disputes. Both formal and informal dis-
pute resolution mechanisms play a vital role in resolving the conflicts and 
grievances arising in the workplace of international organizations, ensuring 
the fair treatment of staff and improving the accountability, efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of the organizations.
Third, international administrative law is considered as a sui generis legal 
system beyond the realm of national jurisdiction. While it is generally recog-
nized as the law of employment relations of international organizations, the 
concept, content and origins of international administrative law remain in-
choate. In practical terms, international administrative law is derived from and 
comprises the internal law of international organizations, general principles of 
law, equity and the case law of international administrative tribunals. It is not 
a static system but evolves as any of its components change over time. The 
development of international administrative law is inevitably shaped by the 
jurisdictional immunities of international organizations.
Finally, the rule of law plays an integral role in the effective, transparent and 
efficient management of international organizations. To ensure that high 
 ethical standards of conduct are respected, international organizations have 
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 codified the duties of their staff members to report suspected misconduct on 
the one hand, and the obligation of organizations to protect staff against retali-
ation, on the other. Effective investigative and disciplinary procedures are also 
essential to safeguard the integrity of the organization, whilst safeguarding the 
due process rights of staff. In addition to protecting the integrity of interna-
tional organizations, an effective performance management system is impera-
tive to the efficient operations of international organizations. Performance 
management systems must ensure a balance between the respect for the rights 
of staff in accordance with established rules and the need of international or-
ganizations for accountability and sustainability in the delivery of their vital 
mandates.
